Case Information
*1 Filed 11/13/14 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION [*] IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
OVERSTOCK.COM, INC. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A135682 v. (San Francisco City & County
GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-07-460147) Defendants and Respondents. I. I NTRODUCTION
Often, it is the federal courts, applying federal law, that wrestle with claims of cross-state securities fraud involving a nationally-listed stock. Here, plaintiffs of various states allege defendants, securities firms headquartered on the East Coast, violated California and New Jersey law through their involvement in massive naked short selling of Overstock shares. The trial court sustained demurrers to plaintiffs’ New Jersey Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim without leave to amend and subsequently granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ California market manipulation claims.
We affirm the dismissal of the belatedly raised New Jersey RICO claim. We also affirm the summary judgment as to three of the four defendants, but reverse as to Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corporation. The evidence, although slight, raises a triable issue this firm effected a series of transactions in California and did so for the purpose of *2 inducing others to trade in the manipulated stock. In reaching this disposition, we conclude Corporations Code section 25400, subdivision (b), reaches not only beneficial sellers and buyers of stock, but also can reach firms that execute, clear and settle trades. However, as we further explain, such firms face liability in a private action for damages only if they engage in conduct beyond aiding and abetting securities fraud, such that they are a primary actor in the manipulative trading.
II. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Plaintiffs are Overstock.Com, Inc., an online retailer, and seven of its investors. In their Fourth Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged defendants intentionally depressed the price of Overstock stock by effecting “naked short sales”—that is, sales of shares the brokerage houses and their clients never actually owned or borrowed. This practice, and specifically perpetuating the naked short positions by means of exotic trading schemes, allegedly increased the apparent supply of the stock, lead to a “pile on” of further short sales, and thereby decreased the stock’s value—including the value of shares plaintiffs sold. Plaintiffs claimed defendants’ conduct violated Corporations Code sections 25400 and 25500, [1] Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500, [2] and New Jersey’s RICO statute (N.J. Stat. 2C:41-2(c)–(d)). To put plaintiffs’ allegations and the nature of the evidence proffered during the summary judgment proceedings in context, we start with an overview of how securities transactions unfold, naked short sales, and the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) efforts to prohibit abusive short selling.
A. Steps in a Securities Transaction
Securities transactions involve a number of steps. These include, among others, executing a trade order, clearing a trade, and settling a trade. (See generally Henry F. Minnerop, Clearing Arrangements (2003) 58 Bus. Law. 917, 919 ( Minnerop ); 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a2–2(T) (2014).)
*3
Execution is the process of reaching agreement on the terms of a transaction. This
includes, for a buyer, not only finding the best price, but also choosing the right seller
given the size of the order, the nature of the security being traded, and the costs and fees
associated with the trade. (See
Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
(3d Cir. 1998)
Upon execution, “the actual transaction has only begun. Thereafter, several steps must be taken to complete the course of dealing. These steps are typically the responsibility of a clearing agency” associated with a given stock exchange. ( Bradford Nat. Clearing Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission (D.C. Cir. 1978) 590 F.2d 1085, 1091, fn. 2 ( Bradford ).) “The clearing agency has three functions. First, the agency ‘compares’ submissions of the seller’s broker with those of the buyer’s to make sure that there is a common understanding of the terms of the trade. Following this process, the resulting ‘compared trade’ is ‘cleared.’ Most simply, this amounts to the clearing agency advising the selling and buying brokers, respectively, of their delivery and payment obligations.” ( Ibid. )
“The final, ‘settlement,’ stage in the process involves the delivery of securities
certificates to the purchasing broker and the payment of money to the selling broker.
Modernization of this task has led to storage of most stock certificates in a depository
affiliated with the clearing agency. Thus, ‘delivery’ amounts to a bookkeeping entry that
removes the security from one account and places it in another.” (
Bradford, supra
,
Some firms, known as clearing firms, specialize in postexecution, “back office”
clearing and settling of trades in conjunction with the appropriate clearing agency, in
which the clearing firm is a “participant.” Such firms may provide these services to
*4
“introducing” brokerage firms on a fee-for-service basis. (
Dillon v. Militano
(S.D.N.Y.
1990)
B. The Parties
Overstock sold shares in May and December 2006 through public offerings arranged by a San Francisco firm, W.R. Hambrecht + Co. The other seven plaintiffs are individuals who sold Overstock shares in 2004, 2005, and 2006.
There are four defendants, two related “Goldman” entities and two related “Merrill” entities. Their ordinary activities can be understood with reference to the stages in a securities transaction discussed above.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. (hereinafter Goldman Brokerage) executes, clears, and settles securities transactions. Its operations are centered in New Jersey and New York. In some cases, Goldman Brokerage performs execution, clearance, and settlement for a single transaction. In other cases, its clients execute elsewhere and Goldman Brokerage provides only clearance and settlement services. Goldman Brokerage also houses a *5 securities lending department which procures and supplies stock associated with certain transactions, including, as explained below, short sales. In this case, Goldman Brokerage’s execution of certain client trades and its own purchase of certain securities in connection with its securities lending business are primarily at issue.
Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. (hereinafter Goldman Clearing) likewise executes, clears, and settles securities transactions. It is an SEC-registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Securities Clearing Corporation. It is headquartered in New Jersey and has significant operations there, and in New York and Chicago. It offers its clearing services to other SEC-registered broker-dealers, hedge funds, and institutions. In this case, Goldman Clearing’s clearing and settlement services are primarily at issue.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. (hereinafter Merrill Brokerage), like its Goldman Brokerage counterpart, provides various investment services and runs a stock lending department that borrows and lends securities. This department conducts its borrowing, lending, and related transactional activity in New York and Illinois. As with Goldman Brokerage, it is Merrill Brokerage’s trade execution and lending operations connected to naked short sales that are primarily at issue.
Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp. (hereinafter Merrill Clearing), like its Goldman Clearing counterpart, provides various investment services and is an SEC- registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Securities Clearing Corporation. Merrill Clearing is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merrill Brokerage. It is headquartered in New York and has a substantial presence in New Jersey and Illinois. It also has a San Francisco customer service office. Merrill Clearing offers only limited execution services, and most Merrill Clearing clients execute their own trades. Merrill Clearing uses Merrill Brokerage to procure stocks needed to settle (or close out) a transaction. As with Goldman Clearing, Merrill Clearing’s clearing and settlement operations are primarily at issue here.
C. “Naked” Short Selling
In a short sale, the seller sells stock the seller does not own. It is a bet against the stock. In an ordinary short sale, the seller borrows stock from a lender (such as a brokerage firm’s lending department), sells this stock to a buyer at the going price, and then purchases replacement stock—hopefully at a lower price—to return to the lender. Lenders typically charge a borrow fee for lending shares to sell short. The seller profits if the stock price falls enough to cover all costs and fees associated with the sale, including borrowing the stock. Otherwise, if the stock price rises or does not fall enough to cover the costs and fees, the short seller suffers a loss. If the short seller never delivers the stock to the buyer, a “fail to deliver” occurs. The sale nonetheless appears on the seller’s and buyer’s books, and is then termed a “naked” short sale.
Stocks that are “hard-to-borrow” (also called “negative rebate” stocks) can command high borrow fees, given their scarcity and desirability for short selling. During the 2005 and 2006 timeframe, Overstock was a particularly hard-to-borrow security, and shares of the company commanded a negative rebate of up to 35 percent of its value on an annualized basis. Thus, any trader hoping to profit from selling short would ordinarily need to recoup the borrow fees through a significant decline in the price of the security. In naked short sales, however, there is no borrowing and thus no borrow fee, and it is significantly easier to make a profit.
Short selling, itself, is lawful. (
GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt
(3d Cir.
2001)
But there are situations in which intentional naked short selling can be employed
to manipulate the market. (See
Cohen
,
supra
, 722 F.Supp.2d at pp. 424–425 [“fails to
deliver can occur for a variety of legitimate reasons, and flexibility is necessary in order
to ensure an orderly market and to facilitate liquidity,” but some fails may be “a potential
problem” when “willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of
how market participants value a security”];
Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital
Management, LLC
(2010)
D. Regulation SHO: Regulating Abusive Short Sales
The SEC began to focus on naked short selling and its potential abuses in 2003
and 2004. (See Charles F. Walker, Colin D. Forbes,
SEC Enforcement Actions and
Issuer Litigation in the Context of A “Short Attack”
(2013) 68 Bus. Law. 687, 691
[relating history of SEC regulation of short sales, particularly through Regulation SHO].)
It recognized manipulative short selling could pose problems for the markets and took
*8
“steps to restrict or prohibit it in various situations. See Regulation SHO Proposed
Release, SEC Rel. No. 34–48709, 68 Fed.Reg. 62972, 62975–78 (Nov. 6, 2003); Short
Sales, SEC Rel. No. 34–50103, 69 Fed.Reg. 48008, 48009 (Aug. 6, 2004); Amendments
to Regulation SHO, SEC Rel. No. 34–56212, 72 Fed.Reg. 45544 (Aug. 7, 2007);
Emergency Order, SEC Rel. No. 34–58166 (July 15, 2008).” (
Pet Quarters, Inc. v.
Depository Trust and Clearing Corp.
(8th Cir. 2009)
In its 2003 proposal to regulate, the SEC warned: “Naked short selling can have a number of negative effects on the market, particularly when the fails to deliver persist for an extended period of time and result in a significantly large unfulfilled delivery obligation at the clearing agency where trades are settled. At times, the amount of fails to deliver may be greater than the total public float. In effect the naked short seller unilaterally converts a securities contract (which should settle in three days after the trade date) into an undated futures-type contract, which the buyer might not have agreed to or that would have been priced differently. The seller’s failure to deliver securities may also adversely affect certain rights of the buyer, such as the right to vote. More significantly, naked short sellers enjoy greater leverage than if they were required to borrow securities and deliver within a reasonable time period, and they may use this additional leverage to engage in trading activities that deliberately depress the price of a security.” (Regulation SHO Proposed Release, SEC Rel. No. 34–48709, 68 Fed.Reg. 62972, 62975, fn. omitted.)
