388 So. 2d 1069 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1980
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
P. S. D., a fifteen-year-old boy, was adjudicated delinquent for theft of a firearm, carrying a concealed firearm, and theft of a moped. The only viable issue on this appeal is the legality of the seizure of the person
In March 1978, at about 8:00 p. m., Mr. Fernandez, an assistant manager of a Winn-Dixie grocery store, called the police. Police Officer Rudloff was immediately dispatched to talk to Fernandez. Fernandez briefly told Rudloff that he had been advised by a man whom he did not identify
Acting on this information, Rudloff, in his patrol car, circled the shopping center parking lot adjoining the store. Within about ten minutes, the officer spotted the appellant driving a moped, heading through the parking lot in the direction of Winn-Dixie. At about the same time, Rudloff saw another boy (later identified as George Norris) walking through the parking lot. The two boys met. Both were young and black
An anonymous tip may provide justification for a valid stop and frisk. Hetland v. State, 387 So.2d 963 (Fla.1980), adopting the opinion of the District Court in State v. Hetland, 366 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also In the Interest of R, 387 So.2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Byrd v. State, 380 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Our task is to evaluate the nature of the information contained in the tip along with the circumstances in the present ease to determine whether the anonymous tip contained sufficient indicia of reliability so as to credit the accuracy of its content and, if so, determine if it, along with other information which thereafter came to be known to the police officer, justified the stop.
In our view, the concurrence of the following factors requires us to conclude that the tip was reliable and the officer’s stop of the appellant justified: (1) the anonymous tip contained specific information and descriptions; (2) the information provided was fresh and immediately acted upon, see Lachs v. State, 366 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); (3) the appellant and
Affirmed.
. We reject without further discussion appellant’s attack upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of guilt on the theft charges. § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat. (1977); State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567 (Fla.1968); Burroughs v. State, 221 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Borghese v. State, 158 So.2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
. Sometime after Officer Rudloff stopped the two boys, he learned of the informant’s identity.
. In street jargon, hold up the store.
. As we stated in Franklin v. State, 374 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the race of a person may be considered as an element of identification, but is surely not sufficient in itself to justify a stop.
.Since a frisk of the appellant did not occur, we need not reach the question of whether it too would have been justified by the information known to the officer. See Lutz v. State, 354 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); cf. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977). It is our view, however, that a frisk of the appellant would have been justified in light of the nature of the intended crime and the unusual clothing worn by the appellant and Norris. See State v. Ramos, 378 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). If that were insufficient, the movement of the appellant towards the revolver would have clearly cured the insufficiency. See State v. Francois, 355 So.2d 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); United States v. Pope, supra. Of course, if the stop were unlawful, no lawful frisk can follow. United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979).