PAASO v PAASO
Docket No. 99584
Michigan Court of Appeals
Submitted December 8, 1987. Decided August 15, 1988.
170 MICH APP 628
REFERENCES
Am Jur 2d, Parent and Child §§ 41 et seq.
Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights. 75 ALR3d 228.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The child support provision in the original judgment of divorce was defective in that it did not specify the amount of money ordered for the support of Scott. The trial court‘s granting of defendant‘s motion brings the judgment into conformity with the court rule on divorce judgments and orders.
2. The Age of Majority Act does not bar the circuit court from requiring plaintiff to pay child support for Scott beyond his eighteenth birthday and until he graduates from high school.
3. The circuit court erred in issuing the ex parte interim order because the order does not comport with the applicable court rule. The error was harmless, however, given plaintiff‘s later opportunity to challenge the petition.
4. Plaintiff‘s attempt to challenge the change of custody is rejected. He openly acknowledged at the hearing on the petition that he was not challenging the change in custody.
Affirmed.
DANHOF, C.J., dissented. He would hold that a circuit court has no power to order child support beyond the eighteen-year age of majority. He would reverse.
1. PARENT AND CHILD - CHILD SUPPORT - DIVORCE - COURT RULES.
A child support provision in a divorce judgment must specify the amount of money ordered for the support of each child (
2. PARENT AND CHILD - CHILD SUPPORT - AGE OF MAJORITY.
A circuit court pursuant to the child support statute and the court rules has the power to order a parent to pay child support for his or her minor child until the child graduates from high school or reaches eighteen years of age, whichever occurs later; the Age of Majority Act does not preclude an award of child support beyond a child‘s eighteenth birthday (
3. PARENT AND CHILD - CHILD SUPPORT - INTERIM ORDERS - HARMLESS ERROR - COURT RULES.
It is error for a circuit court not to comply with the court rule which sets forth what an interim order for child support must state, but the error is harmless where the party aggrieved by
Parker & Miller (by Yvonne G. Gilbert and Michael J. Kehoe), for plaintiff.
Michael J. Gallagher, for defendant.
Before: DANHOF, C.J., and SHEPHERD and C. L. BOSMAN,* JJ.
SHEPHERD, J. Plaintiff appeals a Livingston Circuit Court‘s post-judgment award to defendant of child support for the maintenance of the minor child of the parties beyond the age of eighteen years, change in physical custody, and attorney‘s fees on an ex parte basis and after hearing on the merits in an order dated April 13, 1987, as amended April 23, 1987. We affirm.
On July 23, 1982, the court granted a consent judgment of divorce to plaintiff and defendant. Joint custody of the remaining minor child of the parties, Scott Paaso, born April 14, 1969, was ordered. The sole support provision contained in the judgment provides:
SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILD
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the Defendant, Candice Rae Paaso, shall not be responsible for the support оf the minor child of the parties, Scott Charles Paaso. The above shall be subject to further order, control and provision of this Honorable Court.
Although this provision indicates who is not responsible for child support it does not indicate who is responsible. Neverthelesss, plaintiff finan-
A hearing on the parties’ motions was held on March 23, 1987. Custody was not disputed. The court ruled that it would await a Friend of the Court investigation and report on the amount it should award in child support. The court also ruled that it had the authority to award child support beyond the minor‘s eighteenth birthday. It held enforcement of the ex parte order in abeyance pending the Friend of the Court report.
On April 13, 1987, the trial court entered its order for child support and confirmed the ex parte order. It required plaintiff to pay $500 per month in child support until Sсott finished high school, the amount to be adjusted pursuant to the Friend of the Court report. The court further issued a memorandum supporting its conclusion that plaintiff could be required to pay support beyond the minor‘s eighteenth birthday. Plaintiff now appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
I
As a preliminary matter, we find that the child support provision in the original consent judgment of divorce, quoted in full above, was defective. The court rule in effect at the time, GCR 1963, 729.2(1), now
II
The trial court‘s jurisdiction over child support orders is provided by statute:
The court shall have jurisdiction in making such order or judgment relative to the minor children of such parties as authorized in this chapter to award custody of each child to 1 of the parties or a third person until each child has attained the age of 18 years and may require either рarent to pay such allowance as may be deemed proper for the support of each child until each child shall have attained that age and may in case of exceptional circumstances, require payment of such allowance
for any child after he attains that age. [
MCL 552.17a ;MSA 25.97(1) .]
Plaintiff argued below and now on appeal that the Age of Majority Act,
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person who is 18 years of age but less than 21 years of age when this act takes effect, and a person who attains 18 years of age thereafter, is deemed to bе an adult of legal age for all purposes whatsoever and shall have the same duties, liabilities, responsibilities, rights and legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired at 21 years of age. [
MCL 722.52 ;MSA 25.244(52) .]
Plaintiff relies on the case of McNames v McNames, 93 Mich App 477; 286 NW2d 892 (1979), and its progeny, Felcoski v Felcoski, 159 Mich App 762; 407 NW2d 11 (1987); Arndt v Kasem, 135 Mich App 252; 353 NW2d 497 (1984); Boyd v Boyd, 116 Mich App 774; 323 NW2d 553 (1982); Garrett v Garrett, 108 Mich App 258; 310 NW2d 355 (1981); Sumerix v Sumerix, 106 Mich App 7; 307 NW2d 727 (1981), for support in arguing that the language of the jurisdiction statute, taken in conjunction with the promulgation of the Age of Majority Act, precludes the trial court from awarding сhild support beyond a minor‘s eighteenth birthday.
