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Pacific Investment Management Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP
603 F.3d 144
2d Cir.
2010
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Costumes, Inc., non-prevailing party’s L.P. v. Morris 243 F.3d ness of the claims or (4th (2) Cir.2001); defenses; (3) motivation; party’s see also Knit waves, (Inc.), Lollytogs objec Inc. v. Ltd. 71 F.3d whether the claims or defenses were (2d Cir.1995). (4) 996, 1012 unreasonable; tively compensation Fogerty Fantasy, and deterrence. See determining When the amount of Inc., 510 U.S. 534 n. statutory damages to copyright award for (1994). 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 The third (1) infringement, courts in consider: objective unreasonableness— factor — (2) mind; fringer’s expenses state of given weight. should be substantial See saved, earned, profits by infringer; Co., Publ’g Matthew Bender & Co. v. West (3) the revenue lost the copyright hold (2d Cir.2001). 116, 122 240 F.3d (4) er; infring the deterrent effect on the (5) parties; infringer’s Here, er and third Appellees’ defenses were not ob- cooperation providing evidence concern Indeed, jectively Appellees unreasonable. material; ing the value of the infringing prevailed on important several issues. Ap- (6) the conduct and attitude of the pellees trying also were reasonable in parties. Impor. See N.A.S. Corp. v. Chen Appellees resolve the case short of trial: Enter., Inc., (2d son 252-53 made an Judgment Offer the amount Cir.1992). $3000, rejected, Appellants which fa- vor of continuing to demand over mil- $1 The District Court awarded total of lion in damages, notwithstanding the evi- in statutory damages, based on $2400 its dence that Appellees had received less finding Appellees’ profits in- from than in revenues from infringing $600 fringing sales of the songs Albums and sales. meager,8 were and that the award did not higher deterrence, need to be to achieve circumstances, In these the District because deterrence was effectuated here Court did not abuse its discretion de- by Appellees having pay their own at- clining attorneys’ to award fees. torneys fees. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion calcu- III. Conclusion lating statutory damages. above,

For the reasons stated the order D. The District Court is AFFIRMED. District Court’s Decision Not Attorneys’

to Award Fees

Section 505 of the Copyright Act

provides that a district court may “in its ...

discretion award a reasonable attor

neys fee to the prevailing party” copy

right action. 17 U.S.C. 505. The Dis

trict Court declined to Appellants award

attorneys fees. PACIFIC INVESTMENT MANAGE

When determining whether to MENT Capi COMPANY and RH LLC fees, attorneys award may LLC, district Plaintiffs-Appel courts tal Associates lants, consider such factors as the frivolous- Appellants support contended that revenues must their claim. higher, have been but offered no evidence to *2 Investment Funds: Pacific

PIMCO Al., Series,

Management Et

Plaintiffs, Joseph LLP and P.

MAYER BROWN Defendants-Appellees,

Collins, Al., Inc., Defendants.* Et

Refco

Docket No. 09-1619-cv. Appeals, Court of States

United Circuit.

Second 14, 2009.

Argued: Dec. April

Decided: parties stated above. is directed to amend *The Clerk of Court listing caption to conform to official *3 NY, defendant-appellee Joseph P. for Col- lins. Paik, Special Counsel

Christopher (David Becker, Counsel, and M. General Stillman, Solicitor, brief), Jacob H. Commission, Exchange Securities DC, amicus curiae the Washington, Exchange Commission. Securities *4 (Donald Ayer B. and Cooper David M. Romatowski, brief), on the Jones Peter J. York, NY, DC, Washington, and Day, New support Law Firms in of for amicus curiae appellees. Jaffe, P.C., Jaffe,

Erik Erik S. S. Wash- DC, amicus curiae former ington, for SEC Officials, Law Fi- Commissioners and Professors, and Law nance Securities in support appellees. Practitioners of (Brian Faughnan, Lucian T. Pera S. on Reese, LLP, brief), the Adams and Mem- (Susan Hackett, phis, TN Senior Vice (Stuart Grant, M. J. Sabella James Counsel, President and General Associa- Megan McIntyre, D. Szydlo, F. Brenda Counsel, Corporate Washington, of tion Mackintosh, M. on the and Christine brief), DC, curiae on the for amicus Associ- P.A., brief), Eisenhoffer New Grant & of Corporate support ation of Counsel DE, York, NY, plain- for Wilmington, appellees. Manage- Investment tiff-appellant Pacific (Lawrence Robbins, Gary A. Orseck S. Company LLC. ment Untereiner, Alan E. Kath- Roy Englert, T. (Salvatore Graziano, Coffey J. John P. Taaffe, Zecca, and Damon W. on erine S. Browne, Weiss, Ann M. Elliott John C. Russell, brief), Robbins, Englert, Or- Robinson, on the Jeremy P. Lipton, LLP, seck, Untereiner & Sauber Washing- brief), Berger Litowitz & Gross- Bernstein (Robin ton, and Amar D. S. Conrad DC LLP, York, NY, plaintiff- for mann New Sarwal, Litigation National Chamber Cen- Capital RH Associates LLC. appellant brief), ter, DC, on the Washington, (George A. Borden and K. Villa John of curiae of Commerce amicus Chamber brief), Singer, Williams & Craig D. on support of States America United DC, LLP, Washington, for defen- Connolly appellees. LLP. Mayer Brown dant-appellee (Jonathan PARKER, P. Bach Before: CABRANES and William J. Schwartz AMON, District brief), Judges, and Circuit Cassidy, Kathleen E. York, LLP, Judge.** New Cooley Godward Kronish

** York, Amon, by designation. sitting of New B. of the United The Honorable Carol District Court for the Eastern States District

