History
  • No items yet
midpage
Owen v. Owen
444 N.W.2d 710
S.D.
1989
Check Treatment

*1 Palmer, Gunderson, Mary Poulas Nelson; Goodsell & G. Verne Goodsell OWEN, Appellant, and Plaintiff Vicki Gunderson, Palmer, Nelson, & Goodsell brief, Rapid City, appel- for and OWEN, E. Defendant Ronald lant. Appellee. and Jackson, Craig Lynn, A. Shultz Pfeifle No. 16481. Lebrun, Rapid City, defendant & appellee. Supreme South Dakota. Court of May Argued MORGAN, Justice. Aug. 2, 1989.

Decided (Vicki) appeals from order Vicki Owen

dismissing negligence cause of action her (Ronald). re- Owen We Ronald and remand. verse Ronald and Vicki Owen husband 6, 1986, was wife. On March Ronald driv- ing City, a 1967 Ford van near Gas Grant two County, Indiana. Vicki and her chil- passengers dren in the Ronald were van. van, lost control of the skidded off road, utility pole. hit suffered Vicki hip femur. As a broken and fractured left result, hospitalized she from March was 6, 1986, 19, 1986, August until and contin- At ongoing ues to have medical treatment. accident, parties the time were residents, temporarily resid- South Dakota ing complete higher in Indiana to Ronald’s life-long education. Vicki is a resident of Dakota, parties in South lived both years prior for six re- South Dakota They in turning to school. owned home Dakota, and, in Sturgis, South while Indiana, pay continued to South Dakota property parties Both licensed their taxes. in held vehicles South Dakota and South They in Dakota drivers licenses. voted during South Dakota absentee ballot if Presidential election and there was a they local election at the time were vacations, during college South Dakota they It always par- would vote. was ties’ intent return to their home and live completed after Ronald his South Dakota have, fact, parties re- education. Both and reside their turned South Dakota Sturgis. home in complaint in filed a Dakota Vicki South operating alleging negligent Ronald admitting the van. Ronald filed an answer accident, denying any negligence *2 7H part. Additionally, on his Ronald moved to loci delicti rule. Heidemann was allowed complaint dismiss the for failure to state a to maintain an imputed negligence action upon cause of action law, relief could be under the Nebraska whereas South granted. hearing A was conducted Dakota law permitted where would not have the admitted, the court objection, without cause of action. an proof offer of made concerning Vicki This court has continued apply the lex parties’ the contacts to South Dakota. The loci delicti rule to the rights substantive of trial complaint, court dismissed Vicki’s parties in multi-state tort actions. See holding that the doctrine of lex loci delicti First Nat’l Bank Minneapolis v. Kehn requires that apply Indiana law to this Ranch, (S.D.1986); 394 N.W.2d 709 and of Furthermore, cause of action. it held that interest, special Justice opinion Sabers’ requires the Indiana Vicki to Schick v. Rodenburg, (S.D. allege prove willful or wanton miscon- 1986). urges Vicki this court to overrule duct. properly plead, Since Vicki failed to these cases adopt a “modern” or “most complaint her appeals. was dismissed. She significant relationship” rule. In support position, of her she appeal, On cites Vicki contends that decisions from this court as many thirty-two as should states that apply abandon the lex loci delicti or “the either the “modern” place rule or wrong” of the rule in the lex multi-state tort loci delicti alternative, exception. adopt actions or the policy exception to argues the rule. She Many of the cites, decisions along Vicki further, that the of the Indiana with the seminal formulating decision the guest statute in South Dakota is unconsti- rule, “modern” Jackson, Babcock v. tutional. 473, 743, N.Y.2d 240 N.Y.S.2d 191 N.E.2d (1963), were available to this court