The following year, in 2004, the SEC adopted Regulation SHO which imposes
two requirements—“locate” and “delivery”—aimed at curtailing intentional naked short
sales. (
Electronic Trading Group, LLC v. Banc of America Securities LLC
(2d Cir. 2009)
In other words, Regulation SHO requires brokers to have a reasonable belief they
can “locate” the shares to be sold short and requires “participants”—i.e., clearing firms—
to “deliver” shares on a timely basis. Bona fide market makers’ trades, however, are
exempt from the locate requirement. (17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b)(2)(iii) (2014).) Thus,
market makers and their brokers, when engaged in legitimate trading, can commеnce a
short sale without first worrying about whether they have ready access to the shares. The
delivery requirement, in turn, only applies to “threshold securities,” meaning certain
listed securities already suffering numerous fails to deliver (17 C.F.R. § 242.203(c)(6)
(2014)), and clearing firms can “reasonably” delegate the obligation to deliver shares to
bona fide market maker clients. (17 C.F.R. 242.203(b)(3)(vi) (2014); see also Short
*10
Sales, S.E.C. Release No. 34-50103, available at
E. SEC and Exchange Actions Against Market Maker Clients of Defendants Following the enactment of Regulation SHO, the SEC and several exchanges brought enforcement actions against a number of market participants for violating locate and delivery requirements, including two market maker clients of defendants, Steven Hazan and Scott Arenstein. While Hazan and Arenstein purported to be bona fide market makers, in fact, they were not.
Hazan, a New York resident, was sanctioned in an August 2009, SEC order for
violating both locate and delivery requirements. (
In re the Matter of Hazan Capital
Mgmt., LLC
, SEC Release No. 60441 (Aug. 5, 2009) available at
In the reverse conversion trades, Hazan would sell short a hard-to-borrow threshold security to a counterparty. He would also buy from that counterparty a call option in the security and sell to that counterparty a put option in the security, such that he would eliminate all market risk associated with the short sale. Because all three components of the reverse conversion were priced interdependently, Hazan was assured an “agreed-upon” profit. Meanwhile, the counterparty—for instance, a brokerage firm such as Goldman Brokerage or Merrill Brokerage—was willing to pay this price to Hazan to “obtain” on its books shares of the hard-to-borrow threshold security, which it could lend for a profit until the put and call options expired. “Consequently” explained the SEC, “prime brokers created the demand for the reverse conversion to create inventory for stock loans on hard to borrow securities and options market makers like [Hazan] fed this demand.”
Hazan employed additional nefarious trading practices to insure the short sale portions of the reverse conversions remained “naked” over time. Specifically, when alerted by clearing firms of his Regulation SHO obligation to deliver shares so settlement *11 could occur, Hazan engaged in “sham reset transactions” that only gave the appearance of delivery, while actually perpetuating his undelivered short positions. Hazan would “obtain” the necessary shares for delivery by buying from another market maker who was also selling short and who similarly never intended to deliver shares to Hazan. Meanwhile, Hazan would “pair” or hedge his new “purchase” with option trades, creating what the SEC called “married puts” or “buy-writes,” sometimes using “FLEX options.” Even though Hazan’s clearing firm—a firm such as Goldman Clearing or Merrill Clearing—would not receive actual delivery of the shares, it nevertheless would record the transactions as generating a “close out” and a new long position. There was also an appearance of delivery of the “purchased” shares back to the other market maker (who had never delivered them in the first place). In the end, Hazan would reestablish his previous short position, still naked, while succeeding in having the Regulation SHO thirteen-day delivery clock, in the clearing firms’ eyes, “reset” to day one. As settlement dates approached again and again, Hazan would repeat this process until the options on the original reverse conversion trade “expired or [were] assigned, thus” finally “closing out the short position and eliminating the synthetic long position that the short position had hedged.”
Hazan pocketed over $3 million through his trading strategy. The SEC ordered him to disgorge it, enjoined him from further violations of Regulation SHO, censured his organization and barred him from association with any broker or dealer, with the right to re-apply for association after five years. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) issued a similar order regarding the same conduct. (Hearing Board Decisions NYSE AMEX LLC 09-AMEX-21 and 09-AMEX-22 (Aug. 4, 2009); NYSE ARCA, Inc. 09-ARCA-5 and 09-ARCA-6 (Aug. 4, 2009).) NYSE Amex and NYSE Arca imposed $500,000 in penalties, and barred Hazan from membership and association with any member for seven years.
Arenstein was sanctioned in a June 2007 order issued by the American Stock Exchange (ASE). ( In the Matter of Scott H. Arenstein (Jul. 20, 2007, AMEX case No. 07-71.) He admitted engaging in the same reverse conversions and sham reset *12 transactions as Hazan and made at least $1.4 million from his unlawful trades. The ASE ordered disgorgement, assessed a $3.6 million fine, and barred him from membership and associating with any member for five years.
In 2011, Keystone, another purported market maker and a Goldman Clearing client, was sanctioned by the NASDAQ for engaging in the same kind of sham reset transactions. “[O]n the very same day [Keystone would be] ‘bought-in’ by Keystone’s clearing firm,” Keystone, on over fifty occasions would “negate[] the clearing firm’s buy- in and contradict[] guidance provided by the Securities and Exchange commission requiring that [it] be a net purchaser of the open fail position in the security by selling near equivalent number of shares.” Keystone was required to disgorge $2 million in profits, pay a $500,000 fine, and suffer a censure and “three-month suspension in a supervisory capacity.” (John C. Pickford, Enforcement Counsel, NASDAQ OMX PHLX, notice of Disciplinary Action Against Keystone Trading Partners to Members, Member Organizations, Participants and Participant Organizations re FINRA Matter No. 2010022926 and Enforcement No. 2011-04, Jul. 7, 2011.)
In short, there is no question Hazan, Arenstein and Keystone, purported market maker clients of defendants, engaged in abusive naked short selling and flagrant violations of the federal securities laws.
The SEC has continued to target abusive naked short selling, recently pursuing not
only traders, but the firms that enabled their manipulative trading. The SEC pulled no
punches in this regard in
In the Matter of OptionsXpress, Inc. et al.
, in which it ruled the
brokerage firm violated Regulation SHO in connection with sham reset transactions,
similar to those just discussed, designed to avoid delivery: “Because [the firm] knew . . .
shares that were the subject of [a] buy were shares for [it’s client’s] account that were the
subject of simultaneous deep-in-the-money calls, which would be exercised and assigned
so that no shares were delivered to [the clearing agency], optionsXpress engaged in a
sham close-out of its fail to deliver position. . . . [¶] . . . OptionsXpress did not close out
its . . . fail to deliver positions by executing consecutive buy-write transactions and
willfully violated Rules 204 and 204T. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Feldman [the client] did not
*13
mislead those he dealt with at various clearing brokers who knew, directly or indirectly,
that he was not going to the deliver securities if his calls were exercised and assigned;
however, the market as a whole did not have this knowledge.
See Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.
v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc.
,
F. The Instant Lawsuit
1. Pleadings and Demurrer to New Jersey RICO Claim Plaintiffs filed suit against Merrill Brokerage and Merrill Clearing, and Goldman Brokerage and Goldman Clearing in 2007, based largely on their suspected involvement in the Hazan and Arenstein trading schemes. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, filed in April 2009, alleged several causes of action, including as relevant here, violations of California’s Corporate Securities Law (§§ 25000 et seq.).
In December 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, seeking to add a cause of actiоn under New Jersey’s RICO statute against the Merrill and Goldman defendants. According to plaintiffs, the new RICO claim was simply a new theory based on facts unearthed late in discovery on their California securities claims.
*14 Defendants, though wary of the new complaint, ultimately chose to acquiesce in its filing and entered into a stipulation with plaintiffs, which became an order of the trial court in January 2011. In the stipulation, the parties recited their conflicting positions on the motion for leave to amend (defendants believed the Fourth Amended Complaint was defective and prejudicial, while plaintiffs did not) and noted the court’s “tentative inclination,” expressed at a case management conference, “to address any issues of prejudice . . . by continuing the trial date.” The stipulation also expressly stated defendants were “not waiving, and expressly reserve[d], all rights to file in response to the Fourth Amended Complaint any and all pleadings, motions, and other responses on any grounds available under law or equity.” The complaint was deemed filed, and the trial date was continued for approximately three months, to December 5.
As advertised, and as pertinent here, plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint re- alleged violations of sections 25400 and 25500 and additionally alleged a violation of New Jersey’s RICO statute (N.J. Stat. 2C:41-2(c)–(d)).
Defendants demurred to the New Jersey RICO claim, arguing California law, not New Jersey law, should apply and, in any case, plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the New Jersey law. They did not ask the trial court to dismiss the new complaint based on prejudicial delay, but sought denial of further leave to amend on that ground. Ruling from the bench on May 10, the trial court concluded the allegations about conduct in New Jersey were vague and conclusory, did not disclose whether actionable trade or commerce occurred in that state, and thus failed to state a claim.
The trial court also found such lack of detail in the pleadings so close to trial “pernicious to defendants.” However, rather than denying leave to amend outright, it allowed plaintiffs to submit a proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, stating it would consider granting leave based on the contents of the proposed pleading. Plaintiffs promptly submitted a proposed amended complaint with over 50 pages of additional allegations in support of their New Jersey RICO claim.
After extensive briefing and a lengthy hearing, the trial court, on August 1, 2011, denied leave to file the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. It cited two grounds: *15 (1) granting leave to add the new RICO claim would prejudice defendants on the eve of trial; and (2) the RICO claim “would be futile because the facts as alleged . . . do not warrant the application of New Jersey RICO [law] to this case under California choice- of-law principles.”
2. Summary Judgment on the Corporations Code and UCL Claims Two weeks later, on August 19, 2011, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining causes of action, including those based on California’s securities laws.
Defendants advanced several arguments as to plaintiffs’ state-law securities claims: (1) no actionable conduct occurred in California, (2) defendants did not “effect” any stock transactions, (3) defendants’ conduct was not manipulative, (4) defendants did not act for the purpose of “inducing” others to trade in a manipulated stock, (5) defendants’ conduct did not cause any decline in Overstock’s share price and thus did not result in injury to plaintiffs, and (6) federal securities laws and regulations preempted the state-law claims. We do not discuss the parties’ extensive evidentiary showing here, but do so in the next section in discussing the merits of the motions.
