This is a civil action to recover damages *30 in the amount of $3,000 from a defendant contractor alleged to have resulted from a breach of the contractor’s implied warranty of habitability of a dwelling house. Aftеr a trial to a jury in the Superior Court, a verdict was returned for the defendant. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for a new trial and subsequently a motion for a directed verdict. Their motion for a new trial was granted on the issue of damages only, and their motion for a directed verdict was granted with respect to liability. The defendant is now prosecuting an appeal in this court from that order.
The record discloses that defendant corporation engaged in the business of building dwelling houses and apartments and that sometime in 1967 it had completed the erection of a dwelling house on Wood Cove Drive in the town of Coventry. Thereafter, on December 27, 1967, plaintiffs purchased this dwelling hоuse from defendant builder and began occupancy thereof on January 22, 1968. It does not appear to be disputed that on January 28 of that year, during a heavy rainstorm, water flowed into the basement of the building, causing severe damage to a family room and basement, as well as to personal property stored therein. Testimоny was adduced through plaintiffs also for the purpose of establishing that certain appliances installed in the premises were either inoperative or defective. These included a hot water heater defectively installed and a garbage disposal and a number of thermostats through the house improperly wired and defеctive.
The trial justice instructed the jury that “[i]n this state in the sale of a new dwelling house there is an implied warranty made by the seller to the buyer that the dwelling house is reasonably fit for human habitation. * * * [A] long with the contract of sale * * * is the unstated implied warranty of fitness * * To that portion of the charge defendant excepted. In this court defendant сontends that *31 the instruction thus given to the jury by the court, that the law in this state imposes an implied warranty of habitability on the builder of a house that he subsequently sells, was erroneous. In support of this contention defendant urges that the principle of caveat emptor has never been overruled or abandoned in this jurisdiction.
The question here, in оur opinion, is not whether the principle of caveat emptor has been overruled or abandoned in this state but whether we will join the increasing number of jurisdictions that hold that the builder of a house selling it to another impliedly warrants that such dwelling is reasonably fit for its intended use, human habitation. This is an era when mass production and commercialism have extended themselves into the realm of home construction and in which a customer purchasing a new dwelling from the builder thereof must rely on his skill and workmanship.
We think that the courts which have adopted the principle of implied warranty of habitability have done so on sound ground. In
Bethlahmy
v.
Bechtel,
While defendant in the instant case urges that we retain and apply the doctrine of caveat emptor to the transaction under consideration, he has given us no sound reason for continuing to apply that doctrine. A reading of the more recent cases in this arеa of the law provides us with numerous examples of the harshness and injustice of this ancient common-law doctrine when applied to the sale of a new
*32
house by the builder-vendor. In
Rothberg
v.
Olenik,
Our research discloses an abundance of judicial opinion exhaustively researched and excellently written that persuades us to adopt the doctrine that where a builder-vendor sells a house, either new or under construction, he implicitly warrants that the construction has been or will be done in а workmanlike manner and that the dwelling will be reasonably fit for human habitation. For this reason we will refrain from duplicating the excellent work of so many eminent jurists and text writers. 1
Therefore, we conclude that the trial justice was not in error and that where there is a sale of a new house by a vendor who is also the builder thereof, there is an impliеd warranty of reasonable workmanship and habitability sur *33 viving the delivery of the deed. This is not to hold that the builder is required to construct a perfect house. Whether the house is defective is determined by the test of reasonableness and not perfection, and the duration of such liability after the taking of possession is to be determined by standards of reasonableness.
It appears from the record that plaintiffs, after the verdict was returned, for the first time moved for a directed verdict. Nothing in the provisions of Super. R. Civ. P. 50 makes any provision for making a motion for a directed verdict after the verdict has been returned. That rule provides only that the motion may be made at the сlose of the opponent’s testimony or at the close of all of the evidence and that the motion may be decided when made or may be reserved for decision after the return of the verdict. The granting, therefore, of the motion for directed verdict was erroneous.
The plaintiffs have argued in this court that the trial justice рroperly treated their motion for a directed verdict as a motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto.
In
Russo
v.
Odell,
105 R. I. 349, 357,
Lastly, we turn to consider defendant’s contention that the trial justice erroneously granted plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. We cannot agree. It is clear from the record
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that on the mоtion the trial justice, in an exercise of his independent judgment, considered and passed upon all of the material evidence in the case in the light of his charge to the jury and upon the weight and credibility of the witnesses.
Barbato
v.
Epstein,
97 R. I. 191,
Nothing in the record discloses that the defendant complied with the burden stated above. A close scrutiny fails to disclose that the defendant directed our attention to any specific items of evidence that the trial justice either misconceived or overlooked. On the other hand, the trial justice pointed out the paucity of evidence adduced by the defendant of sufficient probative force to negate the liability of the defendant for a breach of the implied warranty. He stated that he believed the testimony of the plaintiffs as to the cause of the damage and to conditions existing in the structure that would sustain a finding of a breach of that warranty. Following our long-standing rule that upon a motion for a new trial we will not disturb the findings of the trial justice unless he was clearly wrong, we hold that the trial justice did not err in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.
The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the cause is remanded tо the Superior Court for a new trial.
Notes
See, e.g., Wawak
v.
Stewart,