Owen v. RutledgeOwen v. Rutledge
Rutledge was employed by CVCC on a year-to-year basis as an instructor from
On appeal Owen raises three issues:
“I. Whether mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce alleged rights which arise solely out of contract.
“II. Whether administrators are entitled to gain tenure under the rules and regulations of the state junior, community and technical colleges.
“III. Whether an official of a state junior, community [or] technical college has the authority to contractually bind a state college by disregarding the longstanding administrative interpretation of an administrative rule of the state junior, community, and technical colleges.”
We will address these issues in the sequence presented by Owen.
I.
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce the rights of teachers under the tenure laws. Of course, the threshold question presented here is whether Rutledge was tenured. That is a proper issue to be litigated in circuit court. Cf., Berry v. Pike County Board of Education, 448 So.2d 315 (Ala. 1984). We have held that if a teacher is in fact tenured under Chapter 24 of Title 16 of the Code of Alabama 1975, “Tenure of Employment of Teachers,” then mandamus will lie to enforce the rights of the tenured teacher. Wooten v. Alabama State Tenure Commission, 421 So.2d 1277 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982); Alabama State Tenure Commission v. Green, 409 So.2d 850 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982). We believe that the same rule should apply with regard to the tenure of teachers employed by junior, community, and technical colleges under the provisions of
II.
The resolution of the issue of whether Rutledge was entitled to tenure turns upon the construction of Section 612 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Board of Education. Section 612 reads:
“An instructor or professional staff member may achieve continuing service status when he has been approved for employment by the State Board of Education for the fourth consecutive year. No person is eligible for continuing service who does not possess the minimum degree requirement in his specialty.”1
Tenure rules are to be read into all contracts entered into by school boards and teachers. Cf., Madison County Board of Education v. Wigley, 288 Ala. 202, 259 So.2d 233 (1972).
“it becomes a question for the factfinder to determine the true meaning of the contract. Mass. Appraisal Services, Inc. v. Carmichael, 404 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1981). Furthermore, surrounding circumstances, including the construction placed on the language by the parties, is to be taken into consideration in order to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. See, Carmichael, supra; City of Montgomery v. Maull, 344 So.2d 492 (Ala. 1977). Also, it is axiomatic that ambiguities should be interpreted most strongly against the party drawing the contract. Lilley v. Gonzales, 417 So.2d 161 (Ala. 1982); United States Fidelity Guaranty Corp. v. Elba Wood Products, Inc., 337 So.2d 1305 (Ala. 1976).”
Rivers v. Oakwood College, 442 So.2d 74, 76 (Ala. 1983).
The evidence presented by the parties was in sharp conflict. Rutledge put forth testimony from Dr. Savage, president of CVCC at the time Rutledge was employed, that he thought the term included administrators. Rutledge also placed into evidence the minutes of a meeting of the State Board of Education in 1979 at which the Board considered the question of whether § 612, originally adopted in 1967, should be amended to explicitly remove administrators from its provisions. From those minutes it is apparent that some members of the Board, particularly Dr. Martin, who was chairman of the Board when § 612 was adopted, were concerned that § 612 had included administrators as persons eligible for tenure. It is interesting to note that the Board did later amend § 612 in 1979 to explicitly exclude administrators from being eligible for tenure. Owen put forth testimony from Dr. Wayne Teague, the current State Superintendent of Education; Dr. Ernest Stone, State Superintendent of Education from 1967 to 1970; Dr. Erskine Murray, Assistant Superintendent of Education for General Administration; and others to the effect that administrators did not attain tenure. The trial court concluded that Rutledge was entitled to tenure under § 612 as it read when Rutledge was hired.
When the factfinder‘s conclusions are based upon evidence presented ore tenus, or partly so, we will not disturb those conclusions unless they are palpably wrong and contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Murphree v. Henson, 289 Ala. 340, 267 So.2d 414 (1972); Lott v. Keith, 286 Ala. 431, 241 So.2d 104 (1970). Owen presented numerous witnesses who testified it was their interpretation of § 612 that it did not grant administrators tenure. However, only one of these witnesses, Dr. Stone, was present when the original rule was adopted. Dr. Martin, who was chairman of the Board when § 612 was originally adopted, expressed his opinion in the 1979 meeting that administrators were probably covered by § 612. While the question is a close one, we are not prepared to say that the trial court‘s conclusions are palpably wrong.
III.
Our disposition of the previous issue is dispositive of the question raised here. Initially we note that while Owen characterizes his interpretation of § 612 as the longstanding interpretation of an administrative rule, there is no such written interpretation on record. There is a “Superintendent‘s Policy Statement No. 15,” issued in 1970, stating that persons on the pay schedule styled “Twelve-Month Personnel Not Included in Other Salary Schedules” will not achieve continuing status, but that policy statement is in itself ambiguous.
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.