I. BACKGROUND
California’s rule of “horizontal exhaustion” in liability insurance law requires all primary insurance to be exhausted before an excess insurer must “drop down” to defend an insured, including in cases of continuing loss.
(Community Redevelopment Agency v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
(1996)
Also, in
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., supra,
The first problem involves whether an excess insurer has a duty to “drop down” and defend in an underlying action alleging that the insured caused continuous property damage that existed at points in time prior to the inception of a policy of the only primary insurer that is defending the insured. On this point, the insured’s theory (the insured is the appellant here) is that since there is no way at all that the primary insurer wоuld have any duty to indemnify the insured for any liability for property damage that occurred prior to the primary insurer’s policy inception, there was no “other insurance” available for that prior occurring property damage. Therefore the excess insurer had to drop down and defend because of the potential for liability for the increment of damage occurring before the one' defending primary’s policy period.
The solution to this problem is relatively easy. As we show below, under
Buss v. Superior Court
(1997)
The other problem builds on the implications of whether there is “other insurance available” within the meaning of the excess insurer’s policy when the lone defending primary insurer’s policy contains a “self-insured retention” or SIR. In Justice Croskey’s own treatise on insurance law, he (or his co-authors) suggest that because SIR’s are not considered insurance, there would be no need to exhaust such an SIR before the policy of an excess insurer covering another policy period could be triggered. 5 The question thus arises: Does the treatment of SIR’s as “not insurance” mean that, in a situation like the present case, there would be no “other insurance available” for the first x dollars (x representing the self-insured retention) spent on the underlying action, and therefore the excess insurer (whose own underlying primary insurer has already exhausted) would have a duty to defend to at least that extent?
Wе reject the idea for several reasons, the primary of which is it is perfect legal logic leading to absurdity—that is, it would be contrary to the reasonable expectations of all parties by obliterating the distinction between excess and primary insurance. An excess insurer could end up defending
In sum, under the facts of this case, the tail end, lone defending primary insurer cannot “share the misery” with thе first-period excess insurer. (See
State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co.
(1998)
I. FACTS
There was an underlying continuous damage construction defect suit filed in June 2002 by two homeowners against the developer of their property. Specifically, the suit alleged that foundation vents were blocked with stucco, which stucco work was done by the insured, Padilla Construction Company, Inc., in 1995. 6 (We shall refer to Padilla as “the insured” often in this opinion.) The insured was brought into the suit two months later by way of cross-complaint by the developer.
The insured had four successive primary liability policies from January 1995 until March 1, 2003:
—From the beginning of 1995 to end of 1996: Transcontinental Insurance.
—From the beginning of 1997 to end of 1997: Reliance Insurance.
—From the beginning of 1998 to March 1, 2001: Legion Indemnity.
—From March 1, 2001, to March 1, 2003: Steadfast Insurance.
Additionally, coincident with Transcontinental’s primary policy (Jan. 1995 through the end of 1997), the insured had two yearly commercial umbrella policies issued by Transportation Insurance Company. .
In tabular form, over the period of the continuing loss, the policies may be expressed this way: ..
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We will refer to Transcontinental as the Stage 1 Primary Insurer, Transportation as the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer,
7
and Steadfast (the “lone defending primary insurer”
Of the four primary insurers, only two were available to defend the insured in the underlying suit. Both Reliance and Legion became insolvent, and both sides in this case have assumed that nothing was available from either carrier by way of a defense. We will also operate on that assumption.
The insured initially requested only Stage 1 Primary Insurer to provide it a defense of the underlying suit. (The request was made in late Sept. 2002.) However, after the Stage 1 Primary Insurer accepted the request for a defense under a reservation of rights, and hired a firm to defend the insured, the newly hired defense counsel then requested a defense from Stage 4 Primary Insurer. The request for a defense, however, was routed through the insured’s third party claims administrator. In April 2003 the third party claims administrator took the position, on the insured’s behalf, that it “elect[ed]” not to trigger the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies, at least in part because the Stage 4 Primary Insurer? s policies had a $25,000 self-insured retention. (The mechanics of the self-insured retention are discussed in part III. below, when we set forth the policy language bearing on this case.)
