Owens v. Truckstops of America

impairment rating provided anatomical Kennedy. OWENS, Plaintiff/Appellant, Joseph

Dr. Carl Finally, argues Huntsville Manor AMERICA, OF TRUCKSTOPS awarding the trial 30% court erred America, Inc., Inc., America, and B.P. disability permanent partial Harless’s Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Ap injury Dr. did not emotional because Wolfe pellees, provide percentage impairment. a of mental Instead, opined Dr. that Harless was Wolfe “extremely mentally,” pointed impaired DESIGN, INC., B. MICHAEL and Vitro provide do out that the AMA Guides not Products, Inc., Third-Party inju rating numerical for mental Defendants/Appellees. provide ries. Dr. was not Wolfe asked Tennessee, Supreme train impairment based on his Nashville. experience, ing separate apart Guides, one his train the AMA based on Jan. experience taking

ing and account the into impairment for in provided

levels of mental Guides, specifically all are de of which impairment permits

fined. Section 241 an given

rating “by appropriate to be meth accepted commu

od used medical

nity” in do circumstances which the Guides Dr. apply. party requested

not Neither give than impairment rating an other

Wolfe Consequent

one based the AMA Guides. rating

ly, the record does contain impairment.

Harless’s mental be

cause it is obvious from the record rather

that Harless mental has sustained substantial trial

impairment, remand her case to the we proof point,

court for further on this after appro

which the trial court shall fashion opinion. award

priate consistent reasons, judgment of foregoing

For the part,

the trial court is reversed affirmed shall be

part, and the case remanded. Costs evenly

split parties. between C.J., DROWOTA,

ANDERSON,

REID, JJ., BIRCH, concur. Nashville, North, North, for

Steve Mark PlaintiS/Appellant. Howard, Johnson,

Barry H. L. Michael Howard, Ruth, Sowell, Gracey, Nash- Tate & ville, Defendants/Third-Party Plain- for tiffs/Appellees. Holmes, Stewart, Don-

Martin D. Estes & nell, Nashville, Jr., Bryant, John W. M. Brewer, Brooks, Bryan Brooks, & Krause Nashville, Defendants/Ap- Third-Party for pellees.

OPINION REID, Justice. interlocutory appeal for de- presents

This principles termination the applicable assessment among application joint tortfeasors case, in those to this transitional prior which the cause of accrued Balentine, 833 decision decision of the S.W.2d 52 case Appeals is modified and the Court of trial remanded to the court.

