178 U.S. 22 | SCOTUS | 1900
OSBORNE
v.
SAN DIEGO LAND AND TOWN COMPANY.
Supreme Court of United States.
*32 Mr. Alfred Haines for appellants.
Mr. John D. Works for appellee. Mr. Lewis R. Works, Mr. Bradner W. Lee and Mr. Charles D. Lanning were on his brief.
Mr. John Garber and Mr. Frank H. Short filed a brief as Amici Curiae.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
One of the grounds of demurrer to the bill was that it appeared from the complainants' own showing that their remedy was by appeal and not by bill of review. It is not pressed with much earnestness here, and is clearly untenable. Whiting v. United States Bank, 13 Pet. 6; Putnam v. Day, 22 Wall. 60; Buffington v. Harvey, 95 U.S. 99; Ensminger v. Powers, 108 U.S. 292; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1; Story's Equity Pl. 10th ed. sec. 403 et seq.
The principal contention of the appellants is that the water rights are easements in the real estate constituting the water system. In other words, (as described by appellants) "incorporeal interests in the corporeal property of a water system annexed to lands irrigated by that system." Being such, the corporation may sell them, the land owner may contract for them *33 may buy them outright and free himself wholly from annual rates, or may stipulate for a particular rate. In other words, that the water right is an interest in the system, paid for with the land, or by the stipulated rate, and not subject to any rate or to increase beyond the stipulated rate, according to the varying expenses or valuations of the system.
It is claimed to be property, and the right to sell and to buy it is asserted respectively for the owner of the system and the consumers of its waters, and that the constitution and laws of the State of California do not prohibit this, or if they can be construed to do so, violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by depriving appellants of their property without due process of law, and violate also certain provisions of the constitution of the State of California.
It is further contended by appellants that conceding a contract cannot be made between "water corporations" and their customers for a particular rate which will preclude regulation by the State, that until such regulation the parties company and consumers may contract. And, further, that the rate of $3.50 per acre per annum was the rate charged and collected by the company, and therefore became the rate established by law by virtue of a provision in section 5 of the statute of 1885, hereafter quoted.
It is also contended that the answer in the original suit averred the rate of $3.50 per acre per annum was a reasonable rate, and denied that the increased rate of $7.00 per acre was reasonable, and that on the issue thus raised, the defendants there, complainants in the bill of review, were entitled to a hearing.
The charge of error in the decrees is based on their adjudging against these contentions.
Opposing the contentions of appellants, the appellee makes a distinction between the facilities for the use and the right to use the water of its system and the actual use of it. The compensation for the former, appellee concedes may be the subject of contract; the rate for the latter, it contends, is subject to regulation *34 by law, but, until so regulated, may be established by the water companies.
The Circuit Court did not accept the distinction made by appellee. It did not accept the view contended for by appellants. It held, interpreting the constitution and laws of the State, that the appropriation and disposition of water was a public use, the right to collect tolls or compensation for it a franchise, subject to regulation and control in the manner prescribed by law, and that such tolls and compensation could not be fixed by the contract of the parties.
If the contention of the appellee is justified, that the contracts between it and the appellants gave it the right to establish the rates, the controversy is narrowed and simplified, and we are relieved from deciding the many interesting and difficult questions pressed by appellants for judgment.
There was some difference in the way the water rights of the defendants arose, but they are assimilated in the same legal right by the allegation in the original answer, that the company did "not make or claim any distinction in respect of the character and quality of the water right, or of the annual rates actually established or collected for irrigation."
It is only necessary, therefore, to say in description that some of the lands were purchased before 1892, and up to that date there was no express or separate grant of "water rights." Some were purchased after 1892, and as to them there was a specific sale of the appurtenant water right. The contracts in both cases contained an agreement to sell certain described real estate, "together with a water right to one acre foot of water per annum for each and every of said above described real estate, to be delivered by the party of the first part through its pipes and flumes at a point said water to be used exclusively on said real estate, and not to be diverted therefrom. Provided, that the party of the first part may change the place of delivery of said water, so long as the same is near the highest point of said land. For which land and water right the party of the second part agrees to pay the sum of dollars."
The contracts also contained the following provisions:
"And the party of the second part further agrees and binds *35 self, heirs, executors and assigns to pay the regular annual water rates allowed by law and charged by the party of the first part for water covered by said water rights, whether such water is used or not, and to pay for all water used on said land for domestic purposes, monthly, under such rules and regulations for the delivery of water to consumers, as the party of the first part may from time to time make."
