1 Ind. L. Rep. 401 | Ind. | 1881
— Issue ivas joined upon the complaint of appellants, wherein they charged appellees with maintaining a nuisance, and prayed for an injunction against its continu
The substantive allegations of the complaint may be thus summarized: Appellants are the owners of a house and lot in the town of New Harmony, which they occupy as their dwelling-house ; that on the 26th day of April, 1878, Robinson, Thomas & Co. erected and put in operation a flouring mill, in close proximity to the house of appellants ; that the appellees subsequently became the owners of said mill; that on the 20th of December, 1878, the mill was burned; that the appellees threaten to rebuild ; that the mill was a nuisance, and that it can not be operated without becoming a nuisance ; that the smoke and cinders make the water of appellants’ cisterns and wells foul and impure ; that the noise, the smoke, dust, dirt, and offensive odors caused by the running of the mill, essentially interfere with appellants’ enjoyment of life and property.
A single question is presented upon the pleadings. The court below overruled appellants’ motion to strike out part of the answer of the appellees, and of this ruling complaint is made. We can not reverse for an erroneous ruling denying a motion to strike out mere surplusage. The rule of practice upon this subject is now too firmly settled to warrant us in disturbing it, even were we so inclined. The Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Pixley, 61 Ind. 22 ; Galvin v. The State, ex rel., 64 Ind. 96 ; City of Crawfordsville v. Brundage, 57 Ind. 262; Mires v. Alley, 51 Ind. 507; Rout v. Woods, 67 Ind. 319. Appellants argue that, as evidence was admitted of the irrelevant matters stated in the answer, there should be a reversal. This question is not in the record. In order to make such an objection available, the parties should, upon the trial, object to the introduction of the evidence, take the proper exception, and by proper assignment among their reasons for a new trial present the ruling for review. This was not done in this case.
The seventh instruction asked by the appellants reads as follows : “If the jury find from the evidence that the running and use of said mill lessens the personal enjoyment of plaintiffs, by reason of the noise, smoke, dust, dirt and cinders, in their said dwelling, then the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint have been sustained.”
The eighth instruction, as asked by appellants, was as follows : “If the jury find from the evidence that the per.sonal enjoyment of the plaintiffs in their residence has been and will be lessened, by either the noise, smoke, dust, dirt, cinders, horses, mules or teams, caused by the running and use of said mill, then the allegations of the complaint have -been sustained.”
Both of these instructions were modified by the court, .-and, as the modifications are essentially the same, we con-' sider them together. The modification of the seventh instruction consisted in writing after the word “ mill,” the words “materially and essentially the modification of the eighth was made by inserting the words just quoted after the words ■“has been and will be.” Appellants argue that the insertion of these words radically changed the definition of “nuisance.” . We think otherwise. The relief sought is not the recovery of damages merely, but an injunction restraining appellees from rebuilding their mill and from conducting their business. It is important to keep in mind the fact that the business of milling does not belong to that class which constitute nuisances per se. It is also important to sharply mark the distinction between suits for injunction and actions for damages. In the latter class, the remedy is an ordinary one ; in the former, the extraordinary powers of the court are- invoked. It is not every injury which will support an action for damages that will entitle the complainant to relief by
The instruction numbered eight, asked by appellants, was properly refused for the reason that it asserted that if the appellants’ property was diminished in value by the running of the appellees’ mill, the verdict should be in favor of appellants. This instruction was erroneous for at least two reasons : First, because it does not inform the jury that the diminution in value must be essential and material, and probably continuous ; second, because it does not inform the jury that, although damage may have resulted, there can not be a recovery unless the appellees were shown to have been guilty of some actionable wrong. In all such cases as the present, legal injury and resulting damages must be shown. Thex-e must be a concurrence of wrong and damage.
The thirteenth instruction asked by the appellants is as follows : “The right to enjoy pure air is an essential right; the-
The ninth instruction, given at the request of the appellees, is as follows : “The relief given by the remedy of injunction, against a useful manufactory or business which is properly managed, is never granted in a case of doubt, but only upon a case clearly made out, where the injury or annojuvneo complained of is not only a violation .of the plaintiff’s rights, but such a violation as is, or will be, attended with substantial, serious or irreparable damage, or esseutially interferes with their comfortable enjoyment of property.”