Pleadings complaint, plaintiff, Jo- original Owens, Amer- seph sued Carl (“Truck- ica, America, B.P. Inc. Inc. and injuries. stops”)1 personal for defendant; however, “Truckstops the defendants plaintiff ica” names of Amer- 1. The also complaint it is entitled complaint alleges that the sus- personal injuries September indemnity from Vitro and Michael tained occupied him when stool be rendered judgment operated by Truck- and, owned and alternatively, restaurant it is entitled to Truekstops broke, causing fall to the stops Michael, pro rata contribution complaint, which was filed on floor. The pursuant to the Uniform Contribution 14, 1988, day permitted September the last Act.3 The motion was Among Tort-Feasors limitations, charges that the statute of 23,1989. August allowed on negligent it Truekstops was in that failed pleadings on was the status of the This the stool in a safe condition and maintain 4, 1992, May on which the decision the date danger of to warn the failed Balentine, McIntyre v. of this Court using the stool. (Tenn.1992), was released. Truekstops responded complaint to the 23, 1992, more than three December On general a denial of and cau- Truekstops its third- years after had filed the “affirmative defense” that the sation and complaint, a motion to dis- party Vitro filed any injury by proximate cause of sustained ground third-party complaint on the miss the plaintiff of unidentified third was the acts rights indemnity and contribution that the parties Truekstops for was not liable. which by among were abolished the de- tortfeasors 2, 1989, Truekstops August moved the On McIntyre.4 cision court that it to file a be allowed 2,1993, Truekstops moved that its On June (“Vi- Products, complaint against Inc. Vitro and amended to assert that Vitro answer be tro”), designed and manufactured the caused or contributed to Michael (“Mi- stool, Design, B. Inc. and Michael alleged injuries resulting and chael”), Truekstops.2 which sold the stool to damages. allegations Based on strict lia- 4, 1993, tort, then, relying bility implied warranty plaintiff The on June breach (1994),5 § merchantability, Truekstops in the Ann. 20-1-119 asserts Tenn.Code (2) separate per- deny entity by that there is an known that name. Institute a action complaint. by filing If the son a summons and by plaintiff proceed to under this section elects 2. See Tenn.R.Civ.P. 14.01. action, filing separate complaint so filed “original complaint shall not be considered an §§ 3. Tenn.Code Ann. 29-11-101 to 29-11-106 complaint” initiating "an the suit" or amended (1980). purposes of this subsection. (b) ninety brought within A cause of action McIntyre rights indemnity. 4. did not to discuss (a) (90) pursuant days to subsection shall not be by any of limitations. This section barred statute Comparative party fault —Joinder of third de- any applicable repose, statute of shall not extend (a) In civil actions where fendants. — fault is or becomes an permit main- nor this section to shall issue, if a defendant person when such an tain an initiating original complaint named in an a suit applicable an statute of re- action is barred limitations, applicable filed within the statute of pose. complaint or named in an amended filed within (c) neither shorten nor This section shall limitations, alleges applicable an statute of lengthen applicable statute of limitations original answer or amended answer to the or action, provided any cause of other than as complaint person party that a not a to amended (a). subsection injury the suit caused or contributed to the or (a) (b) (d) provisions of subsections recovery, damage plaintiff seeks for which the apply any commenced not to civil action shall plaintiff’s of action and if the cause or causes 28-1-105, origi- except pursuant an action to by any person would be barred such general nally court and commenced in sessions oper- applicable statute of limitations but for subsequently in circuit or chan- recommenced section, may, within ation of this cery court. (90) filing ninety days first answer (e) any This section shall limit person's alleging answer such or first amended allege or amended in an answer defendant fault, either: person suit not a to the answer that a injury (1) for which the person to the complaint add caused or contributed Amend the such recovery. pursuant seeks to Rule 15 of the Ten- as a defendant section, (f) "person” purposes pro- of this and cause For nessee Rules of Civil Procedure legal entity. person; individual or means to be issued for that cess 4,May the essential May McIntyre on legislature on which was enacted whether pleadings were issues raised 13,1993, in McIn- year after the decision one guilty negligence which Truckstops was complaint his to amend tyre, filed a motion or contributed proximately caused as defendants add Vitro and Michael whether, in event injuries, complaint alleg- amended original suit. The plaintiff, Truckstops found liable manufactured, was designed, es that Vitro pro indemnity or Truckstops entitled to was Michael; was that Vitro sold the stool to and Michael. rata contribution design and manufacture negligent in the stool; dangerous stool was a and that the holding in alleg- complaint also product. The amended apply to comparative fault would principles of stool to that Michael sold the es McIntyre the decision all cases tried after Truckstops’ restau- stool in and installed the released, McIntyre, was installing rant; negligent that Michael was the Court be case before requires that the failing to warn that the stool the stool analysis decided under dangerous; and that Michael breached approved in the extent merchantability. warranty Vi- implied can be subsequent decisions motion to opposed the tro and Michael imposing sub in this case without applied grounds that complaint on the amend the any party. Concepts of injustice on stantial to this applicable 20-1-119 was Section efficiency the basis of com are fairness and therefore, cause of and al., Page et W. Keeton parative fault. See by the stat- against them was barred Law Torts Keeton on the Prosser and of limitations, laches, estoppel. The and ute of (5th 1984); McIntyre, 67, § ed. at 468-470 complaint granted. was motion to amend 56, Consequently, fairness 58. 833 S.W.2d pursuant to Rule interlocutory appeal On controlling princi efficiency must be the Practice, 9, Appellate Rules of Tennessee cases commenced adjudicating those ples Appeals found that the decision Court of McIntyre can which prior to the decision Truckstops’ third- McIntyre required that procedures to all not be conformed and Michael for against claim Vitro by of contemplated the doctrine dismissed, re- but the court contribution be as a except noted where fault. indemnity claim for fused to dismiss the applied here rules procedure, the transitional warranty mer- implied of on breach of subsequent based precedents for constitute will held chantability. Appeals of also The Court cases. against Vitro any by plaintiff arose, the alleged cause of action When by the statute was barred or Michael for a claim right to assert plaintiff had making the order limitations and reversed Vitro, and Mi- Truckstops, damages against pursuant 20-1- Section them defendants them, per- chael, recover 100 any of or any parties damages from cent of his basis, found, legal any applicable upon Review Standard of injuries, his caused or contributed questions of presented are The issues by his own not barred provided his claim was based by motions to dismiss law raised Corp. v. e.g., See Velsicol Chemical conduct. a claim and statutes on the failure to state (Tenn.1976); 337, Rowe, 342-43 543 S.W.2d scope of re Consequently, the limitations. King, Tenn. Johnson cor presumption of novo with no view de (1968). op- Notwithstanding these 13(d); Tenn.R.App.P. Union rectness. See action, and causes parties tions as Huddleston, Corp. Carbide sued, only party Truckstops was action al- cause of negligence was the the last original complaint, filed leged in the Issues of limitations. day by the statute allowed recovery obviously expected no plaintiff than The pending for more had been This suit Truckstops any party other than against years when the decision and one-half three than theory liability other no Prior to the release McIntyre released. was have the Nevertheless, injury, and the would tiff S the law effect when gence. 20-1-119, to Truckstops days under Section against right, filed suit for 90 person per or him to obtain such would have allowed assert a claim damages by recovery sons, complaint full for his amendment proof Truckstops’ negligence proxi- action, applicable if the statute separate even injuries, mately to his caused or contributed 8.03 and run. See Rule of limitations had own in the absence of a defense based on his 14.01,Tenn.R.Civ.P. Rule conduct. See id. presented on of the motions Disposition though, according to the law then Even requires the of issues appeal resolution plaintiff had applicable, claim that comparative negligence, statutes relating to lost and Michael had been limitations, joint tort- third-party practice, expiration prior to sue them his failure contribution, tort, feasors, liability in limitations, Truckstops still of the statute implied warranty of indemnity, and breach right, pursuant Con- had the Uniform merchantability. Act, Among which Tort-Feasors tribution exercised, to assert claims Negligence Comparative in- Vitro and Michael for contribution demnity. McIntyre § Tenn.Code Ann. 29-11-104 was suit (1980). injuries personal sustained It between two motor vehicles. collision ac If the cause of action had suit, two-party essentially a was crued after the decision owner, injured driver of one vehicle sued Ann. after the effective date of Tenn.Code defense operator the other vehicle. The 20-1-119, rights and liabilities of the contributory negligence and the determi significantly parties would be different. The court’s appeal was the trial native issue plaintiff a cause of action which would have comparative charge the doctrine of refusal to negligence unless would not be barred his adopted a modified negligence. The Court negli negligence not than the his was less negligence: comparative form of injuries, gence responsible of those for his recovery his would reduced in direct but be negligence re- long plaintiff’s as a [S]o proportion negligence con to the extent his negligence mains less than the defendant’s injuries McIn tributed to the sustained. See recover; may in such a plaintiff Also, tyre, except at 57. as dis 838 S.W.2d plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced subsequently,6 cussed the defendants would percentage of the total proportion to the liable, jointly not be but each defendant’s negligence plaintiff. to the attributable proportion par to that would be at 57.7 McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d ty’s Truckstops still fault. See id. at 58. compar- involving principles of In no case right and would have the to assert Vitro since the Court plain or to the ative fault decided Michael caused contributed plaintiff); v. pp. to the Bervoets 430- fendant was liable 6. See discussion of strict infra Inc., 905, Pontiac-Olds, Ralls Harde 431. (actions (Tenn.1994) be- for contribution 908 princi- will be tried under tween defendants ples negli- Previously, "comparative the terms fault”). "comparative each of of "comparative gence” been used and fault” have express a distinct be used to these terms princi- interchangeably somewhat to include the meaning. apportioning damages ples governing of be- “comparative negligence" is defined plaintiff The term a as well as be- tween Balentine, plaintiff's negligence in the measure of the See as tween defendants. 