Oxbow Calcining USA Inc. et al., Respondents-Appellants, v American Industrial Partners et al., Appellants-Respondents.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York
948 N.Y.S.2d 24
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered February 3, 2011, which denied defendants’ motion to the extent that it sought to compel arbitration and dismiss the fraud and fraudulent concealment causes of action or, in the alternative, to stay the action pending a simultanеously commenced Texas arbitration, and which granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reinstating plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, dismissing the fraud and fraudulent concealment causes of action, and granting the motion to stay the action, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
The facts gleaned from the first amended complaint (the complaint) are as follows. Plaintiff Oxbow Carbon LLC (Oxbow Carbon) is the immediate parent and sole owner of plaintiff Oxbow Calcining USA Inc. (Oxbow USA), formerly known as
Defendants Rogers and Bingham are former directors of GLC USA and principals of defendant American Industrial Partners (AIP). Defendants American Industrial Partners Capital Fund II, L.P. (AIP Fund II) and American Industrial Partners Capital Fund III, L.P. (AIP Fund III) are affiliates of AIP. In or about 1998, AIP, through AIP Fund II, acquired all of the stock of GLC USA and its subsidiaries, which the complaint refers to collectivеly as GLC.
The calcining process emits large amounts of waste heat, which can be converted to steam. Adjacent to the calcining plant is a steam plant that Dynegy Power Corp. (Dynegy) owned and operated until sometime in 2000. Pursuant to an agreement between GLC and Dynеgy, waste heat was transferred from the calcining plant’s kilns to the steam plant and used to heat generators that produced steam and electricity for sale to end users. The release of flue gas from both the calcining plant’s kiln stacks and the steam plant’s boiler stack was conducted pursuant to regulatory permits issued to GLC.
In 2000, GLC purchased the steam plant from Dynegy. Before operations could resume, the plant required refurbishment, including the installation of a new pollution control system, which GLC could not fund.
In 2003, AIP sold a portion of its interest in GLC to the Great Lakes Carbon Income Fund (GLC Income Fund), but continued to hold a controlling interest. In 2004, two competing offers for the purchase of the steam plant and the transfer of waste heat from the calcining plant were submitted to GLC. One was from Cinergy and the other from AIP, which, along with аnother entity, formed nonparty Port Arthur Steam Energy LP (PASE), the arbitration respondent, for that purpose. Because GLC’s AIP directors were conflicted, GLC appointed an independent committee of non-AIP directors to review the competing proposals.
In November 2004, tо obtain the committee’s approval, AIP, with the knowledge of the individual defendants, represented, as had Cinergy, that it would install electrostatic precipitators in its new pollution control system. Based on defendants’ knowledge of GLC, and defendants’ representations that AIP would fully protect the interests of GLC and its shareholders, the committee agreed to accept AIP’s proposal. However, AIP soon ad-
In 2005, AIP sold another portion of its interest in GLC to the GLC Income Fund. In 2006, it sold its remaining interest to Rain Commodities (USA) Inc., an unaffiliated third party. In or about May 2007, Oxbow Carbon, LLC purchased the stock of GLC.
Plaintiffs allege that AIP’s inadequate injection system, and installation of unlined carbon steel boiler stacks, resulted in excessive and rapid corrоsion, causing the stacks to fail. After AIP/PASE refused to fix the problems, Oxbow USA had to fix them, at a cost estimated to be between $6 million and $9 million. Towards this end, Oxbow USA installed a “cooler baghouse” (an added pollution control system), replaced corroded boiler stacks, and retаined experts to conduct testing.
On July 16, 2010, Oxbow LLC demanded arbitration in Texas of claims against PASE for breach of the HEA and related duties. Simultaneously, plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that defendants, as former directors and controlling shareholders of GLC, engaged in fraud before and during the sale of the steam plant to PASE and breached their fiduciary duty to GLC and its shareholders. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants concealed the material risks created by the inferior pollution control system, causing Oxbow Carbon to overpay for GLC. Shortly after the сomplaint was filed, defendants moved, inter alia, to compel arbitration.
The Federal Arbitration Act reflects a strong public policy favoring arbitration, a policy New York courts have also promoted (see Matter of Smith Barney Shearson v Sacharow, 91 NY2d 39, 48 [1997]; Matter of Miller, 40 AD3d 861, 861 [2007]). Nevertheless, “the obligation to arbitrate . . . remаins a creature of contract” (Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F3d 218, 224 [2d Cir 2001], cert denied 534 US 1020 [2001]), and parties may structure arbitration agreements to limit both the issues they choose to arbitrate and
Guided by these principles, we find that Supreme Court correctly denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants are signatories to the agreement to arbitrate. Whilе the arbitration provision in the HEA is broad, covering “[e]very dispute of any kind or nature between the Parties arising out of or in connection with this Agreement,” the HEA defines the term “Parties” as GLC LLC, now Oxbow Calcining USA Inc, and PASE, the arbitration claimant and respondent.