Judge parties pur- PARKER concurs in the tween Refco and third for the opinion pose concealing court judgment and Refco’s uncollectible (2) concurring opinion. portions debt and drafted of Refco’s separate and files a security offering documents that contained CABRANES, A. Judge: JOSÉ Circuit false information. Although defendants al- presents primarily two appeal This legedly created false statements that in- about questions scope of federal securi upon, relied all vestors of those statements 10(b) whether, § ties laws: under Refco, Mayer were attributed to and not (“Ex Exchange the Securities Act of 1934 Collins, at Brown or the time of dissemina- Act”), § change 78j(b), 15 U.S.C. and Se tion. Exchange curities and Commission Rule that a secondary We hold actor1 (“Rule 5”), 17 10b-5 C.F.R. 10b— private can liable in a damages be held 240.10b-5, corporation’s outside coun 10b-5(b) brought pursuant action to Rule sel can be liable for false only for false statements attributed to the create, attorneys allegedly those but which secondary-actor defendant at the time of *5 firm were attributed to law or its attribution, dissemination. plain Absent attorneys at time the statements were they tiffs cannot show relied on defen (2) disseminated; plaintiffs’ and whether statements, dants’ own false partic and claims that in participated defendants ipation in the creation of those statements scheme to defraud investors are foreclosed amounts, most, aiding at to abetting and Court’s decision Stoner securities fraud. We further hold that Partners, idge Investment LLC v. Scienti plaintiffs’ claims that partici defendants Inc.,

fic-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 128 S.Ct. pated in a scheme to defraud investors are (2008). 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 not meaningfully distinguishable from the Plaintiffs-appellants, Pacific Investment claim at issue in Stoneridge, and therefore Management Company Cap- LLC and RH properly were dismissed. ital Associates (jointly, “plaintiffs”) LLC appeal judgment from a of the United BACKGROUND States District Court the Southern Dis- (Gerard trict of Lynch, New York E. In reviewing the District Court’s dis Judge) dismissing their against claims de- missal an action pursuant of to Fed. fendants-appellees Mayer 12(b)(6), LLP Brown R.Civ.P. accept as true the Brown”), firm, (“Mayer Joseph a law following noneonclusory allegations set (“Collins”), P. partner Collins former forth in Second Amended Com , — Mayer Plaintiffs Brown. alleged plaint. that de- Iqbal See v. U.S. Ashcroft -, 1937, 1949-50, fendants violated federal securities laws 129 S.Ct. 173 L.Ed.2d (2009); the course of representing Street, the now-bank- 868 Cherry South LLC (“Refco”). rupt brokerage LLC, firm Refco Inc. Group Hennessee (2d Cir.2009). Specifically, they claimed that defendants This case arises from the (1) Refeo, facilitated fraudulent transactions collapse be- 2005 of which was once one “secondary 1. We use the term suppliers); actor” to refer firm’s customers and Central Bank (such defendants), accountants, lawyers to Denver, as N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of parties employed by or other who are not Denver, N.A., 164, 191, 511 U.S. issuing subject firm whose securities are the (1994) (characterizing 128 L.Ed.2d 119 allegations Stoneridge, of fraud. See accountants], "lawyer[s], bank[s]” as "sec- (using U.S. at 128 S.Ct. 761 the term actors”). ondary "[sjecondary issuing actors” to refer to an that, circular transactions was at the of broker- these providers largest of the world’s Refco periods, reported of financial interna- end in the clearing services age and it various third receivables owed to derivatives, and futures currency, tional entity rather than the related parties Mayer According plaintiffs, markets. RGHI. outside primary Refco’s served as Brown company’s col- until the from 1994 counsel Mayer participated Brown and Collins Brown, Collins, Mayer partner

lapse. transactions seventeen of these sham loan Refco contact with primary the firm’s was 2005, representing 2000 and both between charge of the billing partner According plaintiffs, Refco and RGHI. Refco was a lucrative account. Refco negotiat- included defendants’ involvement larg- Mayer Brown and Collins’ client for loans, drafting of the ing the terms client. personal est relating the documents to the revising loans, transmitting the documents to the model, Refco part of its business As custody participants, retaining of and customers so that credit to its extended copies doc- distributing the executed “margin”- i.e., trade trade on they could — uments. from money borrowed in securities 1990s, In Refco customers Refco. the late allege Plaintiffs also that defendants are trading losses and conse- massive suffered responsible appearing for false statements repay hundreds of quently were unable Offering in three Refco documents: an margin loans extend- millions of dollars an unregistered Memorandum for bond of- properly by Refco. Concerned fering July (“Offering ed Memoran- *6 (2) “write-offs” accounting dum”), for these debts as Registration a Statement for a survival, company’s registered offering threaten the subsequent would bond Refco, Statement”), help with the of defen- allegedly Reg- and a (“Registration dants, arranged a series of sham transac- pub- for Refco’s initial istration Statement designed to conceal the losses. in offering August tions lic of common stock (“IPO Statement”). Registration that Refco plaintiffs allege Specifically, contained false Each of these documents uncollectible debts to Refco transferred its they misleading statements because (“RGHI”) entity Inc. Group Holdings, —an to disclose the true nature of Refco’s failed by controlled Refco’s Chief Executive Offi- condition, financial which had been con- purport- exchange cer-—in receivable cealed, part, through the loan transac- Recog- edly from RGHI to Refco. owed tions described above. debt owed to it nizing large allegedly participated Defendants entity suspicion arouse related would Refco, contained allegedly creation of the false statements regulators, and investors defendants, above. in a in each of the documents identified help engaged with the of attorneys Mayer and Brown at the end Collins other of sham loan transactions series portions of year pay allegedly reviewed and revised quarter and each fiscal to of each Offering Memorandum and attended It did so off the RGHI receivable. another drafting Collins and parties, third who then sessions. loaning money to RGHI, attorney personally also Mayer which Brown the same amount loaned Discussion & Management off Refco’s drafted pay in turn used the funds to (“MD A”) portion of the Offer- Analysis & Days period after the fiscal receivable. which, Memorandum, according to