52, (Tenn.1992) purpose of reduc- (adopts system terms used for 56 plaintiff's recovery the defendant in ing from "comparative place the common fault" in negligence attrib- proportion "contributory negligence” to de- to the law doctrine system encompasses plaintiff. It plaintiff may uted to the recover from termine whether damages to the defendant); determining attributable Rivergate, Spinnaker’s 846 Cookv. 810, (Tenn.1993) against which this (finding plaintiff the defendants that the adopted the “outmod- previously when it abandoned plaintiff the issue of failed to raise unjust of contribu- "comparative negli- common law doctrine ed and the doctrine of whether Balentine, negligence.” McIntyre determining tory applied the de- gence” whether 58, Truckstops McIntyre, id. they sought,” allow though all have been is would even cases, respon- and Michael were found that to show that Vitro transitional has the Court damages negligence sible for some substituting comparative for the thereby reducing of its the extent contributory traditional doctrine of preventing plaintiff thus from obtain- upon any par- gence worked an unfairness plaintiff ing recovery, a full unless the has Likewise, ty.8 application of § 20- right, pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. negligence in case not defeat the this would otherwise, 1-119 or to assert claims right alleged, damages to recover Vitro and. Michael. Truckstops upon proof Truckstops from proximate- negligent negligence and its Truckstops’ Consequently, deciding before ly plaintiffs in- caused or contributed to the Truckstops’ to the juries damages.9 its claims under Michael, rights However, application those defendants must be principles plain- case would limit the determined. recovery portion tiffs to that corresponding to the fault attributable Limitations Statutes of granting without recognized in rights of other Vitro and Michael claim that benefit and, therefore, McIntyre, impose could barred the statutes of limita plain significant application recovering him a unfairness. The from them. The tions which allows the defendant tiffs causes of action for strict injured on non-party “that a caused or contributed accrued when he was show injury damage recovery September 1987. The record does or from which 56; Hickman, doing they fleets what the courts are when S.W.2d at see also John Scott Note, Fairness, Efficiency, plain- and Common Sense: between come to address interface Percentage The Case One Action as to Fault liability. tiffs' fault and so-called strict Negligence Comparative Jurisdictions Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, Victor E. Liability, Joint and Several Abolished (3d 1994). Modified ed. 11-1 (1995) (quoting 48 Vand.L.Rev. 741 n. Nonetheless, the usefulness of the terms in Nat’l, Co., Schneider Inc. v. Holland Hitch discussing justifies adoption de- the issues their (Wyo.1992)). The temí “com- P.2d 566 n. spite purposes of this their limitations. For the parative fault" is defined as those “comparative negligence” opinion, will the term encompass the determination of how to negligence system apportioning to of refer "apportion damage recovery among multiple or and the between a according joint tortfeasors of only "comparative to term fault” will refer not to those actors after reduction for attributed liability system apportioning tort- of between plaintiff's negligence.” of feasors, principles govern- set of but also to the Co., Nat’l, 843 Schneider Inc. v. Holland Hitch analysis grounded ing actions P.2d at 566 n. 4. tort. The rationale behind this distinction is that negligence generally only theory by which is reduced; whereas, Corp., plaintiff’s damages e.g., Toyota 897 can be 8. See Whitehead v. Motor 1995) liability may (Term. (comparative negligence be based on theories defendants’ S.W.2d 684 negligence. other than apportioning damages principles applied be problems recognized It is that there are defendants in strict tween a have the use of these terms and that scholars actions); Ledes, 895 S.W.2d 680 Volz approaches: suggested alternative (Tenn.1995) (damages apportioned among defen McIntyre ] v. Balentine uses the [in The Court of the defen to fault even if one dants fault,” adequate "comparative term which is McLain, insolvent); is Eaton v. dants negligence inappropriate actions but for for (Tenn.1994) (prior doctrines of common law actions, conceptual- strict ly in which the contributory negligence, chance last clear remote "comparative term causation” confused implied assumption have become of risk term, The best for sometimes is substituted. comparative negligence); subsumed Perez actions, both and strict (Tenn.1994) (implied McConkey, “comparative responsibility.” assumption longer an absolute bar to of risk is no Wright, Logic and Fairness Richard W. recovery). Liability, Mem.St.U.L.Rev. Joint and Several (1992); 45 n. contributory negli- plead Truckstops did not "comparative will be used in The term fault” appropriately gence in this case. re- instances because it more (Tenn.1975). Accordingly, plaintiff is warranty claim clearly alleged his when show personal asserting any claim for accrued, certainly no later than accrued barred warranty of mer- injury. injury implied Tenn.Code Ann. date of the See or breach (1992). 47-2-725(2) § Tenn.Code or Michael. chantability against Under Vitro per- (Supp.1993), actions Ann. 28-8-104 from Vi- plaintiff cannot recover Since the injury, including products sonal may be attrib- which tro or Michael cases, year within one must be commenced them, full may be denied a to he utable the cause of action from the date on which all of to recover recovery unless he is allowed implied Actions for breach of the accrued. However, Truckstops. damages from his warranty merchantability must be com- injustice Truck- this could constitute years 47- within four under Section menced third- Truckstops can assert stops, unless not seek to assert 2-725. The did and Michael. The against claims Vitro any against or Michael until June Vitro is the effect issue then 4,1993, years six after the date of his almost right Truckstops’ on subsequent decisions plain- injury. Consequently, claims the against pursue third-party actions Vitro may against or Michael tiff have had indemnity and contribution. Michael when he moved were barred complaint defen- amend his to make them Third-Party Practice dants. action asserted cause of Ann. The enactment of Tenn.Code Truckstops on plaintiff against was based plaintiffs § 20-1-119 does not revive the Truckstops has asserted negligence, while to assert claims Vitro and Mi on third-party claims based plain chael. Section 20-1-119 now allows tort, implied liability in breach of war to amend a tiff a limited time within which ranty merchantability. The basis any person complaint to add as a defendant can assert alleged by caused another defendant Michael is not limit claims Vitro and injury, if the stat or contributed even action asserted ed to the cause of applicable ute of limitations to a Truckstops. In Turner v. plaintiff against of action the added defendant cause Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318 Aldor Co. of expired. was not has this statute (Tenn.App.1991), decided before enacted until after the claims Appeals examined the Court of had become barred. The state constitution practice in under Rule Tennessee prohibits the revival of these causes of action Procedure,10 and Rules of Civil Tennessee periods. outside of the limitation The Con the de purpose that its “is to enable found Tennessee, I, stitution of Article Section person “whois or implead another fendant law, provides retrospective or law “[t]hat no part him for all or be liable to contracts, impairing obligations of shall against him.’” Id. at 320 plaintiffs claim Retrospective laws are laws that be made.” 14.01). The court (quoting Tenn.R.Civ.P. away impair rights acquired “take or vested held: existing a obli under laws or create new liability to the third-party defendant’s duty, gation, impose a new or attach a new entirely may based on an defendant be disability respect of transactions or consid liabil- theory than the defendant’s Gross, different already passed.” erations Morris may plaintiff a ity plaintiff. Since This Court or more defendants choose to sue one potential that a defendant has determined others, that joining it is irrelevant without a acquires right not to be sued once a vested against the third- plaintiff has no claim applica of action has accrued and the cause to as- chosen not party defendant or has expired. limitations has Watts ble statute of sert one. County, v. Putnam part may all or liable to him for who is or be commencement of the action

