*1 actions employment of the adverse cause compensation the workers’ filing his

was

claim. attempt to charac- reject Buehrle’s

We theo- as alternative

terize his admission Instead, has con- Buehrle

ry recovery. reason for the factually that

ceded not exclu- actions was employment

adverse all, filing of workers’

sively, if at his is fa- claim. This admission

compensation the Mis- claim under

tal to his retaliation Act, and Compensation

souri Workers’ properly entered.

summary judgment was

VI. grant court’s affirm the district City. in favor of the

summary judgment COMPANY;

OWNERS INSURANCE Company, Insurance

Auto-Owners

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v. WORKS, INC., do- AUTO

EUROPEAN Autopia; Percic En- business

terprises, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-3068. Appeals,

United States Court

Eighth Circuit. 13, 2012.

Submitted: June Sept.

Filed: 2012. En Banc

Rehearing Rehearing

Denied Nov. *2 “advertising injury”

policy provisions damage.” After settlement “property or action, state the federal was reached concluded that district court1 *3 fax adver by sending unsolicited sustained of the TCPA are in violation tisements injury provi covered under appeal, policies. The insurers sion are not covered that TCPA claims arguing standard Minne policies. Applying inter of insurance contract principles sota are pretation unambiguous where words “plain, ordinary, popular and given their meaning,” Co. Wis. v. Woz Gen. Cas. Travel, niak (Minn.2009)(citation omitted), Tobin, ambigu and argued, Allison M. Timothy P. in Garrison, brief, language is construed favor Minneapolis, on the ous Lange insured, Mining Mfg. Co. v. MN, Minn. appellants. for 175, 179 Travelers Indem. argued, Rolling Oppenheim, David Max (Minn.1990),we affirm. Jansen, Meadows, IL, Louise Jenneane Blanchfield, MN, D. Minneapolis, Garrett I. Paul, MN,

Jr., Penney, Phillip D. Brant St. brief, Bock, IL, Chicago, on the Andrew a Autopia, repair company, an auto hired appellees. firm called Business to Business Solutions 5,000 prospective to fax advertisements to MURPHY, MELLOY, and Before According Autopia, to customers COLLOTON, Judges. Circuit repre- to Business Solutions had Business MURPHY, Judge. Circuit complied sented that its services with fax- only that it sent ing guidelines and faxes and Auto- Company Owners Insurance to receive persons who had consented this Company brought Owners Insurance Enterprises them. Percic was one of the declaratory judgment seeking action a rul- fax recipients of these advertisements ing that their insurance issued alleges that it never consented to receive Works, Inc., European doing Auto busi- them. Autopia, ness as do not cover class claims brought Enterpris- in state court Percic action brought Percic class lawsuit es, complaint alleged Inc. The state court court, state against Autopia Minnesota Autopia Telephone violated Con- claiming Autopia had violated the (TCPA), sumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. TCPA and committed the common law tort 227(b)(1)(C), by § fax sending unsolicited unsolicited fax sending of conversion

advertisements. to it other class mem- advertisements prohibits argue

In this federal action the insurers bers. The TCPA pro- do not fall within the unsolicited fax advertisements and such claims Kyle, 1. The Honorable Richard H. United sota. Judge Minne- States District for the District of recipients Autopia of action to and Percic were named as defen- a private