We first define our standard of review. it when reviewed the issues in A Heidemann. pursuant motion to dismiss to SDCL After a careful review of the 15-6-12(c) “modern” provides expeditious remedy rule, adopted this court the lex loci delicti legal to test the sufficiency pleadings. rule. Charlson, Akron Savings Bank v. 83 S.D. 251, 253, (S.D.1968). 158 N.W.2d adopting In rule, the lex loci delicti This court “must treat as true all facts court problems noted the inherent in the

properly pleaded complaint.” in the Id. “modern” rule. only questions We deal with the of law Although there is dissatisfaction with arising thereon. Id. the lex loci delicti rule there is also a part reluctance on many courts South Dakota consistently has fol adopt the fragmented approach modern lowed delicti rule multi-state to the settlement of multi-state conflict tort Rohl, actions. Heidemann v. problems of laws because of the lack of 250, 260, S.D. 194 N.W.2d guidelines. discernible and suitable For plaintiff, special administrator for the part the most the variants of the modern estate of the deceased who was a resident approach set theory concepts forth Dakota, of South sued the owner of an rather than followable rules. As a result airplane in which deceased was killed when there is considerable confusion and incon- Anselmo, it crashed near Nebraska. The sistency in application. its airplane enroute, nonstop, from Colo 86 S.D. at 194 N.W.2d at 169. Be- Colorado, Springs, rado to its destination of problems, cause of these pre- inherent Falls, Dakota, Sioux South when it crashed ferred ‘place “to retain the traditional in Nebraska. This court was faced with wrong’ rule with its built-in cer- virtues of question of whether South Dakota or tainty, simplicity, application.” and ease of applied imputed negli Nebraska law to an Id. gence claim the owner. After re viewing adopted the rules jurisdic other age contends Vicki of Heide- in determining tions conflict or requires choice of mann this court to review the lex questions, law adopted this court the lex loci delicti rule and it for abandon persuaded. are not of Tennessee in “modern” rule. We Whitlow Nashville C. & Co., 344, 347, concerns this court had Heide- 114 Tenn. The same St. L.R. S.W. today. Application (1904): remain mann *3 in- rule results confusion and “modern” justify refusing a court in To enforce Currie, consistency. Comments on See right of action which occurred under Purcell, Reich v. 15 UCLA L.Rev. state, the law of another because it is (1968), post- for a discussion of how laws, against policy the of our it must in New York have Babcock decisions against good appear that it is morals or frenetically theory theory from “hopped that, justice, natural or for some other jumping pro- bean ... like an overheated reason, such the enforcement of it would ducing contradictory practically results in general prejudicial be to the interest of cases.” identical our citizens. Next, that if we do not Vicki contends Mazey, Accord 481 S.W.2d Winters rule, our loci delicti we should abandon lex (Tenn.1972).2 Several courts have used exception adopt public policy to the rule. grant public policy excep- this standard to argues She that of Indiana’s A tions to lex loci delicti. review of these statute, guest ANN IND. CODE 9-3-3-1 § decisions is useful. (Burns 1988),1 prevents injured Hotel, Inc., In v. Driscoll Schmidt spouse recovering compensation from from Minn. a Minne- unk negligent host -.s she can demon- plaintiff brought against sota suit a Minne- misconduct, strate or willful wanton vio- owner, sota bar who violated Minnesota’s public policy lates South Dakota and should dram-shop by selling liquor statute to an particular not enforced. Under the pa- intoxicated Minnesota resident. This case, agree facts of this we and create a subsequently injured plaintiff tron in a car public policy exception limited to lex loci equiva- wreck in Wisconsin. There nowas delicti. dram-shop Ap- lent statute in Wisconsin. First, we note that the lex loci delicti plication of Wisconsin law under the lex long rule in the field of torts has admitted loci delicti rule meant that could exceptions: two against not recover the bar owner. (1) forum, fori, the The law of was overturning the court’s lower dismissal for matters, (2) applied procedural the action, failure to state a cause of controlling law of the forum was when- Supreme Minnesota Court held that place wrong ever the of the law parties significant contacts with Minnesota contrary extraordinarily to an (all residents; parties were Minnesota de- strong public policy of the forum state. fendant bar owner was licensed under Am.Jur.2d Law § law) coupled Conflicts of Minnesota with Wisconsin’s preventing foreign interest violations of laws, foreign jurisdiction’s liquor justified applying that a reasons Minnesota contrary “principles equity law would be were law under the succinctly explained by Supreme justice.” Court Id. at 368. child, brother, sister, 9-3-3-l(b) (Burns 1988) being IND.CODE ANN or hitchhiker was provides: transported payment without therefor in or owner, (b) vehicle, operator, person respon- upon injuries or the motor unless the or operation sible for the of a motor vehicle is not by death are caused the wanton or willful mis- damage arising injuries liable for loss or from owner, operator, person conduct of the or re- to or the death of: sponsible operation of the motor vehicle. (1) parent; his 68-1984, by As amended P.L. SEC.2. (2) spouse; his (3) stepchild; his child or is This court aware that the Winters decision brother; (4) his found that an Alabama did not sister; (5) his (6) a or We, however, public policy. violate Tennessee’s hitchhiker; holding agree are not bound and do not resulting operation from the of the motor ve- reasoning. with its parent, spouse, step- hicle while the child or

