The following statement of the case by counsel for the appellant is not questioned by counsel for the appel-lees ; On and prior to the 23d day of January, 1898, the Pacific Coast Company, a corporation, was the owner of the American registered steel steamship Corona, 230 feet long, 35 feet beam, 14 feet mean draft of water when fully loaded, and of 1,492 gross, and 996 net, registered tons measurement. That steamer, on January 23, 1898, and while on a voyage from Seattle to Juneau, and elsewhere in Alaska, with a full cargo and 250 passengers, ran upon a then unknown reef
The assignment of errors presents the questions: (1) What was the value of the steamship at the end of her voyage, that is, as she lay stranded on the reef? and (2) what was the value of her freight then pending? The law is well settled that in such cases as the present one the owner, in order to secure the limitation of liability provided for by the statute, must pay the value of the ship at the time her voyage was ended and the amount of her then pending freight. The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1150, 30 L. Ed. 134. “If,” said the court in that case, “by reason of the loss or sinking of the ship the voyage is never completed, but is broken up and ended by causes over which the owners have no control, the value of the ship (if it has any value), at the time of such breaking up and ending of the voyage, must be taken as the owner’s liability. In most cases of this character no freight will be earned, but if any shall have been earned it will be added to the value of the ship in estimating the amount of the owner’s liability. These consequences are so obvious that no attempt at argument can make them plainer.” 118 U. S. 492, 6 Sup. Ct. 1156, 30 L. Ed. 143. The court then proceeded to say:
“If this view Is correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that any salvage operations, undertaken for the purpose of recovering from the bottom of the*881 sea any portion of the wreck, after the disastrous ending of the voyage as above supposed, can have no effect on the question of the liability of the owners. Their liability is fixed when the voyage is ended. The subsequent history of the wreck can only furnish evidence of its value at that point, of time. And it makes no difference, in this regard, whether the salvage is effected by the owners or by any other persons. Having fixed the point of time at which the value is to be taken, the statute does the rest. It declares that the liability of the owner shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending. If the vessel arrives in port in a damaged condition, and earns some freight, the value at that time is the measure of liability; if she goes to the bottom and earns no freight, the value at that time is the criterion. And the benefit of the statute may be obtained either by abandoning the vessel to the creditors or persons injured, or by having her appraisement made and paying the money into court, or giving a stipulation in lieu of it, and keeping the vessel. This double remedy given by our statute is a great convenience to all parties. It does not make two measures or standards of liability, for the measure is the same whichever course is adopted, but it enables the owner to lay out money in recovering and repairing the ship without increasing the burden to which he is subjected.”
Turning now to the findings of the commissioner, approved and adopted by the court below, we find that the value of the ship at the time her voyage was ended was fixed by taking the lowest estimate of her value at Port Townsend, to which place,she was towed from the place of her wreck, made by any of the witnesses, which estimate amounted to $33,000, and deducting therefrom the actual cost of getting the ship to Port Townsend, which was found to be $23,500, thus leaving $9,500 as the value of the ship as she lay on the reef at the end of her voyage. It is manifest that this eliminated from the problem any and all risk or hazard attending the undertaking. The evidence in the case leaves no room for doubt that the risk and hazard were great. The position of the ship on the reef was itself the strongest sort of evidence of that fact. And there was risk that, in the event the vessel could be successfully floated and repaired, the cost might exceed her value when all of that was done. And the findings here expressly show that such cost actually did exceed the value of the ship when the repairs were completed by more than $10,000. It is true that this subsequent history of the wreck is not conclusive evidence of the fact that she was of no value as she lay upon the reef, for the demand for ships at the time of the completion of her repairs and other considerations may have entered into the question of her then value. But that the subsequent history of the wreck does furnish some evidence of its value at that time was expressly decided by the supreme court in the case of The City of Norwich, supra. Added to this is the undeniable fact that the owner actually risked the $23,500 that the findings show that it cost to get the ship from the reef to Port Townsend. This amount is more than double that fixed by the findings as the value of the ship as she lay upon the reef. Such cases admit of no exact rule for fixing values, but, the record in this case considered, we are of opinion that the latter amount should be reduced two-thirds; that is to say, that the value of the ship at the time of the termination of hex-voyage should be fixed at $3,166.66.
In respect to the pending freight, the law is that freight pending is
Included, also, within freight pending, as found and decreed by the court below, is the item of $7,770 prepaid passage money. It is insisted on the part of the appellant that passage money and freight are governed by the same rules, and that the passage money was no more earned by the Corona than was the freight. There is in this case, however, this important distinction between the two items: In the contract between the owner and the passengers there was this express stipulation, to wit, “In the event of the loss or detention of the steamer during the voyage, the vessel, her owners or charterers, shall not * * * refund the amount of passage.” This was not, as argued by counsel for the appellant, a collateral contract, such, for instance, as a contract for insurance upon the vessel or freight which, it was held in the case of The City of Norwich, supra, and in other cases, need not be surrendered by the owner in a limited liability proceeding, but the stipulation here entered into and constituted a part of the' contract of carriage itself. As therefore the passage money in question was prepaid under an express agreement that the owner of the ship should not refund it, notwithstanding a failure to deliver the passengers at the place of destination, we think it clear that it must be regarded as earned. It is urged, however, on the part of the appellant, that in any event there should be deducted from the amount of the prepaid passage money the $2,500 expended by the owner in forwarding the passengers to their destination, as, also, the sum of $475 claimed to havé been refunded by the owner to some of the passengers. It is said that the decision of the supreme court in the case of The Scotland, supra, requires this to be done. In respect to the $475 it appears from the evidence that the owner of the ship furnished to certain of its passengers tickets from Seattle to Skagway, aggregating that sum, taking from such passengers a receipt for the ticket declaring:
“This ticket is furnished me, not on account of any obligation of the company to me, but as a donation to assist me in returning to Alaska. I hereby accept same as above, and release said company from all liability for loss I sustained on steamer Corona.”
For the reasons stated the findings and judgment of the court below must be so modified as to reduce the value of the ship at the time of the termination of her voyage to $3,166.66, and the value of her then pending freight to $7,770, making the full limit of the petitioner’s liability $10,936.66, and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.