closed, ing repaid all of the loans were and Refco’s business and discussed paid plaintiffs, a fee for their parties third were way in a that defen- financial condition in the scheme. The result participation Offering provide private right dants knew to be false. The' securities laws no Memorandum was used as the foundation action. See id. at 311-14. The District Statement, Registration for the which was plaintiffs’ Court also dismissed Rule 10b- substantially 5(a) (c) similar content. Accord- liability” claims for “scheme further ing plaintiffs, defendants assist- upon concluding that the Court’s preparation Registration ed in the of the Stonevidge decision in foreclosed theo- by reviewing comment letters Statement ry liability. id. at Finally, See 314-19. Exchange from the Securities and Com- the District Court dismissed (“SEC”) participating mission in draft- 20(a) § plaintiffs claims because failed ade- ing Finally, plaintiffs allege sessions. quately plead an underlying violation of directly defendants were in re- involved federal securities law. id. at See viewing Registration the IPO received, they pre- Statement because DISCUSSION reviewed, sumably the SEC’s comments on filing. We review de novo a District Court’s Offering Both the Memorandum and the claim, dismissal for failure to state a see Registration IPO note that Statement 12(b)(6), assuming Fed.R.Civ.P. all well- Mayer represented Brown Refco in con- pleaded, nonconclusory allegations factual nection with those Reg- transactions. The complaint to be true. See Ashcroft — istration Statement does not mention -, Iqbal, U.S. S.Ct. Mayer Brown. None of the documents 1949-50, (2009); 173 L.Ed.2d 868 Selevan specifically any attribute of the informa- Auth., (2d v. N.Y. Thruway Mayer tion contained therein to Brown or Cir.2009). Collins. appeal This scope concerns the of the Plaintiffs, purchased who securities from private right of action available under during Refco period that defendants 10(b) Exchange Act and Rule fraud, allegedly engaging were com- (hereinafter, 10b-5 liability”). “Rule 10b-5 *7 menced this action after Refco declared 10(b) Section makes it unlawful any “for bankruptcy They in 2005. asserted claims person, directly indirectly, or ... [t]o use 10(b) § for violation of Exchange of the employ, or in connection with purchase the Act and Rule promulgated 10b-5 thereun- ..., or any security any sale of manipu- der, along with person” claims for “control deceptive lative or device or in contrivance 20(a) liability § under of the Exchange contravention of regulations such rules and 78t(a). Act, § 15 U.S.C. as the and Exchange] [Securities Commis- The District Court dismissed may sion prescribe.” 78j(b). § 15 U.S.C. against Mayer claims Brown and Collins 10b-5, thereunder, Rule promulgated pro- 12(b)(6). pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. See In vides as follows: Refco, re Litig., Inc. Sec. 609 F.Supp.2d It shall any person, be unlawful for di- (S.D.N.Y.2009). respect plain- With to rectly or indirectly, by any the use of tiffs’ claim that defendants violated Rule instrumentality means or of interstate 10b-5(b) by drafting portions and revising commerce, any or of the mails or of public documents, of Refco’s the Court facility any national securities ex-

found that no those docu- change, ments were attributed to defendants and (a) plaintiffs that had alleged device, scheme, therefore con- To employ any or duct akin to aiding abetting, defraud, for which artifice to

(b) of which were not attributed to them the any make untrue statement To disseminated; fact or to omit to state a time the statements a material were (2) necessary allegations fact order the in the com- material whether made, in the the statements to state a claim for plaint make are sufficient 10b-5(a) circumstances under which light liability” “scheme under Rule made, misleading, (c).2 or they were

(a) act, any practice, or engage To operates which or course of business 5(b) I. Plaintiffs’ Rule Claim 10b— as a fraud or deceit operate would Plaintiffs the District assert any person, upon in holding attorneys Court erred who or purchase sale connection with participate in the of false state any security. in a dam private ments cannot be liable § 240.10b-5. C.F.R. if ages action the statements are not at that, Supreme Court has held The attorneys tributed to those at the time of private damages maintain a action under Along with the dissemination. SEC as 10(b) 10b-5, and Rule curiae, plaintiffs argue that attri amicus (1) a material plaintiff prove must only by bution is one means which attor or omission the de- misrepresentation neys and other actors can incur (3) (2) fendant; scienter; a connection liability They urge fraud. securities us or misrepresentation between the omis- adopt a “creator standard” and hold or sale of a securi- purchase sion and creating that a defendant can be liable for (4) misrepresenta- ty; upon reliance on, rely a false statement investors (5) loss; omission; economic tion or regardless whether statement (6) loss causation. attributed to the defendant at the time of Stoneridge, 552 U.S. SEC, According dissemination. to the “[a] Broudo, Pharm., Inc. v. (citing Dura if person creates a statement ... U.S. L.Ed.2d 577 336, 341-42, 125 S.Ct. (2005)). statement or [2] if he [1] provides is written or the false or spoken misleading him, person puts information that another then primarily two issues appeal This raises regarding scope of Rule 10b-5 into statement, [3] if he allows the whether defendants statement to be attributed to him.” Brief private actions: 10b-5(b) Supporting can be under Rule for false for SEC as Amicus Curiae liable (“SEC Br.”) drafted, *8 at 7.3 they allegedly Plaintiffs-Appellants that but nothing § emphasize opinion able under 10b and Rule 10b-5 are entitled 2. We that this liability respect Piper v. scope to to little or no deference. See Chris- limits the Indus., Inc., 1, 27, actions, 430 U.S. 42 n. government 97 enforcement whether Craft 926, ("[The S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 124 opinion civil or criminal in nature. This re- 'expertise' presumed in the securities- only SEC’s] lates to actions under Rule 10b-5 value the law field is of limited when narrow brought by private individuals. legal peculiarly judi- issue is one reserved for resolution, namely Although urges adopt to a so- cial whether a cause of 3. the SEC us standard,” judicial position implied by interpre- called "creator it takes no action should be allegations complaint particular of liti- the in the tation in favor of a class on whether Indeed, gants. prior relating in our cases are sufficient to maintain a cause of action action, against Mayer implied the Court has under- under that standard Brown or causes of standably We not invoked the 'administrative def- Collins. SEC Br. at 5. note at the outset rule, supported scope of the erence’ even when the SEC the SEC's views on the case.”). right particular judicially implied of action avail- the result reached in the created 152 that, independent appraisal property our of the real respond