However, in June 2003—just a few months after the insured’s (at least putative) election not to trigger Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies, the Stage 1 Primary Insurer notified the insured that, because of numerous other claims against the insured, its policies were nearing exhaustion. In response, the insured reiterated its position that it elected not to trigger the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies, and requested its defense attorney to “tender the defense and indemnity” to Transportation, which we will refer to as the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer. The Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer quickly declined the tender on the ground that the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies had not yet exhausted. ■
The Stage 1 Primary Insurer’s exhaustion formally occurred on December 30, 2003. Along with the exhaustion came a formal notification to the insured that the Stage 1 Primary Insurer’s defense was being entirely withdrawn. The insured then assumed its own defense, and, at some point in 2005, reached a settlement with the developer. The settlement was presumably $60,000 or less, to which the Stage 4 Primary Insurer contributed.
This coverage litigation between the insured and the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer ensued, the insured’s theory being that the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer had a -duty to “drop down” and defend (and if necessary indemnify) the insured once the Stage 1 Primary Insurer’s limits were exhausted. After an еxpedited court trial based on stipulated facts and exhibits, the trial court ruled that because there was still “primary coverage available” to the insured in the form of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies, the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer was not obligated to provide a defense.
IH. THE POLICIES 8
A. The Stage 4 Primary Insurer
Whatever else the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies provide, they provide no coverage for “occurrences” not within the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy period, here from March 1, 2001, through March 1, 2003. The policy language is: “This insurance applies to . . . ‘property damage’ only if: [][] . . . m (2) The . . . ‘property damage* 1 **’ occurs during the: ‘policy period’.”
The Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies were also clearly commercial general liability (CGL) policies, a fact also stipulated to by the parties.. That is, the policies contained a typical CGL insuring clause. 9 Accordingly, the premiums for the two Stage 4 policies were costly, respectively $315,000 and $356,500 for the two successive policies.
And, by the same token, the policies were also clear—in their “other insurance” clauses—that they were “primary” policies. Here is1 the languagé: “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover under Coverage A or B of this policy, our obligations are limited as follows: [f] a. Primary Insurance H[] This insurance is primary except when there is other insurance applying on a primary basis. Then b. below applies. [1] b. Excess Insurance [f] This insurance is excess over any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis. [][] When this insurance is excess, we will have no duty to defend any claim or ‘suit’ that any other insurer has a duty to defend. If no other insurer defends, we will undertake to do so, but we will be entitled to the insured’s rights against all those other insurers. H] When this insurance is excess over other insurance, we will pay only our share of the amount of the loss, if any, that exceeds the sum of'[f] (1) The total amount that all such other insurance would pay for the loss in the absence of this insurance; and [(J[] (2) The total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under any other insurance.” (Italics added.)
As to the self-insured retention endorsement, it began with language that “This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the: Commercial General Liability Coverage Part,” then provided a schedule showing that the retention was $25,000 “Per Occurrence,” but “$N/A Per Claim” and “Aggregate $N/A.” The insured was also required to notify the insurer if there was “potential penetration” of the retention at “50 % of self insured retention.”
The text that followed the schedule was clear that the insured was responsible for
defense
costs, as well as indemnity costs, up to the retention amount of $25,000 (hence it was truly a “self-insured retention” as distinct from a “deductible”
10
). The “Self Insured Retention Endorsement (Defense Costs Included)” began
One of the facts to which the parties stipulated was that the insured’s defense costs in the underlying suit “currently exceeds $25,000.”
B. The Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer
There is no argument that the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s policies were “primary” policies. They weren’t. In comparison with the $315,000 annual premiums paid by the insured for the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy, the cost of the two Stage 1" Umbrella Insurer’s policies was (even for the mid-1990’s) a relatively cheap $20,067 and $27,389 a year respectively for the years 1995 and 1996.
The Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s policies had an “Other Insurance” clause which makes its insurance excess over any unexhausted primary policies otherwise providing coverage to the insured, regardless of whether they are listed on the umbrella carrier’s schedule of underlying insurance. Here is the entire “other insurancе” clause from the policy: “Whenever you are covered by other: [ft] a. primary [ft] b. excess; or c. excess-contingent [ft] insurance not scheduled on this policy as ‘scheduled underlying insurance’, this policy shall apply only in excess of,- and will not contribute with; such other insurance. This policy shall not be subject to terms, conditions or limitations of other insurance. In the event of payment under this policy where you are covered by such other insurance, we shall be subrogated to all of your rights of recovery against such other insurance and you shall execute and deliver instruments and papers, including assignment of rights, and do what is necessary to secure such rights.”
The Stage 1 Primary Insurer was indeed listed on the schedule of underlying insurance in the two policies in the record.
Another section of the policies dealt with “Defense Payment and Related Duties” which further bore on the issue of the policies’ interаctions with other policies. We will call this clause the “defense clause” because it fastened an obligation onto the insurer given the circumstance of exhaustion by all primary insurers. The defense clause read in pertinent part: “1. If a claim or ‘suit’ alleges damages covered by underlying policies and the obligation of all ‘underlying insurers’ either to: [f] a. investigate and defend the insured; or [f] b. pay the costs of such investigation and defense; fft] ceases solely through the exhaustion of all underlying limits of liability through payment of a combination of covered expenses, settlements or judgments
The Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s policies also defined “underlying insurer” this way: “ ‘Underlying insurer’ means an insurer whose policy covers an ‘incident’ also covered by this policy but does not include insurers whose policies were purchased specifically to be in excess of this policy. It includes all insurers providing: [1] a. ‘unscheduled underlying insurance’; and [(ft] b. ‘scheduled underlying insurance.’ ”
The policies further defined “Unscheduled underlying insurance” this way: “a. ‘Unscheduled underlying insurance’ means insurance -policies available to an insured, whether: [][] (1) primary; [f] (2) excess; [f] (3) excess-contingent; or [5] (4) otherwise; [f] except the policies listed in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance, [f] b. ‘Unscheduled underlying insurance’ does not include insurance purchased specifically to be in excess of this policy.”
IV. ANALYSIS
■ A. The Policy Period Problem
The main focus of the insured’s briefing involves the logical implications of the “policy period” language in the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy. Here is the logic:
(1) The underlying case involved “continuing” property damage that spanned the policy periods of four insurers, from 1995 to at least the time of the lawsuit in 2002.
(2) There is no question that the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies do not cover liability for property damage outside its policy period, i.e., the period before March 1, 2001 (which, we might add, constitutes the lion’s share of the time on the risk).
(3) By definition, the continuing loss encompassed a period clearly not covered by any of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies (i.e., all the damage for which the insured was alleged to be responsible that occurred before the Stage 4 Primary Insurer came on the risk).
(4) Therefore, there was—given the insolvencies of the Stage 2 and 3 Primary Insurers and the exhaustion of the Stage 1 Primary Insurer’s policies—no coverage at all for whatever quantum of property damage or (to use Justice Baxter’s phrase from Montrose II) “increment of harm” 11 that might be ascribed to the loss period prior to March 1, 2001, when the Stage 4 Primary Insurer came on the risk.
(5) Therefore, there was thus at least some damage for which the insured was being sued that was not even potentially covered by the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy.
(6) And, since there was no coverage at all for that increment of harm, it follows that the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s other insurance exclusion was not implicated: There was—to track the language of that clause—no “other primary insurance”, to cover those increments of harm.
(7) Ergo, the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer was obligated to drop down and defend the underlying suit.
The insured’s argument is not without considerable force. No court could, in good conscience given the unambiguous language of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s “policy period” language, say there was even potential coverage for the insured’s liability for property damage that occurred in the period 1995 through 1996 (the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s period), or, for that matter, any property damage that occurred prior to March 1, 2001.
