189 Ind. 90 | Ind. | 1920
On October 8, 1913,. appellant leased 241 acres of land to appellee Finkelstein to explore for oil and gas. On February 28,1914, Finkelstein assigned the lease to appellee Osburn Oil Company. Appellant sought to quiet his title to this 241 acres by two paragraphs of complaint. In his second paragraph he sets out the lease and claims a breach of conditions therein, and also sets out a demand for the surrender of the premises, and asks that the lease be forfeited and his title quieted. Answers were general denial, and also paragraphs of special answer. Appellant’s demurrers to the paragraphs of special answer were overruled. The cause was tried by the court, who made special findings of fact, stated his conclusions of law thereon, and rendered judgment for appellees.
Appellant assigns as error: (1) The overruling
The third assignment of error presents two questions : (a) Error of the court in admitting in evidence a release executed by the appellee Osburn Oil Company to a portion of the real estate described in the lease, (b) Error of the court in admitting, over the objection of appellant, evidence with reference to tests for the presence or absence of oil on lands adjacent to the real estate described in appellant’s complaint.
The 241-acre tract of land lies in sections 7 and 12. That is to say, in two different ranges — 151 acres lie in section 7; 61 acres lie immediately west in section 12. Projecting to the west from the sixty-one acres is a narrow strip containing twenty-nine acres.
The lessees put down three test wells on the premises. The third well was located in the center of this 29-acre strip and was the only producing well. A fourth well was drilled, which was nonproductive. Thereupon lessee Osburn Oil Company, pursuant to a condition in the lease, executed a release which described the 241-acre tract of land just as it was
Appellant’s objection is that this release and reservation is too indefinite and uncertain in its description and that, therefore, the court erred in permitting it to be introduced in evidence. Appellee Osburn Oil Company introduced a plat of a survey made by an engineer and recorded at the same time the release was recorded. To this appellant objected upon the ground that the release did not refer to the plat. That is to say, that there was no language in the release that indicated that a plat had been made and filed as explanatory thereof.
5. Appellant also contends that the. release contains no granting clause. The release, after setting out a description of the ten-acre reservation, contains the following: “hereby surrenders, cancels, annuls and releases said oil and gas lease as to the balance of the real estate described, which balance of remainder of said real estate is as follows, to wit:” (Here follows same description of the real estate as in lease.) Appellant does not say what word or words should here be added to make this release sufficient. We are left to imagine that he means quitclaim. We hold it sufficient without that word.
The court did not err in admitting the release and plat in evidence.
Appellant next contends that the court erred in permitting appellee Osburn Oil Company, in cross-examination of appellant’s experts and also in direct examination of its own witnesses, to inquire about the productiveness or nonproductiveness of wells on lands adjacent. Appellant says that the only question was whether the oil company had complied with its contract in drilling the required number of w'ells.
“It is further expressly agreed * * f that * * * second party shall drill and complete twenty-four wells on leased -premises, per year from date hereof, * * * provided oil or gas is found in paying■ quantities, in which event second party agrees to drill a sufficient number of wells to equal oné well on each ten (10) acres of said leased premises. In the event second party fails to * * * complete said twenty-four wells as above set forth, within said stated time, then this lease shall cease and determine, and shall be null and void and second party shall forfeit all rights * * *. It is further agreed * * * that in the event that after a reasonable test shall have been made * * * and it shall be found that a portion of said leased premises is not productive * * * then second party shall have the right to have such portion of said leased premises surveyed, and shall have the right to execute a ivritten release as to such surveyed portion * * * and shall record same, and after the recording of such release the said portion * * * so released shall be excluded from the operation of the terms of this lease, * * *. For the purpose of determining whether oil or gas exists in and under said leased premises, second party agrees to drill three wells to be called test wells, * * *. Said test wells shall be drilled for oil and gas whether productive or nonproductive, and shall be drilled to such a depth as shall be a reasonable test of said leased prem*96 ises. Said test wells shall he considered a part of the total number of wells to be drilled the first year as hereinbefore provided for.”
It was further agreed in this lease that $1,000 should be deposited by the lessee in a named bank to guarantee the drilling of the three test wells within 120 days after the execution of the lease.
Appellee Osburn Oil Company drilled three test wells to the satisfaction of appellant, because he released the $1,000; but it seems to be the contention of the appellant that the oil company was required to drill twenty-four wells on these premises, or, at least, it was required to drill many more wells in order to properly explore for oil and gas.
With the questions, which we have above indicated, to be answered, it surely cannot be said that it was not proper for the court to hear evidence of explorations on adjacent lands. The appellant’s claim was that a reasonable test had not been made; that the operator, having found one well that was producing, was compelled to explore further, by virtue of the 24-well provision in the lease. To determine whether the operator had arbitrarily quit where prudent men, acting in good faith, experienced in the business, would proceed, no better evidence could be adduced to throw light upon this subject than the opinions of experts in the business, based upon the explorations on the premises and the results thereof, and explorations on the adjoining premises and the results thereof. The court did not err in admitting this evidence.
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.