ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND AMENDED OPINION
ORDER
Our opinion filed August 15, 2006, is amended to include the following at the end of footnote 7.
We further note that 20 U.S.C. § 1415 was amended subsequent to the underlying events in this case. We have no occasion to consider whether these amendments alter the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA.
*1167 With the filing of the amended opinion, Judges Thompson, Tashima, and Callahan vote to deny the petition for rehearing, and the petition fоr rehearing is denied.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing en banc is denied. Fed. R. App. P. 35.
No further petition for rehearing will be entertained.
OPINION
P.N., plaintiff-appellant, filed an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq.,
to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in resolving a conflict with the Seattle School District (“SSD”) over her child’s education. The conflict was resolved by a settlement agreement signed only by the parties. The district court held that P.N. was not a prevailing party, and thus, not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the IDEA because the settlement agreement lacked any judicial
imprimatur.
We affirm. We hold, consistent with our own precedent and decisions by our sister circuits, that (a) the definition of “prevailing party” set forth by the Supreme Court in
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
I
The IDEA seeks “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and preparе them for employment and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To implement the IDEA, schools must prepare a written Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for each disabled child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d);
Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackon,
The IDEA alsо provides that the parents of a child with a disability who is the “prevailing party” may be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Here, we are called upon to determine the legal definition of “prevailing party” as used in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and whether P.N. meets this legal definition.
*1168 II
For many years, P.N.’s child, T.N., experienced difficulty in school, and P.N. repeatedly asked the SSD to evaluate T.N. for learning disabilities and to provide appropriаte special education. When SSD failed to do so, P.N. obtained a psychological evaluation and enrolled T.N. in a private school. In March 2003, P.N. hired an attorney to represent her in attempting to obtain special education for T.N. from SSD and reimbursement for the costs of psychological evaluation and private schooling.
Over the next seven months P.N. and her attorney corresponded and met with SSD personnel. By the end of September 2003, SSD had agreed to fund T.N.’s placement in the private school for the summer of 2003 and for the 2003-2004 school year on a part-time basis, but had not agreed to reimburse P.N. for the expenses associated with T.N.’s private evaluation and his enrollment in the private school from March through June 2004.
. In November 2003, P.N., through counsel, requested a due process hearing under the IDEA. In early January 2004, the parties entеred into a settlement agreement whereby SSD agreed to reimburse P.N. for the costs associated with T.N.’s psychological evaluation and attendance at the private school. The settlement agreement expressly reserved “any issue of attorneys’ fees and costs.” On January 23, 2004, the administrative law judge, at P.N.’s request, dismissed the due process hearing proceeding.
On February 4, 2004, P.N. filed in this action for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs under the IDEA. She sought $13,653.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred in the due process proceedings and attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the federal action to recover fees. In October 2004, the district court denied P.N.’s summary judgment motion for attorneys’ fees and subsequently dismissed P.N.’s claims with prejudice. P.N. filed a timely notice of appeal.
III
Although we review a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and costs for an abuse of discretion, any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation underlying the district court’s attorneys’ fees decision are reviewed de novo, and factual findings underlying the district court’s decision are reviewed for clear error.
Carbonell v. I.N.S.,
IV
A P.N., as an alleged prevailing party, was entitled to file an action for attorneys’fees under the IDEA
P.N.’s complaint specifically sought only attorneys’ fees and costs under the IDEA. 1 Although it wаs revised in 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) continues to provide that the court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of costs to a prevailing party who is a parent of a child with a disability. 2
*1169
We have held that the phrase “action or proceeding brought under this section” in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes the filing of a complaint by a prevailing party seeking only attorneys’ fees and costs. In
Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist.,
Although we have not expressly so held before today, our prior cases imply that the district court has jurisdiction over a case in which fees are sought although liability is established оutside the district court proceeding itself. See Barlow-Gresha m Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell,940 F.2d 1280 , 1285 (9th Cir.1991) (allowing “the prevailing parents to recover attorneys’ fees when settlement is reached prior to the due process hearing”); McSomebodies v. Burlingame Elementary Sch. Dist.,897 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.1989) (awarding the parents of a disabled child attorney fees incurred in an administrative due process hearing under the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act [the predecessor of the IDEA]).
Id.
at 1026. Accordingly, we hold that the IDEA authorizes an action solely to recover attorneys’ fees and costs, even if there has been no administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce a student’s rights under the IDEA.
See BarloW-Gresham,
B. The Supreme Court has defined “prevailing party” to require a judicial imprimatur of the material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship
The critical question is whether P.N. is a “prevailing
party” and thus eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees as part of costs under the IDEA. The term was addressed by the Supreme Court in
Buckhannon.
The Court’s opinion commenced by noting that under the American Rule, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorneys’ fees, but that Congress has authorized the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties under numerous statutes.
Id.
Referring to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court commented that a “prevailing party” is “one who has been awarded some relief by the court” and that this view “can be distilled from our prior cases.”
Id.
at 603,
The Court recognized that in addition to judgments on the merits, “settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees.”
Id.
at 604,
The Court held that the “catalyst theory” was too broad because it “allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.”
Id.
at 605,
We have only awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff has received a judgment on the merits, see, e.g., Farrar; supra, at 112,113 S.Ct. 566 , ... or obtained a court-ordered consent decree, Maker, supra, at 129-130[100 S.Ct. 2570 ,65 L.Ed.2d 653 ], ... — we have not awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff has secured the reversal of a directed verdict, see Hanrahan, 446 U.S. [754,] at 759,100 S.Ct. 1987 , 64 L.Ed.2d *1171 670, ... [1980], or acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has violated the Constitution unaccompanied by “judicial relief,” Hewitt, supra, at 760[107 S.Ct. 2672 ,96 L.Ed.2d 654 ], ... (emphasis added). Never have we awarded attorney’s fees for a nonjudicial “alteration of actual circumstances.” Post, at 1856 (dissenting opinion).... We cannot agree that the term “prevailing party!’ authorizes federal courts to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), has reached the “sought-after destination” without obtaining any judicial relief. Post, at 1856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
at 605-06,
The Court was not impressed with the argument that legislative history supported a broad reading of “prevailing party.”