Nor are plaintiffs subsidiaries of оr the successors in interest to GLC LLC. Although they are the grandparent and parent companies to Oxbow LLC, which is the successor to GLC LLC, “[i]nterrelatedness, standing alone, is not enough to subject a nonsignatory to arbitration” (World Bus. Ctr. v Euro-American Lodging Corp., 309 AD2d 166, 171 [2003], citing TNS Holdings v MKI Sec. Corp., 92 NY2d 335, 340 [1998]). A parent corporation’s complete ownershiр of a subsidiary’s stock is also insufficient, by itself, to pierce the corporate veil (see De Jesus v Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 87 F3d 65, 69 [2d Cir 1996], cert denied 519 US 1007 [1996]; Thomson-CSF, S.A. v American Arbitration Assn., 64 F3d 773, 780 [2d Cir 1995] [“Anything short of requiring a showing of some accepted theory under agency or contract law imperils a vast number of parent corporations”]).
Defendants contend that the nоnsignatory plaintiffs must arbitrate under an estoppel theory. However, there is little authority for enforcing an arbitration provision between two nonsignatories (see Invista S.A.R.L. v Rhodia, S.A., 625 F3d 75 [3d Cir 2010]; American Personality Photos, LLC v Mason, 589 F Supp 2d 1325, 1331 [SD Fla 2008]; Amstar Mtge. Corp. v Indian Gold, LLC, 517 F Supp 2d 889, 900 [SD Miss 2007]). Even if estoppel may be raised in this situation, a nonsignatory may be estopped from avoiding arbitration whеre it “knowingly accepted the benefits of an agreement with an arbitration clause” (MAG Portfolio Consultant, GMBH v Merlin Biomed Group LLC, 268 F3d 58, 61 [2d Cir 2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The benefits must be direct, and the party
Arbitration of the claims against the individual defendants is not required, since the alleged misconduct does not relate tо their behavior as officers, directors, or agents of PASE, the other signatory to the agreement, but, rather, to their behavior as former directors of GLC USA (see Hirschfeld Prods. v Mirvish, 88 NY2d 1054 [1996]).
The fraud claim should have been dismissed since it merely alleges an intent not to perform future contractual obligatiоns (see New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308, 318 [1995]; Pacnet Network Ltd. v KDDI Corp., 78 AD3d 478 [2010]; Fletcher v Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, 75 AD3d 469, 470 [2010]).
The fraudulent concealment claim should also have been dismissed. To state a claim for fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendant had a duty to disclose certain material information but failed to do so; (2) that the defendant then made a material misrepresentation of fact; (3) that said misrepresentation was made intentionally in order to defraud or mislead; (4) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on said misrepresentation; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 63 AD3d 583, 586 [2009]). Plaintiffs failed to allege that, at the time of the subject transactions, they were known parties that could be expected to rely on defendants’ representations or omissions (see e.g. Sykes v RFD Third Ave. 1 Assoc., LLC, 15 NY3d 370 [2010]; Swersky v Dreyer & Traub, 219 AD2d 321, 326 [1996]). They alleged conclusorily that defendants intended to cause them harm, based on a possibility that the injection system might fail some day. However, former directors of a company do not owe a duty to disclose information to future, unknown purchasers.
Supreme Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims as time-barred under
Verizon Directories Corp. v Continuum Health Partners, Inc. (74 AD3d 416 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 716 [2010]) is inapposite. In Verizon, we rejected the plaintiff’s contention that it was a resident of New York, or that its cause of action accrued in this State, by virtue of its authorization to do business and asserted extensive presence here. Verizon did not claim that its principal office was in New York.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action as time-barred under the borrowing statute is premature and is denied without prejudice to renewal after further discovery. Should it be determined оn renewal that the borrowing statute does not apply, the claims on behalf of Oxbow USA against the individual defendants in their capacities as directors of GLC will be governed by the six-year statute of limitations of
As to the AIP defendants, “where an allegation of fraud is essential tо a breach of fiduciary duty claim, courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under
Defendants’ motion to stay this action pending the outcome of the arbitration should be granted.
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them unavailing. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Friedman, DeGrasse, Freedman and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