10. At time after third-party plaintiff, against defending party, plaintiff’s him.... a as a complaint be may a summons and cause 14.01. Tenn.R.Civ.P. person to the action served (citations omitted). Id. guidance See also 4 American charged to the trial courts with (Timo 3d, Liability Law Products 52:17 implementing system. this new 1987). thy eds., E. Travers et al. 3d ed. McIntyre, part 833 S.W.2d at 57. As of its Notwithstanding appli the above-stated rule guidance bar, for the bench and the Court party practice cable to third generally, the rendering described that decision’s effect as comparative contemplates doctrine of joint liability the doctrine of and several “ob- apportionment that the of fault is limited to solete,” stating, against plaintiff those which the has a cause [hjaving adopted closely thus a rule more of action. Truekstops, Since the claims that linking liability it would be in- posture in the third-party plaintiff, of a has rule, simultaneously consistent to retain a Michael, posture Vitro and in the joint liability, and several for- are claims which the tuitously impose degree that Owens could have asserted proportion out of all to fault. Michael, apportionment Vitro and an of lia Id. at 58. The Court further stated: bility among first-party defendant and Among [T]he Uniform Contribution Tort- defendants that is consistent Act, §§ Feasors T.C.A. 29-11-101 to 106 fault can be (1980), longer no appor- will determine the accomplished according third-party pro tionment of between codefendants. ceedings in this case. response petition Id. to a for a Liability Between Joint Tortfeasors rehearing, the Court stated that further Negligence I. guidance regarding advisability “the of re- joint taining and several in certain Truekstops McIntyre insists limited ... circumstances should await an joint “abolished” and several in all appropriate controversy.” Id. at 60. That retried, eases McIntyre “tried or after the presented issue is in the case before the decision,” that, consequently, its Court. portion is limited to that of the fault attribut Truekstops able it. also claims it has fault decisions rendered right, show, pursuant under to date primarily this Court have dealt answer, to its amended that Vitro and Mi plain with the allocation of fault between the chael plaintiff’s caused or contributed to the tiff and the defendant or defendants. injuries resulting damages, thereby (Tenn. re McConkey, Perez v. ducing eliminating liability part. 1994), on its there was one defendant. The Vitro and Michael also contend that McIn negligence. cause of action was common law tyre abolished and several assumption The issue was whether of risk rights the incidental of contribution in plaintiff’s charge was an absolute bar to the demnity. negligence. The defendants in Eaton v. McLain, (Tenn.1994), 891 S.W.2d 587 were McIntyre in negligence complaint charged husband and wife. The defendant; consequently, a sole common law the issue was the only allocation of fault in that case was be- in assigning factors to be considered fault to tween the and the defendant. After and the defendants. There was trial, remanding the case for a new the Court competing rights no determination stated: liabilities between the defendants. recognize today’s We decision af- legal principles opportunity fects numerous surround- The first to the com consider ing litigation. part, peting pre tort For the most interests between tortfeasors was harmonizing compar- in these with sented Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac- Inc., Olds, day. ative fault must await another How- In S.W.2d ever, compelled provide charged we feel to some that case the tortfeasors were with comparative negligence. 11. The Court also used the term "obsolete” to into the doctrine of contributory indicate that the doctrines of remote McIntyre, 833 at 57. negligence and last clear chance were subsumed original) (quoting in negligence. (emphasis Id. separate, independent acts of 58). in Bervoets The Court Court, that case was Like the case before the § 29-11- that Tenn.Code Ann. made clear McIntyre in pending when the decision 103(1), provides that tortfeasors’ “rela- which Bervoets, passenger in who was a rendered. degrees fault shall not be considered” tive Jackson, operated by was in an automobile determining pro in rata shares of liabili- jured Ber- when the vehicle was wrecked. doctrine of ty, is not consistent with the voets sued Jackson and the owners fault, imposes liability in comparative which vehicle, who, turn, third-party claim in filed a holding in Ber- to fault. The direct relation Inc., Adanac, alleg against for contribution fault, comparative that under Jack- voets was ing caused the that the defendant Adanac, jointly Inc. were not son and by unlawfully serving alcoholic accident Jackson, but, plaintiff, severally liable to the Jackson, minor. drinks to who was a Jack full, damages in paid plaintiffs’ who had entered son and his insurance carrier allowed, case, to in that transitional would be Bervoets, agreement into a settlement with against for contribution Ada- assert a claim against claims in which Bervoets released his assessed, nac, would be Inc. so a parties. pursued insurer then all Jackson’s rehear, according explained petition on to against Adanac for contribution. percentage of fault attributable to to “the Following the release of the decision of the defendants.” each McIntyre, Adanac moved to dismiss Jack- plaintiff’s of action in Ber- Had the cause ground son’s claim for contribution on the adoption of subsequent arisen to the voets McIntyre abolished and several fault, Jackson, in to comparative an effort right and the incidental to contribu- liability, of his would have reduce the extent rejected interpre- tion. The Court Adanac’s Adanac, alleged in Inc. his answer opinion McIntyre, stating: tation of the damages, caused or contributed recovering than plaintiff, pain less McIntyre regard statements with [0]ur damages, have amended his com- full would adoption to the effect of our of a scheme pursuant to 20-1-119 to assert plaint Section remedy fault on the of contri Thus, Adanac, pur- Inc. a claim bution make it clear that we did not intend fault, pose the assessment deprive litigants right pursue proportion would appropriate claim for contribution in an proceeding to accomplished been without the case: contribution, was made neces- enforce Id. at 907. there is no of contri- Since sary in time within Bervoets because the jointly among bution tortfeasors who are not plaintiff a claim which the could assert liable, recognized right the Court that the Adanac, directly expired Inc. had would be utilized in some situa- contribution when was decided. rights and liabilities of tions to resolve the Procedurally, Bervoets and the case before jointly severally tortfeasors liable oth- cases, In are similar. both explanation why there was no ers. charge of plaintiff sued a defendant on a Bervoets, right to contribution in the Court negligence, filed a third- and the defendant quoted McIntyre: asserting sepa- others [Bjecause particular defendant will rate, independent negligence. act of In nei- percent- henceforth be liable for the a claim ther ease had the asserted plaintiffs damages age of a occasioned directly against defendant. situations that defendant’s cases is that The main difference the two paid Bervoets, had, more than his where a defendant has settlement arise, judgment longer “share” of a will no recovered his while, full, present and therefore the Uniform Contribution in the the issue Act, §§ had Among T.C.A. 29-11- Tortfeasors the defendant’s (1980) longer McIntyre was decid- 101—106 will no determine not been resolved when were apportionment liability between co- ed. The defendants Bervoets charged separate, independent acts of with defendants. 430 comparative each of the and contribu