But there is a core flaw in the logic. It confuses the obligation of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer to indemnify—which is indeed limited only to that increment of harm after March 1, 2001—with the obligation of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer to defend a suit that, includes an increment of harm after March 1, 2001. If the Stage 4 Primary Insurer had any defense duty at all to defend the underlying lawsuit against the insured—say, because of the potential for coverage raised by post-March 1, 2001 damage—then it had a duty to defend the entirety of that underlying lawsuit, including that portion of die underlying lawsuit asserting claims for damage occurring before March 1, 2001. As the Supreme Court explained in Buss v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4tti at page 49, an insurer must defend an entire action when there is at lеast one claim that is potentially covered—including the balance of the action, which may press claims that are not even potentially covered. 12
To be sure, the
Buss
case involved an underlying “mixed action,” which included
claims
both potentially and not potentially covered, and therefore the insurer had a duty to defend “entirely.” (Accord,
Horace Mann. Ins. Co. v. Barbara B.
(1993)
However, after
Buss,
our high court decided
Aerojet-General Corp.
v.
Transport Indemnity Co.
(1997)
Yet there is one more wrinkle to the problem. In articulating the principle as to time, as distinct from covered claims, the Aerojet-General court framed the rule as to an insurer’s duty to defend an action alleging continuous damage extending beyond its policy period in terms of time forward, not time past.
The relevant passages are worth quoting in the text here, because it shows that the high court was choosing its words carefully, so as to keep the issue open for another day: “Generally, the insurers assume that their contractual duty to defend is limited
To give an example: If Insurer A’s policy period extended from, say, 1970 to 1973, and there was an action against its insured alleging continuous property damage that took place over the years 1971 through 1986, Insurer A would have a duty to defend the entire action. (Assuming, of course, that there was not some other basis that would relieve Insurer A of its duty to defend even for damages that were alleged to have occurred in the period 1970 through 1973.) Our case, by contrast, is like one where the action against the insured alleged continuous property damage that took place in the period 1966 through 1971. Does this twist make a difference?
While we don’t have a Supreme Court case on point, a couple of decisions of the Court of Appeal indicate that the requirement to defend “entirely” extends even to underlying actions where the continuous property damage happens before the policy period.
First there is an observation from
Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1995)
Second, and more directly on point, is
State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co., supra,
63 Cal.App.4th at pages 1545-1548, which rejected the notion of restricting an insurer’s defense obligation to just an amount pro rated based on its time on the risk. The
State of California
v.
Pacific Indemnity
case is particularly instructive in regards to the case before us because it involved allegations of underlying continuing damage that continued on for 43 years—1947 until 1990.
13
The insured had elected to “self-insure” for all but one of the 43 years of continuing damage, and that year was September 1963 through September 1964—that is,' about 16 years of continuing property damage had elapsed
before
the insurer’s
Here is the key passage from
State of California
v.
Pacific Indemnity:
“The comprehensive general liability insurance policy in this case covered property damage, and Pacific Indemnity does not dispute that at least some of the claims were potentially covered. This triggered Pacific Indemnity’s contractual duty to defend claims potentially covered.
(Buss
[v.