Likewise, Parker, Indiana, justice” “natural Gordon as well (D.Mass.1949), F.Supp. aff'd, 178 F.2d “prejudicial general as to the interest of (1st Cir.1949), a Massachusetts court Whitlow, our citizens.” 84 S.W. at 621. refused to follow the rule in lex loci delicti Further, a suit for alienation of affection. Plaintiff parties’ believe con Pennsylva and his wife were domiciled in tacts with this state applying warrants nia, arguably where the harm to marital South Dakota law. Other than the fortui occurred, domicile the defendant’s tous event of the occurring accident wrongful acts with the wife occurred Indiana, parties’ contacts are with Pennsylvania longer Massachusetts. no parties long-time South Dakota. Both *4 recognized alienation of affection as a state; they residents of this owned a home action, cause of but Massachusetts did. in paid property South Dakota and taxes in Reasoning that Massachusetts had an in state; they registered this their in vehicles controlling terest in conduct that lowered South Dakota and held South Dakota driv community, the standards of the the court licenses; they ers voted in South Dakota refused, public policy exception under a elections; they both intended to return to delicti, Pennsylvania lex loci to enforce South Dakota to and in live fact have re law. Id. at 42. turned after the All accident. of these Similarly, enforcing guest Indiana’s factors convince us that Vicki is not a against statute citizens of this state runs but, shopping, who is forum rath contrary strong public policy to the estab er, life-long pro resident entitled to the legislature, thereby lowering lished our tection of this state’s law. protection a standard of it intended for Indiana’s interests this matter are min- injured passengers. enforcing imal. This is not an issue of reasoning, To understand our it is neces- Instead, Indiana’s rules of the road. sary to retrace the demise of the South Vicki, court must decide whether because guest Dakota many years, statute. For guest, seeking she is a is barred from injured plaintiffs’ displeas- this court noted wrong redress for a committed. The acci- statute, guest ures with the SDCL 32-34-1 may Indiana, dent have occurred in it but 1978), (repealed up held that it seeing guest has no interest in its statute court, legislature, change to the not the applied to our citizens. Burke, the law. Behrns v. S.D. N.W.2d Allowing public policy excep- this limited decisions, tion to lex loci delicti maintains the cer- Reacting legislature, to our the 1978, repealed guest statute, tainty, simplicity, subject and ease of approval.3 earlier, to a referendum of providing The we discussed while injured passen- new standard of care owed applications repug- means to avoid that are gers by ordinary a host became “want of public policy nant to the of our state. care or skill.” 20-9-1. SDCL Having guest ruled that Indiana’s stat- And while Indiana is free to its enforce public policy ute violates our and will not citizens, guest against statute its own enforced, necessary it is not to address certainly obligated South Dakota is not objection. Vicki’s constitutional contrary follow a statute that runs so to its We reverse and remand. public policy. legislature intended that injured passenger an be allowed to recover theory simple a host under a WUEST, C.J., concurs.