vides 227(b)(1)(C), sought § The insurers faxes. 47 U.S.C. dants. determina- of such (b)(3). Injured parties may sue for actual tion that the claims at issue in the state statutory amount of proceeding or for court were not covered $500 under 227(b)(3)(B). § policies. violation. Id their Percic filed a per counterclaim seeking a declaration -that the claims had alleged that the unsolicit- complaint “advertising inju- asserted were covered as “unlawfully interrupted ed faxes had ry” “property damage.” and/or priva- Plaintiffs and other class members’ Autopia left cy being interests alone.” Percic, and the Autopia, insurers settled repre- maintained that it had relied on the litigation court in March 2011. state *4 to sentations of Business Business Solu- agreement The settlement stated that Au- any- had not intended to harm tions and 5,851 topia had faxed unsolicited advertise- Autopia tendered its defense to one. ments, 3,903 which had been received. (collectively the and Auto-Owners Owners parties agreed entry The also to the insurers) who undertook the defense under judgment against Autopia amount of rights. reservation $1,951,500, represented which for $500 each unsolicited fax received class purchased had a commercial Autopia 227(b)(3)(B). members. See § U.S.C. liability liability policy garage and general agreement The settlement stated and a commercial coverage from Owners only against was enforceable the insurers from Auto-Owners. The policy umbrella coverage if were found in the federal ac- liability and commer commercial tion, against individually. Autopia The policies contained identical cial umbrella approved state court certified the class and case, of this and language purposes the settlement. to here as they simply will be referred part poli In relevant policies.” “the summary Both sides then moved for sums that “the insured be cies covered judgment declaratory judgment in this ac- damages legally obligated pay to as comes granted summary The tion. district court ” ‘advertising injury.’ The because of ... judgment Autopia to and Percic and de- “in “advertising injury” as policies defined nied the insurers’ motion. It concluded more” of four jury arising out of one or claim that the TCPA was claim for ad- The section at issue listed offenses. vertising injury and was thus covered un- publication in this case is “oral or written “plain ordinary meaning” der the person’s right material that violates a policies. Specifically, the court held privacy.”2 also cover sums fax unsolicited advertise- obligated legally that “the insured becomes ments in violation of the TCPA was an ... ‘proper because of pay “oral or written of material ” ty damage’ caused “occurrence” or person’s right privacy.” that violates a an “incident.” coverage it found under the advertis- Since injury of the provision policies, action instituted the state class

While question court did not reach the pending, Auto- district against Autopia Percic was property damage provision declaratory initiated this whether pia’s insurers provided coverage. action in federal district court. also judgment organization types person or libels a or or 2. The other three of offenses related to ders infringement, advertising copyright mis- disparages person's organization’s goods, are or ideas, advertising and “oral appropriation of products or services.” publication of material that slan- or written Capital Am. States Ins. Co. v. solitude. appeal, arguing insurers determining Cnty., 392 F.3d erred in Assocs. Jackson district court (Second) (7th Cir.2004); advertising injury. Restatement violations were TCPA (1977). § that TCPA violations They also contend Torts 652A dam- property under the are not covered plain The insurers contend that the lan- They seek reversal of the age provision. policies’ injury of the guage summary judgment grant adverse interest, only secrecy provision covers summary judgment their favor. entry of since that is concerned with grant the district court’s review being published. content material novo, summary judgment “viewing de argue The insurers further that the TCPA light in the most the evidence favorable allegations complaint and the con- v. Extendi nonmoving party.” Skare only cern the intrusion on solitude caused care Health Servs. advertisements, by unsolicited fax not the (8th Cir.2008). Summary judgment ap in- content of those advertisements. The genuine no dis propriate where “there is unambigu- surers contend in sum that the *5 pute any as to material fact and the mov only language policies protects ous of the judgment ant is entitled to as matter of secrecy privacy based violations and 56(a). parties The law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. privacy pro- the seclusion based interests the in agree governs that Minnesota law tected the TCPA. policies at terpretation of the insurance pol Courts which have examined similar Supreme issue here. Since the Minnesota icy provisions disagree pol whether on specific has never addressed the Court type icies cover caused presented appeal, issue in this our task is in privacy violations raised TCPA claims. it. predict to how court would resolve Enters., majority of circuits which have consid Callas Inc. v. In See Travelers (8th Am., question ered the have held that 952, dem. Co. 193 F.3d 955 Cir.1999). phrase secrecy pri is not limited based

vacy violations and that the phrase covers II. See, e.g., TCPA violations. Park Univ. Enters., Reading, Inc. v. Am. Co. Cas. primary presented issue here Pa., (10th 1239, Cir.2006); 1250 advertising injury provision is whether the Augusta, Hooters Inc. v. Am. Global publication for “oral or written of material Co., 201, Fed.Appx. Ins. 157 206-07 a person’s right privacy” violates Cir.2005) (unpublished); W. Rim Inv. Ad sending covers the of unsolicited fax adver visors, Co., Fed.Appx. Inc. v. Ins. 96 tisements violation of the TCPA. The Gulf (5th Cir.2004) (unpublished), aff'g parties dispute do not that TCPA viola (N.D.Tex.2003); F.Supp.2d 836 see also may tions for unsolicited faxes Co., 1000, Transp. Penzer v. Ins. 29 So.3d privacy right, violate some form of but (Fla.2010). example, 1006-07 For they disagree type as to whether the duty Tenth found a Circuit defend privacy violation on which Percic’s TCPA University Enterprises, Park because the claim policies. is based is covered (1) of an Privacy allegedly “transmission unsolicited distinguishes law between se act, crecy publishing fax can constitute a while punish based torts that disclosure of receiving the can result in an inva private information about someone other same (2) privacy” than the sion of under Kansas law. 442 recipient, and seclusion based involve intruding torts on another’s F.3d 1251. (Minn.1998). 246, In inter- ac contrast, has N.W.2d the Seventh Circuit