Other lands (about nine hundred acres) described in the answer as "lying outside of National City" were derived, not from the company, but water rights were attached to them on the same basis as to the lands sold by the company up to 1892. After that date the company refused to furnish water, except upon the payment of a sum in gross for the water right over and above the uniform annual rate established and collected, or in lieu thereof six per cent annual interest upon the company's estimate of the value of such right. The price was first fixed at fifty dollars, afterwards at one hundred dollars, and the contract in addition providing for the sale of the water right contained the following provision:
"In consideration of the foregoing stipulations and agreements, the party of the second part agrees and binds self, heirs, executors and assigns, to pay the sums above specified promptly as the sums, and each of them, falls due, and that will in all things comply with and perform the terms and conditions of this agreement on part to be performed, and that, and they will promptly pay all annual water rates and charges for the water to which is entitled under and by virtue of this agreement, at rates fixed by the party of the first part as allowed by law, and at the times, in the manner, and according to the rules and regulations made and adopted by the party of the first part, the annual rental for the amount of water to which the party of the second part is entitled under this contract, to be paid whether the same is used or not, and also to pay for all water used by on said land for domestic purposes at the rates fixed by the party of the first part and allowed by law."
Under the same form of contract water rights were attached to about four hundred acres of lands belonging to other defendants.
*36 To lands which lay in what is designated Ex-Mission the contracts contained the following provision:
"The parties of the first part will make application for the use of the water upon the form provided by the party of the second part for that purpose, and pay for the use of the water at the current rates as may be enforced from time to time for supplying lands in National Ranch, and subject to the same general rules and regulations."
J.M. Ballow, one of the defendants, claimed his water right under a contract, which provided as follows:
"Provided, that said party of the second part shall make application in the form provided by the company, for the use of the water, and use the same under the same restrictions and conditions, and to pay said party of the first part the current rate therefor, as established, for Chula Vista; provided, said restrictions and conditions are not inconsistent with the water right hereby granted to said party of the second part."
The rates in Chula Vista were governed by the general contract.
It is apparent that the contracts in all things substantial to the controversy are similar. They provide for the payment of a certain sum for land and water rights, or for water rights alone, and all for the payment of annual rates besides. And provide directly or by reference that the annual rates shall "be fixed by the party of the first part, (the company,) as allowed by law," to be paid whether the water is used or not. Water used for domestic purposes is also to be paid for "at the rates fixed by the party of the first part and allowed by law."
These provisions do not leave much room for construction. For irrigation purposes and for domestic purposes the rental of water is to be paid at rates "fixed" by the company. The only qualification is "as allowed by law." What this means we shall presently consider; but whatever it means, it does not sustain appellant's contention that the rate of $3.50 per acre per annum was irrevocable, secured to them free from the power of variation by the company or by law. It is not important to consider, therefore, whether, under the constitution and laws of the State, they could contract with the company for the price *37 of a water right. If the contract, they plead, gives to the company the power to fix the annual rate, the only inquiry which need be, is whether the power has been exercised "as allowed by law." What this means can be the only controversy.
The appellee concedes the power of the regulation of rates by the board of supervisors, but claims that until the power is exercised the right to fix the rates rests with it, and that those fixed by it are "allowed by law." The appellants contend that the power of the board of supervisors is only a power to fix maximum rates, and below them the right of the parties to contract is unrestrained, (a view sufficiently discussed already,) and that until the board shall act "the statute itself fixes the standard of maximum rates, as being the `actual rates established and collected by the corporation,' and forbids the corporation to exceed such maximum."
The contention is claimed to be based on section 5 and section 8 of the act of 1885. Section 5 vests the power to fix rates in the board of supervisors, and provides "when so fixed by such board shall be binding and conclusive for not less than one year next after their establishment, and until established anew or abrogated by such board of supervisors as hereinafter provided." And then follows the provision upon which appellants especially rely:
"And until such rates shall be so established, or after they shall have been abrogated by such board of supervisors, as in this act provided, the actual rates established and collected by each of the persons, companies, associations and corporations now furnishing, or that shall hereinafter furnish, appropriated waters for sale, rental or distribution to the inhabitants of any of the counties of this State, shall be deemed and accepted as the legally established rates thereof."
Section 8 provides that those furnishing water "shall so sell, rent or distribute such waters at rates not exceeding the established rates fixed and regulated therefor by the boards of supervisors of such counties, or as fixed and established by such person, company or association, or corporation, as provided in this act."
