Padock v. Dollar Tree Stores CA4/3
G064222
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 17, 2025|
Check TreatmentFiled 11/17/25 Padock v. Dollar Tree Stores CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CYNTHIA PADOCK,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064222
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01359171)
DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC.
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Glenn R. Salter, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Hayley S. Grunvald, and
Matthew G. Halgren, for Defendant and Appellant.
Valencia & Cywinska, Mark Joseph Valencia, and Izabela
Cywinska Valencia, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (Dollar Tree) appeals from the trial
court’s order denying its motion to compel Cynthia Padock to arbitrate her
claims against it. Padock opposed the motion to compel arbitration
exclusively on the ground she elected to avoid arbitration of her claims under
the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act
of 2021 (EFAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402. The trial court agreed with Padock,
concluding the EFAA applied because she filed her case after the date of its
enactment. We conclude filing a case after the EFAA’s enactment is only one
of the requirements for the application of the EFAA. The claims involved also
must have accrued on or after the enactment date or a dispute between the
parties must have arisen on or after that date in order for the EFAA to apply.
The undisputed facts here show neither occurred. Accordingly, the EFAA did
not apply, and the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel
arbitration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 3, 2023, Padock filed a complaint against Dollar
Tree, alleging multiple causes of action under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code §§ 12900 et seq. The
complaint alleged that Padock worked as a cashier/associate at Dollar Tree in
2021 from May through November. It alleged, among other things, that
during Padock’s employment, an assistant manager and a co-worker sexually
harassed her by making crude and explicit remarks. The harassment
continued despite her complaints to her manager. On November 8, 2021,
Padock contacted the Human Resources (HR) department at Dollar Tree to
complain about the hostile workplace. HR told her not to return to the store
and that they would transfer her to another store. However, they never called
her back or reached out to her about her employment status. Her manager
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“wiped clean [her] schedule.” Later that day, Padock resigned, claiming she
was “constructively terminated due to unfavorable work conditions that
violated public policy.”
On March 15, 2024, Dollar Tree filed a motion for an order to
compel Padock to submit her claims to arbitration and to stay the court
proceedings. In the motion, Dollar Tree contended that Padock had signed a
valid enforceable arbitration agreement when she started working and the
arbitration agreement encompasses all of her claims. Dollar Tree noted that
when Padock was informed about the arbitration agreement during a meet-
and-confer, she asserted she could avoid the arbitration agreement under the
EFAA. Dollar Tree argued the EFAA did not apply because her claims arose
before it was enacted on March 3, 2022.
Padock opposed the motion to compel arbitration solely on the
basis of the EFAA. She argued her claims fell within the scope of the EFAA
because she filed her claims with the California Civil Rights Department on
November 3, 2023, and then filed the instant complaint the same day.
In reply, Dollar Tree argued the EFAA does not apply because a
claim or dispute had arisen before March 3, 2022 based on the allegations in
the complaint. Specifically, Padock alleged she complained to HR about
sexual harassment on November 8, 2021, but HR ignored her, forcing her to
resign that same day.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to compel
arbitration. It found “case law is hopelessly split” on whether the EFAA
applies in cases where the sexual harassment occurred prior to the effective
date of the EFAA (March 3, 2022), but the lawsuit was filed after its effective
date. The court resolved the alleged split in favor of Padock based on the
purpose of the EFAA to end the practice of forcing victims of sexual
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harassment to have their claims “funneled into arbitration against their
will.”
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dollar Tree challenges the trial court’s order denying its motion
to compel arbitration. “There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating
an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s
order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence
standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a
decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.” (Robertson v.
Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.) Here, the trial court’s denial was based on its interpretation of the EFAA. Accordingly, we employ a de novo review. (See Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc. (2024)99 Cal.App.5th 214
, 221 (Kader) [“We review statutory interpretation issues de novo”].) “The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. To accomplish that objective, courts must look first to the words of the statute, giving effect to their plain meaning. If those words are clear, we may not alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. [Citation.] Whenever possible, we must give effect to every word in a statute and avoid a construction making a statutory term surplusage or meaningless.” (In re Jerry R. (1994)29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1437
.)
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II.
EFAA
The EFAA, enacted on March 3, 2022, provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election
of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or
sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a
collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement
or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to
a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the
sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402, subd. (a).) A statutory note to the EFAA provides: “This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” (Pub.L. No. 117–90 (Mar. 3, 2022) § 3,136 Stat. 26
, 28.) “Any issue as to whether the [EFAA] applies to a dispute is to be determined under federal law. (9 U.S.C. § 402
, (b).)” (Kader, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)
The trial court concluded the EFAA applied because the instant
case was filed after March 3, 2022. In Murrey v. Superior Court (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1223 (Murrey), a panel of this court concluded based on the
statutory language and legislative history that the EFAA “is only applicable
to cases filed after its enactment.” (Id. at p. 1235.) There, the plaintiff alleged
she was sexually harassed in 2000, and she filed a complaint in March 2021.
(Id. at p. 1231.) The panel concluded the EFAA did not apply because Murrey
filed her case approximately one year before the EFAA was enacted. (Id. at p.
1235.) Thus, a prerequisite for the application of the EFAA is that the case is
filed on or after March 3, 2022.
