*1 not bar practices does employment tion Specific recovery. from full employee for reasons be made on the
findings must question and on
plaintiff’s resignation for cause.4 she was terminated
of whether findings must make
The trial court also damages.
on the issue of is therefore remanded to
The case for specific
trial court determinations following issues: background Was the difference in
(1) plaintiff and Drake between
experience justify unequal pay?
sufficient discharge
(2) grounds Were there resign because
plaintiff, or did alleged discrimination?
(3) Damages. and remanded.
Reversed J.,
OTIS, part took no in the considera- of this case.
tion or decision OTTERNESS, al., Appellants, R. et
Gene HORSLEY, Joseph et
Daniel
al., Respondents.
No. 47254.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Feb. Minneapolis, for Rooney, F.
Edward pellants. rebutting illegal reasons resignation Associates’ dis- tiff succeeds
4. A
which is caused
termination,
may
discharge.
given
be entitled
her
she
Cf.
crimination is a constructive
damages beyond
of her
the date
Young
Savings
Southwestern
and Loan
to additional
Assn.,
1975).
plain-
(5
If
termination.
509 F.2d
143 Cir.
*2
Kelley
Timothy
proximately
Torrison & O’Neill and
J.
per
miles
hour. When he
Paul,
Dwyer,
respondents.
St.
part way
was
intersection,
one
of the passengers shouted a warning. De-
ROGOSHESKE, KELLY,
Heard before
and,
fendant
turned to his right
for the
YETKA, JJ.,
and considered and decid-
time,
first
plaintiff
saw
approaching from
ed
the court en banc.
the south. Defendant attempted to acceler-
ate, but was unable to avoid the collision.
KELLY, Justice.
The motorcycle struck the
vehicle’s
appeal
judgment
This is an
from a
of the
rear door. Plaintiff was thrown to the
dismissing plaintiffs’
district court
cause of
ground
wrist,
and suffered a broken
brokеn
action against
pursuant
each defendant
femur, and lacerations. From where he
special jury verdict in defendants’ favor.
stopped,
had last
defendant had driven at
We affirm.
least 35 feet when the collision occurred.
This action arose out of a collision be-
Plaintiff testified that he was driving
tween an
automobile driven
Daniel
north оn Lexington at 45 to 50 miles an
Horsley,
hereafter
and a motor-
hour. As he drove over the crest of the hill
cycle
Otterness,
driven
Gene
hereafter
intersection,
south of the
he saw defend-
plaintiff, that occurred at the intersection
ant’s vehicle approach the stop sign and
of Yankee Doodle Road and Lexington Ave-
stop. Whеn defendant did
proceed
im-
nue in Eagan Township
on July
mediately, he
Yankee
assumed defendant
Doodle Road
was wait-
generally
runs
east
and west
for him to
and has one lane
cross the
for traffic in
intersection and
each
Lexington
direction.
continued toward
Avenue runs
the intersection without
north
and,
and south
reducing
at the time
speed.
of the
When he was 20 to 30 feet
accident, also had one lane
intersection,
for traffic in
from the
pulled
defendant
out
each direction. Traffic on Yankee Doodle
from the
stop sign
front of him. He did
Road was
by stop
controlled
signs on each
not have time to take evasive action and
side of its intersection with Lexington.
could nоt avoid the collision.
Lexington
through highway.
was a
South
trial,
At
defendants introduced evidence
intersection,
of the
Lexington Avenue rises
that within a few hundred feet south of the
to the crest of a hill approximately
of a¼
driveway
intersection a
led from the west
mile away. The land surrounding the inter-
Lexington
side of
to nearby fields and that
section was generally undeveloped, al- plaintiff’s motorcycle was not a “street
though there was a house at the northeast
bike,” but one
operated
that could be
corner of the intersection. At the time of
brushy areas where a street bike would be
accident,
the view from Yankee Doodle damaged. No other
suggested
evidence
Roаd south on Lexington was not obstruct-
not,
that plaintiff
fact,
did
drive on Lex-
ed.
ington Avenue from the hill south of the
At approximately
p.
6:30 m. on
day
intersection.
accident,
defendant was proceeding east
parties
stipulated
Roger
on Yankee Doodle Road.
approached
He
$4,574.25
Lucille Otterness had incurred
the intersection and initiаlly stopped west
expenses
medical
as a result of their son’s
stop
sign which was about 34 feet
accident and that
damage
there was
$400
west of the intersection. After some dis-
the motorcycle.
cussion among the
passengers
automobile’s
about which
The case
proceed,
was
jury,
defendant
submitted to the
drove
point
about 14 fеet
special
finding
west of the
returned a
verdict
intersection
stopped again.
damages,
Defendant
suffered no
de-
and two of his four passengers looked both
fendant was not negligent, plaintiff was
ways on Lexington
100-percent
and saw no oncoming
negligent,
and that
Defendant,
traffic.
