People v. E.M.People v. E.M.
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E.M. appeals from the trial court’s denial of recall. He argues the trial court erred in several respects, including its ruling that recent changes in the sentencing law do not apply to his case. The Attorney General initially conceded that we must remand for resentencing, but after the parties had briefed the merits of the issue, the Secretary issued a new letter to the trial court rescinding its recommendation of recall and resentencing. The Attorney General now argues this appeal is moot because the Secretary’s letter of rescission eliminated the trial court’s jurisdiction to recall the sentence on remand.
For the reasons below, we hold the Secretary’s letter of rescission does not moot this appeal. We further hold the trial court erred by denying recall, and that it retains
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1984, a jury found E.M. guilty on 15 counts: counts 1, 2, and 8—first degree robbery (
In December 2019, the Secretary recommended to the trial court that it recall E.M.’s sentence and resentence him under
In September 2021, the trial court denied recall in a written order. The court ruled that although Senate Bill 1393 applied retroactively to cases that were not yet final, E.M.’s case was final, making him ineligible for relief. The court stated, “While this Court recognizes that a recommendation from the Secretary of the CDCR provides a court with the authority to recall a sentence, the Court declines to use that authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the law.” E.M. timely appealed from this order.
In June 2022, after the parties had briefed the matter on appeal, the Secretary issued a letter to the trial court purporting to rescind the Secretary’s prior recommendation of recall. The Secretary’s letter stated, “I have personally reviewed inmate [E.M.]’s case factors and do not support the prior recommendation for a sentencing recall.”
The Attorney General then moved this court to augment the record with the Secretary’s June 2022 letter of rescission, or alternatively, to take judicial notice of it. The Attorney General argued that the Secretary’s letter of rescission rendered this appeal moot because the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to resentence E.M. on remand.
We granted the motion to take judicial notice of the Secretary’s June 2022 letter, and we ordered the parties to brief the following issues: (1) whether the Secretary has the authority to rescind a recommendation for recall and resentencing made in accordance
II. DISCUSSION
In his opening brief, E.M. argued the trial court erred in denying recall, and he requested we remand for the court to consider whether to recall his sentence and resentence him under the procedures set forth in the newly-enacted
The Secretary then issued a letter to the trial court purporting to rescind her recall recommendation. The Attorney General now contends this appeal is moot because the trial court no longer has jurisdiction to recall E.M.’s sentence under
For the reasons below, we conclude this appeal is not moot. We further conclude the trial court erred in its denial of recall.
A. Legal Background
Under subdivision (a)(1) of
We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s denial of recall. (People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863-864 (Frazier); People v. McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 211 (McCallum).) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.)
B. The Appeal Is Not Moot
As set forth above, after the parties had briefed the merits of E.M.’s claim on appeal, and two years after the Secretary’s original recommendation of recall, the Secretary issued a letter to the trial court rescinding the recommendation. The Attorney General now argues the appeal is moot because the Secretary validly exercised her power to rescind the recommendation and the trial court is now barred from resentencing E.M.
E.M. contends the Secretary had no authority to rescind her recommendation under
If the language of a statute is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. (People v. Sanchez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 14, 18.) We see nothing in the plain language that clearly gives the Secretary the power to rescind her recommendation.
Where the statutory language is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. (People v. Reynoza (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 181, 186.) Neither party cites any legislative history for
The Attorney General asserts that the Secretary’s power to issue a recommendation inherently includes the power to rescind it. For this position, the Attorney General relies on In re Fain (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 376 (Fain). In Fain, a court of appeal held the Adult Authority, after granting parole to a prisoner and setting a prisoner’s release date, had the power to rescind it. “Any deliberative body—administrative, judicial or legislative—has the inherent power to reconsider an action taken by it unless the action is such that it may not be set aside or unless reconsideration is precluded by law. [Citations.] The power of administrative reconsideration is consistent with the principle that ‘ “notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 389.) This holding, however, was based in part on the observation that “[t]he actions of the Adult Authority, including those granting a parole and fixing a release date, are purely administrative in nature. [Citations.] They are thus not ‘judicial functions’ which may be restrained by a writ of prohibition.” (Id. at p. 389.)
