Norma B. OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUTOMOTIVE MACHINISTS PENSION TRUST, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 07-35253.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 6, 2008. Filed Jan. 12, 2009.
As stated in the Connelly affidavit, Travelers did pay out $297,503 to Polygon and was entitled to interest on that amount plus attorney fees and costs in connection with enforcing its rights under the Indemnity Agreement. Travelers also negotiated with Polygon for the assignment of additional outstanding judgments (“Assigned Judgments“) that had been previously entered against Brenneke, NSP, and Sherwood in the underlying state litigation. While Travelers did receive $209,025 from the Multnomah County Sheriff‘s Office as a result of a writ of execution on Brenneke‘s residence in satisfaction of one of the Assigned Judgments, Connelly stated under oath that there remained “at least $211,300” which was still owed and unpaid by Brenneke. Brenneke, in response, offered no evidence to controvert Travelers’ admissible evidence. Indeed, Brenneke‘s arguments did not deal with the issue of the amount of damages at all. Hence, there was no evidentiary submission from Brenneke to rebut Connelly‘s sworn statement (and accompanying exhibits) to the effect that Travelers is still owed “at least” $211,300, which is the sum contained in the district court‘s damage award.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Harry M. Reichenberg, Law Office of Harry M. Reichenberg, Federal Way, WA, for plaintiff/appellee Norma Owens.
Jonathan P. Meier, Sirianni Youtz Meier & Spoonemore, Seattle, WA; Molly Lawrence, Northwest Women‘s Law Center, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae.
Before: HARRY PREGERSON, WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., and JOHN T. NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge NOONAN.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
I. Introduction
For more than thirty years, Norma Owens (“Norma“) and Phillip R. Owens, Sr. (“Phillip“) maintained a “quasi-marital” relationship in the state of Washington. In 2004, Norma and Phillip separated. On August 19, 2005, the Superior Court of King County, Washington, issued a state court order (“Order“) awarding Norma a fifty-percent interest in the pension benefits being paid to Phillip by Automotive Machinist Pension Trust (“Automotive Trust” or “Trust“).
Automotive Trust declined to implement the Order on the ground that it was not a valid Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO“) under
We agree with the Washington Federal District Court that, because Norma and Phillip lived together in a quasi-marital relationship for more than thirty years, the Superior Court‘s Order does in fact relate to “marital property rights,” that Norma is an “Alternate Payee” under
A. Background
The important facts are not in dispute. For more than thirty years, Norma Owens and Phillip Owens lived together as husband and wife in a quasi-marital relationship2 in King County, Washington. Although Norma and Phillip were never legally married, they had and raised two boys together, purchased a home together, and held themselves out to their friends and to the public as a married couple. During their thirty-year relationship, Norma and Phillip also acquired numerous joint assets including real property, furniture, furnishings, and vehicles. The Owens’ jointly acquired funds were
Norma‘s formal education ended after the ninth grade. Financially, Norma contributed little or nothing to the household. Instead, Phillip provided the main financial support for the family. Except for brief periods during which she worked for minimum wages, Norma, a homemaker, devoted her time to caring for her husband and raising their two sons. Phillip and Norma filed joint tax returns. The tax returns for 2003, 2002, and 2001 list Norma as Phillip‘s “wife.” Norma was also named as Phillip‘s wife and beneficiary in Phillip‘s life insurance application. Though they were not legally married, Norma and Phillip lived together for more than thirty years in a quasi-marital relationship as husband and wife.
In March 2004, Norma and Phillip separated. Only two major assets of theirs remained: the house in Seattle that they had purchased together and Phillip‘s ERISA pension plan with Automotive Trust. Proceeds from the sale of the house were used to pay off the Owens’ delinquent mortgage payments and other debts. The only significant remaining asset was Phillip‘s ERISA pension plan with
In January 2005, Phillip submitted his claim for early retirement benefits to Automotive Trust. Phillip‘s claim became effective on February 1, 2005 and resulted in Phillip‘s retirement benefit being paid to him as a single life annuity.3 Phillip currently receives gross monthly pension benefit payments from Automotive Trust in the amount of $1905.79; the payments will continue for his lifetime.
