JAMES S. OWENS, Petitioner on Review, v. Manfred (Fred) MAASS, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent on Review.
(CC 93C-13426; CA A85646; SC S42521)
In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon
June 27, 1996
430 | 918 P2d 808
Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.
CARSON, C. J.
Unis, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Durham, J., joined.
In this action for post-conviction relief, we are asked to interpret the provisions contained in
Petitioner was convicted of three counts of rape in the first degree and one count of burglary in the first degree on June 6, 1989. His convictions were affirmed on appeal and became final on January 13, 1992. On November 24, 1993, nearly two years after his convictions became final on appeal, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court determined that, because petitioner had not filed his petition within 120 days after his convictions became final on appeal, the petition was time-barred under
At the time that petitioner‘s convictions became final on appeal,
“(1) Except as otherwise provided in
ORS 138.540 , any person convicted of a crime under the laws of this state may file a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant toORS 138.510 to 138.680.“(2) A petition pursuant to
ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within 120 days of the following * * *:“(a) If no appeal is taken, the date the judgment or order on the conviction was entered in the register.
“(b) If an appeal is taken, the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts.”2 (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner contends that the two-year filing period contained in
The issue presented requires us to interpret
We begin with the text of
“[T]he amendments to
ORS 138.510 * * * by section[] 14 * * * of this Act apply to all petitions for post-conviction relief filed after the effective date of this Act.”5 (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner argues that, under the plain words of section 5 of Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 517, the two-year filing period applies to his petition, because his petition is a “petition[] for post-conviction relief filed after the effective date of [the] Act.” In petitioner‘s view, a literal reading of
At first glance, section 5 does appear to include a petition such as the one filed in this case, because petitioner filed his petition after November 4, 1993, the effective date of the 1993 amendments to
The state contends that the phrase “all petitions for post-conviction relief filed after the effective date of this Act” does not really mean all petitions but, rather, precludes petitions that already had become time-barred under the 120-day filing period, before the effective date of the 1993 amendments to
The state‘s proposed interpretation of section 5 conflicts with the general rule of construction contained in
There are, however, additional aspects of the context of
In 1992, this court determined that the 120-day filing period contained in
In 1993, as previously discussed, the legislature extended the 120-day filing period contained in
“A one-year filing period shall apply retroactively to petitions filed by persons whose convictions and appeals became final before August 5, 1989, and any such petitions must be filed within one year after November 4, 1993.”
The effect of subsection (3) is to provide a one-year window during which criminal defendants whose convictions became final before August 5, 1989, could file for post-conviction relief. That is, defendants who previously had no time limitation upon their ability to file a petition must have filed before November 4, 1994, or their ability to file for post-conviction relief became time-barred.
Petitioner contends that subsection (3) of
We do note, however, that subsection (3), enacted at the same time as section 5, affects the meaning of the phrase “all petitions for post-conviction relief filed after the effective date of this Act,” contained in section 5, as that phrase relates to the applicability of the new, two-year filing period. (Emphasis added.) Because, under subsection (3), criminal defendants whose convictions became final before August 5, 1989, must have filed their petitions within one year of the effective date of the 1993 amendments, the phrase “all petitions” contained in section 5 cannot include petitions relating to convictions that became final before August 5, 1989. In other words, in reference to the applicability of the two-year filing period, subsection (3) limits the otherwise expansive scope of petitions that would be included under the “all petitions” wording of section 5 to petitions relating to convictions that became final after August 5, 1989. That reading of the combined provisions is consistent with petitioner‘s contention that subsection (3) provides a specific filing period for defendants whose convictions became final before August 5, 1989, while the two-year filing period applies to petitions relating to later convictions, filed after November 4, 1993. It also is consistent with the rule that, whenever possible, this court must construe different provisions of a legislative enactment so as to give effect to each provision. See
The state contends that, because subsection (3) of
First, as noted, the existence of subsection (3) of
At this point in our analysis, the statutory context of
“[t]he time element is an inherent element of the right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is a limitation of the right. Such a provision will control, no matter in what form the action is brought. The statute is an offer of an action on condition that it be commenced within the specified time.” Id. at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted). (Emphasis added.)
