G.S. 105-296, in pertinent part, provides: “The following real property, and no other, shall be exemptеd from taxation: . . . (2) Real property, tombs, vaults, and mausoleums set apart for burial purposes, except such as are owned and held for purposes of sale or rental. ...” Unless exеmpted by this statute, plaintiff’s real property is subject to ad valorem taxation by defendant.
“Statutes exempting specific prоperty from taxation because of the purposes for which such property is held and usеd, are and should be construed strictly, when there is room for construction, against exemption аnd in favor of taxation.”
Harrison v. Guilford County,
The words used in G.S. 105-296(2), when given their ordinary *470 meaning, are cleаr and require no construction. The statute distinguishes between real property “set apart for burial purposes,” which is exempt, and that “owned and held for purposes of sale or rentаl,” which is not exempt. Obviously, plaintiff’s property will not be used by plaintiff for burial purposes. It is owned аnd held by plaintiff for sale to purchasers who in turn will use it for burial purposes. When the words, “set apart for burial purposes,” and the words, “owned and held for purposes of sale or rental,” arе considered contextually, we are of opinion, and so decide, that the exemption contemplated by G.S. 105-296(2) refers only to real property presently in use for burial purposes and property owned and held by persons for their use for burial purposes. Since plaintiff’s property is not held for its use for burial purposes but solely for the purpose of sale to others, the conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff’s said property does not fall within the stаtutory exemption.
Since plaintiff relies largely on an excerpt (quoted below) from the opinion in
Cemetery Association v. Raleigh,
The (1869) charter of the Raleigh Cemetery Association contained this provision: “Thаt the real estate of said corporation, and the burial plots conveyed by said cоrporation to individual proprietors, shall be exempt from assessment and taxation, . . .” The property involved consisted of 31.3 acres of land (with frontage on two streets) owned and held by the plaintiff for cemetery purposes. The plaintiff, relying on said charter provision, sought to rеstrain the defendant “from making a local improvement assessment against its property ...” A judgment restraining the defendant, in accordance with the plaintiff’s prayer, was reversed by this Court.
Our opinion states: “The question posed for determination is simply this: Does the above provision in the plaintiff’s charter exempt its real property, held for burial purposes, from local improvement assessments? The answer must be in the negative.” The charter provision expressly exemptеd the real estate o/ the plaintiff from liability for ad valorem taxes. The only question was whether it exempted the plaintiff’s real estate “from local improvement assessments.”
Plaintiff quotes this excerpt from the opinion: “Real property set apart for burial purposes, in this State, is exempt from taxation, unless the property is held for personal or private gain. G.S. 105-296 (2). Hence, the property of the plaintiff is exempt from ad valorem taxes both under the provision contained in its charter and the general law. But, neither the provision in its charter nor the general law au *471 thorizes its exemption from a local improvement assessment made pursuant to and in сonformity with the law authorizing such assessment. No land in a municipality is exempt from assessment for local improvements.” Plaintiff stresses the italicized portion.
Decision in
Cemetery Association v. Raleigh, supra,
was not based upon and did not involve аn interpretation of G.S. 105-296 (2). Reference thereto was incidental. Apparently, through inadvertеnce, the opinion uses the clause, “unless the property is held for personal or privаte gain,” instead of the clause in G.S. 105-296(2), namely “except such as are owned and held for purposes of sale or rental.” In any event, “(i)t is but an expression of opinion upon an incidental question not presented in the appeal, and has not the force of an adjudicatiоn upon the point.”
Miller v. Lash,
Whether G.S. 105-296(2) should be amended by substituting the words, “unless the property is held for personаl or private gain,” or words of similar import, for the words, “except such as are owned and held for purposes of sale or rental,” is a matter for determination by the General Assembly. As now writtеn, G.S. 105-296(2) does not exempt plaintiff’s property from ad valorem taxation. Hence, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.