negligence, and under fault able to Bervoets, accordingly.” jointly tion will be ordered not liable. Contribution was would be Allowing at the claim for damages 908. could be utilized so accomplish equita contribution will the same apportioned between the defendants on the be accom ble results in this case that would fault. basis of their relative plished rights if and liabilities of all of the Ledes, (Tenn.1995), Volz v. 895 S.W.2d 677 parties could be determined to the malpractice a medical case which the pro principles announced in jury percent of the fault to the attributed 10 20-1-119. vided Section physician-defen- plaintiff, percent 45 to the dant, percent non-party physi- and 45 to a Liability in Tort II. Strict Bervoets, cian. As in each tortfeasor was Toyota Corp., Whitehead v. Motor charged separate, independent acts of with (Tenn.1995), 684 was the Court’s S.W.2d negligence. that fault be The decision was involving prod comparative first fault case separately, each tortfeasor attributed liability in ucts action based on strict though tortfeasor was not a even one Tennessee, that in tort. The Court held to the suit. majority jurisdictions, com in the of other comparative These fault cases decided products parative negligence applies to liabil that, negli- the Court establish all cases of liability in tort. ity actions based on strict gence in which the is entitled to a federal case Id. at 691. Whitehead was damages, liability damages will Court, recover pur which the United States District proportion be reduced in to the Supreme suant to Rule Rules of the fault. The deci- attributable Court, question of certified to this Court the separate, sions also establish where compara whether the affirmative defense of than independent negligent acts of more one negligence products can be raised in a tive single, indivisi- tortfeasor combine cause liability in tort. action based on strict injury, ble each tortfeasor will be liable recognized prior adop The Court proportion damages attribut- for that Tennessee, con tion of fault tortfeasors, able to its fault. As to those tributory negligence to an was not a defense and several but several is liability in action based on strict tort. White only, though two or more tortfeasors even Toyota Corp., 897 at head v. Motor S.W.2d joined Co., are in the same action. Ellithorpe see v. Ford Motor (Tenn.1973). However, answer S.W.2d Bervoets, However, as in fairness demands affirmative, ing question in the the certified allowed in this case. that contribution be the Court stated: Truckstops’ third-party products to strict The conduct that leads allega and Michael for contribution based fault, “fault” liability involves as the word negligence apportioned ac tions of will be generally commonly understood. See is of fault attribut cording percentage Powers, The Persistence William C. policy able to each of the tortfeasors. Liability, 61 Tex.L.Rev. Fault in Products that Tennessee not “abandon consideration (1983). keeping principle with the totally system” tort our fault-based fault, linking rejecting pure comparative was the basis for products ability to recover in a strict liabil- rule, percent” McIn favor of the “49 ity case should not be unaffected tyre, applicable is not injuries result from his extent to which his liability among apportionment of tortfea-s fault. own the decision ors.12 This is consistent with Toyota Corp., 897 Motor jury] proceed to Whitehead Bervoets that shall “[the history reviewing at 693. After fault attribut determine 57; Lee & analysis, S.W.2d at 1 J.D. “pure fault” Under a Cf. Barry (rev'd Law, Lindahl, recover even if his the co-defendant gence Tort 12.06 A. Modem greater other 1994); than Negligence/Fault, Comparative ed. Liability apportioned solely based tortfeasors. is causal 1994). ¶3030 (CCH) Prod.Liab.Rep. (Apr. on the

