CHIDIEBERE SARAH OTI, Plaintiff, VS. GREEN OAKS SCC, LLC, ET AL., Defendants.
NO. 4:13-CV-816-A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION
JAN 23 2015
Case 4:13-cv-00816-A Document 32 Filed 01/23/15 Page 1 of 10 PageID 729
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Came on for consideration in the above-captioned action the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Green Oaks, SCC LLC d/b/a Senior Care of Green Oaks (“Green Oaks“). No response was filed. Having now considered all of the parties’ filings, the entire summary judgment record, and the applicable legal authorities, the court concludes that defendant‘s motion for summary judgment should be granted.
I.
Background
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing her complaint on October 7, 2013. Plaintiff pleaded that defendant: (1) failed to pay overtime in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act
II.
The Summary Judgment Motion
Defendant argued for summary judgment on the grounds that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because all of plaintiff‘s claims lack merit. First, defendant argued that plaintiff‘s claim for unpaid overtime fails because plaintiff (a) cannot establish that she performed work for which she was not properly compensated, (b) she cannot demonstrate that defendant knew she was working overtime, and (c) defendant‘s time records and pay records negate the reasonableness of inferences based on her alleged evidence. Second, defendant argued plaintiff‘s claim for unpaid, missed meal breaks fails because (a) such cause of action was not pleaded, (b) to the extent that her claim does not implicate minimum wage or overtime violations, she fails to state a claim under the FLSA, and (c) she cannot establish she worked uncompensated overtime or that defendant knew or should have known of such overtime. Third, defendant argued that plaintiff
III.
Undisputed Facts Pertinent to the Motion for Summary Judgment
The following is an overview of evidence pertinent to the motion for summary judgment that is undisputed in the summary judgment record:
Plaintiff began her employment with defendant as a part-time licensed vocational nurse at Green Oaks. On or about October 22, 2012, she became a full-time employee. She continued to work there until her termination on March 25, 2013. During her tenure at Green Oaks, plaintiff made several complaints regarding lack of overtime pay and missed breaks. It is unclear how many such complaints she made, however her deposition testimony was that around May of 2012, she complained to “Sandra” who referred her
On or about March 25, 2013, plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Dimes regarding her hallway assignment. Plaintiff had been promised a move to a new hallway, but Dimes stated she was still needed on the “Medicare Hallway.” Apparently the conversation became heated, and plaintiff refused to continue working on that hallway and threatened to report Dimes for taking patient charts home in violation of facility rules. Plaintiff was then terminated for insubordination (as well as an allegation of assault which was later determined to be uncorroborated) on March 29, 2013.
Shortly after her termination, plaintiff was contacted by Marina Zuza, the Regional People Strategy Manager at the time, who allegedly told plaintiff she was wrongfully terminated and offered her the opportunity to return to her former position.
IV.
Applicable Summary Judgment Principles
Once the movant has carried its burden under
V.
Analysis
A. Plaintiff‘s Claim for Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA
Plaintiff‘s complaint states that she was not paid for a number of overtime hours. In her deposition, plaintiff estimated the number of hours she worked overtime in 2011, 2012, and 2013. Def.‘s App. at 81-82. However, plaintiff acknowledged that she was just guessing as to these numbers. Id. at 80. Plaintiff also testified that none of her overtime in 2012 was off the clock and therefore should be reflected in her time sheets, though some of the hours in 2013 may have been off the clock. Id. at 177-178.
In order to carry her burden, plaintiff must prove that “[she] has in fact performed work for which [she] was improperly compensated and if [she] produced sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946). The employer then must carry its burden by submitting either “evidence of the precise amount of work performed . . .” or evidence which negates “the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee‘s evidence.” Id. at 687-688. Therefore, initially plaintiff must “produce[] sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter
B. Plaintiff‘s Gap-Time Claim for Unpaid, Missed Meal Breaks
During her deposition, plaintiff testified about a number of missed meal breaks that went uncompensated. She stated that she
C. Plaintiff‘s Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff‘s complaint states she was wrongly terminated in retaliation for her complaints about not receiving overtime pay when she worked more than forty hours per week.
In order to establish retaliation under the FLSA, plaintiff “must first make a prima facie showing of (1) participation in protected activity under the FLSA; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the activity and the adverse action.” Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 624 (5th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, “the defendant must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision.” Id. Once defendant does so, plaintiff must “demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Id. This test is referred to as the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. It was originally a Title VII case, but has been applied in cases of retaliation under the FLSA, and therefore Title VII precedent is instructive.
Because of the generic nature of the complaint and plaintiff‘s apparent confusion during her deposition, the nature of her retaliation complaint is not entirely clear. Plaintiff‘s deposition testimony mentions having complained about uncompensated overtime to “Sandra,” “Pat,” “Tandy,” “Maureen,” “Glynn Brown,” and then “Kim.” Def.‘s App. at 27-28, 32-34. Such complaints are presumably the protected activity required by the prima facie case.3 Plaintiff‘s termination, of course, was the adverse employment action.
Plaintiff‘s burden in showing a “causal link” “in prong three of the [prima facie] case for retaliation is not as stringent as the ‘but for’ standard.” Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001). However, plaintiff has presented no evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action whatsoever. “Close timing between an employee‘s protected activity and an
VI.
Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that Green Oak‘s motion for summary judgment be, and is hereby, granted, and that all claims and causes of action brought by plaintiff against Green Oaks, be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.
SIGNED January 23 2015.
JOHN McBRYDE
United States District Judge