The deduction which appellants make is that when the company *38 once fixes the rates they must remain so fixed, and if changed by supervisorial action recur upon the cessation of that action inevitable always through every change of condition; if excessive, to forever remain so; if deficient, to forever remain so.
The argument urged to support this is that one of the ordinary meanings of the word "actual" is "existing at the time." "And if" (to quote counsel) "the lexicographer be consulted to define the word establish he will give its meaning substantially, as does the Century Dictionary, to be `to make stable; firm or sure; appoint; ordain; settle or fix unalterably.'" To illustrate the immutability which one of its senses convey, counsel quote with apologetic reverence an illustration, which they say is often found in standard dictionaries: "I will establish my covenant with him for an everlasting covenant." Gen. xvii: 19.
We are not impressed with the aptness of the illustration to the case at bar.
Covenants formed and promulgated by a divine wisdom and foresight can have the attribute of immutability, and their language may be used and interpreted to express it. Human regulations are for the most part occasional and temporary. Besides, one definition of a word does not express its whole meaning or necessarily determine the intention of its use. If so, interpretation would not be difficult, and the application of the language of a law or contract would be as unerring as easy.
"Actual," of course, means existent, but it does not preclude change. Nor does the word "establish" convey the idea of permanency. As used in the statute, it has no such meaning. The power of the board of supervisors is not exhausted by one exercise, nor has its result unalterable fixity. It is beyond change only for a year. The language of the statute is "at any time after the establishment of such water rates by any board of supervisors of this State the same may be established anew or abrogated in whole or in part by such board, to take effect at not less than one year next after such first establishment. . .."
It is manifest to construe the word "establish" to mean "to *39 fix unalterably," would throw the powers of the board of supervisors into confusion and contradiction.
To say that the rates are unalterable for a year would prove nothing. Such effect comes, not from the use of the word "establish," but from other words, and, but for them, rates established might "be established anew," as often as the board of supervisors might choose. Nor can it be said that the word means one thing when applied to the power of the board of supervisors, and another thing when applied to the power of the company. To say so is to abandon the argument. That depends upon the meaning of the word "establish" to be "to fix unalterably" to mean of itself, and in its use, permanence and unchangeability. If it does not mean that of itself, there is an end of the argument, for there is nothing in the act or its purpose which would give it such meaning when expressing the power of the company, and something else when expressing the power of the board of supervisors. The purpose of the act rejects such view. Its purpose is regulation, deliberate and judicial and periodical regulation by a selected tribunal, and we cannot believe that the legislature intends by an absolute and peremptory provision to fix rates upon the water companies unalterable by them, no matter what change in conditions might supervene. Against rates which may become unreasonably high, the statute gives relief to consumers through petition to the board of supervisors. Rates which may become unreasonably low, it surely does not intend to impose on the companies forever, except as relief may come from the voluntary justice of its customers or by a violation of the statute and appeal to the courts. There is nothing in the act to indicate such purpose, nor does it need to have such purpose. Its dominant idea is the regulation of rates by law, not commanded to be exercised by the governing bodies as a voluntary duty as establishing rates in cities and towns, but exercised when invoked by petition. Until the necessity of that, what more natural and just than to leave the right with the water companies and recognize it as legal. This is the meaning, we think, of the provisions of sections 5 and 8, supra. To so interpret them makes the scheme of regulation complete adequate, without being meddlesome or *40 oppressive. The power of regulation is asserted and provided for, and ready to be exercised to correct abuse, and who doubts but that its exercise would be invoked.
The appellants assign many errors upon the action of the Circuit Court in sustaining the exceptions to the answer made in the original suit. It would extend the opinion to too great length to consider them separately. They are reduced to and depend upon the claim that they constituted a submission of the case on bill and answer, and if the latter traversed any material allegation of the bill it could not be taken pro confesso, and a decree entered upon it would be erroneous. In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., Petitioner, 160 U.S. 247.
The application of the principle is claimed upon the ground that the answer denies that the rate of $3.50 per acre per annum is unreasonable or that the increased rate of $7.00 per acre is reasonable.
The Circuit Court held that issue was not open to its decision. It said that if the rates established by the board of supervisors were unreasonable they could only be annulled. In no case would the court fix them. "Therefore," it was further said, "it is not for the court in the present case to go into the question of reasonableness of the rates established by the complainant, and which it seeks to enforce. If unreasonable, and the consumers are for that reason dissatisfied therewith, resort must first be had to the body designated by the law to fix proper rates, to wit, the board of supervisors of San Diego County."
We concur in this view, and finding no error in the decree it is
Affirmed.