431 liability Tennessee, were re- liability imposing in reasons for strict of strict the Court in recovery by the Whitehead: reducing plaintiff’s found that viewed damages to proportion attributable imposed liability strict “We prin- fault would not defeat the the user or favor of manufacturer cipal adoption injured reasons for the of strict liabili- to relieve con- consumer order ty: proof inherent in problems ‘from sumers warranty ... ... pursuing negligence (1) encourage greater manu- care noted, sought As we remedies ...’ we products facture of that are distributed to manufactur- place the burden of loss on (2) injured public, and to relieve con- ‘injured persons who are ers rather than negli- proving sumers from the burden of ” powerless protect themselves.’ gence part. on a manufacturer’s Toyota Corp., Motor Whitehead v. Id. at 693. Daly (quoting at 691 v. General S.W.2d 725, Cal.Rptr.

Although Corp., were two in Motors 20 Cal.3d there defendants (1978)) Whitehead, 380, 385-88, 1162, 1167-69 the manufacturer and the seller 575 P.2d product alleged (emphasis original). recognized The Court of the to be defective unreasonably comparative negligence prin dangerous, presented applying the issue that in liability, apportion- ciples to the Court related to actions based on strict ment of between the requirement is still no [t]here the defendants. Whitehead did not address part gence on the of a manufacturer be Court, presently the issue before the proved, only distrib- that the manufacturer rights multiple and liabilities between defen- unreasonably danger- uted a defective or liability dants in a strict case is action. This product. ous controversy,” McIntyre, “appropriate 833 Id. at 693. at S.W.2d for the Court to address “the Procedurally, in a a advisability joint retaining and several lia- satisfy liability action must one of the strict id., bility,” for defendants in the chain of 28—106(b)(Supp. § forth in conditions set 29— product of a distribution who are liable 1994), provides: theory liability tort.13 product No action as defined 29-28-102(6), § doc- recognized Strict in tort is as a when based on the cause action in in tort shall be com- the Tennessee Products trine of strict against any Liability Act of 1978. Ann. menced or maintained seller Tenn.Code (1980 alleged §§ or Supp. product 29-28-101 to 29-29-108 which is to contain 1994). unreasonably § possess Ann. 29-28- a defective condition Under Tenn.Code 105(a) (1980), buyer, dangerous a manufacturer or seller of a user or consumer product may “injury person is also the manufacturer be liable for unless the seller property product product or the manufacturer of the [if] or caused of the defective, or product part in a thereof claimed to be is determined to be defective product unreasonably or dangerous condition or at the unless the manufacturer subject part question or shall not be time it left the control of the manufacturer process in the state of Tennessee part seller.” Proof of on the service of long- required. cannot be secured the manufacturer or seller is not service Eads, unless such arm statutes of Tennessee or Ford Motor Co. v. Tenn. (Second) judicially (1970); has declared manufacturer been Restatement (1965). 402A, Torts, policy cmt. m insolvent. Pontiac-Olds, dissent, not, v. Harde Ralls stated in the decisions in Bervoets 13. The Court has 905; Toyota disapproved joint S.W.2d at Whitehead of the doctrine of and several Inc. 891 684; 435; sense; general p. Corp., Motor Ledes, in a see Volz infra and several disapproved joint 895 S.W.2d at 677. Joint has and several "resurrected,” sense, is, p. liability need not be see particular where the defendants infra (dissent), continued to be charged separate, independent acts of because it has were law, specifically integral part except particular where negligence. This limitation abrogated. the Court’s and several was the basis for 432 ultimate division of plying “to to determine the primary purpose

A of this section is strictly liability among liable defen- injured an consumer main- ensure that liability action whomever tain a strict dants.16 him likely compensate for his is most holding with Whitehead. This is consistent Co., Sears, injuries.” v. Roebuck and Seals case, all of the cases In that as almost (E.D.Tenn.1988). Inc., 1252,1253 F.Supp. 688 comparative fault was where cited therein is not amenable to the manufacturer When actions, liability applied products to strict insolvent, injured process service of or is Whitehead, 691-92, the alloca- 897 S.W.2d at liability against consumer can assert in the among of fault the defendants tion If, seller. under these circum- “faultless” product not was chain of distribution stances, jointly the seller were not held to be an issue because an issue. It was not then, damages, con- liable joint jurisdictions, comparative fault those statute, trary products liability liability of tortfeasors had been and several injured with no reme- consumer would be left adoption of retained after the remedy, dy. legislature grants a When the liability action products fault or the strict judicial decision. cannot be abolished only one defendant. See brought against

Bervoets, at 907. Co., Sears, 229 Roebuck and Conn. Elliot v. liability Consequently, and several (1994); 500, Caterpillar 709 West v. 642 A.2d against parties the chain of distribution (Fla.1976); Co., Kaneko 336 So.2d 80 Tractor theory of strict product is essential to the 447, Processing, Haw. 654 v. Hilo 65 Coast liability. liability does products Since strict Indus., Inc., (1982); Coney P.2d 343 v. J.L.G. only that require proof not but 337, 104, 197 73 Ill.Dec. 454 N.E.2d 97 Ill.2d unreasonably product was defective Blast, (1983); 462 166 Bell v. So.2d Jet Wheel dangerous, parties in the chain of distribution (La.1985); Raybestos-Manhattan, Austin v. single unit for the must be treated as a Inc., (Me.1984); Brisboy v. 280 471 A.2d allocating determining and fault.14 purpose of Corp., Mich. 418 N.W.2d Fibreboard 429 Frost, (1988); Engineered Inc. v. supported by portions of 650 Jack This conclusion is Co., 346 Bldg. Components 304 N.W.2d Among Tort-Fea- the Uniform Contribution (Minn.1981); Corp., Day v. Motors General Act not addressed sors (N.D.1984); v. 345 N.W.2d 349 provide, equity requires, the collective “[i]f Sandford Motors, 292 Or. Div. General liability group shall constitute Chevrolet of some as (1982); Fiske v. MacGre equity ap- 642 P.2d 624 single “[p]rineiples of share” and (R.I.1983); v. Duncan gor, 464 A.2d 719 generally ap- shall plicable to contribution (Tex. Co., 29-11-103(2) 414 § Ann. and Cessna ply.” Tenn.Code Aircraft Co., 1984); 628 (3). Ingersoll-Rand Mulherin Consequently, in the ease before (Utah 1981); tort, Lundberg v. All- Court, liability charge P.2d on the of strict Co., 181, 777 manufacturer, Wash.App. Vitro, Pure Chemical as (1989); v. Pula Furniture Co. Michael, product P.2d 15 Star of a as the seller15 Co., 79, 297 S.E.2d 171 W.Va. dangerous, ski Furniture alleged “shall to be defective Sciano, (1982); 37 Wis.2d Dippel v. single constitute a share.” (1967); Ford Motor Keltner v. jointly severally 155 N.W.2d 55 be held defendants will (8th Cir.1984) (based Co., plaintiff, 748 F.2d with liable as to the law); Corp. Montana indemnity ap- Arkansas Trust principles of contribution been utilized contribution has defendant in 16.Whereas insistence that each 14. The dissent’s attributing plain- liabil- be hable to the an action for strict cases as a means transitional according separate would im- to its "fault” tiff and indemni- ity contribution proving pose the burden means of ty to be the effective will continue abolishing negligent, thus each defendant was jointly liability among apportioning tortfeasors liability. arising com- severally under liable in cases parative fault. against Michael can- 15. The strict of the conditions of be maintained unless one 29-28-106(b) (Supp.1994) Tenn.Code Ann. satisfied. Piper Corp., are also F.Supp. 1093 hable on a claim strict Aircraft (D.Mont.1981)(based law). neghgenee, charged on Montana as their neghgenee charge on the will be ap- When are tortfeasors, separate, independent and their plied liability action, a strict neghgenee charge whl be on the compared strictly fault is with the fault of the only. several single hable as a defendants unit. The fault by inju- of these defendants is measured the applying of to The result these ry by unreasonably caused the or defective charge that on the of strict this case is dangerous product. liability When is found tort, liability liability of and liability neghgenee on strict and also or other several, joint Michael to is theories, apportion the trier of fact must only liability portion but to that of the total plaintiffs injuries damages fault for the or single unit that is attributable to them as percentage damages of share, comparative principles. or under fault by plaintiff, by caused that caused charge neghgenee, of On the of product, by and that caused each tortfeasor proportion to the dam- each is several and acting separately independently.17 This age neghgenee. attributable to its procedure by adopted Whitehead, where the Court stated: Indemnity III. per-