In “primary goal” is to preting to those offered a contract the similar arguments cepted Valspar States Re- parties’ here. In American intent. insurers determine by the Inc., Co., that a Gaylord’s, it held 764 N.W.2d finish, Insurance Inc. v. material (Minn.2009). Unambiguous or written “[o]ral privacy” violates ordinary, “plain, their given words are privacy viola secrecy based only covers Cas. Co. Wis. popular meaning.” Gen. claims does not cover therefore tions and Travel, 762 N.W.2d v. Wozniak 940, 942- F.3d at See 392 under the TCPA. omitted). (citation (Minn.2009) Am- was the Seventh Circuit In that case 43. against the language is construed biguous deter Illinois law would how predicting ex- according to the “reasonable insurer was no issue, that there deciding mine the Mining of the insured.” Minn. pectations suit under a TCPA duty to defend Indem. Mfg. Co. v. Travelers nar “publication” the word policy because (Minn.1990). Minnesota rights re privacy scope rowed ambiguities courts construe favor only leaving provision, ferred to most insurance insured “[b]ecause at 942- Id. secrecy based claims covered. forms, preprinted which presented are subse Supreme Court The Illinois usually accept or potential insured must to the con Illinois law decided quently Bros., Inc. v. reject as a whole.” Nathe interpre court’s authoritative trary. That Nat’l Fire Ins. Am. that such a law ruled of Illinois tation policy pro- An insurance violations. cover TCPA provision does “reasonably if it ambiguous vision *6 Elecs., v. Swiderski Forge Ins. Co. Valley subject interpretation.” to more than one 653, 352, Inc., Ill.Dec. 860 Ill.2d 307 223 Co., 457 at Mining Mfg. Minn. (2006). Illinois Su 307, N.E.2d that the Seventh Court reasoned preme injury provision at issue the word reading of technical Circuit’s legal- damages the insured becomes covers Illi with” was “inconsistent “publication” “oral or pay because of ly obligated construing insurance for principles nois of material that vio- written contracts, undefined which “afford[ ] right privacy.” a of Since lates popularly ordinary, and plain, terms their key the terms of do not define the Id. But see Auto- meanings.” understood “right privacy,” of we “publication” Computing, Ins. Co. v. Websolv Owners (7th Cir.2009) ordinary “plain them their accord Inc., F.3d 550-51 Ctr., Inc. v. meaning.” Trade follow its Iowa would (predicting Brookfield Cnty. Ramsey, holding interpretation American States duty to defend under there was no provision).

identical ordinary conclude that

We III. privacy” “right the term meaning of type easily includes violations of Here, apply are called to we by the TCPA. privacy protected interest language of specific law to the Minnesota stated that viola previously court has Our provision under con advertising injury “ priva are ‘invasions of tions of the TCPA Minnesota law directs sideration. lay meaning[ of ordinary, ] cy’ [the] under interpre of contract “[gjeneral principles Underwriters phrase[].” Universal the[] Lobeck apply policies.” tation to insurance Inc., Network, Co., Auto. v. Lou Fusz 582 Ins. Co. Mut. Auto. Ins. v. State Farm Cir.2005).3 (8th Moreover, plain meaning Other 401 F.3d recognized unexpect “publication” enough have that “an is broad to include courts fax, jangling telephone a or a knock the dissemination of fax advertisements. ed like door, definitions, disrupt multiple can a householder’s “Publication” has in on the (as pro cluding “communication in quiet” and that TCPA news or peace and formation) seclusion, public” “interest in also and “the act or motes this telephone being up process issuing copies lines from tied ... keeps consumption recipients’ public.” and avoids distribution to the Webster’s (2002). paper.” Dictionary ink and Am. States Ins. 392 Third New International narrower, complaint alleged F.3d at 942. Percic’s While the word can have the Autopia meaning urged by violated the TCPA send tort based insurers in “unlawfully publicizing personal unsolicited faxes which “secret or informa tion,” terrupted Plaintiffs and the other class see Auto-Owners Ins. privacy being ordinary meaning

