{¶ 2} After Relators filed their Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Motion. Relators then filed a Brief in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. On November 21, 2007, we issued a per curiam Decision and Entry overruling the Board's motion to dismiss, and the matter is now before us on the Briefs of Relators and the Board, and the Reply Brief of Relators.
{¶ 3} The parties filed stipulations of fact on February 26, 2008, stating in relevant part, "The annexation petition satisfied all other statutory requirements for an expedited annexation by unanimous consent as provided in Sections
{¶ 4} Relators assert one "argument" as follows:
{¶ 5} "RESPONDENTS HAD A CLEAR LEGAL DUTY UNDER OHIO REVISED *3
CODE SECTIONS
{¶ 6} As we previously noted in overruling the Board's motion to dismiss, "It is well-established that a writ of mandamus will issue if the party seeking the writ demonstrates that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, that there is a clear legal right to the requested relief, and that there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." (citations omitted).State ex rel. Overholser Builders, LLC, et al v. Board of Cty. Comms. ofClark County, Clark App. No. 2007 CA 36,
{¶ 7} By way of background, in their motion to dismiss, the Board argued, "the Ohio Legislature intended not to permit mandamus actions in connection with proceedings under R.C.
{¶ 8} Since we found that the third element of the test for a writ of mandamus has been met, we must next determine whether or not the Board has a clear legal duty to act, and whether Relators have a clear legal right.
{¶ 9} "As revealed by the statutes enacted by the General Assembly that are currently in force, it is the policy of the state of Ohio to encourage annexation by municipalities of adjacent territory."Middletown v. McGee (1988),
{¶ 10} "Since 2001, R.C. Chapter
{¶ 11} R.C.
{¶ 12} R.C.
{¶ 14} Relators contend, "Not only does R.C.
{¶ 15} Relators point out that R.C.
{¶ 16} Instead, R.C.
{¶ 17} R.C.
{¶ 18} * * * *7
{¶ 19} "(8) The territory to be annexed to a municipal corporation when agreed to by the municipal corporation to which annexation is proposed and the township in which the territory to be annexed is located.
{¶ 20} * * *
{¶ 21} "(15) Any other matter pertaining to the annexation or development of territory, whether the territory is owned by a governmental entity or a person or private entity."
{¶ 22} Relators direct our attention to the CEDA entered into between the City of Springfield, Springfield Township, and the Board of County Commissioners which is attached to the annexation petition. Section 6 of Article II of the CEDA provides, "TOWNSHIP and CITY recognize, agree and each of their governing bodies have adopted findings in the legislation mentioned in the recitals to the Agreement that, within the territories described in Article I, the annexation of territory to CITY not customarily recognized as contiguous to the corporate boundary of City [whether due to the smallness of the area of geometric coincidence between the annexation area and the corporate boundary of CITY or the contiguity of the annexation area and the corporate boundary of the CITY being by a long and narrow strip of land] will not, in any meaningful way, be detrimental to the unity of the CITY or of TOWNSHIP and should not and will not prevent the annexation of such territory to CITY."
{¶ 23} Relators argue that the above provision does not "contravene R.C. Chapter
{¶ 24} Relators acknowledge the concerns expressed in Middletown v.McGee (1988),
{¶ 25} "In Ohio, courts have frowned upon the use of connecting strips of land to meet the contiguity requirement when annexing outlying territory not otherwise connected to the annexing municipality. Such annexations are usually referred to as `strip, shoestring, subterfuge, corridor, and gerrymander annexations.' (Internal citations omitted). In determining whether a proposed annexation satisfies the contiguity requirement, these courts, as well as the courts of other jurisdictions, have noted that the basic concept of a municipality is that of a unified body, and have consistently inquired whether an annexing municipality would conform to this concept if a proposed annexation were to take place. The concept of a municipality as a unified body has been expressed as follows: *9
{¶ 26} "` * * * The legal as well as the popular idea of a town or city in this country, both by name and use, is that of oneness, community, locality, vicinity; a collective body, not several bodies; a collective body of inhabitants — that is, a body of people collected or gathered together in one mass, not separated into distinct masses; and having a community of interest because [they are] residents of the same place, not different places. So, as to territorial extent, the idea of a city is one of unity, not of plurality; of compactness or contiguity, not separate [sic] or segregation.' (Internal citations omitted)." Id., at 287. The Middletown court concluded that a proposed annexation before it was unlawful because the territory to be annexed "extends outward from the city for several miles * * * [and] it violates the basic concept of municipal unity." Id., at 288.
{¶ 27} Relators distinguish the annexation herein, since it is sought pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 28} Finally, Relators assert, "The City and Township, as authorized by R.C.
{¶ 29} According to the Board, "All expedited annexation proceedings flow through R.C.
{¶ 30} In reliance upon Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co.(1994),
{¶ 31} The Board points out that the General Assembly drafted additional contiguity requirements into R.C.
{¶ 32} Finally, the Board argues that Relators' argument regarding the CEDA reads the word "contiguous" out of R.C.
{¶ 33} In Relators' Reply Brief, they argue, Brennaman must be read in context with the statute to which it is being applied. The distinction between R.C.
{¶ 34} We begin by noting, a "basic rule of statutory construction requires that `words in statutes should not be construed to be redundant, nor should any words be ignored.' (Internal citation omitted). Statutory language `must be construed as a whole and given such interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it. No part should be treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and the court should avoid that construction *12
which renders a provision meaningless or inoperative.'" D.A.B.E., Inc.v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. Of Health,
{¶ 35} In Brennaman, relied upon by the Board, a statute of repose, R.C.
{¶ 36} The Brennaman Court noted the "general axiom of statutory construction that once words have acquired a settled meaning, that same meaning will be applied to a subsequent statute on a similar oranalogous subject," (emphasis added), but the Court determined that the axiom did not apply therein, "as the threshold requirement of similarity in purpose and subject between R.C.
{¶ 37} R.C.
{¶ 38} A review of the record makes clear that the property sought to be annexed is not contiguous to the City of Springfield in a manner consistent with Middletown, but it is rather a disfavored balloon on string1 . The proposed annexation will not produce a "unified body," but rather, "distinct masses" will result. The idea of "oneness, community, locality, vicinity, a collective body," is absent herein, while separation and segregation is inevitable. Moreover, *14
Relators' argument that the City of Springfield and Springfield Township may, by the terms of their CEDA, supercede the "contiguous to" requirement of R.C.
{¶ 39} R.C.
FAIN, J. and GRADY, J., concur.