{1} John Padilla (Plaintiff) appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Intel Corporation, Specialty Drywall, Inc., and Chaparral Materials, Inc. (Defendants). The district court gave preclusive effect to the prior findings of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) concerning the proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries. On appeal, Plaintiff claims that the district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the WCJ’s findings because Plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of proximate cause in the workers’ compensation proceedings. We determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, we affirm the order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
{2} On July 16, 1993, Plaintiff was employed as a laborer by TDC General Contracting, Inc. (Employer), a subcontractor doing business at a construction site owned by Defendant Intel Corporation in Sandoval County, New Mexico. Defendants Specialty Drywall, Inc. and Chaparral Materials, Inc. are other subcontractors that were doing business at the Intel site. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent in their handling of a stack of sheetroek that fell on him and caused injuries to his left knee and lower back on July 16,1993.
{3} Following the July 16 incident, Employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier (Employer-Insurer) paid temporary total disability benefits to Plaintiff. Employer-Insurer also paid all of Plaintiffs medical bills except for those charged by one doctor who was not an authorized health care provider. These payments totalled more than $68,000.
{4} In February 1995, Employer-Insurer stopped paying workers’ compensation benefits to Plaintiff after learning that the Fraud Bureau of the Workers’ Compensation Administration (WCA) was investigating a complaint by Plaintiffs ex-wife claiming that Plaintiff had intentionally pulled the sheetroek down upon himself to fake a compensable injury and defraud Employer-Insurer. When Employer-Insurer stopped paying benefits, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the WCA claiming that he was entitled to additional benefits. In July 1996, while the workers’ compensation proceedings were still underway, Plaintiff also filed a complaint in district court alleging that his injuries were caused by Defendants’ negligence.
{5} On August 7, 1996, the WCJ held a formal hearing regarding Plaintiffs claim for additional benefits from Employer-Insurer. At the hearing, Employer-Insurer denied that Plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits and sought the return of the $68,000 in benefits that it had previously paid to Plaintiff. Without objection, the WCJ admitted into evidence various written statements by Plaintiffs ex-wife and brother-in-law, as well as a report by the WCA’s Fraud Bureau. Plaintiffs ex-wife and brother-in-law were present at the hearing, but were not called to testify by any of the parties. The only witnesses who testified at the hearing were Plaintiff, his mother, and Plaintiffs expert on accident reconstruction.
{6} Following the August 1996 hearing, the WCJ entered a compensation order containing, in relevant part, the following findings:
29. The sheetroek which fell on [Plaintiff] on July 16, 1993[,] while he was at work for [Employer] fell because [Plaintiff] pulled [it] down upon himself.
30. [Plaintiffs] ex-wife and brother-in-law both reported that [Plaintiff] told them that he intentionally pulled the sheetroek upon himself.
31. The sole cause for the sheetroek falling down upon [Plaintiff] on July 16, 1993[,] resulting in his left knee injury was [Plaintiffs] own conduct/actions in pulling the sheetroek upon himself with the intent to injure himself.
32. The injuries [Plaintiff] suffered on July 6, [1993] were willfully occasioned and/or self-inflicted by virtue of the fact that [Plaintiff] pulled the sheetroek down upon himself.
Based on its findings, the WCJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to any workers’ compensation benefits and was required to repay Employer-Insurer for the $68,000 in benefits that Plaintiff had received, plus costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff appealed the decision of the WCJ to this Court. This Court issued its calendar notice proposing affirmance. The WCJ’s compensation order was summarily affirmed by this Court after Plaintiff did not respond to the calendar notice.
{7} After this Court issued its mandate in the workers’ compensation case, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court contending that the prior findings of the WCJ should be given preclusive effect with respect to the proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries. The district court granted Defendants’ motion, and this appeal followed.