Under that rule, then, because petitioner did not file his petition within 120 days after his convictions became final, he lost his ability to file for post-conviction relief.6
Nevertheless, when the legislature chooses to extend the type of statutory time limitation described above, it also may choose to revive actions that previously became extinguished under the statute‘s old time limitation. In order to revive such actions, the legislature must express its intent to do so in the text of the new enactment. See Denny v. Bean, 51 Or 180, 186, 93 P 693 (1908) (“When a remedy has been once barred by statute, a later enactment establishing a longer period of time in which the remedy may be enjoyed, will not be given a retroactive construction to revive the lost remedy, unless that intention is affirmatively expressed in the act.” (Emphasis added.)). In other words, despite the fact that an action already may have become time-barred, it may be revived and subjected to a new, extended time limitation if
The case of A.K.H. v. R.C.T., 312 Or 497, 822 P2d 135 (1991), illustrates that type of expression of legislative intent. A.K.H. involved a civil action to recover damages resulting from abuse that the plaintiff had suffered as a minor. Under the applicable statutes of limitations in place at the time of the abuse, the plaintiff‘s action became time-barred several years before she filed a civil action. After the plaintiff‘s action became time-barred, but before the plaintiff filed her action, the legislature enacted
The application clause contained in section 5 of Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 517, is not explicit, as was the clause in A.K.H. Although the text of section 5 states that the two-year filing period applies to “all petitions” filed after November 4, 1993, that text does not express a legislative
After considering the text and context of
Because the text and context of
Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 517, originated in the 1993 legislative session as House Bill 2352. The bill originally contained only one amendment to
The House Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration amended House Bill 2352 so that criminal defendants whose convictions became final before August 5, 1989, could have 120 days after the effective date of the bill to file for post-conviction relief. In other words, rather than cutting off that group‘s ability to file for post-conviction relief entirely, the amended bill would provide a 120-day window, during which defendants with older convictions could file their petitions. Id. at 2720-3490.
House Bill 2352 then was considered by the House Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections. At a hearing and work session held on April 7, 1993, that subcommittee decided to extend the 120-day filing period to one year, which would apply to petitions relating to convictions that became final before August 5, 1989, as well as to newly filed petitions. Tape recording, House Committee
After the subcommittee agreed to extend the filing period to one year, one representative asked whether the new filing period would apply to criminal defendants whose convictions became final between 1989 and 1993. The discussion following that question demonstrates that the participants in the April 7, 1993, work session were unsure whether the new filing period would affect that group of defendants. For example, the subcommittee‘s counsel indicated that the 120-day filing period would apply to defendants whose convictions became final between August 5, 1989, and November 4, 1993. However, a representative of the Department of Justice, who originally had proposed extending the filing period beyond 120 days, indicated that the one-year filing period would apply to defendants whose convictions became final less than one year before the effective date of the new filing period. Id. at 2236-2566 (statements of Rep. Kate Brown, Holly Robinson, Committee Counsel, and Brenda Peterson, Assistant Attorney General).
Because of that confusion, the subcommittee chair asked for clarification about whether the new filing period would affect criminal defendants whose convictions became final before the effective date of the 1993 amendments. The subcommittee‘s counsel then suggested that the subcommittee add a new provision to House Bill 2352, in order to explain how the new filing period would affect that group of defendants. She stated:
“I have a suggestion. * * * You could do * * * 120 [days] retroactive, like Kevin [Mannix]‘s bill, and everybody current, and then say [that as of] the effective date of this act, everybody will have a year. Then you‘ve got your pre-act people, all 120 days and then you‘ve got your new people, who‘ll have all year. * * * If the committee wants to make it very clear which applies to what, then my suggestion would be to revert the language in [House Bill] 2352 back to the 120 days retroactive for that group, so you‘ve got a group of people who are current under current law and who are going backwards who are going to have 120 days, and then make the one-year provision good for all of those people whose appeals become final after the effective date of the act. Then
you[] either [have the] 120 * * * day group, * * * the pre-89 group * * * and everyone that this currently applies to, and then you have your one-year group, which would be after the effective date of this act.” Id. at 2944-3214 (statement of Holly Robinson, Committee Counsel). (Emphasis added.)
