OPINION BY
WB Publiс Square Associates, LLC (“Appellant”), appeals from the September 12, 2012 order in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denying Appellant’s petition to open and strike judgment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse.
This case was commenced when Erika Oswald (“Appellee”) filed a complaint alleging that Appellant was liable for the injuries that she sustained while “acting in her official capacity as a Wilkes-Barre City Police Officer.” Appellee’s Complaint, 9/15/2010, at 2. Specifically, Appel-lee alleged that Appellant is liable under theories of negligеnce and dram shop law for serving a “visibly and obviously intoxicated [person] at the time that he assaulted [Appellee].” Id. The trial court has summarized the remaining facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
This matter was initiated by a Complaint filed by [Appellee], on September 1[5], 2010[,] аgainst [Appellant], individually and t/d/b/a Hardware Bar. Service of the Complaint was made on September 20, 2010[,] by the Luzerne County Sheriff.
No response to the Complaint was filed so Plaintiff served an Important Notice on [Appellant] on November 10, 2010 by United States First Class Mail. This Notice provided [Appellаnt] with an additional ten days to act before a judgment was entered. Because [Appellant] again failed to file a response, [Appellee] filed a Praecipe for Entry of Judgment by Default and a Default Judgment was entered in favor of [Appellee] and against [Appellant] on Dеcember 17, 2010.
On June 16, 2011, original counsel filed an Entry of Appearance on behalf of [Appellant]. Original counsel for [Appellant] then filed a Written Demand for Jury Trial. Approximately one year later, original counsel withdrew his appearance and current counsel entered hers fоr [Appellant]. On August 9, 2012, more than twenty-two months after the Complaint was served on [Appel*793 lant] and more than nineteen months after the Default Judgment was entered, current counsel filed a Petition to Open/Petition to Strike Judgment. [Ap-pellee] responded to the Petition by filing an Answer and Brief on August 22, 2012. Oral Argument wаs held on September 10, 2012.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 9/12/2012, at 1-2.
On September 12, 2012, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. Should the Default Judgment be stricken where the record reflects a fatal defect in the Important Notiсe because it does not conform to Pa.R.C.P. 237.5, making the entry of judgment void ab initio?
2. Did the trial court err in denying the Petition to Strike Default where the record reflects improper service of the Complaint on the defendant corporation by providing same to a security person, not an officer of the corporation, at a location other than the premises where the Hardware Bar was located?
3. Did the trial court err in denying a Petition to Open Default and failing to consider all three criteria for opening a default where defendant pleaded numerous mеritorious defenses to the allegations contained in the Complaint, where defendant provided a reasonable explanation and excuse for failing to file a response pleading, and defendant, through present counsel, promptly filed a petition to open default?
4.Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s] petition to open default judgment by failing to consider the equities of the matter, the prejudice to the [Appellant] if the petition to open was denied, and the lack of prejudice to [Ap-pellee] if the petition to open default was grаnted?
Brief for Appellant at 5.
Our standard of review regarding Appellant’s petition to strike default judgment is well settled.
“A petition to strike a judgment operates аs a demurrer to the record, and must be granted whenever some fatal defect appears on the face of the record.” First Union Nat Bank v. Portside Refrig
Instantly, Appellant contends that Appellee’s November 10, 2010 notice of praecipe to enter judgment by default failed substantially to comply with the format required by Pa.R.C.P. 237.5 and, thеrefore, violated Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(2). Appellee does not directly respond to Appellant’s arguments, except to claim that “because the issue was not raised before the Lower Court [it] is therefore waived[.]”
Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(2) states: “No judgment of ... default for failure to plead shall be entered by the prothonotary unless the praecipe for entry includes a certification that a written notice of intention to file the praecipe was mailed or delivered.” This written notification of intention to file a praecipe for default judgment (“Ten-Day Notice”) must be delivered to the opposing party at least ten days prior to the entry of default judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(2)(ii). In satisfying Rule 237.1, the notice also must comply with the requirements set fоrth at Pa.R.C.P. 237.5:
The notice required by Rule 237.1(a)(2) shall be substantially in the following form:
* * #
IMPORTANT NOTICE
YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO ENTER A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY ATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING WITH THE COURT YOUR DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTH AGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHIN TEN DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE EN*795 TERED AGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING AND YOU MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY AND OTHER IMPORTANT RIGHTS.
Pa.R.C.P. 237.5 (emphasis added).