members’ interests left at its is broader. policies’ alone.” We conclude that conclude that fax advertise ... phrase “violating] right privacy” “publication” ments is a form of because encompasses rights privacy violations of such transmissions fall within the defini protected communicating the TCPA. See Park Univ. tion of general information Enters., (10th Inc., See, ly. F.3d at 1249-50 Other courts have agreed. e.g., Cir.); Inc., Enters., Inc., Augusta, Hooters 157 Fed. Park Univ. F.3d (11th Cir.). (10th Cir.) Appx. at 206-07 (concluding definition of “publication” can “communicating] include reject argument We also the insurers’ generally”); information Hooters Au that the policies’ “violating] reference to gusta, Fed.Appx. at 208 ... privacy” required Percic to Cir.). plead specific Minnesota common law privacy complaint against tort in its Auto- The distinction “publi- between the term pia. They contend that phrase Minnesota courts cation” and the “making known” *7 (the rejected coverage “have specific being where the latter used in other commercial cause of action policy liability identified in the is policies) has been examined Here, however, pled.” policies not the use several circuit courts. This distinction the ... language “violating] a our “publication” confirms view that can right privacy” defining without that disseminating include fax advertisements. limiting scope. term or its Minnesota law Several circuits have found coverage no directs that words in an policies insurance under which language used the ordinary are to be accorded their meaning. “making any person organiza- known to or Co., See Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. 497 tion covered material that a per- violates N.W.2d right privacy,” opposed Since son’s to the “ TCPA privacy’ language violations are ‘invasions of “publication here which refers to under ordinary, lay meaning[] [the] of of material that violates a person’s right of phrase[],” the[] Universal privacy.” Cynosure, Underwriters See Inc. v. St. Paul Co., Co., (1st Ins. at argument by F.3d this Fire & Marine Ins. 645 F.3d Cir.2011) (Souter, J.); the insurers is without merit. Res. Bankshares 3. interpreted jury,” In Universal we Underwriters which was defined to include "invasion complaint rights Missouri law and privacy.” concluded that a We did not consider the alleging triggered a duty policy’s separate "advertising injury” TCPA violation a provi- policy provision covering defend under a "in- at sion. F.3d 883. Co., Minnesota law re- interpretation,” Ins. 407 one Mercury Paul v. St. Corp. Cir.2005) it in favor of (nearly quires that be construed 631, 641-42 F.3d Co., Mining Mfg. coverage. & Ma- Minn. & Paul Fire language); St. identical Corp., Applying Int’l at 179. the last anteced- v. Brother Ins. Co. rine (3d Cir.2009) (un- the insurers’ compel rule does not 125-26 ent Fed.Appx. added). agree interpretation excluding coverage. We (emphases narrow published) explanation that limiting phrase rule directs that “a Justice Souter’s That with “mak- general than ordinarily only is more modifies the noun or “publication” ... at Cynosure, immediately it follows.” Lar- phrase known.” added). suggests son, latter disclosure the (emphasis While 790 N.W.2d at 705 party, publication to a third information material” phrase “publication the Here or “revealing information can mean either limiting phrase “that violates precedes conveying material ... the act itself privacy.” While it is person’s right a Id.; its content.” apart from considered limiting phrase was in- possible Ins. Paul Fire & Marine see also St. “material,” modify only tended to the word (same). Fed.Appx. at 125-26 equally possible provision to read the limiting phrase modifies the so violating reference policies’ phrase “publication of material.” preceding encompasses thus privacy” “right (“It Inc., 645 at 5 n. Cynosure, See F.3d aby caused TCPA on seclusion intrusion ‘publication’ is not so clear that would not sending unsolicited fax ad violation modified, ‘ma- fairly be read as even with vertisements, “publication” term and the between.”). interpre- latter terial’ After ex of faxes. includes dissemination coverage because tation would result whole, as a we con amining by fax reading publication under this written that “oral or clude (the ma- of the unsolicited advertisements right of person’s that violates a material terial) recipient’s violates the seclusion of unsolicited privacy” covers best, privacy. At the insur- based reject the insur fax advertisements. argument phrase would show ers’ placement that the ers’ contention subject than one “reasonably to more “that limiting phrase violates of which would cover interpretation,” one compels interpreta privacy” right of law, Under Minnesota TCPA violations. from TCPA violations tion which excludes must be construed such contend that the The insurers coverage. in favor of the insured. See situation modify “material” and phrase must Mining Mfg. Minn. *8 antecedent citing the last “publication,” State, v. 790 Larson N.W.2d rule. See They argue that reject contention also the insurers’ only covers situations where provision policy in the provision’s placement that the (the ma the advertisement the content of advertising injuries types next to other of terial) They right privacy. a violates an evaluation of the content require which words, policies argue, in other judgment compels the advertisement only damages re cover unambiguously advertising injury por- in their favor. The person’s right of a sulting from invasions range of policies covers a wide tion of private informa by publicizing privacy copyright infringement injuries, including tion. libel, necessarily it does not follow and and must right privacy provision policy provi