negligence. To enforce Indiana’s HENDERSON, SABERS and in an action between two of our citizens, MILLER, JJ., only temporarily specially. own who were concur Herseth, peti- July 3. S.D.Sess.L. ch. 1. The referendum Nist v. signa- (S.D.1978). tion received number of never valid required, repealer tures so the became law on MILLER, legal I have (concurring specially). students and other authors.2 Justice give objective attempted thoughtful, pleased I to see an erosion am analysis subject to the and believe that delicti strongly assert loci rule but following solution is in the best interests of By go enough. not far majority does the citizens and law of our state. exception, adopting brings Dakota’s conflicts of majority South ages. middle I approach out of the law SOLUTION twentieth should now enter the

believe we majority THE century by joining the vast SOUTH DAKOTA SHOULD ADOPT abolishing completely states CONSID- “CHOICE-INFLUENCING adopting approach which suits best APPROACH WHEN ERATIONS” these modern times.1 FACING CHOICE-OF-LAW CON- FLICTS. spe- proceeding

Before further with this writing, explain give I cial that will RATIONALE my my first and then state “bottom-line” it, As I see we have three alternatives: hopefully my reasons. This will make ra- *5 (1) jurisdictions Remain that with few my to In extensive tionale easier follow. loci; (2) lex majority’s retain Follow surprised research I was to find the volumi- approach piecemeal, and make a ad hoc writing on this nous that has been done loci; scholars, (3) lex subject by judges, law erosion of or Join the countless vast states, Morse, thirty-three plus Compara- 1. As the District Choice of Law in Tort: A of Rico, (1984); displaced Survey, Am.J.Comp.L. of Columbia and Puerto have tive 32 51 part Pielemeier, or in whole. loci delicti in Limitations on Constitutional Special Choice of Law: The Defamation, Case of Multistate example: 2. For (1985); 133 U.Pa.L.Rev. 381 Hancock, Studies in Modern Choice-of-Law: Reese, Approach, Choice of Law: Rules or Torts, Insurance, (1984); Land Titles (1972); 57 Cornell L.Rev. 315 Leñar, (1959); Conflict of Laws Reese, Governing Airplane The Law Acci- Martin, Perspectives on Conflict of Laws dents, (1982); Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 39 1303 (1980); Richman, Diagramming Graph- Conflicts: A Law, Hay, Scoles and Conflicts of Horn- Understanding Analysis, ic of Interest 43 Ohio (L.Ed.1984); Series book (1982); St.L.J. 317 Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Sedler, Michigan: Choice of Law in Judicial (1980); Laws Policy Method and the Laws, Centered Conflict of Carteau, Comments: Conflicts of Law and (1983); Wayne 29 L.Rev. 1194 Analysis Comprehensive Successions: Interest Sprague, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell Ap- as Viable Alternative to proach, Traditional Comity Policy, and Public 74 Cal.L.Rev. (1984); Tul.L.Rev. 389 59 (1986); 1447 Corr, Criminal Procedure and Conflict Laws, 16 Am.Jur.2d §§ 103-105 Conflict of Laws, (1985); of 73 Geo.L.J. 1217 (1979); Cray, Right Comment: Choice of Law in of 8(4) (1967); 15A C.J.S. Laws § Conflict of (1984); Publicity, 31 UCLA L.Rev. 640 Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Currie, Purcell, Comments Reich v. on 15 Rights Substantive of Parties to a Tort Action (1968); UCLA L.Rev. 511 by are Governed the Law of the Place of the Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of (1970); Wrong, 29 A.L.R.3d 603 Law, (1985); 85 Colum.L.Rev. 1585 Annotation, Right Conflict of Laws as to of Juenger, Critique Conflict of Laws: A of Consortium, Action for Loss of 46 A.L.R.3d (1984); Analysis, Am.J.Comp.L. Interest 32 1 (1972); 880 Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Cri- Annotation, Applicable Choice of Law as to (1983); tique, Colum.L.Rev. 772 83 Actions, Statute of Limitations in Contract Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of (1977); Law, A.L.R. 639 (1985); 1985 Duke L.J. 1 Annotation, Leflar, Choice of Law Considerations Choice-Influencing Considerations Statute, Law, Application of Aviation Guest in Conflicts 41 N.Y.Univ.L.Rev. 267 (1975); (1966); A.L.R.3d 1076 Annotation, Liability as to of Crump, Choice of Law Miller and Jurisdiction and Choice Liquor Injuries by Seller for Caused Intoxicat- of Law in Multistate Class Actions after Phil- lips Persons, Shutts, (1980); Co. ed 2 A.L.R.4& 952 Petroleum 96 Yale L.J. 1 Annotation, (1986); Modern Status of Choice of Morrison, Conflicts, Application Death of Vill.L.Rev. Law in utes, of Automobile Guest Stat- (1983-84); (1988). 