The triers of fact will determine the centage plaintiffs damages of a is Truckstops claims that it is enti attributable to the or unreason- defective indemnity tled to from either Vitro or Mi ably dangerous product as well as the neghgenee chael because its should be con percentage plain- that is to attributable passive. sidered It rehes the rule in tiffs own fault. only guilty “passive” Tennessee that one of Toyota Corp., Whitehead v. Motor 897 neghgenee neghgenee rather than “active” added). (emphasis at S.W.2d 693 See also can recover indemnification. & Muni Wolff Duncan, (Tex.1984). 665 at 427 S.W.2d er, Price-Waterhouse, 532, Inc. v.

Thus, adoption (Tenn.App.1991). of fault did 536 Whereas contribution products liability not alter that only part party law under shifts of the loss one from another, indemnity which the of implied defendants the chain traditional shifts of product, distribution of a party who are liable the entire loss from the found hable to theory liability, under a of strict party is should who bear the entire loss. principles, several. Under Liability American Law Products at however, jointly indemnity may § these defendants apphed are 52.1. The law of be severally only percentage solely by impu liable for that of where one is held hable plaintiffs damages by prod- caused tation of law of a relation to a because al., uct. percentage damages wrongdoer. Page For the caused Keeton et Prosser W. product, Torts, strictly hable defendants and Keeton on the Law (5th 1984). single are treated as a unit or share. On the 341-42 ed. “Contracts of indem hand, may expressed, obligation other when is based on nification or an be gence, severally indemnify may by implication each of the defendants is arise from only parties_” hable relationship of the House Marshall, neghgenee. boating Corp. caused its If those defen- Am. v. jointly severally dants who can be held form, following special adopted unreasonably 17. The verdict as The defective or specific allegations (Defendants dangerous product of the be predicated upon B)_% used in cases where is A and n n _ products liability strict and other theories such Defendant X _ negligence: as Defendant Y _ Using percent Plaintiff §5 as the total combined (Total 100%) harm, equal preponderance must find from a the evi- plaintiff’s injuries dence the damages proximately by: Signature or caused of Foreman uct, indemnity comparative negligence may pled as right is not im be paired by is Among the Uniform Contribution defense. The rationale the same pro supporting comparative negligence Act. as a de Tort-Feasors Section 29-11-102© negligence vides: fense actions based principle is well- in tort. any right chapter impair This does not MacGregor, stated the Court Fiske indemnity existing under law. Where (R.I. Brunswick, Div. 464 A.2d indemnity one tort-feasor entitled to 1983): another, indemnity comparative-negligence If the statute obligee indemnity is for and not contribu- actions, tion, applied a defendant indemnity obligor and the is not enti- manufacturer found liable in strict obligee tled contribution from the implied warranty could not have the any portion indemnity obligation. of his damages apportioned plaintiffs because of City also Ins. See Continental Co. v. of culpable Ironically, defendant conduct. Knoxville, negligence found manufacturers liable However, imposes indemnification the damages de- apportioned, would have the loss entire on one tortfeasor based on the clear- spite the fact that their conduct was imprecise pas distinction between active and ly than the of culpable more conduct those negligence sive is inconsistent with the com liability found liable strict defendants parative McIntyre principles adopted fault implied warranty. We the believe Consequently, subsequent and decisions. just be deter- outcome of a case should not can there be no for indemnification by pleading mined adroit or semantical active-passive negligence based on because culpability A distinctions. defendant’s is that distinction is subsumed into the doctrine damages, of wheth- the basis for an award comparative longer of deter fault. While no culpability er that is denominated right indemnity, minative of the to seek the gence, liability, or breach of warran- passive distinctions between the active and ty. Similarly, plaintiffs culpable conduct weighed negligence may by be factors to be apportionment the of is basis for those jury assessing the of the fault damages. parties. v. Hol Schneider Nat’l Inc. land, (Wyo.1992). 843 P.2d 578-79 that, charge of The conclusion is on the implied indemnity is where based warranty implied breach of of merchantabili- legal relationship parties, on the the between ty, plaintiffs damages and claim for the indemnity contin principles the traditional of among apportionment damages those tort- of apply. ue to case, comparative and feasors fault among third-party and defen- first-party Consequently, Truckstops is not entitled to accord- dants will be determined indemnity third-party on ing of fault principles charge of and of the liabilities hereinabove discussed. Truckstops, charge Vitro and Michael on negligence respec- based of will be on their Conclusion percentages tive of fault. Vitro nor Neither indemnity has Michael raised the issue of on considerations, equita- Based on these charge liability. of strict by contemplated the doctrine of ble results accomplished can be best Implied Warranty of IV. Breach Truckstops relieving of by in this case by Appeals, joint liability which existed As of and several noted plaintiffs cause of action third-party complaint alleges no facts in when the accrued, by allowing Truck- implied Truckstops support charge breach warranty merchantability. pursue third-party Consequently, stops its claims will have of that issue is limited the Vitro Michael. discussion recovery as when he expectation that in an action for the same determination Truck- negligence against personal injuries based breach of im filed his action for prod- Truckstops the same plied warranty merchantability stops, of a will have pursue third-party its claims plaintiffs damages by Vitro and Michael as when it made them that was caused that defendant’s joint defendants. In and the doctrine of the event that several Truckstops application. would have found to have caused or no con- by tributed its all, repeatedly First of this Court has dis- injuries damages, shall be joint approved of the doctrine of and several Truckstops allowed to recover from the full general McIntyre in a sense. damages. amount of his And stated, dicta, joint Balentine we pursue shall be allowed to its several was rendered obsolete actions set forth adoption comparative negligence. We Thus, this decision. for the dam- confirmed the obsolescence of the doctrine of ages to which be entitled Ledes, and several in Volz v. among will be allocated all of the defendants (Tenn.1995), 895 S.W.2d 677 in which we in a manner consistent with the doctrine stated as follows: comparative fault.18 again We the doctrine confirm joint and judgment several Appeals of the Court of rendered remanding obsolete our the case to trial decision in court is af- Balentine. system We believe that a firmed as modified this decision. particular wherein a defendant is liable Costs will be taxed parties the only the of a dam- equally. ages by that are caused that defendant’s system fault is the our best achieves ANDERSON, C.J., and BIRCH and goal McIntyre stated in v. Balentine of WHITE, JJ., concur. linking liability keeping and fault. In with DROWOTA, J., dissenting part. in goal, adopt this compa- we decline to a rule DROWOTA, rable to Justice, the rule under the Uniform dissenting Com- part. parative pursuant Fault Act to which the plaintiffs expectations Based on the at the given of a defendant is enhanced time agree he filed this lawsuit in I beyond that defendant’s that, majority with the in this transition fault if culpable another defendant is insol- case, permit it is reasonable to the vent. goal We do not believe that the to recover from the defendants that he linking liability by with fault is furthered complaint named in (“Truckstops”) his all of particular rule that allows defendant’s his proximately that were caused happen- to be determined the by Truckstops and that were not attribut- stance of the financial wherewithal of other (if able to any). the own fault I defendants. agree majority also with the that it is fair in added). (emphasis S.W.2d at 680 permit this transition case to Truckstops to parties receive contribution from the general disapproval In addition to our were third-party joint named as liability, recently several we have However, cases, defendants. I believe that the decided two Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc., (Tenn. parties’ contribution should be based on the 891 S.W.2d 905 1994) respective fault, percentages of Toyota and that this Corp., and Whitehead v. Motor apply only (Tenn.1995), which, method should to the 897 S.W.2d 684 when gence tandem, third-party claims set forth the appear considered tome re complaint, products liability but to quire the strict a different result from that reached Bervoets, If as well. were majority. thus linked to In one of several fault on each claim the com- plaintiff, defendants settled with the who had plaint, injured (including each defendant the third- been in an automobile accident. The defendants) party releasing would be liable settlement had the effect of Although attending consequences may depend allocation of in this case and the compara- will be consistent with the doctrine of collectibility of the awards made. discharge separate tive liabilities posture exactly analogous in a actually who was case will be defendant settlement, as well as all other defendants. situation that in Bervoets —in oth- existed remedy presented issue whether the was words, would be entitled to er McIntyre deci contribution survived our given collect a dollar from one defen- amount did, holding stated In we sion. dant, precluded directly and would be follows: collecting anything de- from other would-be Therefore, today we reaffirm then be deter- fendants. Contribution could and hold that actions for contribution that according to forth in mined the method set May 4, are to be tried retried after Bervoets. 1992,are to be in accordance with the tried