Defendants under 167-68, the at securing bonds. Id. attorneys participate who precedents, reviewing S.Ct. 1439. After the text and cannot of false statements be 10(b), history §of the Supreme Court con- at explicit attribution liable absent cluded that “the [Exchange Act] does Without attribu- time of dissemination. reach not itself those who aid contend, and abet a tion, secondary actors defendants 10(b) 177, violation.” Id. at primary violation of Rule do not commit otherwise, To it explained, hold 10b-5(b) amounts, and their conduct “impose liability would be to ... when at most, aiding abetting. recovery least one element critical for un- requires claims Analyzing parties’ 180, der 10b-5 is absent: reliance.” Id. at history requirement brief of the attribution 114 S.Ct. 1439. Although in our Circuit. we have often Despite holding Rule 10b-5 required for held that attribution is sec- abettors, does not extend to aiders and ondary liability, actors to incur we have for Supreme acknowledged Court imposed certain other defendants no attri- could, in “secondary actors” some circum- requirement. Compare Wright bution v. stances, still be for liable fraudulent con- LLP, 169, Young Ernst & 152 F.3d 174-75 Specifi- duct. Id. S.Ct. 1439. (2d Cir.1998) (requiring for out- attribution cally, explained the Court defendants), accountant side and Lattan- [a]ny person entity, including or a law- LLP, v. zio Deloitte & Touche 476 F.3d accountant, bank, yer, employs who (2d Cir.2007) (same), with In re manipulative device or makes a material Corp. Litig., Scholastic Sec. (or omission) misstatement on which a (2d (not Cir.2001) requiring 75-76 attribu- purchaser or seller of securities relies defendant). corporate tion for insider may primary be liable as a violator un- Upon reviewing history guid- this and the 10b-5, assuming der require- all of the provided by Court, ance primary liability ments for under Rule conclude that required attribution is are In any complex 10b-5 met. securi- private actors to liable in a be fraud, moreover, ties likely there are damages action for securities fraud under multiple be violators.... Rule 10b-5. (citation omitted).

Id. History A. Attribution Re- We considered the effect of Central

quirement private Bank litigation securities against secondary in Shapiro actors primary liability The distinction between Cantor, (2d Cir.1997). 123 F.3d 717 Sha- under Rule aiding abetting 10b-5 and piro against involved the accounting claims especially important became after the Su- firm Deloitte & Touche and predeces- its preme Court’s decision Central alleged complicity sor-in-interest for in the Denver, Bank N.A. v. First Interstate deceptive partnership. conduct of a limited Denver, N.A., Bank 511 U.S. *9 plaintiffs Id. at 718-19. We held that 1439, (1994). S.Ct. 128 L.Ed.2d 119 That to primary failed state a claim for a viola- by case involved the issuance of a bonds against tion of laws securities Deloitte & public building authority plaintiffs’ al- Touche because Denver, legations that Central Bank of issues, indenture [a]llegations “assisting,” “participat- trustee the bond aid- in,” ed and in committing ing “complicity syn- abetted issuer in” and similar by agreeing delay onyms securities fraud to an throughout complaint used all

153 insufficient); prospectuses Vosgerichian bar of Central prohibitive fall within 10(b) International, 862 allege must Commodore A claim under Bank. (E.D.Pa.1994) (alle- 1371, F.Supp. mis- 1378 has a material a made defendant gations an in- that accountant ‘advised’ and indicating or omission statement ‘guid[ed]’ making allegedly client in connection to deceive defraud tent misrepresentations insuffi- security. of a fraudulent purchase or sale cient). (footnote omitted); also 720-21 see Id. at (“[I]f par have Other courts held third 720 Central Bank is to have

id. at may primarily ties be liable for state a defendant must actual- any meaning, real by made in which the de misleading statement in ments others ly make a false or 10(b). significant participation. fendant had to be held liable under Section order See, Toolworks, merely e.g., In re 50 short of such conduct is Anything Software (ac (9th Cir.1994) F.3d n. 3 abetting, and no matter how 628 aiding and be, may primarily countant may it is not be liable based substantial aid ‘significant on its role in trigger liability to under Section enough 10(b).” editing’ a letter sent the issuer to the (quoting In re MTC Elec. Techs. SEC); In re ZZZZ Best Securities Liti Litig., F.Supp. 898 987 Shareholders (C.D.Cal. (E.D.N.Y.1995))). gation, F.Supp. 1994) (an accounting firm that ‘intri was that Central Bank re- principle The cately involved’ the creation of false the attribution of false statements quires ‘resulting decep documents and their at the time of dissemina- to the defendant primary tion’ is a violator of section 1998 decision in appeared tion first our 10(b)).” LLP, F.3d Young v. Ernst & Wright Wright against Elec., at involved claims (quoting MTC Id. 174-75 Young 986) (alterations omitted). firm Ernst & and alle- accounting F.Supp. at We orally approved the firm gations that, in had Shapiro, we followed the noted misleading financial corporation’s false and “bright approach. line” Id. We therefore statements, subsequently were dis- which that “a actor cannot incur held Id. at 171. public. seminated to the primary liability under for a [Rule 5] 10b— statement not attributed to actor Bank, that, after explained We Central Wright the time of its dissemination.” Id. generally adopted had either courts also made clear that attribution is neces- partic- “bright line” test or “substantial sary satisfy the reliance element of a pri- ipation” distinguish test between private damages action under Rule 10b-5. aiding mary violations of Rule 10b-5 (“Reliance only representations Id. abetting: form the made others cannot itself ba- held that a third “Some courts have (alteration liability.” and internal sis of approval review and of docu- party’s omitted)). Because the quotation marks containing ments fraudulent on which misrepresentations 10(b) not actionable under Section be- claims were based were attributed one must make the material mis- cause Young, complaint held that the Ernst & to be a or omission order statement state a claim under Rule 10b-5. failed to See, primary e.g., violator. In re Ken- Id. Secu- Square Corporation dall Research re- Despite Wright’s seemingly clear Litigation, F.Supp. rities (accountant’s (D.Mass.1994) attrib- quirement that false statements be ‘review and *10 defendant, subsequent our de- uted to the approval’ of financial statements and 154 (2d Kasaks, 300, uncertainty or Novak v. 314 may have created