The trial court heard three days of argument on evidentiary objections to the documents filed in connection with the summary judgment motions and a full day of argument on the merits. In an order dated January 10, 2012, the court granted the motions. As to the state-law securities claims relevant here, the court ruled plaintiffs “failed to raise [any] triable issue of material fact supportive of finding that any act by any defendant foundational to liability, causation, or damages occurred in California.” The court declined to reach any of the other grounds for judgment defendants had urged. It issued a final, comprehensive order on April 11 and entered judgment the following day.
III. D ISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs seek reversal of the dismissal of their New Jersey RICO claim and reversal of the summary judgment on their California Corporate Securities Law claims.
A. New Jersey RICO Claim
As recited above, in exchange for a three-month continuance of the trial date, defendants acquiesced to the filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint with plaintiffs’ newly asserted New Jersey RICO claim, while reserving the right to challenge the complaint by answer, motion, or otherwise. The trial court then employed a somewhat unusual, but not unprecedented, process to assess defendants’ demurrer to the New Jersey claim and determine whether to allow further amendment. It first sustained the demurrer, concluding plaintiffs failed to adequately allege actionable conduct in New Jersey. The court also worried the paucity of specifics prejudiced defendants given the impending trial date. It therefore solicited a proposed Fifth Amended Complaint and set a briefing schedule on leave to amend. After reviewing the proposed amended complaint, considering the supplemental briefing, and hearing further argument, the court denied leave to amend. It concluded the New Jersey RICO claim as fleshed out in the proposed amended complaint was so different from what had been previously alleged that belatedly injecting it into the litigation would be seriously prejudicial to the defendants. It also concluded choice of law principles prohibited application of New Jersey’s RICO law to defendants’ alleged conduct.
*17 1. Demurrer to Fourth Amended Complaint
Given how events unfolded, we first address whether the Fourth Amended Complaint, standing alone, adequately stated a New Jersey RICO claim.
The trial court gave several reasons for concluding the pleading was lacking: Plaintiffs did not adequately allege trade or commerce in New Jersey, or conduct affecting trade or commerce in New Jersey. The allegations of conduct by alleged “enterprises” were vague and conclusory. Plaintiffs identified some, but not all, of the conspiring market makers. The conspiracy allegations were vague and conclusory.
Lack of specificity, alone, was sufficient reason to sustain the demurrers. In New
Jersey, it is “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in or activities of which affect trade or commerce to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(c).) To
be liable, a defendant must have been “employed by or associated with a racketeering
enterprise which engaged in trade or commerce in New Jersey or affected trade or
commerce in New Jersey.” (
State v. Casilla
(2003)
Claims under another state’s substantive law, if raised in a California forum, are
subject to California’s procedures for judicial administration, including its pleading
standards. (See
Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. American Medical Internat.,
Inc.
(1995)
Under California pleading rules, fraud must be pled with particularity.
[7]
(
Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.
(1998)
While the pleading spoke broadly of a scheme in which defendants and market makers colluded to use conversions and other exotic trades to inflate the ostensible supply of Overstock shares and drive down their price—presumably the “actions described above”—the Fourth Amended Complaint did not assign any particular action to any particular act of alleged “fraud in the offering, sale or purchase of securities.” Nor did any portion of the complaint disclose a specific instance of allegedly fraudulent conduct. [8] (See Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th *19 772, 783 [“Even in a case involving numerous oft-repeated misrepresentations, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, set out a representative selection of the alleged misrepresentations sufficient to permit the trial court to ascertain whether the statements were material and otherwise actionable.”].)
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded plaintiffs failed to plead their New Jersey RICO claim with the requisite specificity and properly sustained defendants’ demurrers.
2. Denial of Leave to Amend
In
Blank v. Kirwan
, the Supreme Court stated with respect to an order denying
leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can
be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (
Blank v. Kirwan
(1985)
“When a demurrer is sustained, the court
may
grant leave to amend the pleading
upon any terms as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 472a, subd. (c), italics added.)
Accordingly, trial courts are statutorily imbued with wide discretion in the matter of
amendment. (See
Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc.
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
603, 612 [“ ‘[A] litigant does not have a positive right to amend his pleading after a
of the conduct at issue occurred in New Jersey and/or substantially affected trade or
commerce in New Jersey.” Even though plaintiffs averred defendants “effected
transactions at issue” and engaged in other conduct in New Jersey, plaintiffs did not link
these broad descriptors with any particular predicate acts of fraud in New Jersey.
*20
demurrer thereto has been sustained. “His leave to amend afterward is always of grace,
not of right.” ’ ”];
Whitson v. City of Long Beach
(1962)
Furthermore, countless cases involving motions for leave to amend outside of the
demurrer context—motions that similarly implicate a trial court’s discretion (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, subd. (a))—routinely analyze prejudice. (E.g.,
Duchrow v. Forrest
(2013)
In this case, the trial court was not сonsidering pleadings filed at or near the outset of the litigation, the usual context in which a demurrer is interposed and where prejudice is not an issue. Rather, here, the court was dealing with a context equivalent to a motion *21 for leave to amend, namely a request to file an amended pleading very late in the litigation. Indeed, the court expressed serious concern about prejudice at the time plaintiffs sought leave to file their Fourth Amended Complaint adding their new RICO claim. And on discerning the full magnitude of the claim proffered in the Fifth Amended Complaint, the court concluded it was not just “another theory” as they had represented in connection with their Fourth Amended Complaint. Rather, it was a fundamentally different and highly complex claim that could not fairly be injected into the case only two months before summary judgment motions were due and only six months before the already re-scheduled trial date. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ protestations, it is neither accurate nor fair to say the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint simply fleshed out the general allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint and raised no specter of complexity not already apparent in that latter pleading. While the Fourth Amended Complaint focused on an alleged conspiracy between defendants, Hazan and Arenstein, and other unnamed “traders and market makers,” the Fifth Amended Complaint added allegations about several newly- named market makers. While the Fourth Amended Complaint alleged five criminal enterprises, the proposed Fifth Amended complaint alleged ten. Although the Fourth Amended Complaint and proposed Fifth Amended Complaint both alleged a conspiracy to violate New Jersey’s RICO statute, the Fourth Amended Complaint only conclusorily pleaded each “defendant conspired,” while the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, for the first time, alleged which defendants allegedly conspired with which market makers. And not only did the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint allege various iterations of conspiracies to violate New Jersey’s RICO statute between the defendants and Hazan and Arenstein, it also alleged conspiracies between the newly-named market makers and defendants.
In addition, the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint made manifest the New
Jersey RICO claim was based on “conspiracy and indirect liability.” While secondary
conspiracy liability is a feature of a New Jersey RICO claim (N.J. Stats. 2C:41-2(d);
State
*22
v. Cagno
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
In short, with the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, the trial court saw clearly the road ahead if a New Jersey RICO claim was belatedly added to the litigation and accurately observed that road looked “extremely complex.” The court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file the proposed pleading.
*23 B. California Corporate Securities Law Claim
1. Sections 25400 and 25500
“Corporations Code section 25400, a part of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968
(Corp. Code, § 25000 et seq.), provides that it is unlawful in this state to make false
statements or engage in specified fraudulent transactions which affect the market for a
security when done [for specified purposes].” (
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v.
Superior Court
(1999)
*24
Section 25400, subdivisions (a) through (e), address different species of
manipulative conduct “which were common during the so-called pool operations in the
1920’s.” (
Kamen
,
supra
,
“[T]he more general and fundamental prohibitions” of section 25400 are set forth
in subdivisions (b) and (d). (1 Marsh & Volk,
supra
, § 14.05[2], p. 14-61.) Subdivision
(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of
transactions in any security creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or
raising or depressing the price of such security for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of the security by others.” (§ 25400, subd. (b).) “Subdivision (d) makes it
unlawful . . . for sellers or buyers of stock to make false or misleading statements of
material facts for the purpose of inducing a purchase or sale.” (
Diamond
,
supra
,
In this case, we are concerned with subdivision (b), which makes it unlawful “[t]o effect . . . a series of transactions” that create “actual or apparent active trading” raising or depressing the price of the security, for the “purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.” (§ 25400, subd. (b).) Since “[a]lmost any conceivable *25 series of transactions in a particular security would necessarily create either actual or apparent trading or raise or depress the price of the security to some extent, ” the “crucial question” is “intent.” (1 Marsh & Volk, supra , § 14.05[2][d]; California Amplifier , supra , 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 110–111 [as “Marsh & Volk emphasizes,” liability under section 25400 “extends to everyone whose market trades are affected by the market manipulation”; “ ‘[i]n view of this potentially enormous and virtually unlimited liability,’ ” intention is “ ‘a necessary qualification of the defendant’s liability’ ”].)
Before examining the evidence presented in connection with the summary
judgment motions as to the two brokerage firms and two clearing firms, we discuss two
legal issues that are pivotal to the significance of the evidence. The first is the meaning
of the term “[t]o
effect
” a series of transactions in a security. (§ 25400, subd. (b),
emphasis added.) The second is the distinction between liability as a principal, and aider
and abettor liability. (See
California Amplifier, supra,
2. “Effecting” a Trade Under Section 25400 Is Not Limited to Beneficial Sellers and Buyers
Defendants contend section 25400, subdivision (b), reaches only the beneficial sellers and buyers of manipulated securities and does not reach entities that execute, clear and settle trades for clients. Thus, according to the defendant clearing firms, for example, no section 25400, subdivision (b), claim can lie against them as a matter of law. Rather, any claim under this subdivision would have to be advanced against their former trаder clients, such as Hazan and Arenstein, in whose name the manipulative trades were made and who have been punished by the SEC and major exchanges.
