OWASSO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. I-011, AKA OWASSO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL. v. FALVO, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, PLETAN, ET AL.
No. 00-1073
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 27, 2001—Decided February 19, 2002
534 U.S. 426
Jerry A. Richardson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Karen L. Long.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
Will K. Wright, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.*
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Teachers sometimes ask students to score each other‘s tests, papers, and assignments as the teacher explains the correct answers to the entire class. Respondent contends this practice, which the parties refer to as peer grading, violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA or Act), 88 Stat. 571,
I
Under FERPA, schools and educational agencies receiving federal financial assistance must comply with certain conditions.
Three of respondent Kristja J. Falvo‘s children are enrolled in Owasso Independent School District No. I–011, in a suburb of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The children‘s teachers, like many teachers in this country, use peer grading. In a typical case the students exchange papers with each other and score them according to the teacher‘s instructions, then return the work to the student who prepared it. The teacher may ask the students to report their own scores. In this case it appears the student could either call out the score or walk to the teacher‘s desk and reveal it in confidence, though by that stage, of course, the score was known at least to the one other student who did the grading. Both the grading and the system of calling out the scores are in contention here.
Respondent claimed the peer grading embarrassed her children. She asked the school district to adopt a uniform policy banning peer grading and requiring teachers either to grade assignments themselves or at least to forbid students from grading papers other than their own. The school district declined to do so, and respondent brought a class action pursuant to
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 233 F. 3d 1203 (2000). FERPA is directed to the conditions schools must meet to receive federal funds, and as an initial matter the court considered whether the Act confers a private right of action upon students and parents if the conditions are not met. Despite the absence of an explicit authorization in the Act conferring а cause of action on private parties, the court held respondent could sue to enforce FERPA‘s terms under
We granted certiorari to decide whether peer grading violates FERPA. 533 U. S. 927 (2001). Finding no violation of the Act, we reverse.
II
At the outset, we note it is an open question whether FERPA provides private parties, like respondent, with a cause of action enforceable under
The parties appear to agree that if an assignment becomes an education record the moment a peer grades it, then the grading, or at least the practice of asking students to call out their grades in class, would be an impermissible release of the records under
Petitioners, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, contend the definition covers only institutional records—namely, those materials retained in a permanent file as a matter of course. They argue that records “maintained by an educational agency or institution” generally would include final course grades, student grade point averages,
Respondent, adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, contends student-graded assignments fall within the definition of education records. That definition contains an exception for “records of instructional, supervisory, and administrative pеrsonnel . . . which are in the sole possession of the maker thereof and which are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a substitute.”
The Court of Appeals’ logic does not withstand scrutiny. Its interpretation, furthermore, would effect a drastic alteration of the existing allocation of responsibilities between States and the National Government in the operation of the Nation‘s schools. We would hesitate before interpreting the statute to effect such a substantial change in the balance of federalism unless that is the manifest purpose of the legislation. This principle guides our decision.
Two statutory indicators tell us that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that an assignment satisfies the definition of education records as soon as it is graded by аnother student. First, the student papers are not, at that stage,
The Court of Appeals was further mistaken in concluding that each student grader is “a person aсting for” an educational institution for purposes of
Other sections of the statute support our interpretation. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme“). FERPA, for еxample, requires educational institutions to “maintain a record, kept with the education records of each student.”
Under the Court of Appeals’ broad interpretation of education records, every teacher would have an obligation to keep a separate record of access for each student‘s assignments. Indeed, by that court‘s logic, even students who grade their own papers would bear the burden of maintaining records of access until they turned in the assignments. We doubt Congress would have imposed such a weighty administrative burden on every teacher, and certainly it would not have extended the mandate to students.
Also, FERPA requires “a record” of access for each pupil. This single record must be kept “with the education records.” This suggests Congress contemplated that education records would be kept in one place with a single record of access. By describing a “school official” and “his assistants” as the personnel responsible for the custody of the records,
FERPA also requires recipients of federal funds to provide parents with a hearing at which they may contest the accuracy of their child‘s education records.
Respondent‘s construction of the term “education records” to cover student homework or classroom work would impose substantial burdens on teachers across the country. It would fоrce all instructors to take time, which otherwise could be spent teaching and in preparation, to correct an assortment of daily student assignments. Respondent‘s view would make it much more difficult for teachers to give students immediate guidance. The interpretation respondent urges would force teachers to abandon other customary practices, such as group grading of team assignments. Indeed, the logical consequences of respondent‘s view are all but unbounded. At argument, counsel for respondent seemed to agree that if a teacher in any of the thousands of covered classrooms in the Nation puts a happy face, a gold star, or a disapproving remark on a classroom assignment, federal law does not allow other students to see it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
We doubt Congress meant to intervene in this drastic fashion with traditional state functions. Under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of FERPA, the federal power would exercise minute control over specific teaching methods and
For these reasons, even assuming a teacher‘s grade book is an education record, the Court of Appeals erred, for in all events the grades on students’ papers would not be covered under FERPA at least until the teacher has collected them and recorded them in his or her grade book. We limit our holding to this narrow point, and do not deсide the broader question whether the grades on individual student assignments, once they are turned in to teachers, are protected by the Act.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that peer-graded student papers do not constitute “education records” while they remаin in the possession of the peer grader because, as the Court explains, a student who grades another‘s work is not “a person acting for” the school in the ordinary meaning of that phrase. Ante, at 432, 433. I cannot agree, however, with the other ground repeatedly suggested by the Court: that education records include only documents kept in some central repository at the school. Ante, at 433 (“The word ‘maintain’ suggests FERPA records will be kept in a filing cabinet in a records room at the school or on a permanent secure database. . . . It is fanciful to say [student graders] maintain the papers in the same way the registrar maintains a student‘s folder in a permanent file“), 435 (“FERPA implies that education records are institutional records kept by a single central custodian, such as a registrar . . .“).
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 429, 432, Congress expressly excluded from the coverage of FERPA “records of
The Court does not explain why respondent‘s argument is not corrеct, and yet continues to rely upon the “central custodian” principle that seemingly renders the exception for “records of instructional . . . personnel” superfluous. Worse still, while thus relying upon a theory that plainly excludes teachers’ grade books, the Court protests that it is not deciding whether grade books are education records, ante, at 433. In my view, the Court‘s endorsement of a “сentral custodian” theory of records is unnecessary for the decision of this case, seemingly contrary to