206 Conn. 473 | Conn. | 1988
Lead Opinion
In this action the plaintiffs sought to quiet their title with respect to a right of way claimed over the defendants' land, to enjoin the acts of the defendants in obstructing their use of it, and to obtain other related relief. Acting as the trial court, Hon. Philip R. Pastore, state trial referee, found the issues for the defendants and rendered judgment in their favor. The plaintiffs have appealed, presenting as the principal issue whether this court should abandon or modify the ancient doctrine that “[n]o right of way appurtenant can be created without a dominant as well as a servient estate” and that “[t]he way can become legally attached to the dominant estate only if the same person has unity of title to both the way and the dominant estate.” Curtin v. Franchetti, 156 Conn. 387, 389, 242 A.2d 725 (1968). We conclude that this case does not provide a sufficient factual basis to warrant consideration of any modification of the rule and, therefore, decline the plaintiffs’ invitation to resolve the primary issue they have raised.
We also leave undecided the remaining issue raised by the plaintiffs, whether the trial court erred in deciding that they had failed to prove their allegation that the disputed right of way is the only legal access they have to a portion of their land. This issue need not be addressed because its resolution is immaterial to the only basis alleged in the complaint for the existence of the easement, the conveyances made by the defendants’ predecessors in title. Accordingly, we find no error.
The facts essential to our determination of the appeal are not disputed. The plaintiffs, Thaddeus and Pamela Ozyck, as well as Eleanor Harris,
The Harris, Spigelman and D’Atri parcels were once part of a tract of approximately thirty-one acres owned by Herbert Benton, the common grantor of the parties. In 1906, Benton conveyed a piece of this acreage, 100 feet by 100 feet, bordering Long Island Sound, to Aaron Hull without reserving any right of way, although he continued to own the remainder of the thirty-one acres, which included the Harris parcel. The land conveyed to Hull included a portion of the D’Atri parcel and the westerly forty feet of the Spigelman parcel.
In 1910, Hull transferred the land he had acquired from Benton to John Hawley by a warranty deed containing a reference to “a right of way across the south end of said described lot.” When Hawley in 1917 conveyed the same tract to H. Leonard Beadle, the warranty deed also mentioned this right of way. Of the land he had acquired, with 100 feet of frontage on
Of the balance of the land remaining after the conveyance to Hull in 1906 of the piece that included the D’Atri parcel, Herbert Benton retained until his death a portion that included the Harris parcel. In 1929, this land was transferred from his estate to Elliot Benton, who in 1959 conveyed the portion known as the Harris parcel to James and Martha Shryock. After several intervening transfers, the plaintiffs acquired the property in 1976 and 1977.
The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to an easement over the southern portion of the defendants’ land principally by virtue of the warranty deed from Hull to Hawley in 1910 of the 100 feet by 100 feet parcel that Hull had acquired in 1906 from Herbert Benton. In this deed, after the description of the land conveyed, the following language appears: “There is a right of way across the south end of said described lot known as the extension of Vineyard Avenue.” This provision of the deed has been repeated in each subsequent conveyance of the land of the defendants over which the easement is claimed to exist, including the deeds by which they acquired title in 1981.
The plaintiffs claim that the reference to the right of way in the 1910 deed from Hull to Hawley sufficiently indicates that Hull intended to create a right of way across the land of the defendants extending
The only evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ conjecture is that after the 1910 conveyance from Hull to Hawley, Benton may have been the only person whom the right of way mentioned in the deed would benefit. Even if this were true, the mere reference to the existence of the right of way cannot be construed to indicate an intention on the part of Hull to create an easement for Benton’s benefit. The purpose of the reference to the right of way may well have been to protect Hull from any claim by Hawley based upon the warranty deed in the event that Benton or anyone else should assert a right to cross the land conveyed. “Its object evidently was to save the [grantor] contingently from any liability on [his] covenants. . . . Aside from the fact that the [person claiming the easement] is a stranger to that deed, it is impossible for us to construe its language as conveying any right to him.” Butterfield v. McNamara, 54 Conn. 94, 99, 6 A. 188 (1886). The postulated use of the right of way by Benton might be of significance if the plaintiffs were claiming an easement by prescription or upon some other ground than the express grant in the deed to Hull from Hawley that
The plaintiffs also have relied upon a clause appearing in the deeds constituting the chain of title to the Harris parcel, beginning with the first conveyance thereof from Elliot Benton to James and Martha Shryock in 1959. This provision, which followed clauses transferring as appurtenances to the land conveyed two rights of way unrelated to the subject of this action and identified by specific deed references, was as follows: “together with all the right title and interest in and to any other rights of way which may exist.” Although this general appurtenance clause was sufficient to give the plaintiffs, through intervening conveyances repeating it, whatever rights over the defendants’ land Elliot Benton may have acquired from Herbert Benton for the benefit of the Harris parcel, it does not create any right not already in existence. Herbert Benton relinquished the power, to create an easement over the D’Atri parcel when he sold it to Hull in 1906 without reserving any such right. Obviously Elliot Benton, his successor in title to the land that included the Harris parcel, could have no greater rights, nor could the plaintiffs.