Subdivision (b) could have been drafted to apply only to beneficial sellers and buyers. But it was not. Rather, this subdivision applies to “any person, directly or or selling to himself. Rather than respond to these points, plaintiffs, in reply, acknowledged “the trades were actual trades” and “real,” but argued even “real” trades can be manipulative under subdivision (b) if done for a prohibited purpose. We therefore conclude plaintiffs have abandoned any claim under subdivision (a), and pursue a claim only under section 24500, subdivision (b).
indirectly” who “ effect [ s] , alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions.” (§ 25400, subd (b), italics added.) This is in stark contrast to other provisions of section 25400 that apply to narrower classes of persons. (§ 25400, subd. (a) [subdivision (a)(1) applies to those who “effect” transactions, while subdivision (a)(2) and (a)(3) apply only to those who “enter an order or orders”]; id. , subds. (c), (d) [both applying only to “a broker-dealer or other person selling or offering for sale or purchasing or offering to purchase the security”].)
The verb “ ‘to effect’ means ‘to bring about; produce as a result; cause;
accomplish.’ (Webster’s New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1988) p. 432.)” (
People v.
Brown
(1991)
Section 9 of the SEA, on which section 25400 was based, also uses the
terminology “effect . . . a series of transactions” (15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)), and that
terminology is construed broadly. (
United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commerciale E
D’Investimenti
(S.D.N.Y. 1971)
Moreover, reading section 9 to reach, as appropriate, agents of beneficial sellers and buyers also harmonizes the section with other provisions of the SEA and its regulations, which, like California’s definitional statute, speak of brokers “effecting” transactions by carrying out various agency and back-office functions, including clearing and settlement. (See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) [a broker “means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others”]; id.
§ 78bb(e)(3)(C) [“a person provides brokerage and research services insofar as he . . .
effects securities transactions and performs functions incidental thereto (such as
clearance, settlement, and custody)”]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a2–2(T)(b) (2014) [“For
purposes of this section, a member ‘effects’ a securities transaction when it performs any
function in connection with the processing of that transaction, including, but not limited
to, (1) transmission of an order for execution, (2) execution of the order, (3) clearance
and settlement of the transaction, and (4) arranging for the performance of any such
function.”] ; see also
S.E.C. v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.
(D.D.C. 2012)
We therefore conclude the word “effect” in section 25400, subdivision (b), includes more than the activity of beneficial sellers and buyers, and can include execution, clearing and settlement activities by brokerage and clearing firms.
*28
Kamen
does not hold, contrary to what defendants maintain, that “effecting” a
transaction refers only to beneficial sellers and buyers. Indeed, the case does not even
consider the meaning of the term “effect” in subdivision (b). The complaint in
Kamen
“purport[ed] to state a cause of action under section 25400, subdivision
(d)
.” (
Kamen
,
supra
,
Defendants also point out the authors of Marsh & Volk were heavily involved in
the drafting of the state securities laws, and their treatise states section 25400 generally
reaches only those “engaged in market activity.” (Marsh & Volk,
supra
, § 14.05[4],
p. 14-66.) The treatise then continues, “[s]ubdivision (a), dealing with matched orders,
and subdivision (b), dealing with liability for a series of transactions manipulating the
price of a security, by their very nature require that the defendant be a purchaser or seller,
since the conduct prohibited is assоciated with a market transaction.” (
Ibid.
) We have no
disagreement with Marsh & Volk’s general observation, as one can “engage in market
activity” by executing, clearing and settling trades. However, for all the reasons we have
discussed, we conclude Marsh & Volk’s second statement is unsupported and incorrect.
In fact, the treatise provides no analysis on this point, let alone any discussion of either
the statutory language or the like provisions of Section 9 of the SEA on which
Corporations Code section 24500 was based. (See
Diamond
,
supra
,
3. Primary Versus Aider and Abettor Liability
Having concluded any person who “effect[s] a series of transactions” can include
not only beneficial sellers and buyers of shares, but also brokerage and clearing firms that
execute, clear and settle the trades, we next consider under what circumstances brokerage
and clearing firms can incur liability, given the well-established rule that a private civil
action under sections 25400 and 25500 does not reach aiders and abettors. Rather, only
primary actors are subject to civil liability for damages. (
Kamen
,
supra
, 94 Cal.App.4th
at p. 206, citing
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.
(1994)
As did
Kamen
, we take guidance from
Central Bank
. The Supreme Court in
Central Bank
discussed section 10(b) of the SEA—and specifically its anti-fraud
provision—and concluded: “The absence of . . . aiding and abetting liability does not
mean that secondary actors in securities markets are always free from liability under the
*30
securities Act. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which
a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator . . . , assuming
all
of the requirements for primary liability . . . are met. . . . . In any complex securities
fraud . . . there are likely to be multiple violators . . . .” (
Central Bank
,
supra
, 511 U.S. at
p. 191; see
In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation
(S.D. Tex. 2002)
Thus, section 10(b) liability has been imposed on brokerage and clearing firms
when they have crossed the line from aider and abettor to primary violator. (E.g.,
Fox
Intern. Relations v. Fiserv Securities, Inc.
(E.D. Pa. 2007)
In the
Blech
cases, Bear Stearns, a clearing firm, was accused of market
manipulation under section 10(b) for directing and clearing trades of an introducing firm
client, Blech. On the one hand, the trades were arguably legitimate efforts to reduce
Blech’s debt balance on Bear Stearns’ books; on the other, they were arguably known by
Bear Stearns to be propping up the price of the traded securities. (
Blech II
,
supra
,
961 F.Supp. at pp. 577–578;
In re Blech Securities Litigation
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 17, 2002,
No. 94 CIV.7696 RWS)
In Blech III , Bear Stearns moved for summary judgment. Evidence corroborated the plaintiffs’ allegations of Bear Stearns’ orchestration of the trades and knowledge of the manipulation of the market. Not only did Bear Stearns direct trades, but it decided *32 with Blech who should be on the purchasing side of his sales. ( Blech III , supra , 2002 WL 31356498, at p. *11.) Indeed, the plaintiffs alleged “these demands forced parking and trading between Blech Accounts .” ( Id. at p. *15, italics added.) Bear Stearns contended in turn, its “actions with respect to debit demands were simply consistent with its agreement . . . to serve as . . . clearing broker,” an agreement that, under NYSE Rule 382, allocated back-office functions to Bear Stearns and compliance with rules and regulations to Blech as an introducing broker. ( Blech III , at pp. *5–*6, *15.)
The district court аcknowledged “margin calls by a clearing broker or a failure to
make margin calls, even with suspicion or knowledge of impropriety on the part of the
initiating broker, is an appropriate and essential part of the securities business.” (
Blech
III
,
supra
,
In
In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation
, the district court also discussed clearing
firm liability and allowed a SEA manipulation claim to proceed against two such firms
when their activity extended beyond mere clearing services to providing clients with
access to trading platforms that allowed for late trades and trades without time stamps.
(
In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation
,
supra
,
In contrast, clearing firms were absolved of liability in
Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)
Scone Investments, L.P. v. American Third Market Corp.
(S.D.N.Y., Apr. 28,
1998, No. 97 Civ. 3802 (SAS))
The Second Circuit recently addressed the “normal clearing services” standard in
Levitt v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
(2d Cir. 2013)
Levitt
observed courts have grouped clearing firm activity into two categories:
“First, in cases where a clearing broker was simply providing normal clearing services,
district courts have declined to ‘impose . . . liability on the clearing broker for the
transgressions of the introducing broker.’ [Citations.] The district courts have so held
even if the clearing broker was alleged to have known that the introducing broker was
committing fraud, [citation]; even if the clearing broker was alleged to have been clearing
sham
trades for the introducing broker,
In re Blech,
“In the second, much more limited category of cases, district courts have found
plaintiffs’ allegations to be adequate—and so have permitted claims to proceed—where a
clearing broker is alleged effectively to have shed its role as clearing broker and assumed
direct control of the introducing firm’s operations and its manipulative scheme. . . . .
Thus in
Berwecky v. Bear, Stearns & Co.
,
Applying this dichotomy to the facts before it,
Levitt
concluded Bear Stearns did
not have a duty to disclose Sterling Foster’s fraud because plaintiffs “failed to allege
sufficiently direct involvement.” (
Levitt, supra
,
Thus, the threshold for primary liability on the part of clearing firms is high. They do not incur such liability when they provide “normal clearing services”—and that is so even when a firm knows the trader is committing fraud or knows it is clearing and settling sham trades. Rather, to qualify as a primary violator a clearing firm must “shed its role as clearing broker” and engage in conduct akin to “directing” the client’s manipulative trading, or “deciding with” the client how to engage in the unlawful trading, or intentionally providing a specialized tool for the client to engage in unlawful trading, or “initiating, instigating, and orchestrating” the client’s unlawful scheme,” or having “intimate” “hands-on involvement” and participating in “key decisions” about the “details” of the client’s unlawful trading, or assuming “direct control of” the client’s “operations and its manipulative scheme.”
4. The Summary Judgment Evidence
a. Goldman Brokerage Goldman Brokerage was, itself, a purchaser of reversion conversions, and plaintiff’s expert, J. Marc Allaire, based on his review of Goldman documents, averred *36 Goldman bought reverse conversions from Hazan and Arenstein. Allaire and other experts also opined, based on the pricing of these trades, Goldman Brokerage knew the short sale components of these complex trades would fail and continue to fail for the duration of the options components of the trades—in short, Goldman knew the trades were shams and created a “phony” supply of Overstock shares. Indeed, there is evidence Goldman Brokerage acted as Arenstein’s agent in executing conversion trades with itself, and acknowledged Arenstein could provide the firm a supply of shares it could not obtain “in the pits.” In an e-mail, for example, Goldman acknowledged such conversion trades “create inventory to allow customers to short.” In another email, it acknowledged а general goal of its Hedging Strategies Group was “to create supply and perpetuate selling in stocks with a large amount of short interest.” In sum, there is substantial evidence Goldman Brokerage was, itself, a beneficial purchaser of one species of the exotic trades in which Hazan and Arenstein engaged to circumvent Regulation SHO.
