54 Ga. App. 53 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
R. L. Anderson was county guardian of Bibb County, and as such was guardian of the person and property of James P. Eranklin, an incompetent veteran of the world war. On July 3, 1933, Anderson filed with the ordinary of Bibb County his annual return which showed a debit against his ward of $1674.20, the same being funds of the ward which had been placed by the
As illustrative and expressive of the views of this court, under the facts of this case, the following apt and pertinent language from Re Law’s Estate, 144 Pa. 499 (22 Atl. 831, 14 L. R. A. 103), is here quoted: “In the present case, the money was placed in the bank, not as an investment, for any fixed period, but merely for safe-keeping, and at a small rate of interest, until a suitable investment could be found. This was the express understanding of both parties at the time. The transaction was entered on the books of the bank as a deposit merely. It was treated as a temporary, provisional, or precautionary arrangement. No person could speak of this as an investment. An investment carries with it a greater or less degree of permanency, which does not characterize this transaction. It is true that two weeks notice was to be given of the withdrawal of the deposit; but this was a reasonable provision, and not inconsistent with a bank deposit. Almost all savings institutions stipulate for notice of withdrawal with their 'depositors, and such a stipulation is for the benefit, not only of the bank, but also of its depositors. . . It is said the trustee thereby loses control of the money; but that is not the true test. The depositor always, in a certain sense, loses control of the money when he places it in a bank; for the bank may refuse payment of his checks, and, as he then has no claim upon the specific money, he stands upon the footing of a creditor merely. It is true, as a general rule,
The jury were not bound to find, as a matter of law, that because the guardian in this case was a shareholder in, a member of the
Where the caveator alleged that the guardian was a shareholder and director of the bank and was its attorney, and as such had knowledge of the affairs of the bank, the manner in which it was run, made its loans, etc., and therefore knew of the alleged unsafe condition of the bank and should have withdrawn the ward’s money from the bank in the exercise of the proper care and diligence over the funds of his ward, it was certainly competent and proper for the guardian to introduce evidence showing the manner
The guardian, as a witness in his own behalf, testified: “I considered it my duty on the board of directors of the Macon Savings Bank of serving them as a lawyer to advise the board on legal matters that came up.” To this testimony the caveator objected, and the judge in overruling the objection stated to counsel, in the presence of the jury: "I think the jury ought to have that, because it sheds light on the main issue in this ease. One issue for the jury is whether or not Mr. Anderson was in the exercise of ordinary care in selecting this bank as a depository for the money.” The caveator’s objection was on the ground that the witness could
Certain letters from the veterans bureau to the guardian were admitted in evidence over the objection of the caveator. The caveator in this case is acting for the bureau, and that bureau has supervision over the guardian and the veteran ward. The contents of these letters, in which the veterans bureau referred to the money of the ward placed in the bank in question as a deposit, and the reference therein to other returns, and to the manner in which returns should be made, and the explanation of disbursements, etc., were admissible as shedding light on the good faith and diligence of the guardian. A letter signed by an official of the bureau by a rubber stamp was not inadmissible because not properly identified. The admission of these letters, as complained of in grounds 11, 12, and 13 of the motion do not require the grant of a new trial.
The audit and report made by a public accountant as to the condition of the bank after it closed, containing a statement as follows “This statement reflects the financial condition of the Macon Savings Bank . . at the close of business, June 13, 1933, as determined by us after appraisal of the assets . . the appraisal is based on an ultimate realization, and not on immediate liquida
The contention of the caveator that the verdict did not cover all the material issues made by the pleadings, is without merit. See Code, § 110-101; Smith v. Pilcher, 130 Ga. 350, 355 (60 S. E. 1000). The verdict was: “We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff, . . in that he did exercise ordinary care and diligence as per the return in this case.” Presumptions are in favor of the validity of verdicts, and they are to have a reasonable intendment, so as not to be avoided save from necessity; and the test of certainty is whether the verdict can be made certain by what it contains or by the record. See Code, § 110-105. The return of the guardian in which he gave himself credit for the amount deposited in the bank, and the caveat filed thereto, constituted the issue; that is, the plaintiff or guardian contended that he had exercised proper and ordinary care in the handling of the funds of his ward, that his return to which the caveat was filed was correct, and that he was entitled to debit the amount of this deposit or any loss thereon to his ward, and that he should not be held responsible therefor; and the caveator contended that the guardian had failed to exercise the proper degree of care in the handling of these funds of his ward, for the reasons set up in his caveat. This case turned upon the question whether the guardian exercised the proper diligence in regard to these funds of his ward by placing them in said bank and allowing them to remain there. The judge fairly and fully charged the issues and the law to the jury, and gave them the different forms for verdicts that might be rendered in the case. The verdict was not so uncertain that a judgment could not be framed in accordance with its true intent-and purpose and with the issues made by the pleadings. The judgment was “The jury in this case having returned a verdict in favor of the guardian, E. L. Anderson, it is considered, ordered, and adjudged that the verdict of the jury be made the judgment of the court, and that the returns and the item thereof caveated be approved, and the guardian E. L. Anderson relieved of the liability to account for
This disposes of grounds 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 23 of the motion for new trial.
The judge did not err in charging the jury on the question of good faith and due and proper diligence of the guardian, relatively to handling the funds of his ward and placing them in this bank, and the manner in which proper, investments of the funds of the ward should be made; and in the instruction that no order of court is required to place the money of the ward on deposit in a savings bank awaiting a suitable investment, even though a small interest is received therefor, and that the mere fact that there is a reasonable rule of the bank requiring notice before withdrawal of funds does not necessarily constitute a breach of the guardian’s trust. Under the rulings heretofore stated, the court correctly instructed the jury on these questions. This disposes of grounds 20, 21, 22, 24, and 25 of the motion for new trial.
No error of law appearing, and the verdict being authorized by the evidence, the judge did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed.