This case concerns the constitutionality of section 636(c) of the Magistrates Act which allows magistrates, with consent of the parties to the litigation, to conduct civil trials and enter judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Supp. V 1981). Because this procedure offends article III of the Constitution, we reverse and remand for de novo review by the district court.
FACTS
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. charged Instromedix, Inc. with infringement of a patent. Instromedix denied infringement and alleged that the patent was invalid. The parties consented to have the case tried by a magistrate sitting without a jury. The magistrate found the patent valid, but not infringed. 1 Both parties appealed to this court. We raised the issue of the magistrate’s jurisdiction sua sponte because of the possible unconstitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which empowered the magistrate to enter judgment in this case. 2 Because we hold that the provision is unconstitutional, we do not reach the merits of the patent issues. DISCUSSION
I.
Background
Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish. It provides that the judges shall hold their offices during good behavior and shall not have their compensation diminished during their continuance in office. Because the office of federal magistrate is not similarly protected, we must decide whether an amendment to the Magistrates Act runs afoul of the article III dictates. The 1979 amendments to the Magistrates Act added, among other changes, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which confers judicial power on the magistrates, with consent of the parties, to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil case and order the entry of judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The magistrate must be specially designated by the district court to exercise this jurisdiction. Id. Procedures are set up to prevent district judges or magistrates from coercing the parties to give their consent. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). The district judge has the power to vacate the reference of the case to the magistrate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6). Appeals from the magistrate’s judgment may be taken to the court of appeals in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). Alternatively, the parties may consent to have *1308 the appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4).
Even before the 1979 amendments, magistrates were allowed to conduct entire trials in some districts.
3
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976), still in effect, allows a district judge to assign a magistrate duties that are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. In this circuit,
Coolidge v. Schooner California,
By contrast, the 1979 addition of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), here in issue, explicitly allows trial by magistrate, but does not provide for de novo review by the district judge. 4
To the same effect as
Coolidge
is
United States v. Raddatz,
II.
Exercise of Article III Powers by Magistrates
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the exercise of judicial power by non-article III officers in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,
*1309 A. Lack of Article III Attributes
Magistrates are clearly not article III judges.
United States v. Jenkins,
No. 82-1352, slip op. at 3108 n. 1 (9th Cir. June 28, 1983);
United States v. Saunders,
B. Article I Courts
Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress to establish legislative courts separate from the article III system. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 9. The magistrate system does not qualify under this provision. As explained in
Northern Pipeline,
Congress may only establish separate courts in a limited class of cases “in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers.”
C.Magistrates as Adjuncts of the District Court
It is also contended that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) establishes the magistrates as “adjuncts” to the district courts.
9
The
Northern Pipeline
plurality reviewed
Crowell v. Benson,
the functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way that “the essential attributes” of judicial power are retained in the Art. Ill court. Thus in upholding the adjunct scheme challenged in Crowell, the Court emphasized that “the reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases.” Ibid. And in refusing to invalidate the Magistrates Act at issue in Raddatz, the Court stressed that under the congressional scheme “ ‘[t]he authority — and the responsibility — to make an informed, final determination ... remains with the judge,’”447 U.S., at 682 [100 S.Ct. at 2415 ], quoting Mathews v. Weber,423 U.S. 261 , 271 [96 S.Ct. 549 , 554,46 L.Ed.2d 483 ] (1976); the statute’s delegation of power was therefore permissible, since “the ultimate decision is made by the district court,”447 U.S. at 683 [100 S.Ct. at 2416 ].
Northern Pipeline,
This is precisely the problem with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate makes the ultimate decision and enters a final judgment. Thus the provision cannot pass constitutional muster as authorizing an adjunct function of the district court.
III.
Possible Saving Provisions
The use of magistrates to conduct trials and enter final judgment implicates both due process and article III concerns. We recognize that a due process right may be waived voluntarily, 10 but there is more at stake here than the litigants’ due process right to a decision by an article III judge. We believe t, it the Constitution establishes a framework of government that cannot be altered by statute nor waived by litigant consent. The independence of the judiciary, the distribution of power, and the separation of powers are at issue here. With these concerns in mind we consider the possible constitutional saving devices.
A. Litigant Consent
The strongest argument in favor of constitutionality is based on the requirement of litigant consent. 11 The Act provides that *1311 the parties must give their consent before a magistrate may conduct a trial and enter a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
No case squarely holds that litigant consent will solve the constitutional problems.
12
In
Kimberly v. Arms,
The analogy to arbitration has been suggested. If the parties can agree to submit their controversy to an arbiter, bypassing the article III judiciary altogether, the argument runs, they should also be able to authorize a magistrate to resolve their case. The analogy is inapt. When the parties use an arbiter, they do not invoke the judicial power of the United States courts. An arbiter may render a decision, but its effects flow from the parties’ contractual agreement to abide by it, not from an exercise of judicial power. The arbiter has no authority to enter a judgment, and the parties must look to the courts for enforcement of an arbitration award. Also, an arbiter’s decision is generally not subject to judicial review on the merits.
See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
The basis of the consent argument is that the right to an article III judge is a due process right, inuring to the benefit of litigants, and therefore waivable like any other due process right.
See
footnote 10
supra. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
The Court’s opinion in
United States v. Raddatz,
By analogy, two adverse parties from the same state cannot waive the diversity of citizenship requirement and establish jurisdiction in the federal courts. 16 Likewise, litigants cannot waive the jurisdictional requirement of an article III court.
Article III protects institutional concerns of our system of government that due process addresses only incidentally.
See Northern Pipeline,
Therefore, rather than being exclusively a due process right of the litigants waivable by them, the requirement of an article III judge is jurisdictional and thus not waiva-ble.
B. Internal Delegation
One of the dangers of diluting article III jurisdiction is the threat to the separation of powers. For example, when cases involving more than the rights of the parties before the court are committed to administrative agencies which exist at the pleasure of the political branches, there is a possibility that the exercise of judicial power will be subject to influence by those political branches. However, here the magistrates are a part of the judicial branch and it is argued that if their independence is in question, they are under the control of judges, not Congress or the President. Litigants and judges, both within the judicial branch, and not Congress or the President, decide which cases go to a magistrate rather than to an article III judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Therefore, it is argued that the magistrate system poses no separation of powers problem. Threats to the judicial decisionmaker’s independence from within the judicial branch, however, may be just as
*1313
serious as those from the executive or legislative branches. Magistrates might be wary of delivering unpopular opinions if the results of such decisions were curtailment of their authority, future reference in only the most mundane or onerous cases or failure to be reappointed.
See
Comment,
Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act,
80 Colum.L. Rev. 560, 591 (1980);
Northern Pipeline,
A more direct answer is that the magistrates are not insulated from legislative pressures. Their salaries 17 and their very office depend on congressional action.
“Moreover, the internal delegation argument ignores the plain import of article Ill’s language, which authorizes article III judges, and not their delegates, to exercise judicial power.” Comment, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 560, 590 (1980) (footnote omitted).
We conclude that internal delegation does not elevate § 636(c) to the attributes demanded by article III.
C. Appellate Review
The argument is made that article III is satisfied because the magistrate’s decision can be appealed to an article III court, either to the district court or to the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3)-(5);
see Crowell v. Benson,
The Supreme Court implicitly rejected this contention in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
Northern Pipeline
even more emphatically rejects the appellate review argument. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provided for appeals from the bankruptcy court either directly to the district court and then to the court of appeal or alternatively to a panel of bankruptcy judges. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1293, 1334, 1482 (Supp. V 1981). Justice White in dissent suggested that these provisions for appellate review by article III courts satisfied article III objections.
We conclude that appellate review by the district court and the court of appeals will not save section 636(c).
IV.
Retroactivity
Having held 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) unconstitutional, we must consider whether the holding should be applied retroactively or only prospectively. The question is of enormous importance, as hundreds of cases across the country have been tried by magistrates with the consent of the parties. 18
*1314
Northern Pipeline
applied its holding that bankruptcy courts are unconstitutional prospectively. In doing so, the plurality considered three factors. The first is whether the holding in question decided an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed by earlier cases. The second is whether retrospective operation would further or retard the operation of the holding in question. The third is whether retroactive application could produce substantial inequitable results in individual cases.
It might be argued that our holding was foreshadowed by Northern Pipeline. In light of the weight of the arguments on both sides, the complexity of the issue, and the fact that other provisions of the 1979 Magistrates Act have been held constitutional, 19 we find that the result was not “clearly foreshadowed”.
