Ostroth v. Warren Regency, GP, LLCOstroth v. Warren Regency, GP, LLC
Lead
This architectural malpractice case poses the issue whether
FACTS
In April 1998, defendant Edward Schulak, Hobbs & Black, Inc., architects and consultants, was the architect in a renovation project, designing renovations for office spaces at 12222 East Thirteen Mile Road in Warren, Michigan. Plaintiff Jennifer L. Hudock worked in the offices from April 24, 1998, through August 24, 1998. Plaintiff alleges that during that time she was exposed to environmental hazards such as fungus, mold, bacteria, formaldehyde, and carbon dioxide as a result of the renovations to the building’s heating, cooling, ventilation, and plumbing systems. She claims that she sustained personal injuries as a result of environmental hazards arising from the renovation of her workplace.
Plaintiff initiated this action for damages on May 10, 2000. In her first amended complaint filed November 14, 2000, plaintiff alleged that defendant-architect negligently exposed plaintiff to a hazardous environment that caused injury and increased the risk of injury in the future. Defendant first moved for summary disposition, challenging the merits of plaintiff’s claim. The circuit court then allowed defendant to amend its affirmative defenses to include the claim that plaintiffs suit was time-barred by the two-year limitations period of
The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, holding that the two-year limitations period for malpractice claims of
(1) whetherMCL 600.5839(1) precludes application of the statutes of limitations prescribed byMCL 600.5805 and, if not, (2) which statute of limitations,MCL 600.5805(6) orMCL 600.5805(10) , is applicable to the claim asserted against defendant Edward Schulak, Hobbs & Black, Inc., in this case.[3 ]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation,
ANALYSIS
A person cannot commence an action for damages for injuries to a person or property unless the complaint is filed within the periods prescribed by
A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
The several subsections of
Relevant to this case,
When interpreting statutes, “we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed .. ..” DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp,
The period of limitations for an action against a state licensed architect, professional engineer, land surveyor, or contractor based on an improvement to real property shall be as provided in section 5839.
No person may maintain any action to recover damages for any injury to property,real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained as a result of such injury, against any state licensed architect or professional engineer performing or furnishing the design or supervision of construction of the improvement, or against any contractor making the improvement, more than 6 years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement, or 1 year after the defect is discovered or should have been discovered, provided that the defect constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which the action is brought and is the result of gross negligence on the part of the contractor or licensed architect or professional engineer. However, no such action shall be maintained more than 10 years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement.
Defendant contends that the six-year period of
This Court first addressed
[T]he instant statute is both one of limitation and one of repose. For actions which accrue within six years from occupancy, use, or acceptance of the completed improvement, the statute prescribes the time within which such actions may be brought and thus acts as a statute of limitations. When more than six years from such time have elapsed before an injury is sustained, the statute prevents a cause of action from ever accruing.[8 ]
Regarding the purpose of the statute, O’Brien stated: “The Legislature chose to limit the liability of architects and engineers in order to relieve them of the potential burden of defending claims brought long after completion of the improvement.. . ,”
Despite O’Brien’s statement
For this argument, defendant relies on Witherspoon v Guilford,
Although Witherspoon
Because defendant is a state-licensed architect that furnished the design for the improvements to the real property that allegedly caused plaintiffs injury, under
Moreover, it does not render any portion of
Finally, our interpretation is not in conflict with the policies underlying
By enacting a statute which grants architects and engineers complete repose after six years rather than abrogating the described causes of action in toto, the Legislature struck what it perceived to be a balance between eliminating altogether the tort liability of these professions and placing no restriction other than general statutes of limitations upon the ability of injured plaintiffs to bring tort actions against architects and engineers. The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that allowing suits against architects and engineers to be maintained within six years from the time of occupancy, use, or acceptance of an improvement would allow sufficient time for most meritorious claims to accrue and would permit suit against those guilty of the most serious lapses in their professional endeavors.
As stated in O’Brien, “[t]he power of the Legislature to determine the conditions under which a right may accrue and the period within which a right may be asserted is undoubted.” Id. at 14.
CONCLUSION
We hold that
Notes
Plaintiffs husband’s claim is derivative. The other plaintiffs in this case, Ellen M. and Thane Ostroth, and two other defendants, Warren Regency, G.P., L.L.C.; and Warren Regency Limited Partnership, are not parties to this appeal.
“ ‘A statute of repose limits the liability of a party by setting a fixed time after .. . which the party will not be held hable for ... injury or damage .... Unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose may bar a claim before an injury or damage occurs.’ ” Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc,
O’Brien, supra at 15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Witherspoon, supra at 246.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Cf. Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co v West Detroit Bldg Co, Inc,
We note that Witherspoon appears to have been the “first out” under MCR 7.215(J)(1) on the precise question of statutory interpretation presented in this case. However, our decision to overrule Witherspoon to the extent that it is inconsistent with our decision resolves any conflict on the question.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). I concur with the majority in this case that the applicable limitations period is six years as stated in
When I penned my concurrence in Stanislawski I was bound by Witherspoon v Guilford,