This instruction was erroneous. The jury must have inferred from the language used, that it was incumbent upon the appellants to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, for this is the plain and obvious meaning of the first branch of the instruction. In applications for injunctions, the character of the facts relied upon as constituting the nuisance must be such as clearly and fully establish the existence of the nuisance, but the degree of evidence required to prove the existence and character of such facts is not that asserted in the instruction under examination. Actions for injunc
In another instruction the jury were told that, “In proceedings to enjoin a useful manufactory or business in a town, when it is properly managed, the jury should proceed with extreme caution, and weigh the rights of the parties with exceeding care, and never declare such a manufactory «or business a private nuisance, except there be such essential injury that the act or thing complained of can not be justly tolerated without doing violence to the rights of individuals.” It may be that some of the terms used in this instruction ax-e justly amenable to the censure which appellants’ counsel bestow upon them, but the doctrine declared is substantially correct. A lawful and useful business is not
“12. In this case, if the steam mill of the defendant Harriet M. Phillips is used for manufacturing flour and. meal, in the town of New Harmony, and is properly managed, then, to authorize an injunction against the same as a private nuisance, the coal smoke, offensive smell, dust, dirt, noise or confusion, complained of as arising therefrom, one or all, must be sufficiently excessive and frequent as to constitute a grievance; or the danger of fire complained of must be a present, actual or reasonably certain danger, and. not a mere contingency, which may never happen ; and such danger of fire must be more than that which merely increases the rate of insurance on the plaintiffs’ dwelling-house. Also, in addition to this, from all the causes complained of, or from some one of them, there must be an injury to such dwelling-house itself, which amounts to something more than a slight diminution in the value thereof, or which can not be compensated in damages; or from all the causes complained of, or from some one of them, thei-e must be a sensible and material annoyance to the plaintiffs and their families in the occupancy of such dwelling-house, amounting to something-more than a mere personal discomfort, which is fanciful or-may arise from mere delicacy or fastidiousness ; for the personal discomfort to the occupants of such dwelling-house, which would justify such injunction, must be an annoyance which essentially interferes with the ordinary comfort, physically, of human existence; or, in other words, it must be annoyance which renders such dwelling-house materially less suitable for habitation, by persons in average health, or ordinary tastes and sensibilities, not merely according to elegant and dainty modes and habits of living, but according to the notions of ordinary classes living in that locality.”
.This instruction was clearly erroneous. It imposed a burden upon the appellants greater than the law warranted.
The instruction is obscure and confused. The jury may well have understood it to mean that, in addition to proving a wrongful and serious interference with the enjoyment of their property, the appellants were also bound to prove injury to the house itself. If this bethemeaning the instruction is radically wrong. The right of appellants was not merely to have their house protected from wrongful injury, but they had the further right to be protected in its comfortable enjoyment. Noises, odors, smoke and dust may possibly work the house itself
It is true, as a general rule, that such acts as result in a mere diminution in value of property, which can be fully and readily compensated in damages, will not supply grounds, for an injunction, and parties will be left to the redress afforded by an action for damages. But, while this is true, it by no means follows that interference with the enjoyment of the property will not furnish grounds for relief by injunction, although the.property itself may sustain no physical injury whatever. The right to enjoy property is as much a matter of legal concern as the property itself. While, as-we have indicated, we assent to the doctrine insisted upon by appellees, that, as a general rule, a lawful business will not be enjoined merely because it diminishes the value of adjacent property, we do not mean to be understood as holding-that such an element is not proper in considering an application for injunction. Nor do we mean to hold that, where-the act is wrongful, and the injury flowing from it continues,, an injunction will not be granted. We recognize as sound those cases which hold that, where it is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of actions, injunctions will lie, although the only injury resulting from the wrongful acts is pecuniary-loss. 2 Story Eq. Jur., sec. 925 ; IHigh Injunctions, sec. 739..
The last clause of the instruction under examination gives-a controlling force and meaning to the whole of the instruction, and makes it declare an erroneous doctrine. Whether a thing is or is not a nuisance does not depend upon the? notions of people living in a designated locality. It was;
We are not unmindful of the rule that locality is sometimes an important element in detei'mining whether a busi- \ ness is or is not a nuisance, and we have no disposition to run counter to that rule.- If one erects a dwelling-house among mills and factories propelled by steam, which have ¡ been long established, he must expect to suffer the ordinary inconveniences and annoyances which ai’e inseparable from l such establishments. We approve, in its fullest extent, the
Judgment reversed, at the costs of the appellees.