63 A.L.R.4th 167 jurisdictions of majority any price of which abolish the tort rule. paid The rigid in favor is, archaic and rule of lex loci of simplicity therefore, that rule too of gives flexibility and ad- approach (Emphasis added.) high. respon- issues in dresses conflicts laws Laws, Hay, also Scoles and Conflict of See equitable sible and manner. (L.Ed.1984); Leflar, Hornbook Series The WHY ABANDON LEX LOCI? (1959); Hancock, Law of Conflict of Laws learned, Torts, thought- It is to find a Studies Modern difficult Choice-of-Law: writing Insurance, (1984). ful which defends lex Per- loci. Land Titles (if haps only) most common not defense As spe- stated Chief Justice Wuest’s simple easy of the rule is that it is cial concurrence3 in v. Meyer, 295 Hofer This, suggest, lacks apply. certain intel- (S.D.1980): N.W.2d an- “These elegance.. lectual place cient decisions have no modern generally accepted It to be seems society.” Hofer, Chief Justice Wuest analytical focus and has no lex loci lacks went to state: Sprague, objective standards. Choice rigid common law is not and arbi- Comity Law: A Fond Farewell and Pub- trary code, erystalized and immutable. (1986). Policy, lic Cal.L.Rev. Rather, it adapts is flexible and itself rule, underlying rationales for the when changing conditions. It is an accumula- advanced, put simply not practice, into tion expressions the various preserve is thus there no reason to it. tribunals their efforts to ascertain Anderson, 428 Mich. Olmstead what right just between individu- N.W.2d 292 *6 respect als with private disputes. to The modern approaches more to conflicts may just disposi- What be a considered necessary develop- of “a law are considered dispute stage tion of a history at one of system ment to free the from the may stage, considering not be at another increasingly inappropriateness obvious of social, changing economic and other con- Sprague, supra, the old rules.” at 1476. society. ditions of principle of “Commentary As in Professor Weintraub keep stare decisis not meant to a Laws,” Edition, on the of Second Conflict stranglehold developments which 6.19, at said: § responsive values, are experi- to new shaping legal apply But in rules to to ences (Emphasis and circumstances. the human condi- complexities added.) tion, certainty and quest absolute for complete is a dream. simplicity child’s THE WHY NOT ADOPT PUBLIC POLICY produce Rigid, simple irrational rules ?4 EXCEPTION variar dysfunctional solutions to Certainly preferred ap- is blindly to ble, complex problems. Legal rules plying remember, We lex loci. must how- be, be, perhaps inevitably should must ever, that it does not cure the weaknesses produce socially solu- rules that desirable rigid inherent in the Like the rule rule. problems to tions to which those itself, analytical it lacks focus. It has been rules are and that addressed also escape characterized as “an hatch to avoid for feasible the members of a learned supra, Sprague, results.” at 1451. profession place-of- absurd administer. The contact, is said have arisen “not because of wrong rule on the one It focuses that, cases, analytical accuracy, provided injury, in nor because it unintentional tort decision, likely policy principled as most to be unrelated to the for an alterna- time, 980, 384, 337; sitting judge U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d New 3. At that he was a circuit justice. Inc., disqualified America, Boy York v. Scouts Schultz 679, 189, 480 65 N.Y.2d N.E.2d 491 N.Y.S.2d recognized only As of three states (1985); Tenneco, Inc., Wong California public exception argument: Mississippi policy Cal.Rptr. 412 39 Cal.3d 702 P.2d Ass’n, Boardman United Services Automobile cert, denied, (Miss.1985), 470 So.2d “approach” rigid inappropriate require- I have said not a “rule.” As tive to the rights.” stated Professor Reese at 57 Cornell of vested Id. It has been ments easy hard L.Rev. criticized as “too to use without thinking,”

