ORTHOTEC, LLC, Appellant, v HEALTHPOINT CAPITAL, LLC, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
[924 NYS2d 78]
The instant action is not barred by collateral estoppel. “[T]he prior denial of a motion in the underlying case to set aside a default and default judgment has no collateral estoppel effect to bar an independent action in equity directly attacking the prior judgment” (Groves v Peterson, 100 Cal App 4th 659, 661, 123 Cal Rptr 2d 164, 165 [2002] [emphasis omitted]).* Although plaintiff cites no case where this principle was applied to a motion to add a judgment debtor and a subsequent plenary action, defendants do not contest plaintiff‘s extension of the rule. In any event, the rationale for the rule (see Groves, 100 Cal App 4th at 667-668, 123 Cal Rptr 2d at 170) applies to a motion to add a judgment debtor.
To be sure, “collateral estoppel will bar the subsequent independent action . . . if . . . the moving party was in fact given a hearing on the motion that was the equivalent of a trial with oral testimony” (100 Cal App 4th at 668, 123 Cal Rptr 2d at 170-171 [emphasis added]). However, plaintiff was not given such a hearing. It was given the opportunity for a hearing, but it chose not to exercise that opportunity.
Defendants’ reliance on Barker v Hull (191 Cal App 3d 221, 226, 236 Cal Rptr 285, 289 [1987]) is unavailing, since the evidence on the motion which led to the decision to which defendants seek to give preclusive effect was indeed restricted.
We do not find that “in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in” France (see
STEVEN ROSENFELD et al., Respondents, v RENIKA PTY. LTD. et al., Appellants.
[923 NYS2d 328]
ORTHOTEC, LLC, Appellant, v HEALTHPOINT CAPITAL, LLC, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, New York
[924 NYS2d 78]
Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Catterson, Manzanet-Daniels and Román, JJ.