cisions Cir.2000). Scholastic, ambiguity respect with to when attribution Like these cases did 2001, required. In in In re Scholastic Wright not cite or Central Bank. a Corp. Litigation, we held that Securities Notwithstanding uncertainty this re-we for corporate officer could be liable mis- cently importance confirmed the of attribu- representations by corporation, made against secondary tion for claims actors. notwithstanding the fact that none of the Touche, In in Lattanzio v. Deloitte & specifically at- statements issue were accounting we considered claims that the tributed to him. 252 F.3d 75-76. We had, alia, firm & Deloitte Touche inter fi- explained president that as “vice for approved and or misleading reviewed false nance and relations” the defen- investor quarterly public statements issued primarily responsible dant “was Scho- company. 476 at 151-52. F.3d We held lastic’s communications with investors and against that “to state a 10b claim an industry analysts. He was involved accountant, plaintiff issuer’s allege must drafting, reviewing producing, dis- and/or a misstatement that is attributed to the seminating of the misleading false and ‘at accountant the time of its dissemina- during statements issued Scholastic tion,’ rely and cannot on the accountant’s basis, period.” class Id. On that we al- alleged drafting compi- assistance in the or against lowed claims the defen- filing.” (quoting lation of a Id. at 153 proceed. opinion dant to Our Scholastic 174). Wright, 152 explained F.3d at We on, cite, rely did not or Wright even imposing liability that on accountants who Central Bank and contained no discussion approve misleading review and primary of the distinction between viola- contrary Wright’s rejection would be tions of Rule and aiding 10b-5 and abet- participation” the “substantial test. Id. at ting. against Because the claims Deloitte Scholastic, Since district courts in our & Touche were not based on the “account- have struggled Circuit to reconcile its statement,” ant’s articulated we held that holding our holding Wright. earlier Rule 10b-5 did not extend to the See, e.g., In Group, re Warnaco Inc. Sec. (“Under defendants. Id. at 154 Central Litig., F.Supp.2d 314-15 n. 3 Bank, Deloitte is not merely liable for (S.D.N.Y.2005) (distinguishing Scholastic assisting filing Wright from ground that the for added)). quarterly (emphasis statements.” mer involved “a corporate insider rather actor”), than an outside sub nom. aff'd B. Creator Standard v. Attribution Lattanzio, 147; Crossing F.3d Global Standard Litig., F.Supp.2d Ltd. Sec.

(S.D.N.Y.2004) J.) urge Plaintiffs and the to adopt SEC us (Lynch, (discussing the require “creator” standard that would us Wright tension between and Scholastic to hold that a defendant can be liable for noting that might “Scholastic indicate creating a false statement investors Wright’s some relaxation of [attribution] on, rely regardless of whether that state- requirement”). Several of our decisions ment have is attributed to the defendant at the corporate also held officers can They time of provided argue be liable for false information dissemination. by analysts, proposed their standard is consistent with disseminated even if no They corporate distinguish statements are attributed to the the law of the Circuit. Wright ground officers themselves. See Rombach v. on the Lattanzio (2d Chang, Cir.2004); F.3d the defendants in those cases were not

155 explicitly adopted by secondary the false state- been created alleged to have rather, merely re- actor. See id. question, but ments by others. created false statements viewed that, 1. Attribution Is Consistent with not- the SEC contend

Plaintiffs Stoneridge language sug- withstanding the broad always required, these attribution is gests Supreme directly has never The Court a holding that de- are best read as cases addressed whether attribution at the time a if he or she creates can be liable fendant required secondary is of dissemination a or allows misleading statement false in a private damages actors to be liable him or to be attributed to false statement brought pursuant action to Rule 10b-5. support some position Their finds her. Nevertheless, the Court’s recent decision recent cases. See from one of our dicta Stoneridge is instructive. Finnerty, 533 F.3d States v. United Supreme The Court’s focus on reliance (2d Cir.2008) (describing Wright as rule, a Stoneridge favors such as attri Bank, a defen- holding that “under Central bution, designed preserve that is primary liability’ incur for a dant ‘cannot private right element of the of action avail by him nor ‘attrib- neither made statement Wright, able under Rule 10b-5. See the time of its dissemina- uted to at [him] (noting F.3d at 175 that an attribution ” added) (quoting Wright, (emphasis tion’ requirement prevents plaintiffs from “cir 175)). at cumventfing] requirements the reliance Notwithstanding the dicta United Act”). [Exchange] In Stoneridge, reject the creator Finnerty, States v. we dealt primarily deceptive which con secondary actor un- standard for statements, duct rather than false An require- Rule 10b-5. attribution der rejected brought pursuant claims Court ment more consistent with the is against issuing Rule 10b-5 an firm’s cus of sec- guidance question Court’s on the 153, 128 suppliers. tomers and at U.S. Furthermore, ondary liability. actor a 761. The Court held that S.Ct. indistinguishable standard is from creator failed as a matter of law because claims participation” the “substantial test they not plaintiffs could demonstrate it Wright, since have disavowed upon deceptive oivn “reified] [defendants’] incompatible preference with our stated issuing conduct” and because was “[i]t [the “bright Wright, for a line” rule. See Charter, [defendants], that mis- firm] F.3d led auditor and filed fraudulent finan- its 160-61, secondary cial Id. at Accordingly, actors statements.” 128 S.Ct. added); (emphasis in a action under Rule id. at private can be liable (“Reliance by plaintiff upon that are only 10b-5 for those statements deceptive them. The mere acts is an essential explicitly attributed to defendant’s ac- secondary being private a actor as element of the 10b cause of identification of added)). transaction, (emphasis tion.” We think that public’s involved in a or the secondary reasoning actor “is is consistent with an attribution understanding that a requirement in the context of claims based the scenes” are alone insuf work behind Lattanzio, plaintiff If a must 476 F.3d at 155. on false statements. ficient. See secondary deceptive a own against rely claim on actor’s cognizable, plaintiffs To be a claim Rule on that conduct to state under 10b- secondary actor must be based 5(a) (c), statement,” it to reason that a or on stands actor’s own “articulated plaintiff rely must also made another that have *12 156 added) phases (quoting not a district court’s deceptive statements —and