There is no evidence, however, raising a triable issue Goldman Brokerage’s own purchases, or its execution of Hazan’s or Arenstein’s or another clients’ sham trades in Overstock, were made in California. Hazan and Arenstein operated out of New York and New Jersey. Goldman Brokerage operated out of New York, New Jersey and Chicago. Further, plaintiffs did not rebut Goldman Brokerage’s evidence that any conversion trades were consummated on regional exchanges outside of California, such as the *37 Chicago Board Options Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange, or Cincinnati Stock Exchange.
Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted as to Goldman Brokerage. b. Merrill Brokerage
There is a similar shortcoming in the evidence as to Merrill Brokerage. To begin with, there is no evidence Merrill Brokerage, in contrast to Goldman Brokerage, was, itself, a purchaser of reverse conversions in Overstock.
There is evidence Eugene McCambridge, a Merrill broker in Chicago, executed some trades in Overstock shares for Hazan and Arenstein. However, McCambridge could not identify which exchange he used for any given trade. He testified at deposition he would ordinarily route NASDAQ trades through “Arca or P-Coast.” But he was shown and testified specifically about trade tickets showing Overstock trades on the Midwest Stock Exchange in Chicago. The “blotters” (the paperwork showing the trades) also do not identify the exchange used for the trades. Thus, whether McCambridge executed any Overstock trades on the Pacific Exchange is pure speculation, insufficient to raise a triable issue Merrill Brokerage executed trades in Overstock in California.
In addition, there is no evidence the trades McCambridge executed were of the exotic variety designed to avoid Regulation SHO’s delivery requirement. Plaintiffs’ experts purported to identify the alleged manipulative trading and they focused on Goldman Brokerage’s purchases of conversions and on the clearing firms’ activities. They made no reference to the trades McCambridge executed.
Accordingly, summary judgment was also properly granted as to Merrill Brokerage.
*38 c. Goldman Clearing
Goldman Clearing did not have a clearing offiсe in California, and there is no
evidence this clearing firm did anything, in California or otherwise, beyond normal
clearing activity. There is no evidence Goldman Clearing directed, developed, or
instigated—as opposed to acquiesced in—any strategy for repeatedly failing short sales,
shirking delivery obligations, or clearing sham reset transactions. (See
California
Amplifier
,
supra
,
d. Merrill Clearing
Merrill Clearing, unlike Goldman Clearing, had an office in California and from that office provided clearing services to traders in Overstock shares, including Hazan and Arenstein. By February, 2005, Alan Cooper, the head of the office, was having “frequent interactions” with Hazan—approximately five-to-six times a week by telephone and e- mail. Cooper, Hazan, and Merrill Clearing’s compliance department discussed Regulation SHO and, in general, a clearing firm’s responsibility to insure delivery and not to fail trades. At his deposition, Cooper claimed he and the compliance officer were not offering opinions on Regulation SHO, but simply explaining how Merrill Clearing would be implementing it.
In one interaction, in mid-February, Hazan was upset that Merrill Clearing was automatically borrowing shares to insure delivery, when he expected it would not. In an internal e-mail, Cooper, based on a conversation with Hazan, relayed “the trader did not know we were going to be charging [fees to borrow] negatives” and if Merrill Clearing were to buy-in Hazan on the trade, Hazan would likely re-sell shares to “maintain his hedge.” Cooper asked if the buy-ins could be stopped.
What Hazan, and in turn, Cooper, were complaining about was what Merrill termed the “flipping” of all trades for automatic delivery and settlement. This deprived legitimate market maker clients of Regulation SHO’s exemption from the locate requirement, and deprived the clеaring firm of its right under the regulation to delegate delivery obligations to bona fide market maker clients. Hazan was not the only Merrill Clearing client complaining about it. Moreover, Merrill Clearing had had a “do not flip” practice for market maker clients in place prior to the time Hazan and Arenstein became clients, and the complained-about automatic “flipping” started with Merrill’s acquisition of another firm, Sage (for whom Cooper had worked), and its computer system which was not programmed to “hold back” market maker short sales.
About a week later, Hazan sent Cooper an e-mail noting an interaction with Merrill Clearing’s compliance department concerning Regulation SHO, and then posing several questions: Did a clearing firm need to pay to borrow a stock if it’s “being held for less than 10 days” as would be the case with a “flex or short term option hedge?” Could the options market maker exemption exempt trades from Regulation SHO’s close- out requirements if stock did not appear on “the Reg sho list” of threshold securities until after a short sale as a hedge? If Merrill Clearing were long in the stock, could Hazan use that position to offset short sales?
On the afternoon of February 23, Cooper told colleagues, in an email, Hazan was threatening to leave Merrill Clearing for another firm if Merrill could not (without providing further specifics) “accommodate his trading style.” One colleague responded “I would say we can’t.” At his deposition, Cooper could not recall what he had meant by “trading style,” but admittedly knew at the time it involved trading in threshold (hard-to- *40 borrow) stocks, doing “riskless” trades, “delta-neutral” trades, conversions, and reversals. He also admitted having at least a general understanding Hazan could profit from the spread between the pricing of the options components of reverse conversions. And he admitted the reverse conversions the SEC later investigated and for which it imposed sanctions, were the sort of trade Merrill was clearing.
At around the same time—that is, February 2005—Cooper also began working with Arenstein. Cooper spoke to Arenstein about possibly opening an account, and Merrill Clearing’s Managing Director, Curt Richmond, told Arenstein he and Cooper were “speaking to compliance about Reg-SHO.”
In a March 4, 2005 e-mail, Richmond and Merrill Clearing’s President, Thomas Tranfaglia, Jr., discussed how Arenstein wanted to talk to Tranfaglia about Regulation SHO and Merrill Clearing’s related policies. Richmond stated: “After the Hazan incident I informed [Arenstein] that we had no interest in clearing his ‘Reg-SHO fail with FLEX Options Strategy.’ ” Richmond noted Arenstein had taken “some of the other side of Hazan’s closing trades,” but told Tranfaglia “it is your call.” Arenstein particularly wanted to know if Merrill Clearing would charge market makers lending fees on a fail to deliver if there was no violation of Regulation SHO, and whether Merrill Clearing would give its clients a chance to “get out on their own” before Regulation SHO deadlines.
At the end of the month, Cooper relayed to superiors a trading strategy suggested by Hazan—to use a “one day flex” in which Hazan would buy and sell calls in the same number of shares. Cooper asked “[c]ould we fail” on those shares “from the assignment the next day.” The admitted goal was “to reestablish a new short and not borrow it.” Cooper was asked to discuss the matter in person, and the conversation went offline. At his deposition, Cooper claimed he did not believe the goal of such a trade was to evade Regulation SHO, but to address Hazan’s desire to avoid fees related to the supposedly unnecessary, automated borrowing of shares imposed by the computer system Merrill Clearing had inherited from Sage.
The following month, in April 2005, Cooper filled in parts of a spreadsheet listing certain securities Hazan was holding (none of which were Overstock). In the far right *41 column, Cooper marked down checks indicating Hazan “will not pay negative rebate” and had a “desire to fail.”
In mid-May, Cooper oversaw a “Reg SHO test trade” by Hazan. The trade would establish a new 350,000 share short position in a security (one other than Overstock) for which options had been placed before implementation of Regulation SHO, and Merrill Clearing would not process the trade for delivery. At his deposition, Cooper again claimed the purpose of this exotic trade was not to evade Regulation SHO’s delivery requirement, but to move a position from a “faulty” account that required borrowing of shares, to a different account which would allow a bona fide market maker to sell short without borrowing. In an internal e-mail that same day, Cooper said he told Hazan he would be subject to Regulation SHO’s buy in requirement, even though Hazan had earlier hoped for assurances “that the position would not be subject to Reg Sho buy-in in 13 days.”
The compliance department wanted to have further discussions to get more comfortable with the test trade, and wanted to have a procedure set up to deal with “hold[ing] these trades back”—a procedure that it would “need . . . to provide to the SEC.” But the trade was alrеady in motion.
On May 25, 2005, after trade execution, a Managing Director at both Merrill entities and President and Chief Operating Officer of Merrill Clearing, Peter Melz, responded to the compliance department’s concern about the trade saying: “fuck the compliance area—procedures, scmecedures.” At her deposition, Merrill’s compliance officer stated she watched Melz draft the e-mail and it was made as part of an in-office jest.
*42 By mid 2005, Merrill Clearing remedied the computer trading system it had acquired from Sage, and completed implementation of an automated “do not flip” process. This new process ensured trades in negative rebate securities (those, like Overstock, with high borrow fees) would not automatically “flip” to settlement when a market maker was selling short. Thus, Merrill Clearing would no longer inform Merrill Brokerage of the need to acquire shares to settle such short sales. Both firms were aware if the brokerage firm kept on its books the shares of negative rebate securities it otherwise would have provided to comply with Regulation SHO, those shares could be lent out for profit.
Merrill Clearing claims the “do not flip” process was the means by which, as allowed by Regulation SHO, it allocated responsibility for delivery to bona fide market maker clients. Yet, Merrill still had a policy of (1) giving such clients notice of impending 13-day deadlines to close out fail to deliver positions, and (2) actually “buying in” clients who did not comply—a “buy in” being a trade ostensibly conducted to close out a fail to deliver and enable delivery to a waiting buyer.
By summer 2005, discussions within Merrill turned to handling “buy ins.” In late July, Cooper noted Hazan “trades many hard to borrows and will need as much color [that is, information] on potential buy-ins as possible.” On August 29, one of Cooper’s employees, Hugh Skinner, wrote to Cooper that Hazan wanted early notification of buy- ins because late notice “could prevent him from selling into the buy-in.” At his deposition, Cooper stated traders like Hazan wanted estimates of impending buy-ins so they could “sell into it” and, in the case of naked shorts, re-obtain the naked short position and remain risk neutral. This would, Cooper understood, effectively “reset” the Regulation SHO clock and give traders, at least from Merrill’s perspective, a new period of time to complete delivery of shares. As we have discussed, the SEC found this scheme *43 to reset the Regulation SHO clock and avoid delivery to be an egregious violation of the regulation.