Superior Court], supra,
We see nothing in State of California v. Pacific Indemnity (or the Haskel observation) to justify departing from the rule they articulate (or at least adumbrate). The main possible conceptual objection to a common law rule 14 that obligates a defending insurer to defend “entirely,” even though there are damages not even potentially covered because they occurred prior to the policy period, is the loss-in-progress rule (see Ins. Code, § 22). There is a discussion of the loss-in-progress rule in Montrose II, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 689 through 693, and that discussion (relying on § 250 of the Ins. Code) makes it clear that it is enough that the damage be unknown, as distinct from already existent but unknown. 15
Indeed, the facts of
Montrose II
apply at least equally to the case before us, if not a fortiori. There, the insured even received a potentially responsible person letter from the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) indicating that the insured might be held liable for cleanup costs
before
the inception of the insurer’s policy
(Montrose II, supra,
The
Montrose II
court аlso noted that since the insurer’s policies “did not purport to cover damage or injury that occurred prior to the time those policies went into effect”
{Montrose II, supra,
(This is not an insurer-seeking-reimbursement-from-the-insured case, so we need not detail just exactly what might be required for a successful insurer reimbursement action here. Thus we do not comment on any potential Buss action brought by the Stage 4 Primary Insurer against the insured for reimbursement for money spent defending damage claims that were never even potentially covered. Nor do we comment on the ensuing question of whether, in such a hypothetical reimbursement action, the insured might have a valid claim for indemnity or reimbursement from the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer. 16 )
Buss
made clear that the insurer can seek reimbursement for money spent on claims never even potentially covered, and we see no reason the same rule should not apply for money spent on damages never even potentially covered (assuming, for sake of argument, that defense costs for such damages could be segregated out). Both never-even-potentially-covered
claims
and never-even-potentially-covered
damages
are equally uncovered. The insurer’s duty to defend the entirety of a lawsuit including such claims or damages is equally a matter of a “prophylactic” common law rule aimed at protecting the insured because the insured is entitled to an immediate and meaningful defense.
(Buss v. Superior Court, supra,
All of which is by way of saying that there was indeed primary insurance available to the insured as regards the defense of the underlying suit from the Stage 4 Primary Insurer, even though there was an increment of harm claimed in the suit that was not even potentially covered by the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy. There being such primary insurance available, there would be no defense obligation triggered by the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s “defense” clause, while its “other insurance” affirmatively relieved it of any obligation to defend.
B. The Self-insured Retention Problem
The $25,000 self-insured retention in the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s,policy, however, presents conceptually a somewhat more difficult problem as to the obligations of the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer under the circumstances-of this case. Consider the following syllogism:
,(3) From the viewpoint of the insured, the Stage, 4 Primary Insurer’s self-insured retention clause did not provide for a “first-dollar” defense obligation. That is, the Stage 4 Primary Insurer was not responsible for anything until the $25,000 retention was. reached (indeed, the schedule required the insured to warn the insurer when expenses reached the halfway mark). In other words, for the * first $25,000, the insured really had no “insurance” from the Stage 4 Primary Insurer. 19
(4) Since the insured had no other “insurance” for the first $25,000 of the claim against it, the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s “other insurance” clause could not operate to make it excess оf the Stage 4 Primary Insurer at least as to that amount. It was obligated to defend with dollar one—there being, after all, no “other insurance” to pay dollars one through 25,000. 20
The flaw in this logic is the assumption that the self-insured retention can be meaningfully separated from the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy, of which it is a creature, for purposes of the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer’s “other insurance” clause. In classic insurance law terms, treating the self-insured retention as a separate entity from the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy defeats the reasonable expectations of all the parties, including the insured. It obliterates the distinction between primary and excess insurance.
We first off note the temporal anomaly that such parsing creates. An earlier excess insurer would have a duty to “drop down” and defend a claim “beneath” the coverage of a later primary. That’s counterintuitive, to say the least.
We have alreаdy noted the great disparity in the premiums charged by the Stage 4 Primary Insurer and the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer. The yearly premiums charged by the former were no less than
12 to 15 times
the yearly premiums charged by the latter. A primary policy imposes on an insurer a “primary duty of defense” while an excess (or “secondary” or “umbrella”) policy attaches only after primary coverage has been exhausted; hence the latter is cheaper.
(Olympic Ins. Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co.
(1981)
126
Cal.App.3d 593, 597-598 & 598, fn. 2 [
The self-insured retention was part and parcel of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policies. As alluded to above, the selffinsured retention is
itself
a creature of the primary policy. The Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s policy announced that it was, under normal circumstances, a primary policy and would interact with other policies
as
a primary policy (“This insurance is primary except when
there is other insurance applying on a primary basis”
[italics added]). Further, the self-insured retention endorsement was, by its terms, a modification of what would otherwise be covered under the primary policy. (“This endorsement
modifies insurance provided
under the: Commercial
General Liability Coverage Part.” [Italics added.]) The linkage, between the primary insurance and the endorsement meant that it was not a case of the Stage 4 Primary Insurer’s coverage springing to life, fully bom, at the $25,000 lеvel. In the same vein, the Stage 4 Primary Insurer retained the right to step in and
settle
litigation
within
the retention. (See
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Ridout Roofing Co.