Id.
at 607,
C. We have adopted Buckhannon’s definition of “prevailing party” for. IDEA cases
Any questions as to whether we would apply
Buckhannon’s
definition of “prevailing party” to actions brought under the IDEA have been dispelled by our decisions in
Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,
In
Shapiro,
plaintiffs filed an action in a district court under the IDEA. The district court eventually granted plaintiffs some of the attorneys’ fees they requested, and plaintiffs appealed.
*1172
P.N. attempts to distinguish
Shapiro
by-noting that in
Barrios,
The suggestion that we have declined to accept the definition of “prevailing party” as requiring some judicial
imprimatur
is foreclosed by our decision in
Carbonell,
We vacated and remanded. We held that under
Buckhannon,
for a litigant to be a “prevailing party” for the purpose of awarding attorneys’ fees, he must meet two criteria: “he must achieve a ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,’ ” and “that alteration must be ‘judicially sanctioned.’ ”
Id.
at 898 (quoting
Buckhannon,
[I]n recognizing that a litigant can “prevail” for thе purpose of awarding attorney’s fees as a result of judicial action other than a judgment on the merits or a consent decree (provided that such action has sufficient “judicial imprimatur”), this court is in agreement with the vast majority of other circuits that have considered this issue since Buck-hannon.
Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
In support of our conclusion we cited
Pres. Coal. v.. Fed. Transit Admin.,
Thus, although there may remain some uncertainty as to what might constitute a “judicial imprimatur” the existence of some judicial sanction is a prerequisite in this circuit for a determination that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party” and entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees as part of costs under the IDEA.
Again, our position is in accord with the position taken by our sister circuits. The First Circuit noted that at the core of the Supreme Court’s reasoning was the concept of judicial
imprimatur
without which “a federal court may be unable to retain jurisdiction so it can oversee execution of the settlement.”
Doe,
D. There is no judicial imprimatur of the settlement agreement
Although P.N. can show the material alteration necessary to meet the first prong of the prevailing party test, the settlement agreement did not receive any judicial imprimatur. The document is entitled “Settlement Agreement and Waiver and Release of Claims,” and does not appear to contemplate any judicial enforcement. The agreement does reserve “any issue of attorneys’ fees and costs.” This matter, however, was not referred to any court, but was “left for resolution by methods other than by this Agreement and Release.” Thus, when P.N. filed this action two weeks after the administrative law judge dismissed the due process proceeding, there was nothing that could be construed as a “judicial sanction” of the agreement and nothing to suggest that any judicial imprimatur was contemplated. 7
V
Through the IDEA, P.N. secured some special education benefits for her child from SSD. Accordingly, P.N. meets the first prong of the test for prevailing party; P.N. achieved a material alteration of the *1174 legal relationship of the parties. However, P.N. resolved her differences with SSD through a settlement agreement and there is nothing in the record that we can construe as a judicial sanction of that agreement. Accordingly, we are constrained by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckhan-non, and our decisions in Carbonell and Shapiro, to hold that P.N. is not a “prevailing party” as that term is used in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and thus not entitled under that statute to attorneys’ fees as part of costs. The district court’s dismissal of P.N.’s action is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) provides:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (f) or (k) of this section who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g) of this section, and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court оf the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.
. In February 2004, when P.N. filed her action, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) provided that:
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of *1169 the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.
The statute was revised in 2004. Pub.L. 91-230, Title VI, § 615, as added Pub.L. 108-446, Title I, § 101, Dec. 3, 2004, 118 Stat. 2715. Section 1415(i)(3) now reads, in relevant part:
(A) In general
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this section without regard to the amount in controversy.
(B) Award of attorneys’ fees
(i) In general
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs'—
(I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability;....
. The Court further commented:
We have subsequently characterized the Maher [v. Gagne,448 U.S. 122 ,100 S.Ct. 2570 ,65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980)] opinion as also allowing for an award of attorney's fees for private settlements. See Farrar v. Hobby, [506 U.S. 103 ,113 S.Ct. 566 ,121 L.Ed.2d 494 ,] at 111, ... [1992]; Hewitt v. Helms, [482 U.S. 755 ,107 S.Ct. 2672 ,96 L.Ed.2d 654 ,] at 760, ... [1987], But this dictum ignores that Maher only “held that fees may be assеssed ... after a case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree.” Evans v. Jeff D.,475 U.S. 717 , 720,106 S.Ct. 1531 ,89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). Private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,511 U.S. 375 ,114 S.Ct. 1673 ,128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).
.
See Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch.,
. In a footnote, after observing that following Buckhannon we had rejected the catalyst theory, we wrote:
While dictum in Buckhannon suggests that a plaintiff "prevails” only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court supervised consent decree,121 S.Ct. at 1840 n. 7, we are not bound by that dictum, particularly when it runs contrary to this court’s holding in Fischer [ v. SJB-P.D., Inc.,214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.2000)], by which we are bound. Moreover, the parties, in their settlement, agreed that the district court would retain jurisdiсtion over the issue of attorneys' fees, thus providing sufficient judicial oversight to justify an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Barrios,
. The thrust of our, opinion in Barrios was that the district court had erred in concluding that the benefits Barrios obtained in the settlement agreement were de minimis. Id. at 1137.
. There is language in
P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ.,