Our review of applicable precedent has revealed no jurisprudence from this Court directly discussing the relationship between Pa.R.C.P. 237.1 and Pa.R.C.P. 237.5 for the purposes of evaluating a petition to strike a default judgment. However, the Commonwealth Court has had occasion to address this very issue recently in David J. Lane Advertising,
In David J. Lane Advertising, the Commonwealth Court ordered a default judgment stricken due to the respondent’s failure substantially to comply with the strictures of Rulе 237.5, which the Commonwealth Court found to exist hand-in-hand with the requirements located at Rule 237.1(a)(2). David J. Lane Advertising,
[T]he general “failed to take action required of you in this case” language is consistent with the version of the form in Rule 237.5 predating a 1994 amendment (Old Form Notice). In the 1994 amendment, which became effective on July 1, 1995, the Supreme Court chose to remove this general language in the Old Form Notice and to substitute the more specific language in the current form — “failed to enter a written appearance personally or by attorney and file in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you.” Indeed, it appears from the explanatory comment to the rule that the specific purpose of the 1994 amendment was to add this more specific language to the form. The explanatory comment notes that the purpose of the modificаtion is to track the language set forth in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1018.1 for a notice to plead, which language expressly directs the defendant to defend by entering an appearance (either personally or by attorney) and by filing with the court in writing defenses or objections to the claims in the complaint. Thе comment to Rule 237.5 further provides: “Since the notice will in many cases be sent to an as yet unrepresented defendant, repetition of the notice to defend, in modified form helps to stimulate action and stem the tide of petitions to open default judgments.”*796 In adopting the revision to the fоrm, then, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that before entering judgment by default (which is no insignificant matter), it was important to notify a defendant specifically what it failed to do (ie., why it was in default) by tracking the language in the earlier-issued notice to defend. Rather than informing a defendant that he merely “failed to takе action required by you in this case,” a more specific notice of why the defendant was in default that tracks the earlier notice to defend serves as a reminder to the defendant in many cases unrepresented at that point, of the defendant’s specific pleading obligations.
Id. аt 678-79 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). The Commonwealth Court examined the above legislative and judicial history in the context of its holding in Township of Chester v. Steuber,
The [Ten]-Day Notice required by Rule 237.1 in this case was defective on its face, as it was not “substantially” in the form required by Rule 237.5. Rather, the notice was based on the Old Form Notice, which the Pennsylvania Suprеme Court amended to include the very language that the [respondent] omitted from its notice in this case — language that the Supreme Court added for a specific reason. See Erie Ins. Co. [839 A.2d at 387 ]. Failure to include this key language was, therefore, a fatal defect.
Id. at 680.
Turning to the instant case, the opening language in Appellee’s Ten-Day Notice is identical to the deficient language in David J. Lane Advertising. See Appellee’s Ten-Day Notice, 12/17/2010, at 1 (“YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO TAKE ACTION REQUIRED OF YOU IN THIS CASE.”); cf. David J. Lane Advertising,
Due to the significant delay in Appellant’s response to the instant lawsuit, we will briefly address the issue of timeliness. The effect of timeliness on petitions to strike default judgment depends entirely upon the validity of the underlying judgment: “If the judgment was found to be void ... timeliness would not be a factor and the petition to strike would be granted. If the judgment was found to be voidable, timeliness would be a factor and the petition would be granted only if it was filed within a reasonable time. Finally, if the judgmеnt was found to be valid and fully effective, the petition to strike would be denied and timeliness would not be a factor-” Wade,
Instantly, we have concluded that the default judgment is void ab initio; “such a judgment must be striсken without regard to the passage of time.” See Jones v. Seymour,
Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to strike, and we strike the default judgment entered in this matter as void ab initio. In light of our conclusion with regard to Appellant’s first issue, we need not address Appellant’s remaining claims.
Order reversed. Judgment stricken. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and Appellant did not file one.
. Appellant's original petition challenging Ap-pellee’s default judgment exclusively discussed the issue of opening the default judgment. Appellant’s Petition to Open / Petition to Strike, 8/9/2012, at 1-5. Generally, this Court will decline to address issues not first raised before the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). However, we have long held that a litigant may seek to strike a void judgment at any time. See Erie Insurance Co. v. Bullard, 839 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa.Super.2003); Helms v. Boyle,
. Appellee conflates Appellant's separate issues of opening the default judgment and striking the default judgment. Brief for Ap-pеllee at 9. It is well-settled that "[a] petition to strike a default judgment and a petition to open a default judgment are two distinct remedies, which are generally not interchangeable.” Williams v. Wade,
. The explanatory comments accompanying the rules оf civil procedure do not constitute a part of the rule itself, but "they indicate the spirit and motivation behind the drafting of the rule, and they serve as guidelines for understanding the purpose for which the rule was drafted.” David J. Lane Advertising,
. We reaffirm as well our fidelity to the general principle that "a default judgment entered where there has not been strict compliance with the rules of civil procedure is void.” See Franklin Interiors, Inc. v. Browns Lane, Inc.,