197 Pa. 606 | Pa. | 1901
Opinion :by
There is not a specific finding by the court that the mortgage, whose validity is in question, was given to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, but from the finding's made, it necessarily follows that it was given for that purpose. The substance of the findings of fact is that Peters and Simpson were jointly interested in the development of mineral lands which they owned; that the money advanced by Simpson was his share of the capital used in the enterprise; that it was not advanced with the intention that any part of it should be repaid; that there had been no accounting or ascertainment of an amount due, and that the mortgage was largely in excess of the advances made and of the value of the land; that it was given by Peters at a time when he was disposing of his personal property and incumbering his real estate in anticipation of an adverse result of litigation in which he was involved with the plaintiff. These findings are fully sustained by the testimony. There was enough in the circumstances alone to rebut the presumption of fairness and good faith and to require affirmative proof of both by the defendants: Kaine v. Weigley, 22 Pa. 179; Clark v. Depew, 25 Pa. 509; Redfield & Rice Mfg. Co. v. Dysart, 62 Pa. 62. If there was no debt there was no consideration for the mortgage, and presumptively it was fraudulent and given to hinder and delay the plaintiff in his effort to collect his claim against Peters. The attempt by the defendants to explain the transaction only tended to strengthen the prima facie case against them.
The court had jurisdiction to prevent by injunction an assignment of the mortgage. This was the first step made by the plaintiff in order to protect his rights, and the jurisdiction of
The decree is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.