MEMORANDUM OPINION
This сase involves a challenge to a final critical habitat determination by the Unit *123 ed States Fish and Wildlife Service for the San Diego fairy shrimp (Branchinecta sandiegonensis), an endangered species which inhabits the waters in and around San Diego County, California. The Federal Defendants move to transfer the case to the Southern District of California, asserting that the interests of justice will be served best by transferring this action. In support of their motion, the Federal Defendants observe that the agency that substantially developed the final critical habitat determination at issue is located within the Southern District of California, two of the Plaintiffs reside in the Southern District of California, and all five of the critical habitat units designated for the San Diego fairy shrimp are located in sоuthern California, four’ of which are located in San Diego County. Despite the location of the property at issue, the Court finds that the arguments in favor of transfer do not outweigh the deference afforded to the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum, and therefore will deny the Federal Defendants’ motion to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District оf California.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”) is an agency of the Federal Government which is authorized to designate critical habitats for endangered species under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533. In 1997, pursuant to this authorization, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), an agency of DOI, added the San Diego fairy shrimp to the list of endangered sрecies, see Determination of Endangered Status for the San Diego Fairy Shrimp, 62 Fed.Reg. 4925 (Feb. 3, 1997), and in 2000, the FWS designated approximately 4,000 acres in Orange and San Diego counties in California as critical habitat for the species, see Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the San Diego Fairy Shrimp, 65 Fed.Reg. 63438 (Oct. 23, 2000). Plaintiffs, Otay Mesa Property, L.P., Rancho Vista Del Mar, and Otay International, LLC, аre owners of unimproved land in the Otay Mesa area of San Diego County, California. Compl. ¶¶ 1-3 [Dkt. # 1], The 2000 final determination did not include any of Plaintiffs’ land. Pis.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Transfer (“Pis.’ Opp’n”) at 3 [Dkt. # 19].
After a challenge to the 2000 designation by the Natural Resources Defense Council in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which FWS resolved by requesting a voluntary remand for further rulemaking, FWS published a new proposed rule designating approximately 6,000 acres as fairy shrimp habitat, see Designation of Critical Habitat for the San Diego Fairy Shrimp, 68 Fed.Reg. 19888 (Apr. 22, 2003), including about 143 acres of Plaintiffs’ land. Pis.’ Opp’n at 3. As of 2007, FWS had not issued a final rule, so the plaintiffs in the case pending before the Central District of California moved that court to order FWS to complete its rulеmaking. Id. at 4. FWS issued its final rule on December 12, 2007, designating approximately 4,000 acres, including a portion of Plaintiffs’ property, as critical habitat for the San Diego fairy shrimp. See Designation of Critical Habitat for the San Diego Fairy Shrimp, 72 Fed.Reg. 70648 (Dec. 12, 2007).
Plaintiffs’ property is located along the United States-Mexican border in San Diego County, east of the city of San Diego, in a rugged and hilly coastal-mesa area, lying west of the foothills of the San Ysidro Mountains. Pis.’ Opp’n at 4. Most of the area is accessible only in heavy-duty utility vehicles or on horseback, and is not accessible by public roads. Id., Ex. 2 (Wick Decl. (“Wick Decl.”)) ¶ 5. The portion of Plaintiffs’ property that is designated as part of the critical habitat is privately *124 owned, unimproved land, but is zoned for light industriаl use. Pis.’ Opp’n at 4. The Plaintiffs together own approximately 274.55 acres, about 143 acres of which have been designated by the FWS as critical habitat for the San Diego fairy shrimp. Id. These 143 acres are included in a 391-acre area that the FWS refers to as Subunit 5D, a parcel designated by the FWS as fairy shrimp habitat. Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 3, 2008, pursuant to the Administrative Proсedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq., and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., seeking to declare unlawful and set aside the FWS’s final rule designating the critical habitat. The Federal Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. See Dkt. # 13. They argue that the interests of justice will be best served by a transfer to that jurisdiction because the Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife Office in the Southern District of California substantially developed the final critical habitat determination at issue; all five of the critical habitat units designated for the San Diego fairy shrimp are located in southern California, one in Orange County, and the other four in San Diego County; and the property that Plaintiffs allege was included improperly in the final critical habitat determination is part of Subunit 5D, which is located in San Diego County. Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. to Transfer Venue (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 1-2.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes a court to transfer a civil action to any other district where it could have been brought “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is “to prevent the waste of ‘time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect the litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.’ ”
See Van Dusen v. Barrack,
“Transfer under section 1404(a) involves a multi-part analysis: first, the court must determine that venue is proper in the transferor district; next, it must ensure both jurisdiction and venue will lie in the proposed transferee district; and finally, it must weigh several private and public interest factors to determine whether transfer would, indeed, be ‘in the interest of justice.’ ”
Elemary v. Holzmann,
III. ANALYSIS
While it is clear that jurisdiction and venuе over this action are proper here, the Federal Defendants seek to have the case transferred to the Southern District of California. Because venue and jurisdiction over this action also lie in the Southern District of California, this Court must determine whether convenience and the interests of justice recommend transfer to that district.
See Citizen Advocаtes for Responsible Expansion, Inc. v. Dole,
The private interest factors are of limited value in this case. The convenience factors, including convenience of thе parties, the witnesses, and ease of access to sources of proof, have little, if any, impact on this case. The parties agree that there is unlikely to be any discovery or trial since this case involves judicial review of agency action that is preserved in the administrative record, and the case likely will be resolved on summary judgment on the basis оf that administrative record.