It was the San Francisco office that provided the notification function for Hazan and other clients in and around August 2005, but not necessarily for the entire period relevant here. At his deposition, Cooper denied taking an active role in Hazan’s trades or the trades of other Merrill Clearing clients, and viewed his role as largely clerical. He also denied reviewing trades to see if anyone repeatedly used reset transactions to perpetuate the naked short positions.
Despite Cooper’s assertions of passive ignorance, on August 4, 2005, a Merrill Clearing director-level employee, Bill Stein, noticed Cooper’s traders “were knowingly putting on shorts and then basically rolling them every 13 days.” At his deposition, Cooper said he did not recall exactly what this statement referred to, but conceded Stein was referring to “beating the Reg SHO obligation.” Certainly by July of 2006, Cooper understood this regulation-evasion aspect of the trading strategy Hazan and others were pursuing, noting “FLEXs were being questioned” and wrote in an email “[a] few traders have figured out how to use the FLEXs to deal with Reg SHO.”
In December 2005, Merrill Clearing’s chief compliance officer sent a bulletin noting the firm had received regulatory inquiries and scrutiny over “flex trades by two . . . clients in OSTK.”
*44 In an internal January 2006 telephone call, the compliance officer talked about Arenstein’s trading, how he was not acting as a bona fide market maker, and how it was “not okay” to be “recycling” his “short position.” She said: “You know, I—we really—I got to set up a meeting where we have to talk to the business, because these guys, they must be spoken to. Like-and not by you. You know what I’m saying? Like this is not okay. Like you cannot be recycling this short position. I mean, I don’t understand. If he’s got—If he’s got, you know, a buy-in due today, tomorrow, and the next day, right? Then he can’t short anymore in these next few days.”
That same month, the compliance officer followed up with an email to Merrill Clearing executives, telling them “as you know” Arenstein had been involved in trading activity the NASD was questioning as inconsistent with Regulation SHO, and informing them of the flex option recycling scheme and how Merrill’s net fails to deliver in Overstock were not diminishing. She noted if the firm were to drop Hazan and Arenstein, the database of fails “shrinks unbelievably.” There is also evidence, during this time frame, of compliance communications with Hazan and Arenstein during which they insisted they were acting as bona fide market makers, and a telephone call to Arenstein confronting him about recycling of trades and requesting he to do real buy-ins.
Nevertheless, Merrill Clearing continued to clear Hazan’s and Arenstein’s trades for another seven months and did not even begin to wind down its “clearing relationship” with them until August 2006—just before the SEC and New York exchange issued stipulated sanctions orders against the two traders. Even after Hazan was told to leave Merrill Clearing, he continued to increase his short positions there for several months before he was finally terminated.
All told, Merrill cleared Hazan’s and Arenstein’s exotic trades designed to support perpetually naked short positions for more than a year, and as a result failed to deliver Overstock shares for settlement every single day between August 1, 2005 and the end of 2006. The number of failed deliveries quickly rose above a million shares, and at one point reached three million shares.
i.)
Triable Issue Merrill Clearing Was a Primary Violator
As we have discussed, even if there is a triable issue Merrill Clearing knew Hazan
and Arenstein’s trades were designed to evade Regulation SHO and knew it was clearing
sham trades, that is not enough to raise a triable issue of primary liability under
sections 25400 and 25500. Rather, the evidence must be such that Merrill Clearing’s
conduct was arguably akin to “directing” Hazan’s and Arenstein’s trading schemes
(
Levitt
,
supra
, 710 F.3d at pp. 466–467), or to deciding with them how to effect a
manipulative trade (see
Blech III
,
supra
,
While a close question, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to raise a triable
issue Merrill Clearing did more than provide normal clearing services, bearing in mind
the observation of the district court in
Blech III
, that “[i]n this difficult distinction . . .
between aiding and abetting and direct action, the line will be drawn with respect to
summary judgment in favor of protecting the investing public rather than the clearing
broker.” (
Blech III, supra,
There is clearly a triable issue Merrill Clearing had knowledge, indeed abundant knowledge, its clients were rolling shorts and engaging in sham reset transactions to mimic the appearance of genuine trading. There is a triable issue Merrill did not believe, or, at the very least, could not have reasonably believed, Hazan and Arenstein were bona fide market makers engaging in legitimate trading. And there is a triable issue Merrill took an active, direct role in their trading schemes to cause, and to profit from, ongoing failures to deliver shares in short sales of Overstock, as well as other hard-to-borrow securities.
For example, there is a triable issue Cooper and others within Merrill Clearing
purрosefully developed or “contrived” procedures, at the request of Hazan and Arenstein,
by which Merrill Clearing could, and repeatedly did, effect their one-day FLEX options
“to reestablish a new short and not borrow it.” Arguably, Hazan effectively asked Merrill
Clearing to review and approve the exotic “test trade” he concocted to flagrantly violate
the securities laws. Not only did Merrill give its stamp of approval, it continued to clear
Hazan’s unlawful trades even after compliance personnel made it clear this was “not ok.”
Indeed, Merrill did so for another seven months and only stopped clearing those trades on
the eve of the SEC sanction ruling. Such contriving behavior is akin to that found
actionable in
In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation
,
supra
,
Even if Merrill’s do-not-flip procedures were initially designed as a legitimate means to correct the Sage computer problem, they arguably became deliberately employed as tools to implement Hazan’s and Arenstein’s well-understood strategy of perpetuating naked short positions. Similarly, even if buy-in notifications are usually normal clearing activities, it is arguable Cooper went beyond giving routine notice and knowingly coached Hazan and Arenstein on handling buy-in obligations for the very purpose of selling into them and re-obtaining naked short positions. Moreover, the arguable buy-in coaching of these traders cannot be viewed in isolation from the evidence showing Merrill Clearing’s involvement with the development, for these same abusive traders, of the process to “roll shorts.”
Cooper’s techniques were, indeed, known, and ratified, within Merrill Clearing. Cooper’s clients, said one colleague, “were knowingly putting on shorts and then basically rolling them every 13 days.” In 2005, Tanfaglia was given the “call” on whether to add Arenstein as a client given his “FLEX Options Strategy” and the “Hazan incident”—and Arenstein became a client. In early 2006, a Merrill Clearing compliance *47 officer was aware of Arenstein “recycling” his “short position” and called for action, but the abusive trading practices continued.
In sum, while close, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as it must be on review from summary judgment, it suffices to raise a triable issue Merrill Clearing, through its San Francisco office, did more than provide normal clearing services, and did more than knowingly clear its clients’ manipulative trades and sham reset transactions. There is enough to commit to a jury the difficult “distinction between aiding and abetting and direct action.” ( Blech III, supra, supra, 2002 WL 31356498, at p. *15.)
ii.) There Is a Triable Issue Merrill Clearing Acted to Induce Trading in a Manipulated Stock
It is not enough for there to be a triable issue Merrill Clearing crossed the line from aider and abettor to primary violator in a scheme to evade Regulation SHO for the benefit of its clients. Rather, to impose liability under section 24500, subdivision (b), there must be evidence raising a triable issue Merrill participated in Hazan and Arenstein’s manipulative trading scheme for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of shares of Overstock by someone else.
Plaintiffs’ principal evidence that Merrill Clearing had the requisite purpose of inducing market activity in Overstock was not the direct statements by defendants recounted above. Rather, they relied on expert opinions. That is, their experts drew inferences about the clearing firm’s purpose from its knowing participation in Hazan’s and Arenstein’s trading schemes and their opinion Merrill benefited financially when the stock price declined. Since the firm benefitted from price declines, and since market activity is necessary to generate a decline, the experts opined Merrill must have intended to induce further market activity.
Plaintiffs’ experts declared the recycling of naked short positions created downward pressure on Overstock’s price, and plaintiffs’ expert Conner, in particular, testified the clearing firm benefited from price declines, which would spur further short selling and increase transaction fees. Also, when the clearing firm had a fail to deliver *48 position, it might have to pay a “mark” to the party not receiving its shares if the share price rose. If the share price declined, the clearing firm got a “mark.” The clearing firm thus did not profit directly from price declines, but rather held the mark money in a reserve account in case the share price rose. Meanwhile, however, the firm and its client earned interest on the money. Conner, thus, opined Merrill Clearing had a strong financial incentive to see this play out.
While the evidence Merrill Clearing had the requisite purpose to induce market
activity in Overstock stock is attenuated, even “weak” evidence can permit an inference
of unlawful intent or purpose, as intent and purpose are rarely established with direct
evidence and are typically questions for the trier of fact. (See
Page v. MiraCosta
Community College Dist
. (2009)
Here, plaintiffs presented evidence of opportunity and motive, which, when taken
with all the other evidence of Merrill’s knowing conduct, was at least for now sufficient
*49
to survive summary judgment. (See
Bains v. Moores
(2009)
Merrill Clearing claims, of course, it was the one being deceived by the likes of Hazan and Arenstein, and believed these clients were engaged in legitimate options market making activity and therefore the firm could, under Regulation SHO, delegate its delivery obligations to them. (17 C.F.R. 242.203(b)(3)(vi) (2014).) However, a clearing firm can only “reasonably” delegate its delivery obligations. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiffs’ experts opined Hazan, Arenstein, and like traders were not plausibly acting as bona fide market makers and the voluminous, ongoing fails to deliver in Overstock were not due to inadvertence, but were intentional. Similarly, the SEC and other sanctioning bodies *50 easily concluded Hazan and Arenstein were not engaged in bona fide market making. Moreover, the evidence supports an inference Merrill Clearing was sufficiently aware of the supposed market makers’ strategies to avoid Regulation SHO (rolling short, etc.) such that any delegation of delivery obligations under that regulation would be unreasonable.