If an insurance advertisements. the content of the subject more than involve “reasonably sion is injuries violations. The at advertising policies includ- TCPA issue That the other exclusion, predicated are on the here do have such nor do policy ed may they key reflect define the terms in their advertis- of the advertisement content injury provision. than the fact that most ad- nothing more injuries are related to the content vertising sum, In we conclude that under Minne the advertisement. It is a considerable sota law “oral or written argue necessarily that this stretch to person’s right material that violates a unambiguously implies that an privacy” covers the TCPA claim at issue injury happens which not to be related to sending here for the of unsolicited fax content meant to be the advertisement’s advertisements. Such conduct involves a any ap- coverage. excluded from Without (the “publication of material” plain language conflict between the parent advertisement) the unsolicited fax that vio surrounding policy and the of the (the “right privacy” lates a terms, no reason to believe the there is privacy protected by seclusion based Supreme Court would deviate Minnesota TCPA). reading Our am- interpreting from its rule of faithful to principles Minnesota of insur biguous provisions in favor of the insured. interpretation, require ance contract which Co., Ill.Dec. Valley Forge See Ins. give courts to “plain, ordinary, terms their (TCPA coverage 860 N.E.2d under am popular meaning,” and to resolve not, any way, privacy “does biguities according to the ex “reasonable prevent policies’ alternative definitions pectations Mining of the insured.” Minn. ‘advertising injury’ being given from Co., Mfg. 457 N.W.2d at 179. Our con respective pur- effect or thwart their majority clusion is also consistent with the poses”). coverage of courts which have found TCPA claims under provisions. similar Had the insurers wanted to ex See, Enters., Inc., e.g., Park Univ. clude violations from the TCPA advertis (10th Cir.); F.3d at 1251 Hooters Au ing injury provision, they spe “could have gusta, Fed.Appx. at 208 cifically defined the term.” Soo Line [so] Cir.); Advisors, Inc., W. Rim Inv. 96 Fed. R.R. v. Wyo., Co. Brown’s Crew Car (5th Cir.); Appx. Valley Forge Ins. n. 1 (Minn.Ct.App.2005). 307 Ill.Dec. 860 N.E.2d at 323 Autopia “purchased ‘comprehensive these (Ill.). coverage Since we conclude that general liability policies’ expecting cover under the policies’ advertising injury exists age against legal most liabilities.” Minn. provision, we need not reach the issue of Mining Mfg.& 457 N.W.2d at 181. If the property damage provision whether “narrow, technical definition ... in was provided coverage. would have also companies, tended the insurance it was duty their to make that intention clear.” IV. Id. The record indicates that in a subse Accordingly, judgment of the district quent policy specific version of the exclu *9 court is affirmed. injury” sion was added for “advertising arising “directly or indirectly any out of COLLOTON, Judge, dissenting. Circuit action or omission that violates or is al leged to violate ... It policy language [TCPA].” would The insurance at issue thus not have in subject judicial been difficult for the insur this case has been the of ers to make by jurisdic- such intention clear decisions under the law of several tions, writing policies specifically to my exclude and it has divided the courts. In decisions, They argue that the dam- and of TCPA. view, reasoned the better “advertising injury,” to be- ages followed are due likely to be those most Minnesota, “oral or they are those cause arise out of an written Supreme Court that coverage per- no for of material violates publication that there is holding view, that Telephone right privacy.” son’s On a violation of alleging claims (“TCPA”), in Act 47 facsimiles violated Percic’s interest Protection Consumer seclusion, 227(b)(1)(C). avoiding I would therefore intrusions on which is § U.S.C. right privacy. court of a judgment species of the district one reverse the proceedings. further remand for (b), however, italicized subsection and Auto- Company Insurance Owners in context. Minnesota law must be viewed Company issued insur- Insurance Owners point: “Although begin firm on this we Works, Auto European policies ance ordinary meaning of the plain with the state Inc., Autopia. policies d/b/a terms, a contract must the terms of be damages that pay will the insurers read in the context of the entire contract.” obligated pay because the insured is Ins., Quade v. Secura injury.” The definitions “advertising (Minn.2012) (internal omitted). quotation are es- injury” policies in the “advertising will not The Minnesota courts consider the In same. the commercial sentially the (b) isolation, in meaning of subsection but liability