See
Defs.’ Mem. at 11;
accord
Pis.’ Opp’n at 9-10. With respect to the parties’ choices of forum, the Federal Defendants argue that the Court should give little deference to the Plaintiffs’ forum choice.
See
Defs.’ Mem. at 8-9. While a plaintiff is given its choice of forum and “a trial judge must give considerable, but not conclusive, weight to the plaintiffs initial forum choice,”
Pain v. United Techs. Corp.,
Here, most of the Plaintiffs reside within the Southern District of California and the property at issue is located within the Southern District of California. The Federal Defendants therefore argue that the connection between the District of Columbiа and the present controversy is attenuated. They rely on this attenuated connection to assert that the interests of justice favor transfer, but the Court is unpersuaded. Federal Defendants correctly state that the connection between the facts of the controversy and the District of Columbia is attenuated. Because of this attenuated connection, the deference afforded to the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is “diminished.”
See Citizen Advocates,
The public interest factors similarly offer little to overcome the deference afforded to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Neither the first nor the second public interest factor affects this analysis.
1
The Federal
*126
Defendants’ argument in support of transfer relies primarily on the third public interest factor — the local interest in deciding local controversies at home
2
— in conjunction with the attenuated nature of the connection between the District of Columbia and the final critical habitat determination for the San Diego fairy shrimp. To determine whether a controversy is local in nature, courts consider a wide variety of factors, including: where the challenged decision was made; whether the decision directly аffected the citizens of the transferee state; the location of the controversy, whether the issue involved federal constitutional issues rather than local property laws or statutes; whether the controversy involved issues of state law, whether the controversy has some national significance; and whether there was personal involvement by a District of Columbia official.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey,
It is undisputed that the final rule was reviewed and approved by officials of the FWS and the DOI Solicitor’s Offices in the District of Columbia. See Defs.’ Mem. at 9. Thus, the ultimate decision to issue the final rule on the critical habitat designation for the San Diego fairy shrimp was made in the District of Columbia. The Federal Defendants assert, however, and the Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the government officials in the District of Columbia did not have any “particular involvement in the promulgаtion of the final critical habitat designation, which substantially was developed in the Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife Office in San Diego County.” Id. Accepting both of these facts as true, the factors regarding where the challenged decision was made and whether there was any personal involvement by an official in the District of Columbia provide little support for either side, as each side’s argument balances out the other’s.
The location of the controversy is best described as having arisen in the Southern District of California because the portion of Plaintiffs’ property that was designated as part of the critical habitat is located in San Diego County, which is wholly subsumed by the Southern District of California, see 28 U.S.C. § 84(d). This factor weighs in favor of transfer. On the other hand, the controversy involves an issue of federal environmental law under the Endangered Species Act that is subject to judicial review under the APA; no local or state property laws are involved. This factor weighs against transfer.
Finally, this issue affects the residents of San Diego County no more directly than it does the residents of the District of Columbia, or any other district within the United Stаtes, as this is an issue regarding the critical habitat of an endangered species whose vitality is as much a national concern as it is a local concern. Quite simply, this case presents a controversy over the application of a federal law whose *127 purpose is to ensure the conservation of endangered and threatened speсies and their ecosystems. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). Although the fairy shrimp have a natural habitat in San Diego County, the outcome of this case will have no direct or unique impact upon the residents of San Diego County. It is on this point that the Federal Defendants’ argument for transfer ultimately fails.
In each of the cases that the Federal Defendants cite, the local population facеd specific injury of a particularly local nature either as a result of, or upon enjoinment of, a challenged action.
3
In
National Wildlife Federation v. Harvey,
for example, the district court for the District of Columbia found that the local interest in deciding the controversy at home strongly favored transfer to the Southern District of Florida where the plaintiffs challenged the United States Corps of Enginеers’ water management schedule for Lake Okeechobee that allegedly jeopardized the population of an endangered bird species that is native to Lake Okeechobee.
*128
In contrast, the present case directly affects only the Plaintiffs, who oppose the inclusion of a part of their property in the land designated as critical habitat, and the FWS, which is charged with enforcing the Endangered Species Act. The land at issue is private property that is not accessible by the public, and there is no construction project currently planned for the property.
See
Pis.’ Opp’n at 15. Furthermore, the outcome of this case will not affect the local water supply, availability of irrigation water, flood levels or economic development of San Diego County, or have any other foreseeable direct impact on the residents of San Diego County.
Cf., e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the Federal Defendants’ motion to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. A memorializing order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Notes
. The first public interest factor, the transferee court's familiarity with the governing laws, is irrelevant here, as the Plaintiffs base all of their claims on federal environmental law, and this Court follows the well-settled " 'principle that the transferee federal court is competent to decide federal issues correctly.’ "
Sierra Club v. Flowers,
.
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
. The Federal Defendants also cite a number of cases that are factually dissimilar in that they do not implicate issues of federal environmental law, and are therefore unpersuasive.
See Kafack v. Primerica Life Ins. Co.,
. The Federal Defendants cite two other cases in support of their motion to transfer venue, but in each of those cases, the court granted the motion to transfer because a nearly identical suit was already pending in the transferee court.
See Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Badgley,
No. 02-2328(RCL),