principles majority fault. Because Ber- case has followed catego- unquestionably this case fits in this respect claims voets ry, jury on retrial the determine the will complaint. it re- (cid:127)percentage to each attributable rationale to fuses to extend Bervoets will be and contribution claim, products liability arguing that accordingly. ordered theory products of strict law requires

necessarily retention of opinion the retrial of liability, are of the that on precludes We thus and several jury informed this case the should first be my apportionment on the of fault. basis settlement, amount of and then Whitehead, view, this Court’s su- decision if that settlement asked determine argument. pra, defeats this In that reasonable answering questions which this Court was jury may consider fault. The pursuant that had been to us certified the fault of the Bervoets Court, Supreme Rule 23 of the Rules of the (Safeco Insurance defendants Jackson as follows: we stated Adanac, making this Company) and Inc. in discussion, light foregoing our “In jury that the If the finds determination. to us question to the first certified answer reasonable, proceed shall settlement was ap- principles do fault is the attrib- to determine offault based on ply products and con- actions to each utable the of accordingly. be If tribution will ordered tort. strict however, jury the settlement the finds that products to strict The conduct leads was, compar- according of the fault, liability involves as the word fault’ fault, ‘in reason- ative excess of what was commonly keeping understood.... able,’ jury this same then determine will principle linking liability with with the proper damages; amount of and the fault, ability in a to recover jury may consider fault of not be products strict case should making the two defendants in this determi- inju- his to which unaffected extent jury Once the has determined nation. his ries result from own fault.” then damages, amount it shall proper to each attributable determine added) (citation (emphasis at 693 jury that the finds defendants. If omitted). fault, contri- was at defendant be shall ordered bution previously deter- as we have Inasmuch defen- its commensurate with dant among defendants that contribution mined the defendants’ fault. be ordered based on should added). (emphasis at 908 percentages that the respective products that leads to conduct strict ob- If and when this case fault,1 exception made judgment Truckstops, is based on tains a "negligence" part defen- prove of each Contraiy footnote 14 on the 1. to the assertion made in Rather, dant, “abolishing liability.” determining strict majority opinion, thus would, required always, only be to that defendant’s of each defendant dangerous unreasonably prove require plaintiff to that a defective or "separate fault" would not majority products claims view, my

represents, departure from our

prior decisions. Because I not believe do departure promotes

that such a consider- prompted adoption

ations fairness that our comparative fault, there is no because by resurrecting

reason to confuse the law

joint and liability, respectfully several I dis-

sent.

Bobby CAMPER, III, L.

Plaintiff-Appellant, MINOR, B.

Daniel ad Administrator litem Taylor, Estate of Jennifer L. Barnett, Defendants-Appel

Sharon R.

lees.

Supreme Tennessee, Court of

at Knoxville.

Jan. commerce, product placed system was in the stream of insistence that such would "abolish fact, injured thereby. that he liability” overly-expansive or she was strict stems from its Whitehead, already recognized theory liability. we have prod- this in definition of Strict "plaintiffs where we stated: will continue to be means that a ucts does not proving prove relieved that the manufacturer or dis- traditional elements of negligent production, design, gence part tributor in the on the defendant or defendants recover; question. necessarily or dissemination of the De- article in in order to it does not re- allocation, injuries system quire any particular damage fendant's caused defec- Whitehead, product tive remains several strict.” such majority appears If the fault. Because to confuse burden, carry jury proof damage able would then considerations with allo- burden of issues, erroneously apportion majority "fault” —as that defined in believe the term is cation I usage Whitehead—between the various concludes that fault in multiple each defendant’s according determined actions with defendants would be majority’s products liability. percentage. to that “abolishes" strict

Case Details

Case Name: Owens v. Truckstops of America

Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 29, 1996

Citation: 915 S.W.2d 420

Docket Number: 01S01-9408-CV-00077

Court Abbreviation: Tenn.