144 Ga. 656 | Ga. | 1916
1. The procedure in this case was somewhat anomalous. Under the name of amending an execution which had been issued by the ■ clerk of a municipality for sidewalk improvement, and had been levied, and to which an affidavit of illegality had been interposed, a new execution was issued, levied, and attached to the original one, by direction of the mayor and council. The attorney for the city entered a joinder of issue with the averments of the affidavit of illegality, and offered to submit proof in support of the validity of the execution “as amended” and as originally issued. No objection .was made to this form of amendment or joinder of issue, and the case went to trial thereunder. Under the peculiar facts of the case, it will be considered on the basis of the status thus created by means of the amended or substituted execution and the new levy, rather than on that alone arising under the original execution, levy, and affidavit of illegality.
2. If a motion'or resolution was adopted by a municipal council, but the clerk, in entering it upon the minutes, inadvertently omitted a portion thereof, the same council had authority, some eight months thereafter, by resolution, to require the clerk to correct the minutes so as to make them speak the truth and copy upon them the motion or resolution as actually passed, it not appearing that any action had been taken by others on the faith thereof, or that any intervening rights had arisen to third persons.
(a) This was not a proceeding to change a motion or resolution actually jpassed, but simply to correct an erroneous entry or copy thereof inadvertently made by the clerk upon the minutes. The only ground of 'objection urged against the admission of such correcting resolution was that it was irrelevant and immaterial, and was passed after the work had been done to which the original motion related and after an execution had been issued and an affidavit of illegality had been filed. The record does not show any contention that in fact the original motion had not been adopted as claimed by the city council in' their correcting resolution; or that in fact the clerk had not omitted certain words therefrom in entering it upon the minutes; or that there was any contention that there was a different officer or council.
3. While the actions of the mayor and council of the City of Dalton involved in this case may have been somewhat lacking in accuracy and precision, yet, when taken together, they are sufficient to satisfy the provision of the amended charter that “the said mayor and council of the City of Dalton shall have the power to grade, construct, and pave any and all sidewalks within the incorporate limits of the City of Dalton, Georgia, at any time when in their judgment they deem it best and may so declare by ordinance or resolution passed at any regular or call meeting of said mayor and council of the City of Dalton,” etc. Acts 1910, pp. 576, 581.
4. Under the evidence there was no error on the part of the presiding judge, to whom the case was by consent submitted without a jury, in rendering judgment, upon the issue formed, against the defendant in