We conclude Fain is inapposite. Here,
The Attorney General takes the position that the trial court does not have jurisdiction until it actually recalls the sentence, such that the court’s recall must be
The Attorney General argues public policy reasons support the conclusion that the Secretary may rescind a recommendation. He argues it would lead to absurd
We need not decide whether the Secretary has the power to rescind a recommendation soon after issuing it and where the trial court has not yet acted on it; where a subsequent change in the prisoner’s circumstances may support rescission; or where the initial recommendation was erroneously issued due to administrative improvidence. None of those conditions are present in this case, and the Attorney General presents no legal authority for the proposition that the Secretary can reverse her recommendation months after the trial court has ruled and the matter is on appeal.
The Attorney General argues that separation of powers principles support the conclusion that the Secretary has the power to rescind her initial recommendation. The Attorney General argues that any other interpretation of
Given this procedural history, if there are any separation of powers concerns, they weigh against the Attorney General’s position. “The separation of powers doctrine limits the authority of one of the three branches of government to arrogate to itself the core functions of another branch. [Citations.] ‘ “The courts have long recognized that [the] primary purpose [of the separation-of-powers doctrine] is to prevent the combination in the hands of a single person or group of the basic or fundamental powers of government.” ’ [Citations.] To serve this purpose, courts ‘ “have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.” ’ [Citation.]” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 297 (Carmel Valley).) Accordingly, “In a system of separated powers, courts observe jurisdictional limits and focus scarce judicial resources on deciding cases within the scope of their authority.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 779.)
The trial court’s denial of recall is an appealable order, and E.M. timely appealed from it. The matter is therefore squarely within the scope of this court’s authority and jurisdiction. Before the Secretary rescinded her recommendation, the parties had fully briefed the merits of the issues, and the Attorney General had conceded that E.M. was entitled to remand for the trial court to consider recalling his sentence under the procedures set forth in
Accordingly, under the unique circumstances of this case, we hold that the Secretary’s rescission letter does not eliminate the trial court’s jurisdiction to recall and resentence E.M. under
C. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Recall
As set forth above, the Secretary’s recommendation to recall E.M.’s sentence was based on the enactment of Senate Bill 1393 in 2019, which gave sentencing courts the discretion to dismiss or strike a prior serious felony conviction. E.M.’s sentence included such enhancements. Without holding a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied recall on the sole ground that Senate Bill 1393 did not apply retroactively to E.M.’s case because it was final on appeal. E.M. contends the trial court misconstrued the law and erred in several other ways based on the procedural requirements of newly enacted
1. Penal Code Section 1172.1
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) (Assembly Bill 1540) renumbered the recall and resentencing provisions of
Furthermore, “Resentencing shall not be denied, nor a stipulation rejected, without a hearing where the parties have an opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or rejection.” (
2. Remand is Required for the Trial Court to Consider Recall and Resentencing Under Penal Code Section 1172.1
E.M. contends
Because the trial court denied recall prior to the effective date of
The Attorney General contends the retroactivity doctrine of Estrada does not make
The Attorney General’s concession, as far as it goes, is well-taken. “If an amendment ‘ “ ‘which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute’ ” ’ was adopted soon after controversies arose about the proper interpretation of the statute, ‘ “ ‘it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act—a formal change—rebutting the presumption of substantial change.’ ” ’ [Citation.] When a case involving such a clarifying amendment is on appeal, the appropriate resolution is to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings in compliance with the amended legislation. [Citation.]” (People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1039 (McMurray).) The court of appeal in McMurray held that the legislative history of Assembly Bill 1540 shows it was the Legislature’s intent to clarify the former statute’s procedural requirements and its application to “ameliorative laws ... that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion, regardless of the date of the offense of conviction.” (Id. at p. 1038.) “The legislative history further indicates that Assembly Bill 1540 was intended to clarify certain aspects of
Even before the enactment of Assembly Bill 1540, other courts of appeal held that
We agree with the reasoning of McMurray, Pillsbury, and Cepeda. We adopt the holdings of those courts, and we conclude the trial court erred by denying recall on the erroneous premise that Senate Bill 1393 did not apply to E.M.’s case. This conclusion follows regardless of whether
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying recall is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to consider whether to recall E.M.’s sentence and resentence him in accordance with
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Grover, J.
Wilson, J.
People v. E.M.
H049467