186 Mo. App. 1 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1914
— Plaintiff’s action is against tMrtynine defendants, and proceeds as in indebitatus assumpsit for the recovery of $1246.66, the balance claimed to be due for services rendered in connection with certain election contests. Plaintiff suffered a nonsMt below, and, after unsuccessfully moving to have the same set aside, appealed to tMs court.
The services in question were rendered by plaintiff in and concerning the election contests which were commenced in the Supreme Court of this State on or about December 17,1910, involving the offices of Judge of the Supreme Court, Superintendent of Public Schools, and Railroad and Warehouse Commissioner. In November, 1910, almost immediately following the-general election of that year, it appeared that contest-proceedings would probably be instituted by the defeated (Democratic) candidates for the offices above mentioned. Plaintiff, a resident of the city of St. Louis, had for many years been an active political worker in the Republican Party, had had much experience in po
Plaintiff testified that just prior to the day upon which the canvassing of the election returns was to begin, Mr. Morris sent for him, and that he, in company with Mr. Morris, went to Jefferson City, where he conferred with Gov. Hadley, and for three days was present at the office of the Secretaary of State, in connection with the canvassing of the returns, to “keep track of the returns and look for any irregularities that might happen that would be detrimental to the Republican Party.” Plaintiff stated that he then returned to the city of St. Louis, and later, in response to a telephone call from Judge Kennish, which, he says, he answered in Judge Spencer’s office, in the latter’s absence, he, Judge Spencer and Mr. Hocker went to Jefferson City; that as the result of conferences at Jefferson City he went to certain other points in the State, and then reported to Gov. Hadley, who directed him to report to Judge Spencer at St. Louis; and that on December 6,1910, he reported to Judge Spencer, when
When asked by Judge Spencer, on cross-examination, to state again his understanding of this conversation plaintiff said: “That I was to receive $100 a week. You said that I was worth a $100 and that you would gladly pay it if you had it, but you said, unfortunately, the State Committee had placed in your hands a very small sum of money and that you could not consistently guarantee to pay more than $50 on account, with the understanding and agreement that I was to have the additional $50 when the State Committee was in funds.” Q. “Was there anything said about my guarantee or responsibility in the matter ?” A. “$50 a week.” Q. “That the limit would be $50 a week1?” A. ‘ ‘ That was all you would guarantee at the time. ’ ’
Plaintiff proceeded with the work and was engaged therein from December 6, 1910, the date of the agreement above mentioned, tó May 13, 1911, during which time he was paid $50 per week. In his account, contained in the petition, he claims $100 for services rendered prior to December 6, 1911, and $50 per week additional thereafter to May 13, 1911, making a total of $1241.66.
The suit proceeds against Crov. Hadley, Judge Spencer, the four above mentioned' contestees, Mr. Morris and all of the other members of the State Committee.
As to the services rendered prior to December 6, 1910, the date of the agreement with Judge Spencer, no express agreement appears on the part of anyone to compensate plaintiff therefor. Nor do we think that the law will imply any such promise from all of the facts and circumstances shown in evidence. It does not appear that plaintiff intended at the time to charge therefor, but the inference is irresistible that such was not the case. And if plaintiff harbored any such secret intention, the character of the services and the circumstances under which they were rendered, were such as to lead reasonable men, in the position of the other parties immediately concerned,, to believe that they were rendered gratuitously; that plaintiff was assisting in this preliminary work as a matter of party service, without expectation or hope of immediate reward, as were other active members of his political party. His expenses were paid at the time, and there is no evidence of any word or act on his part indicating that he expected compensation; on the other hand Gov. Hadley, called by plaintiff as a witness, testified that plaintiff said that he was rendering such services without charge. And it seems quite clear that those defendants with whom plaintiff was associated in such work had no reason to believe that they would be expected to compensate plaintiff therefor. We have no hesitation in saying that there could be no recovery upon these items of the account. [See Wagner v. Illuminating Co., 141 Mo. App. l. c. 72, 73, 121 S. W. 329.]
The services rendered after December 6, 1910; were rendered under the agreement made by plaintiff with Judge Spencer. This, as plaintiff himself
The evidence is that Mr. Morris, acting upon his ' own initiative, employed Judge Spencer and Mr. Hock-er as counsel, and provided certain funds to defray the necessary expenses incident to the contests, thereby relieving the contestees of the burden of employing counsel and defending the title to their respective offices in these proceedings. In so doing it is to be inferred that Mr. Morris was acting under a sense of responsibility which he felt as Chairman of the State Committee, believing that his political party, through him as the head of its State organization, should assume this burden. He did not, however, contract directly with plaintiff, but this was left to Judge Spencer, one of the counsel employed in the matter. The latter’s agreement did not undertake or purport to bind Mr. Morris personally, nor did Judge Spencer have any authority so to do. Neither did it purport to bind Gov. Hadley or any of the contestees; nor could it, in the absence of authority therefor. It quite clearly appears that Judge Spencer limited his own responsibility to $50 per week, which was paid; and that no further liability could attach to him in the premises. If Gov. Hadley and Mr. Morris are liable, such liability cannot grow out of the agreement made by Judge Spen.cer, but must arise from the acts of these defendants themselves in the premises.
A .further contention is that plaintiff is entitled to recover upon quantum mermt against the four above-mentioned contéstees, upon the theory that where services are'performed for one, either with or without his knowledge and consent, and he knowingly accepts and avails himself of such services, the law will imply a promise to pay a fair and reasonable compensation therefor. Again there is no fault to be found
In the instant case the special contract, price limited plaintiff’s compensation to $50 per week — except in so far as the agreement purported to bind the State Committee as such. It did not purport to and could not bind the contestees for the payment of additional compensation to plaintiff. And no recovery can be had against the contestees upon quantum meruit in the face of the express terms of the agreement made.
And furthermore, one- who is benefited by work performed is not liable therefor if credit is given solely to another at whose request it is performed. [See 40 Cyc. p. 2838.] The evidence shows that plaintiff performed his services relying entirely upon Judge Spencer and the State Committee to compensate him therefor. And as to this it matters not that the agreement, under the circumstances, failed to obligate the individual members of the Committee, who had naught to do with the matter.
But this entire matter becomes immaterial in the view which we take of this cáse. It cannot matter whether the Committee had funds on hand for contest purposes, or otherwise, so far as concerns the personal liability of any of these defendants. Though there was evidence that, from the time of plaintiff’s engagement to that of the trial, the Committee was always in debt to the extent of some thousands of dollars, if the question of the Committee’s financial affairs were here involved, the propriety of the ruling of the trial court respecting the issuance of the. subpoena upon the Committee’s treasurer would demand our consideration. Under the circumstances, however, this ruling need not be reviewed.
Other questions are raised, but they are either not controlling or are disposed of by what we have said above.
The judgment must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.