OSTROTH v WARREN REGENCY, GP, LLC
Docket No. 126859
Supreme Court of Michigan
February 1, 2006
474 MICH 36
Argued October 19, 2005 (Calendar No. 4).
In an opinion by Justice WEAVER, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CAVANAGH, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The Court of Appeals properly held that the six-year period of limitations provided by
MCL 600.5805(14) provides that the period of limitations for an action against a state-licensed architect based on an improvement to real property is as provided in§ 5839 . Section 5839(1) provides that the period within which the plaintiffs can maintain their action against the defendant architectural firm is six years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement.MCL 600.5839(1) is both a statute of repose and a statute of limitations. The plaintiffs’ action for damages against the defendant architectural firm is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.- To the extent that the Court of Appeals decision in Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240 (1994), is inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court in this matter, it must be overruled.
Justice KELLY, concurring, wrote separately to explain that when she wrote her concurring opinion in Stanislawski v Calculus Constr Co, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 7, 1994 (Docket No. 145467), she was bound by MCR 7.215(J)(1) to follow Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240 (1994). She joins in the decision reached by the Court in this matter.
Affirmed and remanded to the circuit court.
- LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, AND CONTRACTORS.
The period of limitations applicable to an action against a state-licensed architect based on an improvement to real property is six years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement (
MCL 600.5805[14] ,600.5839[1] ). - LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, AND CONTRACTORS.
The provisions in
MCL 600.5839(1) regarding the time within which to bring an action against a state-licensed architect based on an improvement to real property provide both a statute of repose and a statute of limitations.
Donnelly W. Hadden, P.C. (by Donnelly W. Hadden), and Ball & Ball, LLP (by Bettie K. Ball), for Jennifer L. and Brian D. Hudock.
Sullivan, Ward, Asher & Patton, P.C. (by Ronald S. Lederman), for Edward Schulak, Hobbs & Black, Inc.
Amici Curiae:
Thomas M. Keranen & Associates, P.C. (by Frederick F. Butters), for American Institute of Architects, Michigan.
Thomas M. Keranen & Associates, P.C. (by Thomas M. Keranen and Peter J. Cavanaugh), for Associated General Contractors of America Greater Detroit Chapter, Inc., and Michigan Chapter Associated General Contractors of America, Inc.
Thomas M. Keranen & Associates, P.C. (by Gary D. Quesada), for Integrated Designs, Inc.
Floyd E. Allen & Associates (by Corey D. Grandmaison) for Ecorse Board of Education.
Sullivan, Ward, Asher & Patton, P.C. (by Michael J. Asher), for the Construction Association of Michigan, Sheet Metal & Air Conditioning Contractors National Association, Great Lakes Fabricators and Erectors Association, and Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors of Detroit.
Sullivan, Ward, Asher & Patton, P.C. (by Christopher B. McMahon), and Thomas M. Keranen & Associates, P.C. (by Gary D. Quesada), for GMB Architects-Engineers, Inc.
WEAVER, J. This architectural malpractice case poses the issue whether
FACTS
In April 1998, defendant Edward Schulak, Hobbs & Black, Inc., architects and consultants, was the architect in a renovation project, designing renovations for office spaces at 12222 East Thirteen Mile Road in Warren, Michigan. Plaintiff Jennifer L. Hudock worked in the offices from April 24, 1998, through August 24, 1998. Plaintiff alleges that during that time she was exposed to environmental hazards such as fungus, mold, bacteria, formaldehyde, and carbon dioxide as a result of the renovations to the building‘s heating, cooling, ventilation, and plumbing systems. She claims that she sustained personal injuries as a result of environmental hazards arising from the renovation of her workplace.2
Plaintiff initiated this action for damages on May 10, 2000. In her first amended complaint filed November 14, 2000, plaintiff alleged that defendant-architect negligently exposed plaintiff to a hazardous environment that caused injury and increased the risk of injury in the future. Defendant first moved for summary disposition, challenging the merits of plaintiff‘s claim. The circuit court then allowed defendant to amend its affirmative defenses to include the claim that plaintiff‘s suit was time-barred by the two-year limitations period of
We granted defendant‘s application for leave to appeal and directed that the parties include among the issues to be briefed
(1) whether
MCL 600.5839(1) precludes application of the statutes of limitations prescribed byMCL 600.5805 and, if not, (2) which statute of limitations,MCL 600.5805(6) orMCL 600.5805(10) , is applicable to the claim asserted against defendant Edward Schulak, Hobbs & Black, Inc., in this case.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v Dep‘t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). This case involves a question of statutory interpretation, which this Court also reviews de novo. Oade v Jackson Nat‘l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250-251; 632 NW2d 126 (2001).
ANALYSIS
A person cannot commence an action for damages for injuries to a person or property unless the complaint is filed within the periods prescribed by
A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
The several subsections of
Relevant to this case,
When interpreting statutes, “we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed . . . .” DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). Judicial construction is not required or permitted if the text of the statute is unambiguous. Id.
The period of limitations for an action against a state licensed architect, professional engineer, land surveyor, or contractor based on an improvement to real property shall be as provided in section 5839.
No person may maintain any action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained as a result of such injury, against any state licensed architect or professional engineer performing or furnishing the design or supervision of construction of the improvement, or against any contractor making the improvement, more than 6 years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement, or 1 year after the defect is discovered or should have been discovered, provided that the defect constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which the action is brought and is the result of gross negligence on the part of the contractor or licensed architect or professional engineer. However, no such action shall be maintained more than 10 years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement.
Defendant contends that the six-year period of
This Court first addressed
[T]he instant statute is both one of limitation and one of repose. For actions which accrue within six years from occupancy, use, or acceptance of the completed improvement, the statute prescribes the time within which such actions may be brought and thus acts as a statute of limitations. When more than six years from such time have elapsed before an injury is sustained, the statute prevents a cause of action from ever accruing.8
Regarding the purpose of the statute, O‘Brien stated: “The Legislature chose to limit the liability of architects and engineers in order to relieve them of the potential burden of defending claims brought long after completion of the improvement . . . .”9
Despite O‘Brien‘s statement10 that
For this argument, defendant relies on Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240; 511 NW2d 720 (1994). Witherspoon addressed whether the six-year period under
Although Witherspoon13 correctly recognized that the current
Because defendant is a state-licensed architect that furnished the design for the improvements to the real property that allegedly caused plaintiff‘s injury, under
Moreover, it does not render any portion of
Finally, our interpretation is not in conflict with the policies underlying
By enacting a statute which grants architects and engineers complete repose after six years rather than abrogating the described causes of action in toto, the Legislature struck what it perceived to be a balance between eliminating altogether the tort liability of these professions and placing no restriction other than general statutes of limitations upon the ability of injured plaintiffs to bring tort actions against architects and engineers. The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that allowing suits against architects and engineers to be maintained within six years from the time of occupancy, use, or acceptance of an improvement would allow sufficient time for most meritorious claims to accrue and would permit suit against those guilty of the most serious lapses in their professional endeavors.
As stated in O‘Brien, “[t]he power of the Legislature to determine the conditions under which a right may accrue and the period within which a right may be asserted is undoubted.” Id. at 14.
CONCLUSION
We hold that
KELLY, J. (concurring). I concur with the majority in this case that the applicable limitations period is six years as stated in
When I penned my concurrence in Stanislawski I was bound by Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240; 511 NW2d 720 (1994). See MCR 7.215(J)(1). Now that I am in the position to overturn Witherspoon and see the wisdom of doing so, I join in the decision reached by the Court in this case.