*1 employee hearing with predisciplinary as
required by personnel rule a viola ORR, Petitioner, Robert Lee employee’s procedural pro tion of that due rights. state, cess We stated: “When the however, promulgates regulation that im The PEOPLE of the State of poses governmental departments more Colorado, Respondent. stringent standards are constitutional ly required, process requires due of law No. 89SC436. departments those to adhere to those stan discharging employees.” Supreme Colorado, dards Id. Court of rule, Once promulgated the State En Banc. employee right procedure had a to that Dec. 1990. being discharged. rule binding until amended and was enforceable Rehearing Denied Jan. by employee to whom it applied. See Glasscock, (Colo. also Ness v.
Ct.App.1989) (police right officer had to be compliance
terminated after proce
with the applicable termination
dures). ambiguities policy All should
be construed CSU as the drafter of policy. grievance procedure in this involved approved by
case was the State Board of
Agriculture operation which oversees the approved adopted, CSU. Once
procedure binding upon became CSU.
Thus, Donahue, Kemp right as in had the grievance pursuant have her heard above, procedure. As discussed
Kemp’s Armstrong letter to Senator did procedure. grievance violate the CSU’s Kemp’s grievance proceed-
termination of
ings Kemp’s right proce- thus violated process required by
dural due CSU’s addition,
grievance procedure manual. Kemp grievance proce-
even if violated
dure, policy specify does not such
violation would result in the forfeiture
Kemp’s right pursue proceeding alto-
gether. importance Because heard,
Kemp’s have grievance her penal-
I see no reason to read such a harsh
ty grievance proce- into the terms
dure. reasons, I foregoing respectfully
For the
dissent. JJ., QUINN, join
LOHR and in this
dissent. *2 24, 1988, May County
On Adams con- Department (“Department”) Sheriff’s checkpoint in sobriety a the 7100 ducted Operation of the block of Pecos Street. governed guide- by written Department. lines of the Pursuant to the guidelines, approximately each of the participating officers had perform specific “assembly tasks to in an Department line” manner. officers were permitted driving to write citations for revocation, suspension, driving under under license, driving under denied driver driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The officers were instructed
all
Street;
traffic northbound on Pecos
how-
ever,
occurred,
backlog
the offi-
if
traffic
bypass
permit
were
the traffic to
cers
checkpoint.
well-lighted check-
The
point,
marked with traffic cones
which was
large
sign stating
and a
reflective
“Adams
County
Department Sobriety
Sheriff’s
Harrison,
Miller,
B. Harri- Checkpoint,”
Hale &
David
the intersec-
was visible from
Boulder,
son,
petitioner.
Street, per-
for
70th
tion of
Avenue
Pecos
mitting vehicles to turn around before en-
Smith,
Atty.,
F.
Michael J.
James
Dist.
turning
tering the intersection. Vehicles
Milne,
Atty., Brighton, for
Deputy Dist.
entering
around
respondent.
entering
would
Vehicles
checkpoint area
to drive
were directed
Chief
ROVIRA delivered
Justice
parking lot,
adjacent
where offi-
into the
Opinion of the Court.
request
identification”
cers would
“basic
the defendant Robert
This case concerns
proof
During
of insurance.
the 4-hour
challenge
Lee Orr’s
lasting
p.m.
operation,
from 8:30
to 12:30
sobriety
by the
checkpoint conducted
a.m.,
stopped
300 cars and
officers
about
County
Department. The
Adams
Sheriff’s
driving
under
arrested
individuals
stopped
sobriety
defendant was
drugs.
or
the influence of alcohol
Drivers
charged
subsequently
suspected
driving
who were
under
of intoxi-
driving
under the influence
15 to 30 sec-
the influence were detained
cating
while his license
liquor
suspected
under
onds. Drivers
county
court denied
suspended.
drugs
were re-
the influence of alcohol
suppress
evi-
defendant’s motion
quested to
field
tests.
perform
checkpoint stop,
obtained
dence
press
release to
Department
issued
County District
appeal
on
the Adams
an-
newspapers and a radio station
two
granted the defen-
Court affirmed.
up checkpoint
nouncing that it would set
petition for certiorari
consider
dant’s
May
unincorporated
24 in
Adams Coun-
permissi-
sobriety checkpoints are
whether
ty.
and federal constitu-
under
state
ble
stopped by an
so,
checkpoint in When the defendant was
and, if
whether
tions
checkpoint and was asked to
We officer at the
met
standards.
this case
insurance,
identification, proof produce
affirm.
registration documents,
and vehicle
ing
the of-
Michigan Dept,
Sitz,
State Police v.
—
ficer
strong
detected a
-,
odor of alcoholic
2481, 2488,
U.S.
110 S.Ct.
beverage on the defendant’s breath. He
412) (brackets
Rister).
L.Ed.2d
Our
also noticed that the
eyes
defendant’s
were
analysis in Rister also indicated that we
*3
watery,
bloodshot and
and
speech
his
was would consider the totality of the facts
slurred. The defendant failed-several field surrounding
sobriety
checkpoint to con
sobriety
Subsequently,
tests.
he was ar-
sider whether it is unreasonable under the
charged
rested and
with driving under the
federal or state constitution. See id. at
influence
intoxicating
liquor, 487-489.