The trial court in rendering judgment for the defendants relied upon our statement in Curtin v. Franchetti, supra, that “[t]he way can become legally attached to the dominant estate only if the same person has unity of title to both the way and the dominant estate.” It is clear that even if Hull had actually intended to create a right of way for the benefit of Benton’s land, this rule would prevent him from doing so, because Hull had no interest in Benton’s land, the presumed “dominant estate.” Though the unity of title doctrine is of ancient origin, Curtin appears to be the first case in which this court has followed it. We also approved the rule, without any necessity for invoking it, more
Although the trial court undoubtedly relied to a large extent upon the unity of title doctrine in rendering judgment for the defendants, the facts relevant to Hull’s
With respect to the second claim of error, that the trial court failed to find that the only legal access the plaintiffs have to the Harris parcel is through the disputed right of way, the plaintiffs have failed to point out how such a finding would have any significant bearing upon Hull’s intention to create a right of way in 1910 when he deeded the land to Hawley. At that time Herbert Benton owned land bounding the piece conveyed on the north and east, over which he presumably had access to the Harris parcel as a portion of the land he retained. In any event, the plaintiffs in their complaint and at trial relied wholly upon a claim of an easement by grant and, even on appeal, do not maintain that they have proved an easement by necessity. If they have no legal access to the Harris parcel as claimed, that circumstance does not enhance the basis for an easement relied upon in this case.
In this opinion, Peters, C. J., Callahan and Hull, Js., concurred.
The plaintiff Eleanor Harris died during the pendency of this action and the executor of her estate was substituted for her as a plaintiff.
Walter and Susan Spigelman are not parties to this action and, therefore, are not affected by its determination.
Although the concurring opinion is critical of our failure to resolve the continuing viability in this state of the unity of title doctrine as approved in Curtin v. Franchetti, 156 Conn. 387, 242 A.2d 725 (1968), we have followed our usual practice of avoiding the reconsideration of earlier decisions in the absence of some necessity arising in the case before us. In Broadway Bank & Trust Co. v. Longley, 116 Conn. 557, 560-62, 165 A. 800 (1933), this court questioned the long-standing common law rule followed in earlier decisions that a part payment by one joint debtor will toll the running of
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do, however, have considerable difficulty with its approach and the rationale that yields that result.
The visceral issue squarely presented to us by the plaintiffs is that the trial court erred when it applied the rule of Curtin v. Franchetti, 156 Conn. 387, 242 A.2d 725 (1968), to find against them.
The rationale of the majority for the result reached can fairly be read as having all but exsanguinated Curtin. This has been done in a case where the result should have been dictated by Curtin, a case involving real property decided less than twenty years ago. It is quite one thing not to adopt the new rule proposed by the plaintiffs because the factual pattern of this case does not quite fit into the factual pattern of those juris
“ ‘A decision of this court is a controlling precedent until overruled or qualified. Daury v. Ferraro, 180 Conn. 386, 389, 143 A. 630 [1928].’ Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 61-62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955).” Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 662, 522 A.2d 812 (1987). We should not overrule one of our earlier decisions “unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it.” Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, supra; Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 76-77, 527 A.2d 230 (1987). We have properly recognized that “ ‘[e]xperienee can and often does demonstrate that a rule, once believed sound, needs modification to serve justice better . . . [t]he adaptability of the common law to the changing needs of passing time has been one of its most beneficent characteristics. A court, when once convinced that it is in error, is not compelled to follow precedent. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
The majority’s serious undermining of Curtin raises grave concerns not only as to that eminently desirable and essential doctrine of stare decisis, but it does so in an area of the law that commands particular stability, i.e., real property. While it is always crucial in justifying adherence to precedent to require that those who engage in matters based on the existing law be able to rely on its stability, it is very more much so in cases involving property rights as Curtin does. See State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381, 97 S. Ct. 582, 50 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1977); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486-87, 44 S. Ct. 621, 68 L. Ed. 1110 (1924); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 1982); Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263, 271 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966). I recognize that stare decisis is not a rule of law but a matter of judicial policy and that it does not have the same kind of force in each kind of case so that “adherence to or deviation from that general policy may depend upon the kind of case involved, especially the nature of the decision to be rendered that may follow from the overruling of a precedent.”
The vitality of common law courts to respond to reasoned need for change and not to perpetuate demonstrably archaic views constitutes one of their fundamental strengths in an evolving society. Stare decisis accommodates that rubric. Given the special place of judicial pronunciations on real property in our system for the reasons set out earlier, the issue of the continuing validity of Curtin should be met now—and decisively so.
I, therefore, concur in the result for the reasons stated.
The plaintiffs framed this issue on appeal as follows: “When the trial court applied the ‘Unity of Title’ rule, it was applying an archaic rule rooted in feudal English property law which no longer has any justification in modem real property law inasmuch as it gives full weight and significance to form over substance, ignoring the intent of the parties involved.”
The defendants met the plaintiffs’ statement of the issue by framing their position as follows: “1. Did the trial court err in applying the rule of cases such as Curtin v. Franchetti, 156 Conn. 387, 389 [242 A.2d 725] (1968), and Stankiewicz v. Miami Beach Assn., Inc., 191 Conn. 165, 170 [464 A.2d 26] (1983), which holds that no right of way appurtenant can be created without a dominant as well as a servient estate and that the way can only become legally attached to the dominant estate if the same person holds unity of title to both the way and to the dominant estate?”
We have recognized this proposition. For example, in Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 243, 121 A.2d 276 (1956), a