Merrill Clearing also views the evidence as showing no more than a desire to
make additional fees and commissions, citing cases holding that is not enough to incur
liability under the securities laws. (E.g.,
Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Money Market 1
Institutional Inv. Dealer
(N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 2011, No. C 09-03529 JSW) 2011 WL
1152568 *1, *8 [“The desire to earn commissions or fees is a common motive to all for
profit enterprises, and that motive—
without more
—is insufficient to give rise to a strong
inference of scienter.”], italics added;
Pope Investments II LLC v. Deheng Law Firm
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 21, 2011, No. 10 Civ. 6608 (LLS))
iii.) There Is a Triable Issue Actionable Conduct Occurred “In This State”
There must also be a triable issue the manipulative conduct engaged in for the
purpose of inducing trading activity occurred “in this state.” (§ 25400;
Diamond
,
supra
,
As we have recited in detail, Cooper, who was in Merrill Clearing’s San Francisco office, figures prominently in the manipulative trading schemes at issue. That other Merrill Clearing officers and employees, who interacted with Cooper and the malfeasant traders, were located in Merrill offices outside California, or that portions of the clearing *51 and settlement processes may have occurred on computers elsewhere, does not mean the clear connection with California can be ignored. (See Diamond , supra , 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1051–1052 & fn. 14 [“ ‘in this state’ ” does not “operate to confine liability for violation of section 25400 to intrastate transactions”].)
Further, plaintiffs’ expert, Conner, based on Merrill Clearing records, declared
part of the clearing process for numerous of the manipulative trades involved providing
trade data to Pacific Clearing Corporation, a regional clearing center located in California
and affiliated with the Pacific Stock Exchange.
[24]
The trial court ruled this expert
testimony lacked foundation, and sustained an objection to it. This was error. Conner’s
testimony was based on his own established expertise and on confirmatory conversations
with another expert with experience (and also personal knowledge, having worked at
Goldman Clearing, in particular). Thus, there was adequate foundation for Conner’s
declaration testimony, and it is for the trier of fact to weigh the credibility of his opinion
and any countervailing opinion or evidence (of which there is currently none).
[25]
(See
Howard Entertainment, Inc. v. Kudrow
(2012)
We reject Merrill’s assertion section 25008 controls when actionable conduct
occurs “in” California. Section 25008 defines when “[a]n offer or sale of a security is
made in this state” and when “[a]n offer to buy or a purchase of a security is made in this
state.” (§ 25008, subd. (a).) It doe not address where a series of transactions are
“effected.” (See § 25400, subd. (b).) Moreover, the phrases “offer or sale” and “offer to
buy or purchase” pertain most clearly to the language of section 25400, subdivisions (c)
and (e), which prohibit the inducement of certain sale and purchase activity. (See
*53
Diamond
,
supra
,
iv.) There Is a Triable Issue As to Causation and Damages Section 25500, establishing a private right of action for violations of section 25400, permits liability only when the plaintiff buys or sells a security “at a price which was affected by such act or transaction” and sustains “damages.” (§ 25500.) “Such damages shall be the difference between the price at which [the plaintiff] purchased or sold securities and the market value which such securities would [otherwise] have had . . . .” ( Ibid. )
Plaintiffs’ damages expert, Shapiro, discussed two theories of causation and damages: a quantity theory and a signaling theory. Put simply, the quantity theory states Overstock’s price declined because naked short sales affected the supply of Overstock shares; the signaling theory states Overstock’s price declined because naked short sales falsely signaled to the market Overstock was in a worse position than it really was.
Under the quantity—or supply and demand—theory, Shapiro concluded “all fails to deliver cause harm” and “even if it is determined that some but not all of the fails . . . are to be included in this case, I could readily calculate the damages to plaintiffs.”
Merrill Clearing presented no expert testimony rebutting Shapiro’s. Instead, Merrill contends his quantity theory is unsubstantiated conjecture, based solely on parroted allegations from plaintiffs’ complaint and without citation to authority. However, Shapiro never quoted plaintiffs’ complaint and cited two academic *54 publications, statements of witnesses in this case, and statements of government officials in support of his expert opinion that naked short sales create a false impression of increased supply without concomitantly changing demand, therefore lowering price. Shapiro also described the process he would use to calculate damages flowing from the appearance of increased supply from particular fails to deliver. [28]
This is not a case, then, where an expert failed to wrestle with other experts’
opinions or ignored inconvenient facts. (See
Nardizzi v. Harbor Chrysler Plymouth
Sales, Inc.
(2006)
Especially given the lack of admissible expert testimony rebutting Shapiro’s methods and conclusions, the trial court’s decision to admit his declaration as to the quantity theory, over defendants’ foundational objections, was proper. (See Imonex Services, Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH (Fed. Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1374, 1381 [“Imonex did not present any competent testimony of its own specifically” *55 addressing the reliability of expert testimony; “[t]herefore, this court detects no abuse of discretion in the district court’s admission of” it].)
Since we conclude Shapiro’s declaration as to the quantity effects theory is sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the matter of causation and damages, we need not determine whether his signaling effects theory, alone, would be adequate to do so. At a minimum, the trial court did not err in allowing his testimony on signaling effects as corroboration of his quantity effects theory.
Merrill contends Shapiro, in his analysis of signaling effects, improperly relied on a so-called “Granger Analysis,” which some academics, asserts Merrill, believe shows correlation but not directional causation. Also, Merrill complains that in his signaling effects analysis, Shapiro—though he allocated 75.3 percent of defendants’ fails to Merrill Clearing and 24.6 percent to Goldman Clearing—assumed both firm’s fails to deliver were all abnormal and manipulative and grouped them, to measure signal strength, in one large clump, as combining the fails would amplify these effects.
There is nothing untoward, given the facts before us, about Shapiro employing a Granger Analysis to corroborate his independent conclusion that fails to deliver were “inject[ing] false information into the market” and causing the observed price decline in Overstock, based upon his review of market conditions, comparable companies, and events. (See Pickett v. IBP, Inc. (M.D. Ala., Apr. 10, 2003, No. Civ. 96-A-1103-N) 2003 WL 24275809, *1, *4, fn. 3 [“The Granger causality test should not be used in isolation to determine causation. When used with other tests and models, however, the Granger test is an appropriate vehicle from which to base an opinion.”].)
Even if Shapiro’s signaling effects analysis was weakened because it depended on measuring the aggregated “signal” from all fails to deliver, without accounting for whether they were manipulative, tied to California, or associated with any particular clearing firm, portions of the signaling effects model still offered corroboration for the conclusions of the quantity effects analysis. For examplе, Shapiro’s event study demonstrated irregular forces (unrelated to Overstock’s performance and the performance of the larger market) were aggravating the decline on Overstock’s price.
Accounting for causation and damages in a case so complex and fluid is no easy
task, and Shapiro’s declaration suitably acknowledged and accommodated for this, at
least for purposes of defeating summary judgment. (See
CILP Associates, L.P. v.
PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP
(2d Cir. 2013)
Thus, while not a particularized showing by any means, plaintiffs provided enough
evidence of causation and damages to raise a triable issue. (See
CILP Associates
,
supra
,
e. Preemption Merrill Clearing also raises the specter of preemption and exclusive federal jurisdiction. It maintains California cannot impose liability for conduct that otherwise complies with Regulation SHO and asserts federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Regulation SHO claims.
Merrill would be correct if plaintiffs simply alleged violations of Regulation SHO.
Section 27 of the SEA provides: “The district courts of the United States and the United
States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
*57
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title [citation] or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this title [citation] or the rules and regulations thereunder. . . .”
(15 U.S.C. § 78aa, subd. (a); see
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein
(1996)
But section 28 of the SEA provides: “ ‘The rights and remedies provided by this
chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law
or in equity . . . Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer
performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does
not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder. . . .’ ” (
Lippitt
,
supra
,
“On its face, § 28 preserves both common law and statutory authority over
securities matters and thus reflects Congressional recognition of state competence in the
securities field.” (
Lippitt
,
supra
,
In
Lippitt
, defendants sought removal of plaintiff’s California Unfair Competition
Law claim, asserting it was a thinly-veiled attempt to enforce New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) rules issued under the SEA. (
Lippitt
,
supra
,
*59 Although plaintiffs broadly discuss Regulation SHO, their claim under sections 25400 and 25500 remains a state-law claim. [31] To prove market manipulation under section 25400, there are a plethora of requirements, none of which is a predicate violation of Regulation SHO or any other federal securities statute or rule. State laws against purposeful market manipulation in no way conflict with the SEA regime, including implementation of Regulation SHO.
IV. D ISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as to Goldman, Sachs & Co., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., and Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.. As to Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp., the judgment is reversed as to plaintiffs’ California securities law claim under sections 25400 and 25500, subdivision (b), and is affirmed in all other respects.
The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. *60 _________________________ Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Margulies, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Dondero, J.
A135682, Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co. *61 Trial Judge: The Honorable John E. Munter Trial Court: San Francisco County and City Superior Court Theodore A. Griffinger, Jr., Ellen A. Cirangle and Jonathan E. Sommer and Lubin Olson Niewiadomski LLP and Myron Moskovitz for Plaintiffs Overstock.com, Inc. et al. Joseph Edward Floren and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP for Defendants Goldman Sachs & Co. et al.
Matthew David Powers, Andrew J. Frackman and Abby F. Rudzin and O’Melveny & Myers LLP for Defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. et al.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part III(A), III(B)(4)(d)(ii)–(iv) and III(B)(4)(e).
[1] All further statutory references are to the California Corporations Code unless otherwise indicated.
[2] Plaintiffs have not pursued their Business and Profession Code claims on appeal. Accordingly, we do not mention them further.
[3] “Introducing” brokerage firms may, on their own, open accounts, provide investment advice, and take customer orders, but they hire clearing firms “to provide processing and administrative services in connection with securities transactions ordered by introducing firms for the account of their customers.” (Minnerop, supra , 58 Bus. Law. at p. 918.) These, typically smaller, brokerage firms “uniformly retain all customer contact functions . . . and frequently execute their customers’ and their own orders themselves . . . , while out-sourcing” the components of the trades. ( Id. at p. 919.)
