284 P. 614 | Kan. | 1930
The opinion of the court was delivered by
In this action judgment was obtained by J. L. Overlander against Jacob Alpheus Overlander for the sum of $505.24. Charles L. Overlander filed a petition asking that he be allowed to interplead in the action and be subrogated to said judgment because of the following facts:
After this fund was impounded with the clerk of the court the Federal Trust Company, upon a proper adjudication, was permitted to draw down the sum of $3,689.30 upon a lien established by it. Subsequently, and on October 21,1924, a motion was made by Jacob A. Overlander (who is the defendant in the present case) to permit him to draw from said fund the sum of $596.14 for the purpose of reimbursing the said Jacob A. Overlander for money paid out by him for taxes on the interest in the land which was owned by Jesse L. Overlander. These withdrawals from the fund originally impounded with the clerk reduced the same so that there was only approximately $1,000 left in the fund to be applied upon the judgment which Charles L. Overlander had obtained against Jesse L. Overlander in action No. 5898.
Charles L. Overlander came into this action and sought to inter-plead on the theory, evidently, that the judgment of Jesse L. Over-lander against the defendant Jacob A. Overlander was an asset which, if he could subject it to payment of his judgment against Jesse L. Overlander, would thereby partially reimburse him on said judgment. He further set out in his petition that at the time this
The interpleader set up that when Jacob A. Overlander obtained the order of the court permitting him to draw down out of the share of the funds impounded with the clerk, the amount of the taxes previously advanced by the defendant Jacob A. Overlander, that this destroyed the counterclaim which defendant had against plaintiff in the present case and enabled the plaintiff to obtain the judgment against the defendant. All of which sets forth a rather hazy, involved and complicated cause for interplea, if any. It sets forth a theory, but whether or not it passes from the stage of a mere theory this court at this time will not undertake to decide.
The right to interplead, if any, is conclusively shown to be barred by the record which was made upon the hearing of the petition for leave to interplead. At that time there were introduced in evidence the files in the partition suit, and these files contained, among other things, a copy of the order which was made on June 27, 1924. The interpleader alleged in his petition to interplead, among other things, that the defendant in this case, Jacob A. Overlander, was allowed to draw down the amount of the taxes out of the funds impounded with the clerk of the court “without notice to your petitioner and without his consent.” In the journal entry of June 27, 1924, in the partition action which ordered the payment to Jacob A. Overlander of the funds therein specified to reimburse said Jacob A. Overlander for taxes paid by him (for which plaintiff in this action, J esse L. Overlander, was liable), it appears that all parties to said action appeared by their respective attorneys. The interpleader herein (Charles L. Overlander) appeared by his attorney, Jacob A. Overlander, who is the defendant in this action and who now comes here as attorney for the interpleader. This same attorney, Jacob A. Overlander, appeared as shown by the journal entry of June 27, 1924, in his own behalf and as attorney for Charles L. Overlander, the interpleader herein, and yet he now comes into court as attorney for the interpleader and attempts to set up as one of the grounds why the interpleader should be permitted to come into this action, the lack of notice and consent on the part of the interpleader.
The attorney for interpleader wants his client to have permission to interplead and be subrogated to a judgment against said attorney. This attorney pleads lack of knowledge on the part of his client of certain acts of the attorney done by him in behalf of said inter-pleader. What land of legal juggling is this? It appears that the attorney, Jacob A. Overlander, in filing this petition for leave to interplead, was simply trifling with the court. His conduct appears to us to be most reprehensible. It smacks of bad faith. An attorney is an officer of the court and as such should at all times deal fairly and honorably with the court and should conduct himself, both with court and client, in a manner which displays the utmost good faith.
On the state of the record we hold that the interpleader was Bound by the acts of his attorney, and the decision of the lower court denying the right to interplead is therefore affirmed.