37 Vt. 196 | Vt. | 1864
In the month of March, 1860, the plaintiff changed his residence to a farm which he had purchased, and which was then situated in the first school district in the town of Jay, and continued to reside on this farm during the remainder of that year. At a town meeting held in that town on the 12th of May in the same year, it was voted that this farm should be taken from that school district and be annexed and set to school district No. 2 in that town. In the grand list of the town for the year 1860, (which was not completed until after the time when this town meeting was held,) the plaintiff’s list was designated by the listers as belonging for the purpose of taxation to school district No. 2. This is an action of trespass for taking and driving away certain cattle belonging to the plaintiff. The defendant, who was collector of taxes of school dis
I. The statute (C. S., p. 144, § 16 ; G. S., p. 151, § 20) confers upon eacMtown, acting “ at a legal meeting notified for that purpose,” full power in respect to the division of its territory into school districts, .and the alteration of the limits of existing districts from time to time, as may be found expedient. The power of the town of Jay, by a vote at a meeting legally warned and held for that purpose, to set the farm on which the plaintiff resided from school district No. 1 to school district No. 2 is not questioned ; but it is claimed by the defendant that the vote of the town at the town meeting held on the 12th of May, 1860, setting off this farm from school district No. 1
II. By statute, all property subject to taxation is to b'e assessed in the list with reference to its situation and value on the first day of April in each year ; (Acts of 1855, No. 43 ; Gr. S., chap. 83,) and all school district taxes voted on the first day of March, or at any time thereafter within one year are to be assessed on the list to be completed on the 15th day of May following, (Acts of 1854, No. 66, Gr. S. p. 538, § 67,) and all real estate is to be taxed in the school district in which it is situated. (C. S., p. 149, § 39 ; Gr. S., p. 156, § 45.) There are other statute provisions declaring that all personal
III. The plaintiff’s list on the 1st of April, 1860, should, for the reasons already mentioned, have been designated by the listers as belonging to school district No. 1 in the list for that year. A record of the boundaries of school districts is required by law to be made in the town clerk’s office whenever those boundaries are established or changed; and this record would, or should, on inspection, furnish the means of determining the school district to which any particular farm or parcel of real estate within the town belonged. But, in respect to personal estate, there would be nothing on the records of the town from which its situs could be ascertained except the designation of it to the several school districts as made by the listers in making up the list; and those records would consequently furnish no means of correcting such a designation, even though it might in fact be erroneous or improper. This consideration would seem to be the only ground upon which the designation, of personal estate to the list of a particular school district could be held to be so conclusive as to make it a part of the list of the district for purposes of taxation as suggested in the case of Woodward v. French, 337, 343 ; but this ground has no application to the case of an error in designating real estate to the list of any particular district, because the situs of real estate is supposed to be always capable of being ascertained from the town records, This is not a case in which any division or apportionment
The judgment of the county court, which was pro forma in favor of the plaintiff, being inconsistent with the grounds of decision and conclusions now adopted, is reversed; and the case will be remitted to that court for a new trial.