On August 10, 2004, shortly after the Owens’ separated, Norma filed a “Petition for Equitable Distribution of Property Acquired During a Meretricious Relationship” in the Superior Court for King County, Washington. In the Petition, Norma claimed that she was entitled to fifty percent of each of Phillip‘s monthly pension benefit payments. On May 11, 2005, the parties participated in an arbitration hearing. Automotive Trust was not a party to that action. On June 7, 2005, an arbitration award was issued in favor of Norma.
Pursuant to the arbitration award, on August 19, 2005, the Superior Court issued an Order assigning Norma “Fifty Percent (50.0%) of each of [Phillip‘s] monthly benefit payments from [Automotive Trust‘s] Plan” based on Norma‘s “quasi-marital relationship” to Phillip. The Superior Court considered the pension benefits that Phillip accrued under the Trust as part of the overall equitable distribution of property acquired during the couple‘s thirty-year quasi-marital relationship. Because the Order related to “marital property rights,” and because it named Norma as an “Alternate Payee,” the Superior Court titled the Order a “Qualified Domestic Relations Order.”
On October 14, 2005, Automotive Trust notified Norma‘s attorney that the Superior Court‘s Order did not, in fact, qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order under
It is [Automotive Trust‘s] understanding that [Norma] and [Phillip] were never married. Therefore, it would not appear that the [Superior Court‘s] August 19, 2005 order relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights, and it would not be qualified [as required by
ERISA § 206(d)(3) andInternal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.“) § 152(d)(2)(H) ].
In a response letter dated February 6, 2006, Norma‘s attorney asked Automotive Trust to re-evaluate its position on the ground that the Superior Court‘s Order was a valid QDRO. Specifically, Norma asserted that: (1) the Order related to “marital property rights” because Norma and Phillip lived together for more than thirty years in a quasi-marital relationship; (2) Washington state law permitted such an equitable distribution of property following the termination of a quasi-marital relationship; and (3) Norma satisfied the “Alternate Payee” requirement because she qualified as an “other dependent” under
On October 27, 2006, Automotive Trust filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On November 10, 2006, Norma filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 19, 2007, the U.S. District Court, Honorable Thomas A. Zilly, presiding, denied the Trust‘s motion and granted Norma‘s crossmotion for summary judgment. The U.S. District Court held that the Superior Court‘s Order (1) was a valid domestic relations order because it related to “marital property rights;” and (2) was a valid QDRO because it recognized the existence of an “Alternate Payee.” On January 30, 2007, Automotive Trust filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of Judgment, which the U.S. District Court denied on March 1, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Automotive Trust timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
The question before us is this: Did the U.S. District Court correctly hold that the state Superior Court‘s Order qualified as a QDRO pursuant to
II. Discussion
A. The Parties’ Contentions
Automotive Trust contends that a non-marital relationship does not, under any circumstance, create “marital property rights,” that Norma does not qualify as an “other dependent,” and that Norma is therefore not an “Alternate Payee” under ERISA. According to the Trust, therefore, the Superior Court‘s Order is not a valid QDRO and Norma is not entitled to receive a portion of Phillip‘s ERISA pension benefits. Norma, on the other hand, maintains that the Order did relate to “marital property rights,” and that she qualifies as an “other dependent” under
B. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court‘s review of a plan administrator‘s conclusions regarding legal obligations under a QDRO. Hamilton v. Washington State Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Plan, 433 F.3d 1091, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether a domestic relations order meets the statutory requirements for a valid QDRO, and therefore is enforceable against a pension plan, is a question determined in the first instance by the pension plan administrator and, if necessary, by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Tr. of Dir. of Guild of America Producer Pension Benefits Plan v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 421 (9th Cir.2000); see also
C. Analysis
Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA,
ERISA enumerates the requirements for a valid QDRO. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order is a “domestic relations order” which “creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee‘s right to [receive] benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan....”
Therefore, for the King County Superior Court‘s Order to be a valid QDRO, the Order must “recognize[] the right of an alternate payee to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under the plan,” Hamilton, 433 F.3d at 1096 (quoting
ERISA requires pension plans like Automotive Trust to pay benefits “in accordance with the applicable requirements of any [QDRO].”
Automotive Trust is a collectively bargained multiemployer pension plan (“Plan“) that is governed by Title 1 of ERISA,
U.S. District Judge Thomas Zilly concluded that the Order issued by the Superior Court of King County awarding Norma a fifty-percent interest in Phillip‘s pension benefits constituted a valid QDRO because (1) the Order relates to “marital property rights” under
a. “Marital Property Rights”
Automotive Trust contends that the Superior Court‘s Order does not constitute a valid QDRO because it does not relate to “marital property rights” within the meaning of
Norma disagrees. She states that the Order does relate to “marital property rights” because she and Phillip lived together in a quasi-marital relationship for more than thirty years. To support her argument, Norma relies on Washington
In family law cases, state courts are authorized to “create enforceable interests in the proceeds of an ERISA plan, so long as those interests [comply] with the QDRO provision[s].” Tise, 234 F.3d at 420. The first requirement for a valid QDRO is that it relate to “marital property rights” as contemplated by ERISA.
[When] interpreting [ERISA], our task is to construe what Congress has enacted. We begin, as always, with the language of the statute. When looking to the plain language of a statute, we do more than view words or subsections in isolation. We derive meaning from context, and this requires reading the relevant statutory provisions as a whole.
Hamilton, 433 F.3d at 1098 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Looking to the “language of the statute,” ERISA does not explicitly define the term “marital property rights.” Therefore, as Hamilton instructs, we must look to the statute as a whole and “derive meaning from context.” Id.
But Automotive Trust urges us to rely on another federal law: the Defense of Marriage Act,
We reject the Trust‘s argument for two reasons. First, DOMA is not applicable here. DOMA‘s legislative history reflects only Congress‘s concern for same-sex marriages; it sheds no light on quasi-marital relationships such as the relationship between Phillip and Norma that is at issue here. Second, as the district court underscored, Washington explicitly recognizes “quasi-marital” relationships for purposes of determining property rights after an extended putative marriage. We agree with the U.S. District Court that the Defense of Marriage Act:
is not dispositive with regard to [Norma‘s] entitlement to benefits under the [Automotive Trust] Plan. The definitions provided by [DOMA] do not address whether a domestic relations order following a quasi-marital relationship is a [QDRO] under ERISA, or whether “quasi-marital” property rights under [Washington] state law fall within “marital property rights” as the term is used in ERISA.
Having determined that ERISA does not explicitly define “marital property rights,” and that no federal definition exists for the term, Hamilton directs us to “derive meaning from context” and “read[] the relevant statutory provisions as a whole” when interpreting ERISA. 433 F.3d at 1098. Reading ERISA as a whole,
The state of Washington recognizes quasi-marital relationships for purposes of property division. “Wholly unrelated to either kind of marriage, [Washington] courts have recognized the existence of [quasi-marital] relationships, which this court has determined to be stable, cohabiting relationships.” In re Marriage of Pennington, 142 Wash.2d 592, 14 P.3d 764, 769 (Wash.2000). Norma and Phillip enjoyed just such a “stable, marital-like relationship[,] where both parties cohabit[ed] with the knowledge that a lawful marriage between them [did] not exist.” Connell, 898 P.2d at 834. In Connell, the court concluded that Washington state “limit[s] the distribution of property following a [quasi-marital] relationship to property that would have been characterized as community property had the parties been married.” Id. at 836.
Norma and Phillip lived together in a quasi-marital relationship for more than thirty years. During that time, they jointly accumulated various forms of community property. In addition to purchasing a home together, the Owens obtained numerous joint assets including real property, furniture, furnishings, and vehicles. The couple‘s community property also in-cluded jointly acquired funds, some of which were held in joint bank accounts, as well as the interest that Phillip acquired in various retirement accounts, including the Automotive Trust pension plan at issue here.
As the U.S. District Court stated, Connell is “instructive on the question of property division pursuant to State community property laws, and ... [on] the limits of a quasi-marital relationship under Washington law.” Connell held:
Until the Legislature, as a matter of public policy, concludes [quasi-marital] relationships are the legal equivalent to marriages, we limit the distribution of property following a [quasi-marital] relationship to property that would have been characterized as community property had the parties been married. This will allow the trial court to justly divide property the couple has earned during the relationship through their efforts without creating a common law marriage or making a decision for a couple which they have declined to make for themselves.