actor’s own Toolworks, conveyed public description to the of In re on statements Software (9th Cir.1994) 615, source and not attributed n. through another and In a claim under state ZZZZ Litigation, to the defendant —to re Best Securities 5(b). (C.D.Cal.1994)). Rule F.Supp. We 10b— however, explain, went on to that the Sec- Stoneridge generally, More rejected had a substantial par- ond Circuit that reliance is proposition stands for the a ticipation bright test favor of line rule. private actions un element the critical Id. proposition, general This der Rule 10b-5. secondary issue of specific applied to A effectively creator standard is supports an attribu liability, actor further indistinguishable partic from a substantial necessary Attribution requirement. tion SEC, ipation According test. to the are reliance. Where statements show liability creator standard would extend a well-known nation publicly attributed to secondary “supplied actors who the writer firm, accounting buyers al and sell law or misleading with false or information” or (and general ers of securities the market “ a misleading ‘caused’ false or statement likely accuracy ly) are more to credit the if be made”-—even the statement dis of the of those statements. Because firm’s seminated to the public made no mention may imprimatur, individuals be comforted Br. at 10.4 defendant. SEC As supposedly impartial assessment Lattanzio, however, explained a and, accordingly, purchase be induced to a “[pjublic understanding secondary that [a security. explicit attri particular Without is at work actor] behind the scenes does firm, however, bution to the reliance on not an exception requirement create to the only participation can be shown firm’s that an actionable misstatement made be “an chain ... through indirect too remote [secondary actor]” “[u]nless liability.” Stoneridge, 552 U.S. public’s understanding is based on the 128 S.Ct. 761. statement, [secondary articulated actor’s] understanding the source for that ... does 2. Attribution Is Consistent with Our (emphasis not matter.” 476 F.3d at 155 “Bright Approach Line” added). Insofar as a creator standard championed by The creator standard actors, impose liability secondary would on plaintiffs and the SEC cannot be recon- here, such as defendants for their role in rejection ciled our unambiguous of a drafting editing false documents on participation” “substantial test in favor of firm, issuing behalf of an it mark a would a In bright Wright, line rule. we noted departure precedents. radical from our applying some courts substantial participation imposed liability test had An requirement, attribution on the hand, “signifi- actors based on their prefer other is consistent with our cant role in editing” bright distinguishing false ence for a line rule “ in- primary documents or them violations of Rule 10b-5 from aid ] ‘intricate! ing abetting. in the creation of false docu- Wright, volv[ment]’ See 152 F.3d at (em- that, Wright, (explaining Shapiro, ments.” See 152 F.3d at 175 we fol- “[i]n statements, many 4. In circumstances creator standard ment in the creation of false rigorous "substantial,” would be even less than the substan- merely "significant,” or "intri- test, participation tial insofar as defendant cate” involvement. any could incur for almost involve- test”). professional, among An others.” Id. at ‘bright line’ attribu- lowed the Uncertainty makes clear—to second- 114 also requirement tion S.Ct. increases *13 alike—that those ary actors and investors doing raising the costs of business and allow a statement to sign or otherwise Winter, who capital. Ralph K. Paying See expose to them themselves to be attributed Prosecutors, Lawyers, Empowering and beyond do not are the liability. Those who Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of right of ac- private of Rule 10b-5’s reach America, 945, 42 Capital in Duke L.J. 962 A establishes no tion. creator standard (1993) (describing “the need to avoid over- violators boundary primary between clear amorphous broad and doctrine and to craft abettors, and it is uncertain and aiders and legal bright rules with lines as a means of expose an might what level of involvement reducing capital” explaining the cost of and liability. the Even SEC individual “[ojverbreadth uncertainty and deter of precise to define the contours struggles costly litiga- beneficial conduct and breed standard, noting person that a the creator added)), (emphasis approv- tion” cited with cause a misstatement arguably “would not Bank, al 511 114 in Central U.S. advice to another merely gave where he 14395; Bank, see also Central 511 S.Ct. required was to be regarding what person (“[A] shifting U.S. S.Ct. made an person and then that disclosed highly disposition fact-oriented of and choice to follow the advice.” independent may damages issue of who be liable for added). (emphasis Br. at 10-11 SEC claim for violation of Rule is 10b-5 not an attribution bright rule, A line rule such as satisfactory liability basis for a of many ap- also has benefits requirement imposed on the conduct of business trans- requirement An attribution is plication. (internal quotation actions.” marks and apply courts to relatively easy for district omitted)). A brackets creator standard protracted litigation and discov- and avoids inevitably uncertainty would lead to re- identity of learning aimed at each ery scope garding of Rule 10b-5 connection, entity that had some person or potentially and deter beneficial conduct. tenuous, to the creation of an however (“[Ojverdeter- Winter, ante, at See Furthermore, allegedly false statement. regulating capital ... rence markets explained, has secu- as the Court activity deter that we wish to encour- will certain- law is “an area that demands rities age.”). Bank, ty predictability.” Central reasons, foregoing we conclude For (quoting U.S. at S.Ct. 1439 Pinter Wright that even if and Lattanzio were Dahl, 622, 652, 486 U.S. explicitly require not read attribution in (1988)). Uncertainty can 100 L.Ed.2d 658 case, every requirement an attribution is many consequences, lead to undesirable prefer- most consistent with our Circuit’s compa- example, newer and smaller “[f]or bright approach ence for a line to the may find it difficult to obtain advice nies liability. question secondary actor Ac- professional may A professionals. from cordingly, reject we the creator standard may company fear that a newer or smaller plaintiffs would advanced and the SEC and that business failure survive Wright litigation against jurisprudence reaffirm our generate securities prosecu- prosecutors these Judge explained that culture of “[t]he Winter has SEC) (including palpably law to seek rules that are regulators have areas of tors and they overbroad so that have a broad arsenal rules that “would have rendered often favored more, less, against suspected wrong- weapons to use capital rather than effi- markets Winter, ante, doers”). (explaining at 962 cient.” See any ac the author of of the docu- namely, secondary portion that “a Lattanzio — primary liability incur under ments. Nor can the mere mention of the tor cannot representation not attributed of Refco be for a statement firm’s consid- [Rule 10b-5] by Mayer to that actor at the time of its dissemina ered an “articulated statement” 175; Wright, adopting tion.” 152 F.3d at see Lat Brown Refco’s statements as its (“Under tanzio, Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 154 Central own. See 476 F.3d at 155. Ab- Bank, attribution, plaintiffs is not liable for sent such cannot actor] [a filing any Mayer in the merely assisting *14 show reliance statements statements].”).6 154; [allegedly Wright, of false See id. at Brown.

