55 Ct. Cl. 154 | Ct. Cl. | 1920
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff’s action is predicated on two separate contracts, one for grading and filling and one for the construction of officers’ quarters at the naval training station, Great Lakes, Chicago, and he seeks to recover on the theory that the United States breached both contracts by failure to make payments as required thereby. Plaintiff contends that he rescinded both contracts because of the Government’s breach, and that he is entitled to recover his expenditures as to each, together with a reasonable profit.
There is no doubt as to the obligation of the Government under the contracts to make monthly payments on estimates. But some time was necessarily required to make an estimate, prepare voucher, secure its necessary certification, and approval, etc., and therefore the contract must be interpreted to mean that payments for work done each month would be
Under the grading contract the plaintiff had done some work in the month of March, 1907, but had then suspended work pending an application for an extension of time, which was granted, and pending efforts to procure some one else to take over this contract because of his own declared inability to carry it on. The extension of time, afterwards granted, was represented to be necessary to enable him to sublet the contract. He did no grading in- April or May, but having failed to sublet the contract, he did some work in May in preparation for further work under the contract and resumed grading and filling in June. His voucher for work done in March was held up because of the uncertainty of his proceeding with the work, but, having resumed, this voucher, No. 8, for $778.97, was delivered to him July 3.
On July 3, 1907, he notified the commandant of the training station in substance that if vouchers due him were not in hand on July 8 he would abandon the work and rescind the contracts. Then, having received voucher No. 8, there was nothing due him on the grading contract. His theory is that he elected to rescind the contracts on July 8. It is apparent that he could not rescind on account of any delay on voucher No. 8, for he had received it on the 3d. We think it was then too early for him to complain of any delay as to the voucher for work done in June. This voucher, No. 9, had been issued on July 5, about the usual time after the end of a month, and forwarded to Washington, and would probably have been in plaintiff’s hands within a reasonable time had he not abandoned the work. It had been stopped by telegraph when he did so, but that was only the eighth day. The average time for the delivery of vouchers, except No. 8, during the progress of this contract had been, as shown, 9f days. A somewhat longer period than that could hardly have been held unreasonable. If there was then no breach, there could be no ground for an attempted rescission, and the contractor was in default when he abandoned the work.
The conditions under the officers’ quarters contract were somewhat different. On July 8, 1907, the plaintiff had not yet received voucher No. 6 for $1,386.90 on account of materials furnished and labor performed in the last half of the month of 'May. This voucher had been issued on the 7th of June, but delayed for reason now assigned as “ good excuses,” partly the absence of the commandant, and the
Question is made as to whether he did, in fact, elect to rescind the contract because of this breach by the Government, and it' is argued, probably with force, that if he was otherwise financially embarrassed and unable to proceed with the work and did not, in fact, at the time abandon or rescind the contract because of the Government’s breach, he can not now avail himself of this breach. There is some room for the contention since, as found, he predicated his action, in conversation had that day, on “lack of funds,” without specific reference to the Government’s delinquency, and afterwards, in letters of the twelfth and sixteenth, assigned that delinquency as the reason for his action, giving rise to the suspicion of an afterthought, but he had some days before the eighth indicated the course he would pursue if vouchers were not in hand by that day, and the fact that he is not shown, in conversation afterwards detailed, to have used language entirely appropriate to the assertion of his right, should hardly be held sufficient to deprive him of it.
And it is contended that it was a pretext, a subterfuge, to shift responsibility for his shortcoming, and that the amount involved was not sufficient to give merit to his claim of a right to rescind because of the default. In a sense, the amount was not large, but whether large or small is a comparative matter, and an amount of money insignificant under some circumstances may be of abnormal value under others. We must know that this transaction was during a time of financial stringency, a “ panic,” so called, when it was diffi
It was ascertained by the prescribed method that the value of the materials furnished and labor done by him, including a reasonable profit, was $11,548.71, and that he had been paid $9,026.55, a difference of $2,522.16, which we think is the correct measure of the plaintiff’s recovery as to this contract.
In the aggregate the plaintiff should have judgment for $3,418.15.