OPINION
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................458
II. BACKGROUND.........................................................459
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ...............................................461
IV. DISCUSSION...........................................................462
A. Federal Circuit Law Governs the Court’s Resolution of the Jurisdictional Issue.................................................462
B. Personal Jurisdiction, Generally........................................462
1. Whether Mylan is “at home” in New Jersey for Purposes of General Jurisdiction after Daimler.......................'.........463
2. Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma Consented to Personal Jurisdiction in this District by Registering to do Business in New Jersey.....467
3. The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction over Mylan Labs................471
V. CONCLUSION..........................................................471
I. INTRODUCTION
This patent infringement action is one of twenty-four related actions concerning various defendants’ submission of abbreviated new drug applications (hereinafter, “ANDAs”) for Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter, “FDA”) approval to market generic versions of Plaintiff Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.’s [hereinafter, “Otsuka”) aripiprazole product known as Ability®. Defendants Mylan Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Mylan Pharma”) and Mylan Laboratories Limited (“Mylan Labs” and collectively, “Mylan”) move to dismiss Otsuka’s Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Mylan does not dispute that each of its entities complies with the statutory registration requirements of the State of New Jersey, that each of its entities holds a wholesale distribution license in the State of New Jersey, nor that each of its entities generate revenue attributable to sales in the State of New Jersey. (See Tighe Dec. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 11; Tighe Supplemental Dec. at ¶ 2.) Rather, Mylan disputes whether this quantum of connections suffices for purposes of personal jurisdiction, given the Supreme Court’s “sea-change” jurisdictional decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -,
The primary issues before the Court are whether the record demonstrates that the Mylan Defendants’ contacts with this forum render them “at home” in the State of New Jersey; whether Mylan’s registration to do business in New Jersey and appointment of an in-state agent for service of process amount to consent to this Court’s jurisdiction; and whether, in submitting an ANDA for FDA approval, the Mylan Defendants purposefully directed activities at this forum.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that this Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma. Because Mylan Labs, however, lacks sufficient jurisdictional contacts with this forum, Mylan Labs will be dismissed. Mylan’s motion will, accordingly, be denied with respect to Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma, but granted with respect to Mylan Labs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Otsuka and New Drug Application No. 21-436
Otsuka, a pharmaceutical company organized and existing under the laws of Japan, holds New Drag Application (hereinafter, “NDA”) No. 21-436, approved by the FDA, for aripiprazole tablets, which Otsuka markets under the trademark Ability®. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 16-17.)
In connection with Ability’s® listing in the Orange Book, the FDA’s book of drug products approved under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter, the
B. Mylan Inc., Mylan Pharma, and Mylan Labs
As stated above, the pending motion concerns the jurisdictional contacts of three Mylan entities: Mylan Inc. and its two subsidiaries, Mylan Pharma and Mylan Labs.
Mylan Inc:, a Pennsylvania corporation having a principal place of business in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, manufactures, markets, imports, and sells generic and specialty pharmaceutical products throughout the United States, including in New Jersey. (See id. at ¶ 2, 7; Tighe Dec. at ¶¶ 2-3, 11.) Indeed, Mylan Inc. expressly identifies itself as “one of the world’s leading generic and specialty pharmaceutical companies,” which “markets more than 1,300 different products in around 140 different countries and territories” (Tighe Dec. at ¶ 3), and “holds the number one ranking in the U.S. generics prescription market in terms of sales and the number two ranking in terms of prescriptions dispensed.” (Compl. at ¶ 7; see also Ex. A to Otsuka’s Opp’n.)
In 2006, the State of New Jersey authorized Mylan Inc. to “transact business” as a “foreign profit corporation” pursuant to N.J.S.A. §§ 14A:13-4, 14-1, -2. (See Ex. F to Otsuka’s Opp’n.) In connection with New Jersey’s authorization, Mylan Inc. identified its registered office and designated an in-state agent for service process of process. (See Tighe Dec. at ¶ 8 (noting Mylan Inc.’s compliance with statutory registration requirements); Ex. F to Otsuka’s Opp’n (identifying an agent in West Trenton, New Jersey).) In addition to being registered in New Jersey, Mylan holds a wholesale distribution license, and generates annual revenues in excess of $100 million in this State. (See Tighe Dec. at ¶ 11.) Finally, Mylan Inc. has actively litigated, as both plaintiff and defendant, over 30 cases in this District. (See Ex. K to Otsuka’s Opp’n (summarizing the cases).) Nevertheless, Mylan Inc. maintains no permanent, physical presence in the State of New Jersey.