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The Murrey court, however, only addressed section 402,
subdivision (a), of 9 U.S.C., which provides that the EFAA applies to cases
“filed under Federal, Tribal or State law.” (Italics added.) The court did not
address whether there are any other requirements for the applicability of the
EFAA. Specifically, it did not address the statutory note to the EFAA, which
provides that the EFAA applies only where a claim accrues or a dispute
arises on or after March 3, 2022. (Pub.L. No. 117–90 (Mar. 3, 2022) § 3, 136
Stat. 26, 28.) Although the statutory note was not codified, it is legally binding. (Doe v. Second Street Corp. (2024)105 Cal.App.5th 552
, 566, fn. 6, citing Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 2024)112 F.4th 74
, 84,
fn. 4 [“‘It makes no legal difference that this provision is codified in a
statutory note, not the main body, of the United States Code’”].) The reason is
that “[a]ll provisions enacted by Congress, including a provision codified as a
statutory note, must be given equal weight regardless of their placement by
the codifier.” (Kader, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 222, citing Famuyide v.
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (D.Minn., Aug. 31, 2023, No. CV23-1127
(DWF/ECW)) 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 153926, at *3 (Famuyide).)
Padock does not dispute that her claims against Dollar Tree
accrued before March 3, 2022. According to her complaint, the sexual
harassment occurred during her employment, which began in May 2021 and
ended when she was constructively terminated on November 8, 2021. Thus,
her claims accrued at the latest on November 8, 2021, well before the
enactment of the EFAA. (See, e.g., Newcombe-Dierl v. Amgen (C.D.Cal., May
26, 2022, No. CV22-2155-DMG (MRWx)) 2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 140079, at *5
[plaintiff’s “claims accrued when the adverse employment action occurred and
she was injured, which was no later than November 12, 2021, the date of her
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termination. [Citation.] This injury predated March 3, 2022, so [EFAA] does
not apply”].)
Rather, Paddock claims the dispute concerning her sexual
harassment did not arise until after March 3, 2022. Specifically, she alleges
the dispute did not arise until November 3, 2023, when she filed a complaint
with the Civil Rights Department and filed her complaint in superior court.
We disagree. As a federal district court noted in a recent decision, the federal
courts have split on when a dispute arises under the EFAA. Some courts have
found “the existence of a claim necessarily encompasses an underlying
dispute and ‘[t]o hold otherwise would mean that the applicability of the
EFAA would hinge not on when a dispute arose or a claim accrued, as the
statute dictates, but rather on when a litigant chose to file a formal
administrative charge or complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Combs v. Netflix, Inc.
(C.D.Cal. (Apr. 16, 2025) No. 2:24-CV-09037-MRA-MAA) 2025 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 94527, at *4 (Combs).) The majority of district courts, however, have
determined that a dispute arises “when a person asserts a right, claim, or
demand and is met with disagreement on the other side. A dispute cannot
arise until both sides have expressed their disagreement, either through
words or actions.” (Famuyide, supra, 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 153926, at *3;
accord, Kader, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 222–223.)
Even under the more lenient definition of dispute set forth in
Famuyide, a dispute arose between Padock and Dollar Tree concerning her
sexual harassment claims by, at the latest, November 8, 2021. According to
her complaint, Padock had repeatedly complained to her manager, who did
nothing to address the harassment. On November 8, 2021, Padock
complained to Dollar Tree’s HR department, but was ignored which resulted
in her constructive termination. “Thus, [Dollar Tree] effectively expressed
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disagreement with [Padock’s] complaints through silence—that is, it took a
position adverse to Plaintiff by not addressing her concerns. . . . [E]ven if
[Dollar Tree’s] silence is not sufficient to infer an adversarial posture, its
[constructive] termination of [Padock], without ever addressing any of her
complaints, certainly is.” (Combs, supra, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94527, at *4.)
Citing Hodgin v. Intensive Care Consortium, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2023)
666 F.Supp.3d 1326, Padock contends that a dispute arises only when the parties take an adversarial posture in a forum with the potential to resolve the claim. Thus, she argues, an internal complaint to her employer is insufficient to establish that a dispute has occurred. In Hodgin, the district court discussed when a dispute arises and concluded that limiting it to when a lawsuit is filed is too limiting. Rather, “‘dispute’ is a broad term that encompasses other forums.” (Id. at p. 1330.) It concluded the dispute arose when the employee filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission because the employee was “now in an adversarial posture with her employer in a forum with the potential to resolve the claim.” (Ibid.) The Hodgin court, however, never addressed whether a dispute can arise in the context of an internal complaint. Stated differently, although a dispute arises when parties are in an adversarial posture in a forum with the potential to resolve the claim, a dispute may also arise when an employee complains to her manager and HR about sexual harassment and the employer constructively disagrees with that claim by failing to address the harassment and terminating her. That is what occurred here. (See Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc. (3d Cir. 2025)133 F.4th 240
, 247 [“In our view, a
‘dispute . . . arises’ when an employee registers disagreement—through either
an internal complaint, external complaint, or otherwise—with his or her
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employer, and the employer expressly or constructively opposes that
position”].)
In summary, the EFAA applies only to cases filed on or after
March 3, 2022. (Murrey, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1235.) Additionally, the
case must involve a claim that has accrued on or after that date, or a dispute
that arose on or after that date. (Pub.L. No. 117–90 (Mar. 3, 2022) § 3, 136
Stat. 26, 28.) Here, although Padock filed her case after March 3, 2022, her
claim accrued and a dispute had arisen before March 3, 2022. Thus, the
EFAA does not apply. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Dollar
Tree’s motion to compel arbitration.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The superior court is directed to issue an
order granting Dollar Tree’s motion to compel arbitration and staying court
proceedings. Dollar Tree is entitled to its costs on appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
MOORE, J.
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