Retroactive application would not further the operation of the holding. It is very clear that retroactive application would visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the 1979 Act’s vesting of jurisdiction in the magistrates. We hold that, with the exception of the case before us, our decision shall not apply to any case of this Circuit referred to a magistrate under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) prior to the date on which the mandate shall issue in this case. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the magistrate is vacated. Our holding prohibits magistrates from rendering final decisions in civil cases, a function reserved for article III officers. It is clear that a magistrate may perform the lesser functions of presiding over a trial and recommending a disposition, so long as the ultimate decision is made by the district judge.
Coolidge v. Schooner California,
VACATED and REMANDED.
Notes
.
But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp.,
. The court would like to thank the parties and the amici curiae, the Department of Justice and the Oregon State Bar, for their helpful briefs on this difficult issue.
.
E.g., Muhich v. Allen,
. The court in
Coolidge
explicitly declined to state an opinion on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
. Only Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice Brennan, reached this issue.
. The justices did not agree upon an Opinion of the Court. Four justices agreed to the plurality opinion; two justices concurred in the judgment, with opinion; three justices dissented, with opinion; and Chief Justice Burger also dissented in a separate opinion.
. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) limits the flexibility in adjusting the magistrates’ salaries. A magistrate’s salary may be reduced during his term in office but not below what it was at the beginning of the term. Id.
. The parties note that the underlying dispute here concerns patent law. The plurality in Northern Pipeline conceded the ability of Congress to create article I courts in certain specialized areas. For example, in the case of courts martial, the political branches of government possess extraordinary, constitutionally recognized control over the subject matter at issue. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, els. 13, 14, art. II, § 2, cl. 1, amend. V. Congress’ power to grant patents is also explicitly authorized in the Constitution. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The plurality refused, however, to allow Congress to set up non-article III legislative courts pursuant to all of its enumerated powers. For example, the power to regulate bankruptcies is also committed to Congress in the Constitution, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4, but the plurality still rejected the bankruptcy courts as special legislative courts.
Secondly, it is only coincidental that this case concerns patents. Magistrates have the power to try any jury or nonjury civil matter, not just patent cases. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
.In United States v. Jenkins, No. 82-1352 (9th Cir. June 28, 1983), the government contended that magistrates are adjuncts to the district court and that consent by a criminal defendant to trial before a magistrate waives the right to trial before an article III judge. The court declined to reach these issues, slip op. at 3108, holding instead that the constitution does not require that crimes committed on a federal enclave be tried before an article III judge, slip op. at 3109-10. Jenkins thus left these issues open.
.
See, e.g., Garner v. United States,
. The commentators are split on whether litigant consent cures the article III difficulties. Arguing that consent is effective to solve the constitutional problems are McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 Harv.J. on Legis. 343, 374-79 (1979); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1297, 1350-54 (1975) and Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 584 (1973). Taking the contrary view are Comment, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The *1311 Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 560, 592-96 (1980) and Comment, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 Yale L.J. 1023, 1047-61 (1979).
.Heckers v. Fowler,
Judgment, however, cannot in general be entered in conformity to the report or award until it is accepted or confirmed by the court. Reason for the rule is, that whenever it is presented, and before it is accepted, the party against whom it is made may object to its acceptance, ... Hearing is then had, and after the hearing the court may accept or reject the report; or, if either party desires it, the report may, for good cause shown, be recommitted.
.
Muhich v. Allen,
.
Williams v. United States,
. Additional support comes from
Patton v. United States,
We come, then, to the critical inquiry: Is the effect of the constitutional provisions in respect of trial by jury to establish a tribunal as a part of the frame of government, or only to guaranty to the accused the right to such a trial?
Id.
at 293,
.
See Jackson v. Ashton,
. Magistrates’ salaries are set by the Judicial Conference and may not be reduced below the level at the beginning of a magistrate’s term in office. 28 U.S.C. §§ 633(c), 634(a), (b). This protection is only statutory and may be repealed by Congress at any time. This is, of course, true of the manner of appointment as well.
. According to figures provided by the Justice Department, federal magistrates terminated 262 jury and 563 nonjury trials with the consent of the parties in the year ending June 30, *1314 1982. The magistrates also terminated 1627 consent cases without trial. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Consent Cases Terminated by U.S. Magistrates — Year Ended June 30, 1982.
.
United States v. Raddatz,
