This case was before the court on a former appeal. (
Respecting what will amount to, or may be received as evidence of a dedication, the law is too well settled to admit of controversy. A setting apart, or dedication to a public use, to be effectual, need not be by deed; nor need it be evidenced by the use of it having been continued for any particular time ; it is enough, that there has been some clear, unequivocal act, or declaration of the proprietor, evidencing an intention tо set it apart for a public use, and that others have acted in reference to, and upon the faith of, such manifestation of intention. If the act of dedication be unequivocal, it may take place immediately. If there bе no such act, it may be evidenced by an uninterrupted use; and that need not be for any particular time.
A dedication has been defined to be, the act of devoting, or giving property, for some proper object, and in such manner as to conclude the owner. (Hunter v. Trustees, &c.,
To apply this doctrine to the case before us. The lots in this addition to the city of San Antonio, were sold with express referenсe to a map, on which this space, if not left open as a common or public way, was, at least, not numbered or marked as a lot; and from its peculiar situation and form, the natural inference of those who consulted the map, with a view to purchase, would be, that it was intended to remain an open space, common, or way, for public use. The witness, McLeod, (the original'purchaser from whom the plaintiff derived his title,) testified, that such was the express understanding between himself
But other witnesses testified, that this open space was left, аnd designed by the proprietor, for a public well; and the great weight of the evidence is to that effect. Some of the witnesses understood the proprietor to say, he would give it for a public well, if the neighbors would make the well; but the understanding of all, was, that it had been left, or would be given, for a public well; and that accords with the testimony of the witness McLeod, that it should remain open, and no buildings or obstructions should be placed upon it. It would so remain, if a public well was sunk thеre. There would probably be no structure to obstruct the view; and that, it seems, was what he considered material, and what he had in view in making a purchase. "What he, and others probably, in the vicinity, were interested in, was, not that a public well should not be sunk there', for that would probably enhance the value of their property, but that there should be no building erected there to obstruct the view. What concerned them was, that the space should be kept open, and not be occupied by a structure like that which defendant has placed upon it; which according to the testimony of all the witnesses who speak to that point, materially impairs the value of the plaintiff’s property. It would be, it would seem, quite immaterial to them, whether the space was to remain open for public use, as a way, or common, or the site of a public well, so that no structure was placed there to obstruct the view, and thus impair their comfort or convenience.
But, leaving out of view the interest which purchasers of property in the vicinity had in keeping this space open, and the view unobstructed, and assuming that this space was to be given to the public for a well, upon the condition that the inhabitants would dig the well, it cannot be supposed that it was contemplated, that this would be done immediately, or until the wants or convenience of the inhabitants required it. This рart of the city must first be peopled, before there would be inhabitants to dig, or have occasion for a well. It might be many years before this part of the city would become sufficiently populous, to require the convenience of a public well. It is not pretended, that there was any time limited within which it must be made. Those who purchased in view of the proffer of this use, had the right to suppose that it would not be withdrawn, nor could it be, to their detriment. Their purchase, in view of this рroposed use, made it a dedication of the property for that use, which could not be resumed, until it should first be determined by non-user ; and this cannot be presumed from a lapse of less time than that which would raise the presumption of а grant of the use. (2 Smith’s Lead. Cases, 5th Amer. edit. 211;
In any view of the case, we think the evidence sufficient to warrant the jury in finding the fact of dedication to a public use; and there is nothing in the evidence to warrant the resumption of the рroperty by the proprietor. In oiu’ view of the law of the case, in its application to the evidence, it will be seen, that our opinion is, that there was no error in the charge of the court, or in the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
On the former appeal, there was nothing in the record to show for what use this spot of ground was intended; and the very material difference between the case as then, and now presented, will be sufficiently apparent without further comment. But it maybe proper to observe, that we may then have attached too much consequence to the fact, that the deeds read in evidence called for the streets, instead of this small open spaсe surrounded by streets. The fact that it was thus separated from the lots, by streets upon which the lots fronted; its peculiar form, not being a square, nor capable of being described as a public square, but being a small triangle, so small and so situаted, as not to be capable of being conveniently made the subject of a descriptive call, sufficiently accounts for the fact that it was not so made in the deeds. The street was itself a more prominent object than this spot of ground, and of course the street would be made the descriptive call in the deeds.
We are of opinion, that there is no error in the judgment, and it is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.