at 175. Application Re-

C. of Attribution 10b-5(a) (c)

quirement II. Plaintiffs’ Rule and (“Scheme Liability”) Claims Applying the attribution standard alleged misleading to the false and state The District Court dismissed case, 10b-5(a) (c) ments in this we conclude that the Rule plaintiffs’ and claims on properly District Court dismissed plain ground Supreme that the Court’s deci 10b-5(b) against Mayer tiffs’ Rule claims Stoneridge plaintiffs’ sion in foreclosed Brown and Collins. No statements in the theory liability.” agree of “scheme We Memorandum, Offering Registration adopt with the District Court and we its Statement, Registration or the IPO State analysis careful claims Collins, ment are attributed to and he is 10b-5(a) (c). brought pursuant to Rule not any even mentioned name Refco, F.Supp.2d See In re at 314-19. Accordingly, plaintiffs those documents. Stoneridge, plaintiffs In sought to hold any cannot show reliance on of Collins’ companies two participation liable for their Lattanzio, statements. See 476 F.3d at in sham transactions that an allowed issuer 154; Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (imposing of securities overstate its revenue. 552 secondary on actors absent attri 153-55, U.S. at 128 S.Ct. 761. Although bution “would circumvent the reliance re the defendants’ deceptive conduct was 10b]”). quirement of [§ enabled the issuer to misrepre- conceal the statements, sentations its financial Offering The Memorandum and Supreme Court found the essential Registration the IPO Statement note that element of reliance was absent. Id. at Mayer Brown, counsel, among other repre explained 128 S.Ct. 761. It sented Refco connection with those transactions but neither document attrib deceptive acts were not [defendants’] any particular Mayer utes public. communicated to the No mem- Mayer Brown. Brown investing is not identified as ber of the public had knowl- appeal liability, Wright’s Because this does not involve claims Scholastic did not relax at- insiders, Lattanzio, against corporate requirement. we intimate no tribution See ("Public required view on understanding whether attribution is for at F.3d that an such claims or whether Scholastic can be accountant is at work behind the scenes does meaningfully distinguished Wright exception requirement from not create an to the may justifiable There be a basis that an actionable misstatement be made Lattanzio. holding rely for public’s that investors on the role the accountant. Unless the under- corporate play issuing public standing executives is based the accountant's articu- statement, explicit statements even in the absence of lated the source for that under- confirmed, however, (footnote standing attribution. ... does not matter." Lattanzio that, omitted) added)). respect at least (emphasis actor place in the presumed, marketplace goods [de- actual or edge, either during services, acts deceptive sphere”). not the investment fendants’] [Plaintiffs], result, times. as a purported relevant None of these distinctions is any of upon show reliance persuasive. [de- cannot in an indirect except actions fendants’] above, explained plaintiffs As admit that too remote for liabil- chain that we find they decep were unaware of defendants’ ity. they tive conduct “scheme” at the time (“It Id.; see also id. 128 S.Ct. purchased Refco securities. Under Ston [defendants], Charter, was not that misled eridge, it does not matter that those trans financial its auditor and filed fraudulent actions were “reflected” in Refco’s finan statements; nothing did [defendants] cial statements. 552 U.S. necessary made it or inevitable for Charter reject 761. The. explicitly Court did.”). as it to record transactions argument ed the rely “investors *15 Stoneridge, May- Like the defendants in only upon public the relating to alleged er and Collins are to have Brown security but also upon the transactions that facilitated sham transactions enabled those (noting statements reflect.” Id. the true of its finan- Refco to conceal state rule”). “there no authority for this Ac cial from investors. As in condition Ston- cordingly, the fact that the sham transac were not aware of those eridge, plaintiffs (or “scheme”) tions allegedly by facilitated and, fact, plaintiffs explicit- transactions Mayer Brown and Collins rendered Ref- ly any knowledge disclaim of defendants’ public co’s financial disclosures false or (“In involvement. Confidential J.A. 300 misleading materially does not distinguish ignorance of the fraudulent conduct of Col- Stoneridge.7 this case from Mayer lins Brown ... Plaintiffs and [and] that, recognize We after Stoner purchased the other members of the Class idge, it is somewhat unclear how the de ”). Accordingly, Refco securities.... as ceptive secondary conduct aof actor could explained, plaintiffs the District Court “did public yet be communicated to the rely any Mayer work on[ ] Brown’s “deceptive.” remain What is clear from on the fraudulent loan transactions” and however, Stoneridge, is that the mere fact they primary failed to state a claim for the ultimate a secondary result of Refco, under Rule 10b-5. In re deceptive actor’s course of conduct is com at F.Supp.2d to public through compa municated attempt distinguish Plaintiffs to Stoner- ny’s financial statements is insufficient to (1) idge by arguing that decep- defendants’ show reliance on the actor’s tive conduct was communicated to the deceptive own conduct. Because that is all (2) public; defendants’ conduct made it here, plaintiffs have alleged we are bound “necessary or that Refco inevitable” would Supreme holding Court’s in Stoner finances, its Stoneridge, misstate see idge. 761; U.S. defen- Furthermore, dants’ conduct occurred in the “investment nothing Mayer about (not- sphere,” see id. at 128 S.Ct. 761 Brown’s or Collins’ actions made it neces- ing that deceptive sary transactions “took or inevitable that Refco would mis- allegedly pre- 7. Nor does the fact that defendants Brown or Collins. Defendants' role in analysis. drafted those disclosures alter the paring those documents therefore adds noth- above, explained allegedly As none of Refco’s ing plaintiffs' claim of reliance. Mayer false statements was attributed reasons, agree foregoing For the aptly- the District Court investors. As lead Rule Mayer with the District Court noted, Stoneridge, “the unlike 10b-5(a) (c) claims for “scheme liabili- not even the Defendants were Brown ty” are foreclosed Court’s fraudulent transac- counter-party to the Stoneridge. decision tions; they merely participated transac- to effect those the documents 20(a) Liability III. Section Refco, F.Supp.2d at 316. In re

