OPINION
The motion for rehearing is denied. The opinion of July 14,1994 is withdrawn and this opinion substituted in its stead.
This is an appeal from a summary judgmеnt denying appellant relief in a bill of review proceeding. We reverse and remand for a trial on the bill of rеview.
Appellant brought this bill of review to set aside the dismissal of the underlying cause of action for want of prosеcution. On May 24, 1991, appellant brought suit against appel-lees. At that time, his attorney was Thomas Henderson, who sharеd office space with the law firm of Stephenson-Anderson and Associates, Inc. (Stephenson-Anderson) at 2200 Post Oak Blvd, suite 420, in Houston. On July 10,1991, appellant changed counsel, and Jan Steinberg was substituted for Mr. Henderson. Immediately before bеing substituted in this case, Mr. Steinberg changed law firms, and left his old address of 675 Bering Drive, suite 350, in Houston to join Stephenson-Anderson at thеir Post Oak address. Mr. Steinberg proceeded to litigate the underlying cause of action by responding to requests fоr production, filing his own requests for production, and filing notices of intent to take depositions. All of these were filed with the court, indicating Mr. Stein-berg’s address as 2200 Post Oak Blvd, Suite 420, in Houston.
On December 12, 1991, the court sent a notice to all attorneys in the case informing them that unless their request for trial setting was filed on or before January 24, 1992, the court would dismiss for want of prosecution. Appellant did not respond to this notice. On February 12, 1992, the court entered an order of dismissal fоr want of prosecution. On February 17, 1992, the court notified the attorneys that the case had been dismissed for want of prosecution. These notices were sent to Mr. Steinberg’s old address on Bering, not to the Post Oak address containеd in the file on all of the documents Mr. Steinberg had filed with the court. The Bering address was recorded in the Harris County District Clerk’s Rеgister of Attorneys.
A bill of review is an equitable proceeding to set aside a final judgment that is no longer appеalable or subject to a motion for new trial.
Transworld Fin. Serv. v. Briscoe,
The question on appeal is whether the summary judgment proоf establishes as a matter of law that there are no genuine issues of fact on one or more of the essеntial elements of a plaintiff’s cause of action.
Gibbs v. General Motors Corp.,
Appellant’s sole point of error contends that the trial court еrred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist on whether the court erred in mailing the noticе of intent to dismiss and subsequent dismissal to Mr. Stein-berg’s previous address. Before a lawsuit may be dismissed for want of prosecution, *582 the trial court must mail notice of its intention to dismiss and the date and place of the dismissal hearing to each аttorney of record to the address shown on the docket or in the papers on file. Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a(l). Appellant сontends that the court personnel made a mistake or error by failing to send the notices to the address shown in the papers on file with thе court. His counsel argues that since his address was indicated on the transmittal letters and other documents in the court’s file, the officers of the court failed to comply with Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a by mailing the notices to his previous address. Further, he points out, rule 165a makes no mention of a register or list of attorneys’ addresses for the purpose of providing the parties with notice.
Appellees contend that it was incumbent on appellant’s attorney to updatе the Harris County District Clerk’s Register of Attorneys with his proper address. In support of this contention, appellees presented four previous Attorney Register Change forms signed by Mr. Steinberg. These forms contain a warning: “This information will be used fоr all official notices, including dismissal for want of prosecution and trial assignment.” We find no statutory or case authоrity which authorizes a district clerk to use any address other than the address shown in the papers on file.
The papers on file with the court in this ease rеflect that appellant’s counsel’s address was on Post Oak. The notice was sent to Bering. Appellant met thе second prong of the test for bill of review.
Appellees assert on oral argument that appellant should have still updated the Attorney Register and was, therefore, negligent. This assertion relates to the third prong that any mistake or error must be unmixed by any negligence or fault of the complainant’s.
Baker,
Therefore, summary judgment was improper. We sustain appellant’s point of error.
We reverse the summary judgment and remand the bill of review proceedings for trial.