In McNames, the defendant appealed a lower court modification of a divorce judgment which required him to “continue [child support payments] until each minor child reaches the age of eighteen, or graduates from high school, whichever
The support order . . . shall provide for the payment of said support for each child until each child reaches the age of majority or graduates from high school, whichever is later, or, in exceptional circumstances, until the further order of the court. [GCR 1963, 729.2(1), now
MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b) .]
The defendant in McNames argued that the Age of Majority Act negated any obligation to support his children beyond age eighteen, esрecially in view of the fact that the original divorce judgment reserved no right to extend support in the future. This Court agreed. The Court quoted, at length, from Price v Price, 51 Mich App 656; 215 NW2d 756 (1974), rev‘d on other grounds 395 Mich 6; 232 NW2d 630 (1975):
This Court, in Price, supra, at 659-661, concluded:
“It is probable that the Legislature did not intend through the Age of Majority Act to dictate that all support must cease at age 18 regardless of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ quoted in the support statute. Yet that is the exaсt effect of the support statute when read in conjunction with the Age of Majority Act.” [McNames at 479.]
We are troubled by such a conclusion. We doubt seriously that the Legislature, in passing the Age of Majority Act, desired that its actions could potentially abrogate financial support for a substantial percentage of the state‘s high school students. A substantial proportion of high school grаduates reach the age of eighteen before matriculation. It is doubtful that the Legislature would have intended for a substantial proportion of high school seniors to go financially unsupported by the
If a statute is clear and unambiguous the “plain meaning rule” applies and precludes judicial interpretation or construction of the statute. Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Bd of Ed, 413 Mich 1; 317 NW2d 529 (1982). However, while this proposition is clear, in construing a statute the court “must read the language of the statute in light of the general purpose to be accomplished . . . . Our first task, therefore, is to ascertain the question of legislative purpose.” Wymer v Holmes, 429 Mich 66, 76-77; 412 NW2d 213 (1987). The self-evident purpose of the child support statute is to ensure financial stability for the children of divorced parents through their formative years. In Elba Twp v Gratiot Co, 287 Mich 372, 394; 283 NW 615 (1939), our Supreme Court stated:
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meаning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.” [Elba Twp at 294 (quoting Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, § 295, р 399). Emphasis added.]
In Price our Supreme Court stated:
While our disposition in this case rests upon the applicability of the saving provision, we are also inclined to the view that even after the effective date of the Age of Majority Act a court may enter an order or amend an order to рrovide for the college education of a person for whom a support order had been entered before he or she was 18. The Age of Majority Act does not purport to deprive persons between the ages of 18 and 21 of any rights theretofore enjoyed by them, but instead grants to persons of 18 the rights and legal capacities formerly withheld until they were 21. Since а college education has long come within the purview of “exceptional circumstances” recognized by the support statute, Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich 418, 426; 78 NW2d 216 (1956), it would appear that such an order ought to be entirely proper for the period between the ages of 18 and 21 years. Further, to interpret the two statutes otherwise would render nugatory the entire provision concerning “exceptional circumstances” in the support statute. [Price, 395 Mich 11, n 5. Emphasis added.]
The support order . . . shall provide for the payment of said support for each child until each child reaches the age of majority or graduates from high school, whichever is latеr, or, in exceptional circumstances, until the further order of the court. [GCR 1963, 729.2(1), now
MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b) . Emphasis added.]
We believe the court rule is consistent with the intent and purpose of the jurisdictional statute, which is to provide for the support of one‘s child through the formative years. High school graduation is, after all, a common childhood milestone. A high school diploma constitutes the bare minimum qualification fоr economic opportunity in this increasingly technology-oriented world. It strikes us as absurd, as a literal reading of the two statutes seems to imply, that the Legislature intended to cast the entire economic burden of support on the custodial spouse during the time between a child‘s eighteenth birthday and high school graduation. The Supreme Court has construed the gap between thе eighteenth birthday and high school graduation as an “exceptional circumstance” within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute, as evidenced by its adoption of the court rule shortly after the Age of Majority Act and its dicta in footnote 5 of Price. It is possible that the Legislature concluded that a minority of high school students graduate after their eighteenth birthday and that provision for their suрport would therefore be exceptional. Such a reading of the intent of the jurisdictional statute comports with common sense, sound public policy, and the purpose of the statute, particularly in light of the Supreme Court‘s adoption of the
III
Plaintiff next argues that the ex parte order does not comport with the court rule on child support orders.
Affirmed.
C. L. BOSMAN, J., concurred.
DANHOF, C.J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that a circuit court has the power to order child support bеyond a child‘s eighteenth birthday until he or she graduates from high school.
In Price v Price, 51 Mich App 656; 215 NW2d 756 (1974), rev‘d on other grounds 395 Mich 6; 232 NW2d 630 (1975), this Court found that the statute which gave circuit courts jurisdiction to order child support payments,
I would follow this line of cases and reverse.