tions.” that, agree was “[a]s therefore We person” lia Any claim for “control Refco, not the Stoneridge, it was case in 20(a) § Act8 bility Exchange under Defendants, that filed fraud- Mayer Brown predicated primary on a violation must be statements; nothing the ulent financial 78t(a) (im § of securities law. U.S.C. it Defendants did made nec- Mayer Brown liability on those who posing “control[ ] to record the essary or inevitable for Refco fraud); for securities any person liable” (quoting it transactions as did.” Id. Ston- Rombach, see, 355 F.3d at 177-78. e.g., 761) S.Ct. eridge, 552 U.S. plaintiffs Because we hold failed (internal marks, brackets, and quotation primary a claim violation state omitted). ellipsis defendants, against we also hold that properly dismissed their the District Court Finally, the fact that defendants’ con- 20(a) Mayer claim against Brown. arguably duct occurred the “investment *16 dispositive materially is not or rel- sphere” Request Plaintiffs’ for Leave to IV. acknowledged Although Stoneridge evant. Amend dangers expanding liability to “the issuing in which the marketplace whole appeal, plaintiffs For the first time on business,” 160, at company does 550 U.S. request opportunity to amend their 1610, opinion 127 S.Ct. the Court’s was since complaint to include facts discovered focused on whether investors primarily original complaint their was filed. Plain- of, on, were aware and relied the defen- recently tiffs do not disclose to us those understanding is dants’ own conduct. This facts there is therefore no discovered and opinion consistent with our recent Unit- suggesting, concluding, basis for much less Finnerty, relied on ed States v. which could amend their claims plaintiffs Stoneridge profes- to hold that a securities way in a against Mayer Brown and Collins specialist trader on the New sional—a make them Nat’l that would viable. See Exchange Employees York Stock not be liable Hosp. Union & Health Care —could 10(b) Cir.1977) 278, (2d § Carey, under absent some evidence that F.2d v. (“Absent conveyed misleading impression appel- he a to some indication as to what Finnerty might complaint at 149. lants add to their order customers. 533 F.3d viable, any Stoneridge to make it we see no reason to undermines assertion inapplicable grant appellants to conduct that occurs in relief this Court which is (citation omit- sphere.” requested the “investment was not below.” liable, 20(a) person provides whom such controlled un- Section as follows: controlling person good who, acted in less the Every person directly indirectly, indirectly any any provi- directly or in- person liable and did not controls under faith chapter any regula- constituting sion of this or of rule or duce the act or acts the viola- jointly tion also be liable thereunder shall or cause of action. tion severally with and to the same extent 78t(a). § 15 U.S.C. any person person to as such controlled to (2d ted)). Accordingly, grant Litigation, we decline to ties 252 F.3d 75-76 Cir.2001), to amend. where we concluded that a cor- plaintiffs leave

porate president vice could be liable CONCLUSION being disseminating “involved” in mislead- statements, ing requiring without public summarize, we hold: To attribution of the statements to him. It is (1) actors, Secondary such as defen- true that the defendant in Corp. Scholastic dants, in private can held liable dam- be insider, corporate rather than an was 10(b) § brought pursuant action to ages However, lawyer. outside accountant or 10b-5(b) only Rule for false state- distinguish Wright the court did not to the actor ments attributed basis; indeed, Wright it did not cite dissemination; the time of all. At least one district court in this (2) for “scheme liabili- Plaintiffs’ claims interpreted say Circuit Corp. Scholastic 10(b) §to and Rule ty” brought pursuant Wright’s that we had relaxed attribution 10b-5(a) (c) foreclosed the Su- are requirement. See In re Crossing, Global In- preme Stoneridge Court’s decision Lit., 322 F.Supp.2d Ltd. Sec. 331-33 Partners, v. vestment LLC Scientific-At- (S.D.N.Y.2004) J.). (Lynch, Subsequently, lanta, 761, 169 552 U.S. require we reaffirmed strict attribution (2008); L.Ed.2d 627 Lattanzio, ment mentioning without (3) plaintiffs Because cannot establish a Corp. Finally, Scholastic in United States defendants, violation primary Finnerty, interpreted Wright their properly District Court dismissed mean that a defendant “cannot pri incur person” claim for “control under mary liability for a statement neither made 20(a) Act; Exchange himby nor attributed to him at the time of dissemination,” its language which one for leave to amend request Plaintiffs’ interpret suggest could that strict attri complaint is their denied. necessary. bution is *17 Accordingly, judgment the of the Dis- (2d Cir.2008) omitted). (quotation marks AFFIRMED. trict Court is precedent our own appears While to be PARKER, JR., Judge, B.D. Circuit consistent, invariably sibling our cir concurring. sharply cuits have debated whether an at requirement necessary tribution is under panel’s opinion The does an admirable Denver, N.A., Central Bank v. First job a a distilling with formidable of task— Denver, N.A., Interstate Bank 511 U.S. 10(b) theory secondary of Rule of 164, 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 Therefore, precedents. actors from our I (1994). Compare Anixter v. Home-Stake concur in careful and Judge Cabranes’s (10th Co., 1215, Prod. 77 F.3d 1226 Cir. Nonetheless, comprehensive opinion. even 1996) Wolfson, 1249, SEC 539 F.3d I fear that our opinion, after this Circuit’s (10th Cir.2008) (rejecting 1258-60 an attri area far from a of law this model requirement) bution with Ziemba v. clarity. Wright decisions in v. Ernst Cas Our (2d Int’l, Inc., (11th LLP, cade F.3d Young Cir. & Cir.2001) 1998), (adopting require and Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche an attribution ment). (2d LLP, Cir.2007), In an F.3d 155-56 amicus brief submitted case, position both hold that actors are not this the SEC takes the that fully a creator allegedly liable to investors where the mis standard is consistent with Moreover, leading statements were not attributed to Central Bank Denver. it However, Wright, argues requirement that an attribution the defendants. after from Corp. prevent we issued In Re Scholastic Securi- would securities laws who make false state- deterring individuals through proxies. anonymously

ments private plain- observes

The SEC also already bring securities claims

tiffs who they prove must significant face hurdles — falsity knew the the defendants statements, a result of the

their and as Act, Litigation Reform

Private Securities giving facts particularity

must with “state strong inference the defen-

rise to required state of

dant acted with 78u-4(b)(2). Ap- The

mind.” U.S.C. argue with some force

pellants our case Mayer Brown

against a result shields in circumstance where the damages

from misleading responsible for the

partner criminally convicted and

statements was years. term of seven prison

received Judgment, United States See Amended Collins, 1:07-cr-01170

America v. No.

(S.D.N.Y. 2010). Mar. importance

In of the exis- light of

tence, non, require- vel of an attribution laws, bar,

ment to securities industry, case could pro-

the securities this Court, as, full perhaps,

vide our as well Court, opportunity an

clarify the law this area. *18 America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee,

MOSKOWITZ, & PASSMAN

EDELMAN, Defendant-

Appellant.

Docket No. 08-3017-cv. Appeals,

United Court of States

Second Circuit.

Argued: March 2010. April

Decided:

Case Details

Case Name: Pacific Investment Management Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Apr 27, 2010
Citation: 603 F.3d 144
Docket Number: 09-1v19-cv.M
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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