Mylan Inc.’s subsidiary, Mylan Pharma serves as Mylan Inc.’s “primary U.S. pharmaceutical research, development, manufacturing, marketing and distribution subsidiary.” (Tighe Dec. at ¶ 4; Ex. A to Otsuka’s Opp’n; Compl. at ¶ 8.) Like its corporate parent, however, Mylan Pharma “does not have any manufacturing plants, corporate offices, facilities, or other real property in New Jersey.” (Tighe Dec. at ¶ 6.) Rather, Mylan Pharma exists and operates in the State of West Virginia. (See generally id.) Nevertheless, Mylan Pharma has registered to do business in New Jersey and has appointed an in-state agent for service of process. (See Ex. G to Otsuka’s Opp’n.) In addition, Mylan Pharma holds a wholesale distribution license in New Jersey, and generates annual revenues in excess of $50 million in this State. (Tighe Dec. at ¶¶ 9, 11; Tighe Supplementary Dec. at ¶ 2.) Finally, Mylan Pharma has been an equally active litigant in this District, having litigated over 30 cases, as both plaintiff and defendant. (See Ex. K to Otsuka’s Opp’n (summarizing the cases).)
Mylan Labs, Mylan Inc.’s Indian subsidiary, constitutes “ ‘one of the world’s largest manufacturers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs)’” (Compl. at ¶9 (citation omitted)), and manufactures and supplies “low cost, high qualify API for [My
C. Mylan Pharma’s ANDA Filing and ADNA Notice Letter
On November 16, 2013, Mylan Pharma submitted ANDA No. 206-240 to the FDA in Maryland, seeking approval to market generic aripiprazole tablets in the United States. (Compl. at ¶ 19.) Mylan Pharma’s ANDA filing included a “paragraph IV certification” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), in which Mylan Pharma set forth its assertion concerning the Ability® patents’ invalidity, in addition to its assertion that the Ability® patents will not be infringed by the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of Mylan’s generic product. (See Tighe Dec. at ¶ 12.)
On May 28, 2014, Mylan Pharma then mailed notice, under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii), of its ANDA filing and its certification of non-infringement and/or invalidity to Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. in Japan and Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. in Maryland. (See Tighe Dec. at ¶ 12; see also Compl. at ¶¶ 19-21, 31, 41, 51, and 61.)
D. Otsuka’s ANDA Litigation
As a result of Mylan Pharma’s ANDA filing, Otsuka filed a Complaint in this District on July 11, 2014,
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to move to dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Where, as here, the Court resolves the jurisdictional issue in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and without the benefit of discovery, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd.,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Federal Circuit Law Governs the Court’s Resolution of the Jurisdictional Issue
The parties dispute the choice of law applicable to the pending motion. Mylan, in particular, insists that Federal Circuit law governs the Court’s disposition of the jurisdictional issue presented in the pending motion, while Otsuka suggests that the Court must follow binding precedent of the Third Circuit. (Compare Mylan’s Reply at 8 n. 5, with Otsuka’s Sur-reply at 1.)
The Court, however, does not find determination of the relevant choice of law to be a particularly complex inquiry. Indeed, because the pending jurisdictional issue arises in the context of a patent infringement action under the Hatch-Wax-man Act, Federal Circuit law unquestionably governs the key disputed issue, namely, whether due process would be offended in the event the Court exercised personal jurisdictional over the Mylan Defendants, the “out-of-state accused infringer[s].” Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House,
B. Personal Jurisdiction, Generally
A federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state. See, e.g., Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,
Therefore, under Federal Circuit law, determining “whether jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant involves two inquiries: whether a forum state’s long-arm statute permits service of process and whether assertion ' of personal jurisdiction violates due process.” See Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd.,
Sufficient jurisdictional contacts, in turn, arise in two forms: general and specific. Daimler,
Otsuka asserts three ground for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Mylan Defendants: (1) general jurisdiction, notwithstanding Daimler; (2) general jurisdiction based upon consent; and (3) specific jurisdiction. The Court will address each argument in turn.
1. Whether Mylan is “at home” in New Jersey for Purposes of General Jurisdiction after Daimler
Otsuka first claims that the Mylan Defendants numerous contacts with this forum suffice to subject each Mylan Defendant to the general personal jurisdiction of this Court. (See, e.g., Otsuka’s Opp’n at 18-20.) The Mylan Defendants, however, claim that their contacts plainly fail to render them “ ‘essentially at home’ ” in this forum. (Mylan’s Br. at 3-5.) Indeed, Mylan argues that its activities in this forum amount to little more than the sort of activities the Supreme Court deemed insufficient in Daimler. (Id. at 3-6.) Here, for the reasons that follow, the Court determines that Daimler fundamentally altered the general jurisdiction analysis, but need not reach the ultimate issue of whether the Mylan Defendants’ jurisdictional contacts render them “at home” in this forum.
