45 S.E. 783 | N.C. | 1903
This is a petition to rehear this case, in which the judgment below was affirmed at the last term by a per curiam decision,
On reargument we see no reason to change our former conclusion. This was an appeal from a refusal to set aside a judgment by default and inquiry on the ground alleged of excusable neglect. The code, sec. 274. The affidavits of both sides are sent up in the record, but improperly, for we cannot consider them, since the findings of fact by the judge are conclusive on appeal. Norton v. McLaurin,
The facts found by the judge are, in substance, that the appellant and another, both living in Raleigh, were served in due time before court with a summons in an action for libel returnable to June Term, 1901, of Guilford Superior Court. His codefendant appeared by counsel, obtained extension of time for answering, and filed answer at the next succeeding term. The appellant made no appearance (429) by attorney or in person, filed no answer or other pleading, and the plaintiff, having filed a verified complaint, took judgment by default and inquiry. When the summons was served upon the appellant he applied to a law firm in Raleigh, who told him they did not attend regularly the courts in Guilford, but advised him to employ another counsel, also residing in Raleigh, who frequently attended the Guilford courts; and the appellant did so, said counsel drawing a demurrer, which, according to his best impression, was, immediately upon being drafted, mailed to the clerk of the Superior Court of Guilford, but whether addressed to J. N. Nelson (the name of such clerk) said counsel is not certain; but he took the demurrer, stating at the time he would mail it, whereupon said law firm told the appellant that as the case stood on a matter of law, it would not be necessary for him to go to Guilford court till notified by counsel, as that docket was crowded and the case could not be reached in some time. The records of the court fail to show any demurrer or other pleading having been filed by the appellant, and the clerk has no recollection of ever receiving any by mail or otherwise. The judge further finds that neither the law firm first employed by the appellant, nor the other counsel called in on their recommendation, attended Guilford Superior Court regularly, though the latter usually did so; that regular terms of the Superior Court were held in Guilford in June, August, September, October, and December, 1901, and January, 1902, as provided by law, at none of which (six consecutive terms) any counsel for appellant was present. At the February Term, 1902, being the sixth term after that at which the judgment was taken, a motion to set it aside was made by a counsel resident in Greensboro, who was then first employed by the appellant. The appellant did not learn of the judgment by default and inquiry till said February Term, 1902, at which time, said counsel being confined to his bed by illness, the appellant went to (430) Greensboro in person and employed counsel there to move to vacate the judgment, and that the appellant has a meritorious defense.
Upon the above facts his Honor properly held that the negligence of the appellant was not excusable. This Court has always held that to hold a party excusable when his counsel has been negligent, he must *343
have employed counsel "regularly attending the court" in which the action is pending, or "who engages to go there specially to attend to the matter." Manning v. R. R.,
(432) Fortunately, however, for the defendant, the judgment by "default and inquiry" carries only a judgment for a penny and costs. Such judgment, says 2 Black on Judgments, sec. 698, "merely admits a cause of action, while the precise character of the cause of action and the extent of the defendant's liability remain to be determined by a hearing in damages and final judgment thereon, the cause of action is not merged in the judgment, and the rights of parties, beyond the mere admission of a cause of action, are neither strengthened nor impaired thereby." Welch v. Wadsworth,
Petition dismissed.
Cited: S. v. Munn,
(433)