68 Ind. 410 | Ind. | 1879
In this action the appellees sued the appellants, as the heirs at - law of one Allen T. Overly, deceased, in his original complaint, to foreclose a certain mortgage alleged to have been executed by said Allen T. Overly, in his lifetime, to the appellee’s intestate, Charles L. Moore, in his lifetime, on certain real estate in Fountain county, Indiana, and to collect the debt secured by said mortgage. To this original complaint the appellants’ demurrer was sustained by the court. Pending the consideration of said demurrer, the appellee filed a second paragraph to his complaint, in which he set up and sought to enforce a vendor’s lien on the same real estate for the collection of the same debt. The appellants’ demurrer to this secónd*paragraph of complaint was overruled by the court, and to this ruling they excepted; and they then answered in four paragraphs, of which the first was a general denial, and each of the other paragraphs -was a special defence. To the special paragraphs of answer, the appellee replied by a general denial.
The issues joined were tried by the court, and a finding was made for the appellee for the balance due on said debt, and that the payment thereof was secured by a vendor’s lien on said real estate, and judgment was rendered accordingly.
The only error assigned by the appellants in this court is the decision of the circuit court in overruling their demurrer to the second paragraph of the appellee’s complaint.
In this second paragraph of the complaint, which is the only complaint in the record, in so far as any question before this court is concerned, and will be so spoken of in our consideration of this case, the appellee alleged, in substance, that on the 25th day of November, 1865, his
To this complaint, the appellants demurred upon two grounds of objection :
1. That it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them ; and,
2. That there was a defect of parties defendants, in this, that the heirs at law of said Charles L. Moore, deceased, were necessary parties defendants, and in this, that the administrator of the estate of said Allen T. Overly, deceased, was a necessary party defendant.
It seems to us that the first of these causes of demurrer was well assigned, for the complaint did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. It was alleged in the complaint, that the notes in suit were given by the decedent, Allen T. Overly, for the unpaid balance of the purchase-money of a certain described tract of land, in Fountain county. From the fact alleged in the complaint, that the appellee’s intestate, Charles L. Moore, at the time of the sale of said real estate, attempted to convey the same by deed to the purchaser, Allen T, Overly, it
In so far as the appellee’s complaint seeks to reform the deed alleged to have been executed by the said Charles L. Moore and Elizabeth E., his wife, to said Allen T. Overly, the complaint is defective, on the demurrer for the want of facts, in this, that a copy” of such deed was not set out in nor filed with such complaint. There is a recital in the complaint, to the effect that a copy of said deed urns there-, with filed ; but the record does not contain any such copy, and therefore we must conclude that it was not filed.
It seems to us, that, under the averment of the appellee’s complaint, said Allen T. Overly left no personal estate to be administered, the administrator of said Overly’s estate-was not a necessary party defendant in this action. Ordinarily, the creditor of a decedent can not collect an unsecured debt from' the decedent’s estate, except by and through an administration of such estate. Leonard v. Blair, 59 Ind. 510. A vendor’s lien can not be enforced, as a rule, unless it is alleged and shown by the evidence that the vendee or debtor has no other property subject to execution, except the property against which the lien is asserted and sought to be enforced. McCauley v. Holtz, 62 Ind. 205, and authorities cited. If the decedent, Allen T. Overly, had been possessed of other property, subject to execution, at the time of his death, then it might have been claimed very properly, we think, that the administrator of his estate was a necessary party defendant to this action.
Eor the reason above given, we are of the opinion that the appellants’ demurrer to the second paragraph of appellee’s complaint ought to have been sustained.