Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The Court has before it defendants’ preliminary objections to plaintiff’s complaint seeking declaratory judgment.
In order to obtain a property interest in employment protected by the Constitution one must have a
Plaintiff bases his claimed property interest on directives issued by the Governor or his Secretary of Personnel.
Only executive orders which are authorized by the Constitution or promulgated pursuant to statutory authority have the force of law. Shapp v. Butera,
Even if we had found that the documents were issued in a manner which made them legally cognizable executive orders, in order for plaintiff to prevail it would have been necessary that the Governor had the power to issue a directive granting an entitlement to continued employment to an employee in a
The basis of plaintiff’s asserted property right being insufficient, we sustain defendant’s preliminary objections.
Order
And Now, this fifteenth day of April, 1980, the preliminary objections of the defendant The Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, and Andrew R. Johnson, individually and in his capacity as Chairman of the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission and A. Marylyn Moyer, individually and in his capacity as a Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission and Robert B. Class, individually and in his capacity as former Executive Secretary of the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission and Larrick B. Stapleton, individually and in his capacity as an Attorney for the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, are sustained and the complaint of Plaintiff, Peter Y. Pagano, is hereby dismissed.
Notes
Prior to the commencement of this action plaintiff initiated a suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against most of the instant defendants alleging they had denied him a property interest in his job without due process of law. The United States District Court abstained from deciding the case pending resolution of plaintiff’s property rights under state law. Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment which is being considered as a petition for review addressed to this Court’s original jurisdiction as per Pa. R.A.P. 1502 and 1503.
There are three documents, consisting of two memos from the Governor’s Secretary of Personnel and one management directive from the Governor.
Concurrence Opinion
Concurring Opinion by
An important distinction in this case is the fact that it involved the discharge of an employee of a quasi-independent commission by authority of that commission. For that key reason, I believe that we have reached the correct result in holding the gubernatorial directive to be ineffective here.
Although no governor should be permitted to impose tenure limitations upon his successor without legislative authorization, we should not discourage the establishment of merit personnel policies made meaningful by enforceability within an administration.
A governor’s constitutional responsibility to administer the executive branch necessarily implies the power to use sound personnel policies for his own administration, as by offering assurances of tenure (dismissal only for cause) to attract qualified persons. Legislative authorization should not be required for a governor to be a reasonable employer and one who is held to his personnel commitments.
We now accept the fact that collective bargaining agreements may provide tenure rights for members of bargaining units. I cannot see why such a reasonable right cannot be part of the bargain by which the executive may choose to hire each individual employee.
In Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,
In DeFrank v. County of Greene,
In the present case, our limitation of the executive’s policy directive contributes to the independence of the commission. However, where that is not a consideration, we should allow an executive to administer personnel tenure on the basis of a declared merit system and, taking the executive at his word, enforce that commitment within his own term.