legal Id. at “a substitute phenomenon By ‘rule’ is meant a found necessary for the intellectual exertion law, namely in most areas of the a for- factors,” Id., “pure- appropriate find and as applied mula which once will lead the obsolete, ly duplicative, and therefore be- sure, to a conclusion. To there court be ‘public policies’ employed defen- cause the inevitably questions be as to a rule’s already inte- sively in earlier times are proper scope application, including gral part analysis.” of the modem Id. at questions of how the words that com- prise the rule should inter- be defined or preted. Once it has been decided what a Along foregoing, with the there are oth- applied, and how it rule means should be majority problems. er holds that however, a conclusion reached will be (and presumably Indiana’s through application. the rule’s states) in other violates our those ‘approach’ system By is meant a policy. One does not have to do much does no more than state what factor or thinking identify many statutory other arriving factors should be considered varying argu- areas from ours which would at a conclusion. ably category. come within the same Such dramshop include other areas of law generally accept- seem to three There cases,5 interspousal immunity,6 statutory approaches dealing ed with choice of law limitations,7 damage compensa- workers’ (1) (2) contacts”; conflicts: “dominant tion,8insurance9 and criminal law.10 What interest”; (3) “governmental “choice- predictability do we do then? do What influencing considerations.” 16 Am.Jur.2d citizens, have? Does this serve our bench Laws, (1979); 15A Conflict §§ sug- and bar in a reasonable manner? I 8(4) (1967); of Laws Re- C.J.S. Conflict gest that it does not! (Second) statement of Conflict of Laws 2d *7 [TJhough approaches the modern have (1969); Annotation, 145 Modern Status of criticized, themselves been a return to Application Choice of Law of Automobile comity the doctrine of and Statutes, (1988); A.L.R.4th Guest 63 167 would not their Annotation, resolve weaknesses. Choice Law Considerations comity public Statutes, Since the doctrines of and Application of Aviation Guest policy longer pur- (1975); Annotation, can no serve a useful 62 A.L.R.3d 1076 Mod- pose, they by Rights should be abandoned mod- ern Status of Rule that Substantive relegated background ern courts and of Parties to a Tort Action are Governed Wrong, studies of the the Place 29 evolution of choice-of-law the Law of of the (1970). doctrine in the United A.L.R.3d 603 States.