[4]
“The term ‘market maker’ ” under Regulation SHO “means any specialist
permitted to act as a dealer, any dealer acting in the capacity of block positioner, and any
dealer who, with respect to a security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in an
inter-dealer communications system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell such
security for his own account on a regular or continuous basis.” (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(38);
17 C.F.R. 242.203(c)(1) (2014).)
“Bona-fide market making does not include activity that is related to speculative
selling strategies or investment purposes of the broker-dealer and is disproportionate to
the usual market making patterns or practices of the broker-dealer in that security. In
addition, where a market maker posts continually at or near the best offer, but does not
also pоst at or near the best bid, the market maker’s activities would not generally qualify
as bona-fide market making for purposes of the exception. Further, bona-fide market
making does not include transactions whereby a market maker enters into an arrangement
with another broker-dealer or customer in an attempt to use the market maker’s exception
for the purpose of avoiding compliance with Rule 203(b)(1) [Regulation SHO] by the
other broker-dealer or customer.” (Short Sales, S.E.C. Release No. 34-50103, available
at
[5]
While “SEC no-action letters constitute neither agency rule-making nor
adjudication and thus are entitled to no deference beyond whatever persuasive value they
might have” (
Gryl ex rel. Shire Pharmaceuticals Group PLC v. Shire Pharmaceuticals
Group PLC
(2d Cir. 2002)
[6]
The standard of review on appeal from a dismissal following the sustaining of a
demurrer without leave to amend is well established: “A demurrer tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint, and the granting of leave to amend involves the trial court’s
discretion. Therefore, an appellate court employs two separate standards of review on
appeal.” (
Roman v. County of Los Angeles
(2000)
[7]
The same is true in New Jersey. (
State, Dept. of Treasury, Div. of Inv. ex rel.
McCormac v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc.
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)
[8] Moreover, because the allegations of securities fraud were so vague, it was impossible for the trial court to make heads or tails of plaintiffs’ statement that “aspects
[9] We therefore need not, and do not, reach defendants’ additional challenges to the New Jersey RICO claim.
[10]
The standard of review of a summary judgment is also well established.
(
Global Hawk Insurance Company v. Le
(2014)
[11] Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleged violations of subdivisions (a) and (b). In their opening brief on appeal, plaintiffs, without providing a detailed analysis, continued to suggest defendants might face liability for violating subdivision (a)(1)’s prohibition against “effect[ing] any transaction in a security which involves no change in the beneficial ownership thereof.” Defendants, citing various SEC regulations and cases, responded there was no evidence beneficial ownership was not changing hands in the trades at issue, and certainly no evidence of trades in which the same trader was buying
[12] Section 9 provides in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national securities exchange—[¶] . . . [¶] (2) To effect, alone or with 1 or more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered on a national securities exchange, any security not so registered, or in connection with any security-based swap or security-based swap agreement with respect to such security creating actual or apparent active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.” (15 U.S.C. § 78i(a), italics added.)
[13]
Regarding this particular rule, the SEC stated it “uses the term ‘effect’ in the
broad sense which the Commission believes that term has in Section 11(a)
and other
parts
of the Act.” (Securities Transactions by Members of National Securities
Exchanges, SEC Rel. No. 14563 (Mar. 14, 1978), available at
[14] Section 25403, for example, provides: “Any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of any provision of this division or any rule or order there under shall be deemed to be in violation of that provision, rule, or order to the same extent as the person to whom the assistance was provided.” (§ 25403, subd. (b).)
[15]
Aider and abettor liability is similarly limited under various federal securities
laws. (
Central Bank
,
supra
,
[16]
As defendants point out, there are substantive differences between
section 25400 and section 10(b) of the SEA—for instance, the focus in section 25400,
subdivision (b), is on “effecting transactions” in manipulated securities, whereas
section 10(b) broadly prohibits any person from the knowing use of deceptive practices in
“connection with” the purchase or sale of a security. (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).) However, that
the conduct prohibited by section 10(b) may be broader, does not suggest the critical
distinction between primary participants and aiders and abettors under that section is not
helpful in defining these roles under California law. (Cf.
Kamen
,
supra
, 94 Cal.App.4th
at p. 206, citing
Central Bank, supra,
[17]
An earlier decision,
In re Blech Securities Litigation
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)
[18] “Bear Stearns supplied Blech with lists of accounts having unpaid trades so that Blech would know which accounts needed to sell to the . . . controlled accounts, and Bear Stearns and Blech directly discussed rebooking trades and switching trades around so that the Blech Trusts ended up buying stock from some accounts in which there were debits for unpaid trades. Shulman [of Bear Stearns] stated: ‘If we handle the liquidations and we don’t sell to him but we sell to the rest of the street, we have a concern that the outside world may perceive that his world is falling apart and the other market makers may pull their bids or significantly lower their bids.’ ” ( Blech III , supra , 2002 WL 31356498, at p. *11.)
[19] Although plaintiffs maintained one seller of conversions, Group One, had a California address, the company’s CEO swore in a 2004 SEC filing the firm, while a California entity, is headquartered in Chicago. There is no evidence Group One engaged in trading with Goldman Brokerage from any office in California as opposed to from its Illinois headquarters. The California address for Group One in some of Merrill Clearing’s trading records does not suffice to establish the location of trades or other interactions with Goldman Brokerage. Plaintiffs cited no deposition testimony or other evidence regarding the location of Group One or any trading history it had with Goldman Brokerage, in particular. Indeed, while plaintiffs’ expert stated Merrill Clearing’s “blue sheets show that Group One was located in San Francisco in 2005–2006,” the expert noticeably refrained from stating Group One conducted manipulative conversion trades with Goldman Brokerage in California.
[20] While plaintiffs’ expert Allaire links the potentially California-based Pacific Exchange with the clearing firms and vаrious sham reset trades, no linkage is made to Goldman Brokerage. The omission is striking. It is not enough, as Allaire states, that Goldman Brokerage purchased conversions whose components were cleared by, for instance, Merrill Clearing, in a manner that links up with California. The question is what did Goldman Brokerage do in California. There is no evidence Goldman Brokerage did anything actionable in California.
[21] Under the version of Regulation SHO in effect between 2005 and 2007, naked positions put on before a security became a threshold security were “grandfathered” and not subject to the regulation’s ordinary delivery requirement. (See former 17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b)(3)(i)–(ii) [effective to August 28, 2005].) None of the parties have discussed whether any component of this “test” trade was or was not grandfathered under the then-effective regulation.
[22] While Merrill claims the sanction orders found Hazan and Arenstein deceived their clearing firms and thus exonerated the firms, that is not a fair reading of the orders. The SEC order against Hazan, for example, describes how, under Regulation SHO, “a clearing firm is permitted reasonably to allocate a fail-to-deliver position to a broker or dealer whose short sale resulted in the position” and states Hazan’s clearing firm “notified” him on numerous occasions it had “allocated” to him the close-out obligation. The order goes on to point out the prime brokerage firms “created the demand for the reverse conversion” trades Hazan was making because by purchasing those conversions they could “create inventory.” It further discusses how Hazan’s “clearing firm,” based on Hazan’s “purported ‘purchase’ of shares,” would “reset” his “Reg SHO close out obligation to day one” thus giving him “another thirteen settlement days in which to close out the short position.” The SEC concluded this strategy was a patent violation of the regulation—and there is no exoneration of the clearing firms.
[23] The trial court overruled defendants’ objections to the pertinent portions of Conner’s declaration, and defendants have not challenged these evidentiary rulings on appeal.
[24] Pacific Clearing Corp. generates data for the Pacific Exchange and the National Settlement and Clearing Corp. on stocks sold or bought on the exchanges. The clearing activity by Pacific Clearing Corp. does not take the place of the clearing functions performed by clearing firms like Merrill Clearing. Rather, clearing firms, like Merrill, must send trade data to Pacific Clearing Corp. for trades executed on the Pacific Exchange as part of the process of clearing trades.
[25]
That a jury might be precluded from learning of any hearsay statement by
Conner’s confirming source (see
Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc.
(1992)
[26]
Accordingly, the “location” of the Pacific Stock Exchange, itself, while a topic
of great debate amongst the parties is not material. And even if it was, we would readily
conclude it was located in California during all relevant periods. Despite its name change
in 2006, the exchange was undisputedly registered with the SEC as a national exchange
in
San Francisco, California. (See Self-Regulatory Organizations et al., Notice of filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change and Amends. No. 1 & 2, etc.,
Release No. 53615 (April 7, 2006), available at
[27]
While plaintiffs assert defendants never raised causation and damages in their
notice of motion for summary judgment, defendants raised these issues on page 42 of
their combined opening memorandum in the trial court. “An omission in the notice may
be overlooked if the supporting papers make clear the grounds for the relief sought.”
(
Luri v. Greenwald
(2003)
[28]
Thus, Shapiro provided evidence the naked short positions perpetuated and re-
established by the various reset transactions were manipulative, causing external,
“artificial” pressure on the price of Overstock. (See
GFL
,
supra
, 272 F.3d at pp. 207–
208.) Indeed, it was essential to the reset trades that “a manipulator act[] as both the
buyer and seller in order to give the false appearance of actual trades without assuming
any actual risk.” (
Cohen
,
supra
,
[29] Whether a fail to deliver actually “creates” a phantom share or merely gives the appearance of extra supply—an issue Merrill raises—is not relevant to Shapiro’s analysis, as the supply and demand model is based on appearances. Shapiro, in turn, cited witness testimony and government sources, such as the SEC, as supporting his conclusion naked short sales create the appearance of additional supply.
[30]
Key to
Lippitt
was the lack of any dispositive federal question. (
Lippitt
,
supra
[31]
We note that the instant case was for some time consolidated with
Avenius v.
Banc of America Securities
(S.F. Super. Ct. case No. 06-453422), which also concerns
manipulative naked short selling. The defendants in
Avenius
, represented by some of the
same lawyers as defendants here, sought removal to the federal district court. The
plaintiff, represented by some of the same lawyers as plaintiffs here, opposed and sought
remand. Citing
Lippitt
, the district court remanded the case, concluding the bank’s
“intent with respect to delivery [of stock] is central to the proof of Plaintiffs’ claims” and
as such, “the duty or liability is not created by federal law [namely, Regulation SHO];
rather it is created by state statute.” A “substantial disputed question of federal law [is
not a] necessary element of the Section 25400 claim.” (
Avenius v. Banc of America
Securities LLC
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 30, 2006, No. C06-04458 MJJ)
[32] Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice filed June 17, 2013, is hereby denied.