looking straight ahead,
negligence was a direct cause of the acci-
then started across the
intersection at
dent. Plaintiffs’
judgment
motion for a
verdict
notwithstanding
plaintiff
and a new trial
testified that he was
While
or,
on the issue of
in the alterna-
damages,
20 or 30 feet from the intersection when
tive,
newa
trial on all issues was denied.
cross,
defendant started to
defendant testi
appeal
Plaintiffs
from thе
judgment
dis-
fied that he drove at least 35 feet from his
missal entered
to the verdict.
pursuant
last stop
before the collision. If
going
per
to 50 miles
hour and
Plaintiffs
jury’s
contend that the
verdict
*3
per hour,
defendant no more than 5 miles
weight
the
liability
contrary
great
is
to
plaintiff would have traveled over 300 feet
fact,
of the evidence
this
coupléd
and that
in thе time it took defendant to drive 35
finding
damages,
with the
of no
indicates
Thus,
feet.
party accurately
if each
esti
the
by passion
that
verdict was so tainted
distance,
speed
mated his
and
the
prejudice
plaintiffs
and
as to entitle
accident
new trial.
could not have
province
occurred. It is the
jury
of the
to resolve such conflicting tеsti
This
gov
court established the rule
mony,
163,
Kolatz v. Kelly, 244 Minn.
69
erning
granting
the
of new trials where the
N.W.2d 649
say
we cannot
has
jury
damages
clearly
found
that are
plaintiff
determination that
was over 300
inadequate
Norman,
in Wefel v.
296 Minn.
feet from the intersection would be unrea
506,
(1973).
Where
party
seeks a new trial on
to the stop sign and the motorist has
ground
justified
the verdict is not
exercised the ordinary and reasonable
evidence,
we will substitute our
3,
care
under
required
judgment that of the
if there
“only
entering
before
commensurate with the
is no еvidence reasonably tending to sustain
circumstances,
required
care
under the
the verdict or if it is
manifestly
palpa
bly against
regard
right way
the usual rules in
weight of the evidence.”
Templin Crestliner, Inc.,
149,
Pickett,
speed
263 Minn.
Bell
prevail.
151,
540,
(1962).
We be Minn.
In this could conclude that Justice (dissenting). per a motorcycle traveling 50 miles hour is from the respectfully must dissent re- visible at a distance more clearly majority sult reached because I am than 300 and that defendant was not feet unable, matter, practical to reconcile as a failing plaintiff ap- to see case present with the decision of this proaching. jury might The further con- Riley court in distance, that, clude such a at (1972). N.W.2d 331 vehicle did not сonstitute an “immediate facts case are strikingly hazard” within the of the meaning state plaintiff traveling similar. The was north statute, 169.20. Minn.St. Sub- toward an uncontrolled intersection. De- division 3 this reads in provision part: fendant driving west on intersect- According
“The
of a
shall
street.
to her
stop
testimony,
vehicle
as she
looked
her
required
this
chapter at
entrance
*4
proached
intersection, had
the
an unob-
to a through highway
yield
shall
the
and
roughly equal
structed view for a distance
right way to
other vehicles which have
block,
to
city
nothing.
and saw
She
entered the intersection from the
intersection,
not
therefore did
brake for the
highway
which
approaching
or
are
so
although her foot was off the accelerator.
closely
highway
to
any event,
plaintiff’s
when
car was near-
hazard,
constitute an immediate
but the
intersection, was
ly through the
it
struck on
having
may
so yielded
proceed, and
rear,
the
right-hand
by
side
defendant’s car.
the
of all
approach-
drivers
other vehicles
that he
Defendant likewise testified
had not
ing the
through high-
intersection
the
“just
seen
car
wasn’t
plaintiff’s
paying
way
yield
shall
the
way to the
48,
any attention.” 295 Minn.
203 N.W.2d
proceeding
vehicles so
or
into
across the
jury compared
parties’ negli-
The
the
through highway.”
gence
100-percent
and found the defendant
basis,
On the same
the
could con- negligent.
clude that plaintiff’s
yield
failure to
the.
appeal,
On
this court overturned the
or to
right-of-way
keep a proper lookout
jury’s findings and
to
held
have
negligence
constituted
was the
direct
been
as a
negligent
matter
law. The
cause of the accident.
reasoning
Riley
underlying the
decision is
particular
importance here. Based on
Were
“driveway
defendants’
theory” the
the physical fact that a
had oc-
collision
only possible ground
verdict,
for the
we
curred, the court reached the rather obvious
might
See,
be
to
inclined
reverse.
LaFavor
conclusion
the two vehicles must have
that
Co.,
American National Insurance
entered the intersection
exactly
at almost
5,
Minn.
