OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
In аn opinion filed on August 6, 2001, this Court held that the failure of a bearing in a traveling block which was part of a block-and-tackle assembly did not constitute a “collapse” of the structure to which it was attached, and therefore was not an event within the scope of coverage of an
I.
Since this Court filed its opinion on August 6, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided
City of Wyandotte v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
II.
In the motion for rehearing, the only source of thе meaning of “collapse” upon which the plaintiff relies is the dictionary, or, more precisely, several dictionaries. He has not identified any relevant case law, industry practices or the parties’ conduct to suggest thаt “collapse” can encompass the simple failure of a bearing in a pulley. The cases cited by the Court in its original opinion, however, reinforce the notion that the sense of the term “collapse” when applied to a structure—such as a derrick or mast—denotes the compromise of the physical properties of the structure including shape, size or strength.
See Indiana Ins. Co. v. Liaskos,
The plaintiff directs the Court to Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary and Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, both of which include among the definitions of “collapse” the notion of “breakdown.” Indeed, New Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language at 197 (Deluxe Encyclopedic ed.1981) defines “collapse” as:
A falling in or together, as of the sides of a hollow vessel; a more or less sudden failure of the vital powers; a sudden and complete failure of any kind; a breakdown.
The Webster’s II New College Dictionary (Houghton Mifflin Co.2001) contains the following definition:
vi. 1. to fall down or inward suddenly; cave-in. 2. to break down suddenly in strength or health and cease to function[a government that collapsed ][a patient who collapsed'] 3. to fold compactly [temporary fencing that collapses ] ... n 1. the act of falling down or inward, as from loss of supports. 2. an abrupt failure of function, strength, or health: breakdown.
Thе plaintiff then looks to the definition of “breakdown” and discovers that it includes “a failure to function.” The plaintiff then reasons that because the bearing in the traveling block “failed to function,” it must have “collapsed” and, thereforе, if the peril did not fall four-square within the Policy, at least an ambiguity exists which should preclude summary judgment for the defendant.
The Court finds that the logic of the plaintiffs argument is diaphanous and brittle; it simply does not support the argument. First, the secondary and tertiary dictionary definitions of terms are not chains of synonyms. Rather, they are intended to expand, not distort, the sense of the defined term. Thus, a “collapse” can indeed be thought of an a type of “breakdown.” But not all breakdowns are properly termed a “collapse.” Similarly, a tornado is a storm but not all storms are tornados; a locomotive is a vehicle but not all vehicles are locomotives. Thus, an insurance policy that protects locomotives destroyed by tornados would not cover automobiles damaged by a hail storm, although one could extract some ambiguity in that analysis employing the logic used by the plaintiff in this case.
Second, the exercisе of linking definitions as one trips through the pages of the dictionary is interesting but neither useful nor illuminating. For example, an alternative definition of “breakdown” is “decomposition.” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Modern Desk Edition at 58 (The World Publishing Co.1971). But no serious student of language, nor an ordinary judgе, lawyer or citizen, would argue that decomposition and collapse have the same or similar meanings. One could, perhaps, collapse in a grave, but not after one’s burial.
Finally, the plaintiff contends once more that all this confusion is the fault of the insurance company which chose to draft the language of the Policy without defining the term. Under the rule of
contra proferentem,
plaintiff claims that the Court must accept his conjured definition of the disputed term. This argument аs framed by the plaintiff, however, sacrifices not only fidelity to the language but the rule of reason as well. It is not reasonable to expect that every word in an insurance contract will be internally defined. Some terns, when given their common and generally understood meaning, will require some interpretative gloss. As the Supreme Court noted when examining statutory language, “[t]here is little doubt that imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these terms would be a nice question, [but] because we are condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”
Hill v. Colorado,
However, just because a skillful advocate is able to concoct an argument that pulls an event within a conceivable description does not mean that a term is ambiguous in the legal sense. “Ever since Macbeth mistakenly relied on the linguistic precision of the witches’ prophecy, people have been able to construct weird and fanciful instances in which even the clearest language brеaks down.”
Glen Coal Co. v. Seals,
III.
In this case, it bears repeating that the term “collapse” has several meanings. See e.g., Indiana Ins. Co., supra. However, a missing, worn or defective bearing causing the failure of a pulley of a traveling block is not an event which can be reasоnably included in any of the definitions of that term. Because there was no collapse of a derrick or mast in this case, there is no coverage.
Since the motion before the Court is one seeking rehearing, it is governed by E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(1), which requires the moving party to show (1) a “palpable defect,” (2) the defect misled the court and the parties, and (3) that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3). A “palpable defect” is a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.
Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc.,
The plaintiff has demonstrated neither a palpable defect in this Court’s previous opinion, nor any reason why there should be a different disposition of this case. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion for rehearing [dkt # 43] is DENIED.
Notes
. After he filed his motion, the plaintiff has sent the Court a letter with "another authority on point” consisting of an unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals decision,
Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Splan,
No. 220477 (Mich.Ct.Apр. Aug. 24, 2001). Although an unpublished decision of a state's intermediate appellate court is not an authoritative source of state law,
see
Mich. Ct. R. 7.215(C)(1)(unpublished decisions are not binding precedent);
King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am.,
. Plaintiff, perhaps, could derive some comfort from a more careful reading of the original opinion in which he will find that the lexicographical source cited in the opinion was the 1989 (secоnd) edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, not the 1933 edition as he suggests in his brief. Nor does the Court accept plaintiff's assumption (without authoritative reference) that the Oxford English Dictionary reflects only British usage of the English language. Rather, according to the editors, the dictionary is a compilation
in alphabetical series [of] the words that have formed the English vocabulary from the time of the earliest records down to the present day, with all the relevant facts concerning their form, sense-history, рronunciation, and etymology. It embraces not only the standard language of literature and conversation, whether current at the moment, or obsolete, or archaic, but also the main technical vocabulary, and a large measure of dialectal usage and slang. Its basis is a collection of several millions of excerpts from literature of every period amassed by an army of readers and the editorial staff. Such a collection of evidence — it is represented by a selection of about 2,400,000 quotations actually printed — could form the only possible foundation for the historical treatment of every word and idiom which is the raison d’etre of the work. It is generally recognized that the consistent pursuit of this method has worked a revolution in the art of lexicography. In 1891 a great English philologist wrote of the 'debt’ which 'English grammar will some day owe to the New English Dictionary’; and the debt has been mounting up ever since. There is no aspect of English linguistic history that the Dictionary has not illuminated; its findings have called for the revision of many philological statements and the reconsideration of many judgments on textual matters. So wide is its scope and so intensive its treatment that it has served for students, both native and foreign, as a lexicon of many languages, and, though it deals primarily with words, it is virtually an encyclopaedic treasury of information about things. It has provided a ready quarry of material for many authors of treatises and dissertations.
Oxford English Dictionary, Preface to the Second Edition (1989). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Oxford English Dictionary can serve as an authoritative source of historical and contemporary English language usage.