policy issued Owners light surrounding provisions. follows, Insurance, is defined as the term The context that the definition of shows emphasis added: with advertising injury “focuses on the content injury” injury means aris- “Advertising rather than harm aris- of an advertisement following of one or more of the ing out of an advertise- receipt from mere offenses: Ins. Co. v. ment.” Auto-Owners Websolv ma- publication or a. Oral written Computing, a per- terial that slanders or libels (d) Cir.2009). (a), (c), and all Subsections disparages or organization son or on an of the content of depend examination organization’s goods, person’s or to determine whether the advertisement products or services. (a) Subjection the content caused harm. b. Oral or written begins with the same precisely even violates a material (b) or phrase as does subsection —“Oral privacy. publication of material” —which written Misappropriation c. (a) that the offender has subsection means business; style doing or ideas tar- material that publicized or than geted person. Rather assume or Infringement copyright, title d. gave phrase the same different parties slogan.4 adjacent meanings subsections (b) read subsection recipi- policy, same we should Autopia Enterprises, and Percic facsimiles, publicizing to an act of to estab- likewise to refer Autopia’s ent of seek material, inju- content of which causes cover dam- lish that the insurance of courts ry. That has been the conclusion pay must to Percic ages Autopia jurisdic- the law of three different applying in violation sending unsolicited facsimiles "following offenses” with "committed umbrella ifies 4. The relevant text of a commercial advertising your goods, prod- the course of Auto-Owners Insurance issued *10 identical, qual- or services.” except opening clause ucts that the “not, tions, in give policy any way, prevent” all of which words in a the other sub ordinary meaning and construe ambi being given their sections “from thwart effect or Websolv, guities against Id., an insurer. See respective purposes.” their 307 Ill. (“The surrounding provi at 551 580 F.Bd 653, Dec. at N.E.2d 318. That obser require ... the examination of the sions true, vation is but irrelevant under Minne offending advertisement. It content of course, construing sota law. Of subsection to infer that is therefore reasonable sub (b) out of context would not leave subsec (b) also concerns harm emanating section (d) (a), (c), tions without But effect. advertisement.”) from the content of an (b) point reading subsection in con law); (applying Iowa State Farm Ins. Gen. text is that the other subsections give Frames, Inc., Cal.App.4th Co. v. JT’s (b) meaning to subsection that it show (2010) (“The 429, 573, Cal.Rptr.3d arising is concerned with harm from the at falls in the issue middle of content of advertising material. Subsec ‘advertising injury’.... four definitions (b) tion “must be construed within the context, in may Viewed this [the definition] [provision] context as a whole and reasonably interpreted most be as refer artificially separated cannot be from the ring advertising material whose content language.” Henning other Nelson Constr. person’s right privacy.”); violates a Te v.Co. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Life Design lecomm. Network v. Brethren Mut. 645, (Pa.Su Ins. 5 A.3d (“When The transmission of an fac- per.Ct.2010) unsolicited term is read with simile policies, publish the context of the it clear ... does material that vio- is ‘privacy’ that the term lates a privacy confined to secre cy interests.... offenses refer to the sense relevant [The] to these insurance policies. content of the material covered the An unwanted advertisement pub- does not policies.”). suggestion here is not that licize recipient information about the the Supreme Court of Minnesota would recipient keep private. wants to “deviate from general interpret its rule of policies thus do not provide coverage for ing ambiguous provisions in favor of the the damages incurred Autopia as insured,” ante, but that the Minne result of its violations of the TCPA. sota court would its rule of follow reasons, For these I would reverse the reading clause the context of the judgment of the district court and remand whole before determining for further proceedings. Quade, whether ambiguous. N.W.2d at 706.

A number of decisions from juris other

dictions that find coverage for damages

arising from unsolicited facsimiles seem to

construe the subsection isolation without

discussing surrounding provisions. exception, court,

One cited is Valley

Forge Elecs., Inc., Ins. Co. v. Swiderski

223 Ill.2d 307 Ill.Dec. 860 N.E.2d (2006). In rejecting the insurer’s ar

gument, Supreme Court of Illinois rea (b) reading

soned that broadly subsection

to encompass unsolicited facsimiles would