Connell, 898 P.2d at 835-36 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Connell recognized that Washington state does not permit common law marriages. But Norma does not argue on common law grounds. Instead, she seeks an equitable distribution of commu
Reading the “relevant statutory provisions [of ERISA] as a whole,” which requires that a QDRO be “made pursuant to a[s]tate domestic relations law (including a community property law),”
b. “Alternate Payee”
The Superior Court‘s Order fulfilled the first requirement for a valid Qualified Domestic Relations Order—that the order relate to “marital property rights.” The second requirement is whether Norma qualifies as an “Alternate Payee” under
The term “[A]lternate [P]ayee” means any spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such participant.
Automotive Trust contends that Norma does not qualify as an “Alternate Payee” because she was not a “spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent” of Phillip. Norma, on the other hand, posits that she is an “Alternate Payee” because she qualified as Phillip‘s “dependent.” In support of her argument, Norma cites to (1) her designation as Phillip‘s “wife” on the couple‘s joint tax returns; (2) her designation as “wife and beneficiary” on Phillip‘s life insurance application; and (3) her undisputed financial dependence on Phillip during their thirty-year long quasi-marital relationship. The U.S. District Court held that, because Norma‘s “dependent status is undisputed for the [thirty]-year term of her quasi-marital relationship with Phillip,” and that “no facts in the record indicate otherwise,” Norma was an “Alternate Payee” under the statute. We agree.
To determine whether Norma qualifies as Phillip‘s “dependent,” we look to the Internal Revenue Code,
It is undisputed that, for more than thirty years, Norma and Phillip shared “the same principal place of abode” in
III. Conclusion
For more than thirty years, Norma lived together with Phillip in a quasi-marital relationship. Norma was a homemaker who devoted her time to caring for her husband and raising their two boys. Phillip served as the household‘s primary wage earner. On that basis, the Superior Court issued a domestic relations order entitling Norma to a fifty-percent interest in Phillip‘s pension benefits, to be paid by Automotive Trust. We conclude that the Order satisfied both requirements for a valid QDRO: (1) it related to “marital property rights” under
We therefore AFFIRM the U.S. District Court‘s ruling on January 19, 2007, that granted the cross-motion for summary judgment in favor of Norma Owens.
NOONAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Where the equities lie in this case is not in dispute. What is controlling, however, is a federal statute specifying that “benefits provided under the pension plan may not be assigned or alienated.”
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text. The creation of such exceptions, in our view, would be especially problematic in the context of an anti-garnishment provision. Such a provision acts, by definition, to hinder the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on garnishment therefore can be defended only on the view that the effectuation of certain broad social policies sometimes takes precedence over the desire to do equity between particular parties. It makes little sense to adopt such a policy and then to refuse enforcement whenever enforcement appears inequitable. A court attempting to carve out an exception that would not swallow the rule would be forced to determine whether application of the rule in particular circumstances would be “especially” inequitable. The impracticability of defining such a standard reinforces our conclusion that the identification of any exception should be left to Congress.
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat‘l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376, 110 S.Ct. 680, 107 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990). The statutory command accompanied by this gloss frustrates Norma‘s claim.
True, exceptions exist, specified by statute. We are told, however, that they are to be read narrowly and are not subject to judicial expansion. Id. As of 1984, Congress provided the QDRO exception. It is Norma‘s only possible path to part of Phillip‘s pension.
A QDRO must relate “to the provision of child support, alimony payments or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse,
The arbitration award she has won and the state domestic relations order she has secured do create property interests in Norma that may well be secured by action taken directly against Phillip. The award and the state order have not created a right to direct payment by the trustee of the plan.
HARRY PREGERSON
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
Notes
Id. at 848, 117 S.Ct. 1754 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).Support obligations, in particular, are “deeply rooted moral responsibilities” that Congress is unlikely to have intended to intrude upon. In accord with these principles, Congress ensured that state domestic relations orders, as long as they meet certain statutory requirements, are not preempted.