A. Standard of Review
{8} “Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Roth v. Thompson,
{9} The party invoicing the doctrine of collateral estoppel has the burden of introducing sufficient evidence for the district court to rule on whether the doctrine is applicable. See DeLisle v. Avallone,
{10} In the present case, Plaintiff does not challenge any of the elements of collateral estoppel that make up Defendants’ prima facie case. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff met his burden of showing that he was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of proximate cause in the workers’ compensation proceedings. Cf. Spectron Dev. Lab. v. American Hollow Boring Co.,
B. Public Policy
{11} We first address Plaintiffs assertion that this Court should not allow the district court to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the WCJ’s findings because it is contrary to public policy. To support this assertion, Plaintiff cites our recent opinion in Eldridge v. Circle K Corp.,
{12} We find both precedents distinguishable. Eldridge, by its own terms, was restricted to “the limited circumstances of this type of case, when the worker claims a cause of action based on deliberate, intentional injury by the employer.” Eldridge,
C. Incentive to Litigate
{13} Plaintiff’s next contention is that he lacked a comparable incentive to litigate the issue of proximate cause in the workers’ compensation proceeding because of the statutory limits on the amount of benefits and attorney fees that he and his attorney may be awarded in such a proceeding. See Shovelin,
{14} In response to this contention, Defendants suggest that proceeding in the administrative forum gave Plaintiff some advantages which offset these limitations. For example, workers’ compensation benefits cannot be reduced under the doctrine of comparative negligence, see NMSA 1978, § 52-1-8 (1989); Gough v. Famariss Oil & Refining Co.,
{15} Under the circumstances of the present ease, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing Plaintiffs incentive to litigate in the administrative forum. In addition to Plaintiffs claim for more benefits, the amount in controversy in the workers’ compensation proceeding included Employer-Insurer’s counterclaim for the return of over $68,000 in benefits it had already paid, plus costs and attorney fees. Further, the amount ultimately recovered by Plaintiff in the action he was concurrently pursuing in the district court could have been significantly reduced if Employer-Insurer had sought reimbursement in that forum under NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-17 (1990). See generally St. Joseph Healthcare System v. The Travelers Cos.,
{16} Finally, Plaintiff cannot claim that a lack of notice of possible collateral estoppel significantly diminished his incentive to litigate
D. Procedural Differences
{17} To further support his assertion that he was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the proximate-cause issue in the workers’ compensation proceeding, Plaintiff attempts to point out various procedural differences between district court proceedings and administrative proceedings before the WCA. We recognize that “[preclusion may be withheld when the party against whom it is invoked can avail himself of procedures in the second action that were not available to him in the first action and that may have been significantly influential in determination of the issue.” Restatement, supra, § 29 cmt. d; see also Silva,
1. Discovery
{18} We first address Plaintiffs contention that his opportunity for full and complete discovery was more limited under the WCA’s discovery rules than under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Rules 1-026 to -037 NMRA 1998 (discovery rules for civil actions in district court) with NMSA 1978, § 52-5-7(F) (1993) (WCA discovery procedure); 11 NMAC 4.4.12 (May 26, 1987, as amended through June 1, 1996) (rules governing WCA adjudication process). Plaintiff contends that the WCA discovery procedure is more limited because Section 52-5-7(F) requires parties to obtain the WCJ’s approval before proceeding with their discovery requests, and in this ease Employer objected to answering some of Plaintiffs interrogatories in the workers’ compensation proceeding.
{19} In response to this contention, we note that the WCA rules provide for a mandatory exchange of certain types of evidence, see 11 NMAC 4.4.12.4, as well as various mechanisms for compelling adequate responses to discovery requests, see 11 NMAC 4.4.12.4.2 (sanctions for failure to comply with mandatory discovery); 11 NMAC 4.4.12.5.2 (pre-trial hearing on disputed discovery issues). In addition, several of the WCA rules expressly incorporate discovery rules that apply in the district courts. See, e.g., 11 NMAC 4.4.12.7.2 (depositions shall be taken pursuant to Rule 1-030); 11 NMAC 4.4.12.8.1 (Rules 1-033, 1-034, and 1-036 apply to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission authorized by WCJ). In this case, Plaintiff had ample time to conduct discovery beyond the mandatory minimum expressed in the WCA rules, and the record does not show that he filed any motions with the WCJ to compel further discovery of matters pertaining to causation. Hence, we fail to see how the determination of the proximate-cause issue was significantly influenced by any difference between the district court’s discovery rules and those of the WCA. See Restatement, supra, § 29 cmt. d; In re Ernesto M., Jr.,
{20} Plaintiffs next contention is that his ability to cross-examine certain adverse witnesses was hampered by the WCA rules concerning the use of deposition testimony at trial and the admissibility of other written statements. Under the WCA rules, written medical evidence such as deposition transcripts of health-care providers generally is admissible in workers’ compensation hearings. See 11 NMAC 4.4.12.7.4. Indeed, the WCA rules generally do not provide for the introduction of medical evidence through live testimony. See 11 NMAC 4.4.12.6.
{21} However, the adverse witnesses whom Plaintiff allegedly lacked the opportunity to cross-examine in the present case were not authorized health-care providers and did not provide medical evidence. With respect to witnesses other than authorized health-care providers, the WCA rules incorporate many of the same rules of procedure and evidence that apply in the district courts. See, e.g., 11 NMAC 4.4.12.7.5 (except for testimony of authorized health-care providers, Rule 1-032 applies to use of depositions); 11 NMAC 4.4.12.15.1 (all district court rules of evidence and procedure apply unless specifically excluded elsewhere in WCA rules). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how or why the WCA Rules would have prevented Plaintiff from successfully objecting to out-of-court statements made by these witnesses if they were inadmissible under the rules of evidence that apply in the district courts. Further, since the WCJ’s pretrial order reserved Plaintiff’s right to call Employer-Insurer’s witnesses, and the record indicates that Plaintiff’s ex-wife and brother-in-law were present at the hearing as potential witnesses for Employer-Insurer, it does not appear that Plaintiff was in fact deprived of the opportunity to examine these witnesses regarding their prior statements. Thus, we fail to see how the determination of the proximate-cause issue was significantly influenced by any procedural differences concerning the admissibility of evidence or opportunity for cross-examination in the workers’ compensation proceeding. See Restatement, supra, § 29 cmt. d; In re Ernesto M., Jr.,
3. Right to Jury Trial
{22} Finally, we address Plaintiff’s assertion that collateral estoppel does not apply because he had no right to a jury trial in the workers’ compensation proceeding. Although the presence or absence of a jury is not “altogether immaterial,” Silva,
{23} Collateral estoppel only requires that the procedures available in the administrative forum be “substantially similar” to the procedures available in the district court; it does not require them to be identical. Shovelin,
III. CONCLUSION
{24} For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the findings of the WCJ under the facts of this ease. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.