(1998)
If the insured wanted to go without any insurance post-March 2001 (we will avoid the “misnomer” of “self-insure”), the insured could simply have “gone bare” and not purchased any, primary or otherwise. Such a decision, of course, would have exposed the insured! s own assets to claims that otherwise might have been insured against except in cases of continuing loss, but that would be in accord with the essential deal between it and the excess insurer (in light of the rule articulated in Montrose IT): If the insured was truly bare and a claim was otherwise potentially covered by the excess policy, the excess would drоp down and cover it. Then again, the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer had essentially bet, back in 1995 and 1996, that the insured would not make any such decision precisely because it would mean exposure of the insured’s own assets to most claims, even if the odd continuous damage claim might entail a defense obligation on its part. 21
In sum, Aerojet-General’s statement that: “an ‘excess insurer’ does not have a duty to defend an insured until ‘primary insurance’ in the form of a so-called ‘self-insured retention’ is exhausted”
(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra,
17 Cal.4th at pp. 72-73, fn. 21) applies here. The statement obtains with just as much force even if the excess insurer’s “other insurance” clause does- not contain a direct reference to “self-insurance” (cf.
V. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover its costs on appeal.
Rylaarsdam, J., and Fybel, J., concurred.
Notes
“It is settled under California law that an excess or secondary policy does not cover a loss, nor does any duty to defend the insured arisе, until all of the primary insurance has been exhausted. . . . HQ The California general rule that all primary insurance must be exhausted before a secondary insurer will have exposure favors and results in what is called ‘horizontal exhaustion.’ ” (Community Redevelopment Agency v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 339, original italics.) Even so, a rule of drop-down upon “vertical exhaustion” is possible in California when a provision in an excess policy states specifically that it is excess over a “specifically described policy and will cover a claim when that specific primary policy is exhausted.” (Id. at p. 340, fn. 6.) The case before us, however, involves no such excess policy.
“Absent a provision in the excess policy
specifically describing
and
limiting,
the underlying insurance, a horizontal exhaustion rule should be applied in continuous loss cases because it is most consistent with the principles enunciated in
Montrose [Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co.
(1995)
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., supra,
This specific point is perhaps most clearly expressed in this passage on page 675 of
Montrose II, supra,
Here is the passage, which immediately follows a section discussing the rule of horizontal exhaustion and then raising the possibility of contribution claims between insurers: “Although there is no known authority on point, each [insurer] apparently is liable only in accordance with its own policy provisions. Thus, each should be able to invoke any deductibles, SIRs (self-insured retentions) and ‘per occurrence’ limits in its policy to control the amount that it must contribute. But a deductible or SIR apparently is not treated as ‘insurance’ which must be exhausted before any excess policies covering other policy ■ periods will attach.” (Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2006) 1 8:256, pp. 8-55 to 8-56, original italics.)
The suits were filed in June 2002 by the owners of two houses at the Crow Creek development in Castro Valley, where Padilla Construction had done plastering work. From the statement of stipulated facts: “Although the complaint alleged that virtually everything was wrong with the plaintiffs’ houses, investigation revealed that the primary issues involved foundation drainage problems, excessive crawl space moisture problems, and resulting damage, decay and mold contamination to the under-floor framing. Padilla’s work was implicated by allegations that the foundation vents at some locations were blocked with stucco.”