Prior to Daimler, general, all-purpose jurisdiction had long been construed to require only that the defendant have “ ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ ” with the forum state. AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp.,
Specifically, in Daimler, 22 Argentinian residents filed a complaint in the Northern District of California against a German manufacturer of luxury vehicles, Daimler-Chrysler Aktiengesellscaft (hereinafter, “Daimler”), alleging that Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary collaborated with Argentinian security forces to commit human rights violations during Argentina’s “ ‘Dirty War.’ ” Daimler,
In filing the suit in California, the plaintiffs further insisted that California courts could exercise jurisdiction over Daimler for “any and all claims,” in light Daimler’s agency relationship with' its “indirect subsidiary,” Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (hereinafter, “MBUSA”). Id. at 752. MBUSA, Daimler’s exclusive importer and distributor in the United States, existed under the laws of Delaware and had its principal place of business in New Jersey. See id. at 751-52. Nevertheless, MBUSA’s annual sales of Daimler vehicles in California generated approximately $4.6 billion in revenues — 2.4% of Daimler’s global sales — • and MBUSA maintained several corporate facilities in the state. See id. at 751-52, 758; see also id. at 766-67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Daimler’s own contacts with California, by contrast, remained “sporadic.” Id. at 758. Despite the limited nature of Daimler’s contacts, the plaintiffs argued that MBUSA’s California contacts could be attributed to Daimler, MBUSA’s alleged principal, for jurisdictional purposes. See id. at 751-52. Daimler moved to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that MBUSA did not qualify as Daimler’s agent and that Daimler’s own contacts failed to support an exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler in California. See id. at 752. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, ultimately reversed on rehearing, finding that Daimler “purposefully and extensively interjected itself into the California market through MBUSA.” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari on the issue of whether, consistent with due process, Daimler could be held “amenable to suit in California for claims involving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring entirely abroad.” Id. at 753. In a unanimous holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.
In so concluding, the Daimler Court clarified, in the context of a suit in California for claims involving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring only abroad, that the applicable inquiry for
Nevertheless, the Daimler Court left open the possibility that, in an “exceptional” case, “a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at 761 n. 19. An evaluation of the substantiality of a foreign corporation’s operations under such circumstances, however, “calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide,” because a corporation simply operating in multiple forums could “scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Id. at 762 n. 20. With respeet to Daimler, however, the Court found its “activities in California plainly” insufficient to approach that level, because California did not serve as Daimler’s or MBUSA’s state of incorporation or their principal place of business. Id. Nor could Daimler reasonably have expected that it would be hailed into California court on an “Argentina-rooted case.” Id. at 761.
In relying upon Daimler, Mylan overstates its square application to the nuanced jurisdictional issue presented in the pending motion. Indeed, the factual and legal contexts of this litigation could hardly be more different than those addressed in Daimler. Most fundamentally, the Daimler case involved foreign plaintiffs from Argentina suing a foreign defendant from Germany based upon conduct that occurred entirely in Argentina. Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court readily concluded that Daimler could “scarcely” have predicted- that it would be subjected to the general jurisdiction of California. See, e.g., id. at 761-62 (describing Daimler as an “Argentina-rooted case,” involving “claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that occurred or had its principal impact in California”). Here, by contrast, each Mylan Defendant has specific, undisputed contacts with this forum and an intention to market generic aripiprazole throughout the United States, including in this forum; and, at the time Mylan provided Otsuka with notice of its ANDA submission, Mylan had already filed related Ability® ANDA litigation in this District. In that regard, this litigation concerns primarily domestic corporations and their domestic patent dispute, including Mylan’s ANDA application to market a generic version of Otsuka’s Ability®, a factual predicate far more related to domestic and forum interests and activities than
Nevertheless, the Court cannot ignore that in Daimler the Supreme Court expressed itself in broad language, and that the factual circumstances of this litigation satisfy neither of the paradigmatic scenarios for “at home” general jurisdiction under Daimler. Indeed, none of the Mylan Defendants constitute New Jersey corporations, nor does New Jersey serve as their principal place of business. Moreover, although Daimler left open “the possibility” that a foreign corporation’s operations may, in an exceptional case, be of a sufficient nature “to render the corporation at home in that State” id. at 761 n. 19, the record in this instance remains unclear as to whether the Mylan Defendant’s contacts rise to a sufficiently substantial level.