After the legislators responded favorably to that suggestion, the subcommittee‘s counsel stated that she would instruct the legislative counsel‘s office to draft a new section to House Bill 2352, in order to draw a distinction between “a ‘group A’ and a ‘group B,‘” i.e., criminal defendants whose convictions became final before the effective date of House Bill 2352, and those whose convictions became final after that date. Id. at 3318-3553. That new provision became section 5 of Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 517.
After considering the discussion that gave rise to the enactment of section 5, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to revive the right to file for post-conviction relief for those criminal defendants whose petitions became time-barred under the 120-day filing period, before the effective date of the 1993 amendments to
Statements made at a conference committee work session on House Bill 2352 also support our reading of section 5 and
In considering that change to House Bill 2352, the members of the joint conference committee questioned whether the new filing period would apply to criminal defendants whose convictions became final before the effective date of the 1993 amendments. Id. at 1180-1763. After Representative Mannix, the sponsor of House Bill 2352, and a Department of Justice representative discussed whether the new filing period would affect those defendants, Representative Mannix summarized the effect of the bill as follows:
“The proposal here would be to say, ‘Well, come on guys, it‘s been since ‘89, do you want to appeal or not? You‘ve got one more year for your old conviction.’ That would be a proposed compromise, and then say for everybody else, two years. Except for the 120 day folks who‘ve already had the door shut. They knew about it, the door shut, and we‘re not going to reopen it.” Id. at 1820-61 (statement of Rep. Kevin Mannix). (Emphasis added.)
The joint conference committee then adopted the compromise amendment to House Bill 2352. Id. at 1951-2292. Both the House and the Senate later passed House Bill 2352 as amended by the joint conference committee, and the bill became effective on November 4, 1993. Or Laws 1993, ch 517.
The quoted statement of Representative Mannix, upon which the joint conference committee relied when it passed the compromise bill, demonstrates that the committee did not intend that the new, two-year filing period should
In summary, after considering the text, context, and legislative history of
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
UNIS, J., dissenting.
The majority‘s opinion proves that the fertile legal imagination can conjure up an ambiguity in words where none exists. At issue in this case is whether petitioner‘s petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred. Ignoring the plain, natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning of the unambiguous words used by the legislature in
The best evidence of legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). See also Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 480, 632 P2d 782 (1981) (there is no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words used by the legislature to express its wishes); Newman
Recent decisions of this court make it clear that, when a statute‘s key terms and their context make the legislature‘s intent clear, this court‘s interpretative task is complete and “we proceed no further.” McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 429, 909 P2d 846 (1996); PGE, 317 Or at 611. Admittedly, the text of
Waterhouse also states that “[t]he omission from the statute * * * of any procedural provisions whatever must be regarded as of controlling significance upon the question of legislative intention.” Id. Thus, a closer reading of Waterhouse is consistent with the statutory rule of construction that enjoins the court “not to insert what has been omitted.”
The majority cites Denny v. Bean, 51 Or 180, 93 P 693 (1908), for the proposition that a right of revival of an action must be expressed affirmatively. The majority then cites Lamb v. Young, 250 Or 228, 441 P2d 616 (1968), in reaching its conclusion that the legislature did not intend to create a right of revival in its amendment to
“[t]he time element is an inherent element of the right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is a limitation of the right. Such a provision will control, no matter in what form the action is brought. The statute is an offer of an
action on condition that it be commenced within the specified time.” 323 Or at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added by majority).
That specific quote comes from Richard v. Slate, 239 Or 164, 396 P2d 900 (1964). In Richard, the court was explaining its holding that the time limitation in the wrongful death statute affected the right, not just the remedy. In Lamb, the court states only that, in “some statutes,” the right as well as the remedy is extinguished, without further elaboration.
Neither Lamb nor Richard supports the majority‘s position. Lamb, citing Richard, states that “the statute is an offer of an action on condition that it be commenced within the specified time.” 250 Or at 231. The specified time in amended
In summary, the text and context of
I respectfully dissent.
Durham, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.