Id. at 1448. on of these Much has been written all Although give I approaches. citations to THE WHAT ARE ALTERNATIVES? writings alternatives, on these various properly finally Once we resolve to de- comparisons. not make detailed Suf- part from the rule say and its fice it to that the dominant contacts policy exception, approach adopted by we must decide on the was York in first New 473, approach Jackson, appropriate to follow. Note that Babcock v. 12 N.Y.2d 191 Hotel, 376, Leflar, Choice-Influencing 5. See Schmidt v. Driscoll 249 Minn. 8. See Considerations Law, 267, (1957). in Conflicts 41 N.Y. Univ.L.Rev. 272 82 N.W.2d 365 (1966). Laws, Hay, 6. See Scoles and Conflict of Horn Id. (L.Ed.1984). book Series 551 566, Ohle, Commonwealth Pa. 10. See (1983). Id. A.2d (1963),11 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 which choice of law decisions N.E.2d based generally adopted as the upon choice-influencing since been these has considera relationships” approach significant “most are relevant they tions because to a rea supra. The Restatement, “govern- Clark, in the sonable choice of law. Clark v. adopted by approach interest” mental 351, (1968); N.H. 222 A.2d 205 Conklin v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d in Reich v. Homer, California 468, 38 Wis.2d 727, (1967). 551, Cal.Rptr. 31 432 P.2d (1968). By considerations, applying these “choice-influencing ap- considerations” pertinent courts can assess the interests by Professor Leflar and proach was refined policy factors involved and achieve a by the of Wiscon- ultimately adopted State desirable result in each situation. Peters v. Zellmer, sin Heath v. 35 Wis.2d Peters, 63 Haw. 634 P.2d 586 (1967).12 states, other N.W.2d 664 Various attempt result, In the to obtain that Arkansas, Minnesota, Hawaii, including recognize must that one of the functions of Massachusetts, Hampshire have New the law of conflicts is to make sure that lead. followed Wisconsin’s relations between the states and commerce WHAT IS THE CHOICE-INFLUENCING and equitable between them is harmonious CONSIDERATION APPROACH? parties to the concerned pre still while serving integrity of the forum law. decision, When faced with a choice-of-law Heath, supra. grounds its conclu- the court considers following considerations: sion lex loci An may results; Predictability of equitable result in an merely decision is happenstance. Maintenance of interstate and interna- Because of its mechanical order; tional equity nature not a conscious factor. task; “governmental its discussion of in- Leflar’s Simplification consideration, the court in Wallis v. terest” governmen- Advancement of the forum’s Co., Mrs. Pie Smith’s 261 Ark. interests; tal Clark, (1977) (citing Clark S.W.2d 453 Application of the rule of law. better (1968)), 107 N.H. 222 A.2d 205 noted choice-influencing All of the elements of the truest interest of the forum is in analyzed and set considerations were well jus- the fair and efficient administration Heath, supra. forth As Leflar later pre- tice. choice should not be one of choice-influencing stated: “The considera parties preferred ferred but of law. approach agrees tions that state interests Heath, supra (citing Leflar, Conflicts always should be taken into account Choice-Influencing Law: More on Consid- law, choice of but holds that this is not *8 (Book H), erations 54 Calif.L.Rev. 1584 only choice-influencing relevant considera (1966)). Comments on Reich v. Pur Currie, tion.” cell, (1968). Ad UCLA L.Rev. SUMMARY ditionally, Professor Leflar various writ subject greater in-depth warrants ings “The analyzed has them further. expressed I analysis than have herein. plain fact is that the considerations have writing majority opinion, I to I Were along, and present operative been and all go greater lengths explain would and motivating every reasons behind have been prop- in adopting articulate our reasons formulated choice-of-law rule that was ever In the approach er to conflicts of law. every case that was ever decided.” conserving further man- Leflar, Choice-Influencing interest Considerations stating Law, power, simply I conclude in Conflicts N.Y. Univ.L.Rev. archaic, that must abandon the obso- proposal Professor Leflar’s we rule of lete, irrational, rigid analysis in is not a rule but a method of Reese, Leflar, supra, 12. Cheatham and 11. Babcock is also noted as the seminal case note 5. Law, Applicable Choice of the 52 Colum.L.Rev. way which led the in the declination of the thorough to cat- was the first effort loci delicti doctrine. choice-influencing alogue all the considerations. adopt appropriate, approach modern adopt

conflicts of laws. would the hold-

ing of Heath and other similar cases and disputes

hold conflicts-of-law analyze apply appropriate

must

choice-influencing considerations deter-

mining appropriate apply. law to

I am authorized to state that Justices join in

HENDERSON and SABERS

special concurrence.

Margo HEINERT, Appellee, Plaintiff and FEDERAL

HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN FALLS,

ASSOCIATION OF SIOUX Savings

Successor to 1st Dakota Home Association,

and Loan Defendant and

Appellant.

No. 16485.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued May Aug.

Decided Johnson,

Charles Rick Johnson of Eklund Davis, Gregory, & appel- lee. Meierhenry

Mark Meierhenry V. & Meierhenry, Danforth, Danforth, G.J. Jr. of Johnson, Falls, Danforth & Sioux for Home Ass’n, Federal Sav. and Loan appellant. *9 WUEST, Chief Justice.
Appellee, Margo (Margo), Heinert brought an against appellant, action Home Savings Federal and Loan Association (Home Federal), alleging that Home Feder- provide al had failed to credit life insurance to her husband, and her now deceased Ha- (Harold), rold pursuant Heinert to an insur- provision ance in a loan disclosure state- jury ment. After a returned a verdict fa- voring Margo, the trial court entered a judgment against Federal, Home ordering

Case Details

Case Name: Owen v. Owen
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 2, 1989
Citation: 444 N.W.2d 710
Docket Number: 16481
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In