Critically, in arguing that the Mylan Defendants are “at home” in New Jersey, Otsuka principally relies upon the Mylan Defendants’ fractional revenue generation in New Jersey, “frequent” litigation in this District, in addition to the physical presence of various Mylan subsidiaries in this State. (See, e.g., Otsuka’s Sur-reply at.) These contacts, however, do not appear the functional equivalent of incorporation or principal place of business, nor do they unequivocally demonstrate the requisite operations of the Mylan Defendants within this State. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig. (No. VI),
Nevertheless, because the Court finds, as stated below, that Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma consented to this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court need not determine whether this litigation constitutes an “exceptional case” in which any one of the Mylan Defendants should be deemed “at home” in New Jersey. But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-389,
2. Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma Consented to Personal Jurisdiction in this District by Registering to do Business in New Jersey
Otsuka alternatively argues that the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma, given their registration to do business in New Jersey, and appointment of a registered agent for service of process in New Jersey.
The Court, however, need not belabor Mylan’s arguments, because it cannot be genuinely disputed that consent, whether by registration or otherwise, remains a valid basis for personal jurisdiction following International Shoe and Daimler. Indeed, International Shoe itself clearly reflects that the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional determinations related to cases where “no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.” See Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement,
Nor does the fact that these decisions predated International Shoe compel any contrary conclusion. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled the holdings of either case, and in the absence of such declaration, the Supreme Court directs' the continued application of its precedents. See Eberhart v. United States,
Nor can the Court find any support for Mylan’s position that Daimler, in essence, precludes general jurisdiction by consent, requiring instead that it be limited be limited to a “corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business” or, in exceptional circumstances, an equivalent forum in which the corporation could be found “at home.” (Mylan’s Br. at 8-9.) Indeed, Daimler in its entirety contains but one fleeting reference to the concept of jurisdiction by consent, and this limited reference served only to distinguish between traditional “consensual” jurisdiction and the “non-consensual bases for jurisdiction” addressed in the decision, rather than to cast any doubt on the continued vitality of consent-based jurisdiction. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
Moreover, though the Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the consent-by-registration theory of personal jurisdiction, this Court cannot ignore that the majority of federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the question have concluded that compliance with registration statutes may constitute consent to personal jurisdiction.
In Bane v. Netlink, Inc., for example, the Third Circuit explained that, “[b]y registering to do business in Pennsylvania, [the defendant] ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, this invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’ ”
Taken together, these precedents provide clear confirmation that designation of an in-state agent for service of process in accordance with a state registration statute may constitute consent to personal jurisdiction, if supported by the breadth of the statute’s text or interpretation. See, e.g., Forest Labs.,
Therefore, the Court finds Mylan’s arguments concerning consent-by-registration without merit. Indeed, sister district court recently addressed and rejected Mylan’s identical arguments in connection with registration statutes in Delaware. See generally Forest Labs., Inc.,
Indeed, the State of New Jersey’s registration statute in this instance requires that “every foreign corporation authorized to transact business” in the State of New Jersey “continuously maintain a registered office” and “a registered agent having a business office identical with such registered office.” N.J.S.A. § 14A:4-1(1). The statute, in turn, provides that “[e]very registered agent shall be an agent of the corporation ... upon whom process against the corporation may be served.” N.J.S.A. § 14A:4-2(1).
Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma concede that they complied with the State of New Jersey’s registration requirements (see Tighe Dec. at ¶ 8), including maintaining a registered agent in the State for purposes of service of process.
Here, the Court finds that Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma consented to the Court’s jurisdiction by registering to do business in New Jersey, by appointing an in-state agent for service of process in New Jersey, and by actually engaging in a substantial amount of business in this State.
Nevertheless, because Mylan Labs has not similarly complied with New Jersey’s registration statute, the Court turns to whether the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Mylan Labs.
3. The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction over Mylan Labs
Otsuka does not focus upon the grounds on which the Court could conceivably exercise specific jurisdiction over Mylan Labs, Mylan Inc.’s Indian subsidiary. (See, e.g., Otsuka’s Br. at 9-12; Otsuka’s Sur-reply at 11.) Rather, Otsuka primarily hinges its position upon Mylan’s integrated nature, the international scope of Mylan Labs’ operations, and the' in-state activities of its independent subsidiary. (See, e.g., Compl. at ¶ 9.) Otsuka, however, identifies no specific activities directed at this forum that, in any way, relate to Otsuka’s infringement claims. For that reason, the Court readily rejects Otsuka’s position that the Court possesses specific jurisdiction over Mylan Labs.
Critically, in evaluating the existence of specific jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit directs district courts to consider: (1) whether the defendant purposefully directed activities at residents of the forum; (2) whether the claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and (3) whether, given the circumstances, the assertion of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable and fair. See, e.g., AFTG-TG, LLC,
V. CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, Mylan’s motion to dismiss will be denied as to Mylan Inc. and Mylan Pharma, and granted as to
Notes
. Of the over 30 defendants involved in these related actions, only the Mylan Defendants have challenged this Court’s personal jurisdiction.
. Otsuka filed a sur-reply together with an informal request for leave [Docket Item 38], which Mylan opposes as improper under the Local Civil Rules. [Docket Item 42.] Despite Mylan's objection, given the complexity of the jurisdictional issues involved in the pending motion, the Court will grant Otsuka's informal request, and will consider Otsuka's surreply.
. At that time, Otsuka had filed six substantively identical Complaints naming other ANDA filers as defendants. See, e.g., Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Torrent Pharma. Ltd., Inc., Civil Act. No. 14-1078 (JBS/KMW); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Alembic Pharma. Ltd., Civil Act. No. 14-2982 (JBS/KMW); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pharma. USA, Inc., Civil Act. No. 14-3168 (JBS/KMW); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Aurobindo Pharma. Ltd., Civil Act. No. 14-3306 (JBS/KMW); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Intas Pharma. Ltd., Civil Act. No. 14-3996 (JBS/KMW); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Sun Pharma. Indus. Ltd., Inc., Civil Act.
. On March 20, 2015, Otsuka moved to amend its Complaint in order to alleged infringement of a sixth patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,759,350. [Docket Item 62.] Otsuka's motion to amend will be addressed by separate Order.
. Moreover, the Court may always revisit the issue of personal jurisdiction if later revelations reveal that the facts alleged in support of jurisdiction remain in dispute. See Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc.,
. Nevertheless, in the absence of relevant Federal Circuit authority, particularly whether registration constitutes consent for jurisdictional purposes, the Court may, and necessarily must, refer to decisions of other federal courts for guidance. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence, agreeing with the Supreme Court’s ultimate judgment, but for different reasons. Daimler,
. By contrast, the Supreme Court suggested that "exorbitant” theories of general jurisdiction would spawn "unpredictability,” by rendering a corporation potentially liable to suit for all claims in many if not all states. Id. at 761-62.
. On December 17, 2014, Judge Gregory M. Sleet certified an interlocutory appeal of the post -Daimler personal jurisdiction issue in the context of the AstraZeneca ANDA litigation, and the Federal Circuit recently granted interlocutory review. See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., App. No.2015-117 (Fed.Cir. Mar. 17, 2015). On January 14, 2015, Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark then “wholeheartedly agree[d] with Judge Sleet that the existence of personal jurisdiction in an ANDA case in a post-Daimler world is an important question of first impression that will be (and has been) raised in many pending ANDA cases,” thereby requiring additional direction from the appellate courts. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
. At the outset, the Court rejects Otsuka’s position that the Mylan Defendants prior litigation activity, and "admission” of personal jurisdiction, constitutes “consent” for purposes of this action. (See, e.g., Otsuka’s Opp'n at 12.) In that regard, the Court agrees with the Mylan Defendants that, " 'consent to jurisdiction in one case ... extends to that case alone.' ” (Mylan’s Reply at 4 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria,
. The Pennsylvania statute specifically stated that a foreign corporation qualified as a "foreign corporation under the laws of [the State]” then this "shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person[.]” Bane,
. Two other Circuits have similarly confirmed that viability of consent-by-registration jurisdiction, but ultimately concluded that the relevant state court precedent did not, standing alone, subject foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of the relevant state. See, e.g., King,
. Mylan Labs, by contrast, has not complied with New Jersey's registration statute, and therefore the Court cannot conclude that Mylan Labs consented to the general jurisdiction of this forum.
. For that reason, the Court rejects Mylan’s reliance upon Agbottah v. Orange Lake Country Club, No. 12-1019,
. As a result, the Court need not reach the issue of whether future intent to distribute serves as a sufficient forum-related contact for purposes of specific jurisdiction. The Court notes, however, that the one district court in this Circuit to' have addressed this issue, AstraZeneca,