(1967);
Affirmed. 338): provision
1. This present remains in effect at time. 169.96, failure to yield disagree general “Under Minn.St. cannot with this con- prima is facie evidence right-of-way struction of appli- but its negligence. Where there is no evi- cation in this case has produced a result of a right-of- dence to excuse violation which is unnеcessary both and counterintui- statute, the court should hold the tive. The majority reasons as follows: The violator as a matter of law.” jury could have concluded that while he (Italics supplied.) was stopped intersection, defendant, at the care, the exercise of due any failed to see only material fact differenti- oncоming reasonably per- traffic which he the present Riley ates case from ceived as an Having “immediate hazard.” is supra, type of intersection in which observation, made such an right-of-way case, the collision occurred. In the shifted from any oncoming vehicles to de- uncontrolled; here, the intersection was en- fendant as he еntered the intersection. The into try the intersection from the east and plaintiff motorcyclist was therefore under a by stop signs. west was controlled How- duty yield and his fail- ever, the difference in the nature of the ure to do so prima negli- constituted facie practice intersections involved does not in gence. justify opposing right-of-way/nеgli- gence rules the court has established for the reasoning While this internal- certainly two situations. coherent, ly it the simple overlooks truth that the motorcycle was fact an “immedi- sure,
To be the right-of-way question in ate hazard” when defendant started into the instant case is controlled a different *5 the intersection. The fact that an accidеnt 169.20, statutory provision. Minn.St. occurred is conclusive that the proof motor- states in part: cycle must have been so close to the inter- “The driver of a vehicle shall stop as section as to constitute an “immediate haz- required by this chapter at the entrance majority opinion support- ard.” The is thus through highway yield and shall only able if agreeable proposi- one finds right of way to other vehicles which have tion that a driver who looks and fails to see entered the intersection from the another vehicle with which he approaching highway or which approaching are so can considered ultimately fairly collides be closely through highway as to I find negligent. any рroposition hazard, constitute an immediate but the unacceptable. Absent obstructions having so yielded may proceed, and driver’s there were none in this view—and approach- drivers of all other vehicles case—the failure to see a vehicle the intersection on the high- close enough to collide with can be chаrac- way shall yield to the negligence,2 terized unless we are only vehicles proceeding so into or across the willing dangerously to countenance low through highway.” driving technique. standards of The majority opinion *6 SCOTT, (dissenting). Justice join
I in the dissent of Mr. Justice Todd.
YETKA, Justice (dissenting). join with the dissent of Mr. Justice
Todd.
OTIS, J., part took no in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. example, evidence of obstructions to 4. For automоbile was so
the fact ‘[t]hat proper circumstances consti- view could under an immediate hazard is close as to constitute legitimate tute a excuse. accident.’ It is the event of the established clear from a reading cases that the of those negli- contributory 5. Evidence of not mean that the event of the statement does things gence as excessive could include immediacy of the haz- accident establishes the proper speed to maintain a lookout. or failure as a matter of law.” ard notes correctly this provision has been construed to To require bring the result in this case into ac- only that a driver exercise reasonable care cord with both the facts of the operative looking Lake, both directions proceeding before accident and our decision in v. from a stop sign into an A supra, intersection. I would allow the fact of the collision motorist who complied has with this re- to support mandatory inference that quirement gains the right-of-way “danger while two wеre inside the zone” vehicles moving across the with one Under such intersecting highway. respect to another.3 least, very 2. At language a driver who fails to see what is in Peterson certain of this court’s Rodekuhr, obviously present zero-percent negli- 204, 209, v. cannot be gent. where it “Plaintiff was stated: places some reliance the statement Requiring mаtter of law this inference as a 3. would, course, pearing necessitate the abandonment some of our cases the effect circumstances, I would hold that defendant law, not, have exer- Child, by could as a matter of HUEPER, Minor Bruce proceeding into cised reasonable care before Hueper, His Mother and Sharon so, dеfendant being intersection. That Guardian, Respondent, gain right-of-way could not under v. 169.20, Having subd. 3. entered the inter- § Dean and John M. GOODRICH right-of-way, section without the defendant Neubauer, third defendants and prima negligent. would be held facie party plaintiffs, Appellants, excuse,4 any the absence of defendant as a matter of adjudged negligent would be law. al., GREGOR, party third Arland et submit, This be func- analysis, would Respondents, defendants, tionally identical to that which we em- ployed Riley supra, and would do no violence to the mechanism HUEPER, al., Respondents, Emil W. et contained in subd. 8. Once de- established, fendant’s negligence jury weigh any plain- would be free to Dean and John M. GOODRICH Neubauer, Appellants. contributory negligence5 tiff’s in the com- parative negligence balance. The results 47288, 47289. Nos. under the rule I have outlined seem much jibe more with intuitive sense Minnesota. likely Supreme our Court of of fault in intersection collisions. Feb. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand instruction that this case with the defend- Horsley ant found as a matter be law, leaving to the the calculation of parties’ comparative negligence.