Technically, there is а difference between umbrella and excess policies. Umbrella coverage is a “type” of excess coverage, typically providing, as in the present case, for losses for which there may be no “underlying” insurance. The other type of excess coverage is “ ‘following form’ coverage” which, as the name indicates, follows the form of a specific underlying policy. Because umbrella insurance provides coverage “ ‘for certain losses for which there may be no underlying insurance,’ ” they provide “ ‘broader coverage than the underlying insurance.’ ”
(Century Indemnity Co. v. London Underwriters
(1993)
Since there is no issue as to notice or emphasis, in quoting policy language we will change any words in all capitals to normal capitalization.
“We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as ‘damages’ because of ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking those ‘damages,’ and we will pay all ‘covered expenses’ we incur with respect to such ‘suit,’ up to the limits of insurance. . . . [fj This insurance applies to ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ only if: [f] (1) The ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ is caused by an ‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘coverage territory’; and [j[] (2) The ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ occurs during the ‘policy period.’ ”
General Star Nat. Ins. Corp.
v.
World Oil Co.
(C.D.Cal. 1997)
See footnote 4, ante.
“To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.] To defend immediately, it must defend entirely. It cannot parse the claims, dividing those that are at least potentially covered from those that are not.”
(Buss
v.
Superior Court, supra,
Ironically, the underlying suit began when the insured filed an action baséd on the discharge of pollutants, but the insured soon found itself a cross-defendant when various defendants sued it for contribution for the same continuing damage.
One must keep in mind that a key part of the rationale in Buss was that the requirement to defend entirely was “law-imposed” as distinct from “contract-imposed." (See Buss v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 48-49.)
Thus answering Bishop Berkeley’s famous conundrum concerning falling trees, forests and sound, in the negative, at least in the context of insurance law.
On the other hand, by holding that the Stage 4 Primary Insurer had a duty to defend the underlying suit and its policy had to be exhausted before the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer had to drop down and defend that suit, we probably are saying something about a “hypothetical” equitable contribution action by the Stage 4 Primary Insurer against the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer. Then again, come to think of it, this case would merely be stealth contribution litigation by other means if it turned out that the Stage 4 Primary Insurer was really paying to press this action against the Stage 1 Umbrella Insurer—after-all, the insured received a proper defense from the Stage 4 Primary Insurer—-but that’s only speculation on this record.
For the eight-year period 1976 through 1984, the insured in
Aerojet-General
had what were are known as “fronting” policies, which really appear to be form of suretyship or bonding rather than insurance. Fronting policies of the kind described in
Aerojet-General
guarantee the claims of injured third parties with thе insured being liable to the fronting insurer for reimbursement of anything it might pay out by way of both indemnification and defense. (See
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra,
17 Cal.4th at pp. 49-50 & fn. 3; see also
Columbia Casualty Co.
v.
Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co.
(1991)
In
Nabisco,
there - was a primary policy which expressly made its coverage excess “if ‘there is other insurance or self-insurance.’ ”
(Nabisco, Inc.
v.
Transport Indemnity Co., supra,
The
City of Oxnard
case did not involve excess or umbrella policies as such—that is, the two policies at'issue there weren’t resting on top of a primary policy. Rather, they were resting on top of a specific self-insured retention, and were excess in the sense that “coverage was only available after Oxnard [the insured] became legally obligated for a loss in excess of its retained limit or SIR.”
(City of Oxnard v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., supra,
A point emphasized by the result in the
City of Oxnard,
case, and which also distinguishes the case before us from
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co.
(2000)
In supplemental briefing, the insured describes the possibility of an excess drop-down for the limited space of zero to $25,000 (because “there is no other primary insurance at that level”) as a “fallback argument.”
A corollary to the point that the self-insured retention is part and parcel of the later primary insurer’s policy is that the danger of an insured being able to “game” coverage from an earlier excess insurer by the simple expedient of having an SIR in a later primary policy is eliminated. The basic need of the insured to obtain a primary policy for most risks (which, after all, are of a noncontinuous nature) means that excess insurer could reasonably anticipate that the insured would continue to obtain primary coverage in the future. If the insured really wanted to “game” coverage from an earlier excess insurer, it would have to brave a multitude of other risks. = ’
