280 F. 38 | 8th Cir. | 1922
These cases present the same questions, were argued and briefed as one, and will be disposed of together.
Commonwealth Steel Company, a creditor, for rolling stock material and supplies sold to the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, to the amount of $145,000 filed its bill against that company on August 16, 1915, alleging that the defendant’s lines of railway and equipment were subject to mortgage and other liens in a very large amount, that the net income from operation had not been sufficient in the two preceding rears to pay the interest on those fixed obligations, and that there was immediate danger of the holders of those securities declaring a default and taking immediate possession of the defendant’s railroad, that defendant was in need of funds for capital expenditures, that suits had been brought against it to recover excess charges for transportation of freight and passengers, and that claims of that character were asserted for more than $1,000,000 and the defendant was unable to pay them, that defendant was indebted for materials and supplies furnished to it, and for traffic balances and other operating liabilities in an amount exceeding $5,000,000, and was without funds to pay the same, that all of its assets were mortgaged or pledged and it was without collateral security or other means available to effect loans with which to meet its current liabilities, that there was grave danger of other creditors bringing suits and levying executions on the defendant’s properties, or some part thereof, and in that manner the defendant would be greatly crippled in the operation of its lines of railroad and would not be able to operate it as a single system, and that in this way its railroad property would be dismembered and sacrificed, that the only means whereby the company could be able to pay its floating indebtedness and discharge its current obligations was by the continued maintenance and operation of its lines as a whole and uninterruptedly, that the defendant had made diligent efforts to obtain funds to meet said liabili
On the same day the Commonwealth Steel Company filed its bill of complaint against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company it also filed m the same court a like bill against St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, alleging that it was a creditor of that company in the sum of $55,335 for rolling stock material and supplies sold to it. Its allegations need, not be repeated; they were like those in its bill against Missouri Pacific Railway Company. The defendant answered that, bill on the next day admitting its allegations, and on August 19th the court entered an order appointing as receiver for that company the same person whom it appointed as receiver for the Missouri Pacific ‘Railway Company. On August 8th following, the Union Trust Company and B. P. Edwards, as trustees in a mortgage given by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company in July, 1912, to secure its issue of negotiable bonds, filed their bill against that company, alleging that bonds to the amount of $31,331,500, payment of which was secured by that mortgage, had been issued and were then outstanding, that default had been made in the payment of interest thereon, that under the terms of the mortgage the principal was also due, and that the railway company was insolvent. They prayed for a receiver, that the mortgage be foreclosed, the railroad sold as an entirety, and the mortgage indebtedness paid out of the proceeds. The Iron Mountain Company answered that bill on October 27th, admitting its allegations and joined in the prayer. On October 28th the two causes against the Iron Mountain Company were consolidated and the receivership extended over the consolidated cause. Appellants’ claims for overcharges, like those in the Missouri Pacific case, were referred to a special master appointed to'hear and determine the same. That road was also operated by the receiver until sale and delivery. Decrees of forclosure and sale were entered in each case on December 21, 1916, in which the court found that each railway company was insolvent, that the amount due under the mortgage in suit in the Missouri Pacific case was $34,698,700, and in the Iron Mountain case $34,304,745, and ordered that the properties of the two railway companies be sold subject as to each to liens and prior mortgages on main and branch lines for large amounts. A plan of reorganization of the two companies and their properties into one had been formulated and copies thereof
The two railroads had been operated for a long time as one, and had become known and recognized as the Missouri Pacific-Iron Mountain System. Their interests, both in operation and obligations to the public, were in large part in common. The securities of one had been used for the other. In fact, the Iron Mountain belonged to the Missouri Pacific in stock ownership, the latter holding all but $45,135 par of the issued stock of the former. Each road had branch lines on which there were underlying mortgages, and there were mortgages on each covering main and branch lines, all senior to the two mortgages set out in the foreclosure suits. Each had more than 3000 miles of operated lines in and through several States.
The special masters appointed to make the sales advertised them as directed by the court, and the two sale^ came on for February 21, 1917. The successful bidders for both properties were Duncan A. Holmes and Robert H. Neilson. They notified the special masters that their bids were made in behalf of a new company to be organized to take over both railroads, pursuant to the plan and agreement of reorganization that had been agreed on between the bondholders and stockholders of the two companies, and caused the masters to so report the sales to the court. On March 6th appellants came into court through their counsel and objected to the plan of reorganization. Their objection was two-fold; first, their claims are, they say, entitled to a preference and should be paid in full, and second, if they are only general creditors, they say they have not been fairly and equitably treated as against old stockholders. Their claims in large part, if not in their entirety, are for alleged overcharges in transportation rates paid under compulsion of an injunctive order against them which was vacated in Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 474, 33 Sup. Ct. 975, 57 L. Ed. 1571. The first objection was met by an order made on March 6th that appellant-claimants should have the right to prosecute their claims to final determination on the question as to whether they were entitled to preferences, which should not prejudice their right to participate in the plan and accept preferred stock in the new company as general creditors under the terms of the plan, if they failed to establish preferences and succeeded only in having their claims allowed as general creditors. The court then approved the plan of reorganization and confirmed the sales of the properties of the two to a new company to be organized, over the objection of appellants that the plan was not fair and equitable to general creditors; which is the one issue presented by this appeal.
Enough of the situation dealt with in the reorganization plan and the offers which it held out to the classes interested in and having claims against the two old companies and their railroads, material to a determination of the one question presented here, may be stated thus:
The purpose of the reorganization plan was to preserve the assets of the old companies for those who were entitled to share in them, to rehabilitate them and to put them on a financial basis that would enable the new company to continue the operation of the railroads; and we also think the offer made in the plan to general creditors was all they were equitably entitled to receive. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931; St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McElvain (D. C.) 253 Red. 123; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Col (D. C.) 238 Red. 812.
In making the orders appealed from, approving the plan and agreement of reorganization and overruling appellants’ objections, the trial court did not err.
Affirmed.