42-4-1202(l)(a),
(1984),
17 C.R.S.
and
§
The
surrounding
facts
the De
license
suspended,
partment’s sobriety checkpoint are similar
42-2-130,
Supp.1990).
&
§
to those surrounding
sobriety
check
After the trial court determined that the
point we
in
considered Rister. See id. at
checkpoint stop was not unconstitutional
significant
485. We find
two
differ
and denied the
sup-
defendant’s motion to
ences between the
checkpoint
Pecos Street
press
evidence obtained
stop,
First,
and the
checkpoint.
Rister
the defendant was
convicted of
Pecos Street
twelve arrests for
while his
impaired by
the con-
driving while intoxicated were made of 300
alcohol,
sumption
42-4-1202(l)(b),
§
stopped
vehicles
while the State Patrol in
driving while his
suspended.
license was
made
Rister
no arrests for driving while
intoxicated of 233
vehicles
Sec
II
ond,
average
detention of motorists at
(cid:127)
In People
(Colo.
v.
the Pecos
Street
was 15 to 30
1990), we held that the Colorado State Pa
average
seconds while the
detention of mo
trol’s
operation
establishment and
of a so
torists at
the Rister
min
was 3
briety checkpoint that met certain stan
utes.
dards did not violate the fourth amendment
of the United
difference, however,
States Constitution or article
Neither
suggests
II,
section
of the Colorado
stops
Constitution.1 that the Pecos
any
Street
were
less
conclusion,
In reaching our
we stated that
stops
reasonable than the
in Rister. We do
the reasonableness under both constitu
not believe the number of arrests made at
tions of establishing
operating
sobriety checkpoint
to be a constitutional-
checkpoints depended
ly
significant
determining
balance of
factor in
wheth-
“ ‘the State’s interest in preventing
drunk
er
stops
permissible
are
un-
en driving, the extent to which
II,
check der
fourth
amendment or article
[the
point] system
reasonably
However,
can
be said to
section 7.2
comparably
interest,
advance that
degree
and the
length
shorter
of time—15 to 30
seconds
upon
intrusion
stops
motorists who are
the Pecos Street
versus 3 minutes in
”
briefly stopped.’
(quot
stops
to stops on reason ists unless are based checkpoint; opportunity to avoid reading plain A of the stat suspicion. able way to operated in a was is intended to ute reveals that the statute motorists; and De- delays for avoid undue police to make authorize officers brief only partment stopped motorists officers reasonably suspected of stops of motorists to identification and long enough obtain The statute’s while intoxicated. insurance, drivers are re- proof of which wording that it is a statute of denotes 42-2-101(6) carry, and -4- quired to §§ limita empowerment rather than 1213, Supp.1990). & 17 C.R.S. police to make authority on tion the Pecos Street We hold that bearing stops, and thus it has no individual amendment, stops did not violate fourth State v. Tourtil See checkpoint stops. on 7, the Colorado 423, or article section lott, 845, 848-53, P.2d Or. 618 289 statute, (1980) Constitution. (concluding that 425-27 permitted police to an officers which Ill they if have reasonable sus argues picion individual commit next sec believe The defendant (1984), crime, grants not intended to 42-4-1202.1, ted a 17 C.R.S. tion comply stops than the that all law-enforcement greater to motorists protection Palmer, 43 Cal.3d statute); Ingersoll v. against unreasonable Colorado Constitution cf. 61, 1348-49, 42, 1321, Cal.Rptr. 743 seizures, checkpoint stop and that the 42-4-1202(1), part for relevant that it unlawful vides in 3. Subsection operat- blood-alcohol drive a vehicle with part prohibits individuals from relevant ing per grams of alcohol hun- level of .15 or more influence of intox- a vehicle while under the by blood as shown chemical dred milliliters of icating liquor, or while the individual's defendant revealed impaired by consump- blood test of the tests. A operate a vehicle is 42-4-1202(1.5) was .202. level pro- that his blood-alcohol Subsection tion alcohol. (1987) (previous P.2d erage period cases of detention for motorists and police holding that seizures made in viola- thus weighing constituted a “factor in fa- statutory tion of on au- limitations vor stops.” reasonableness of the thority inapplicable sobriety-check- are Maj. op. disagree at 511-12. with the point prohibited stops, by which are not majority’s sig- attribution constitutional statutes; California “none these deci- nificance to that factor. sions of law holds methods enforce- Until this decision in court's specifically prohib- ment not authorized are of intrusions into ited”). personal privacy security under the expressly prohibit The statute does not Colorado Constitution did not turn ei checkpoint stops, as the defendant con- ther by the results obtained the intrusion cedes, willing impose are not and we period or the of time which the interpretation on the statute that its terms subjected individual was to the intrusion. Court, do express. See District Rather, consistently Colorado case law re Colo, 241; 420 P.2d at see also Har- quired three temporary conditions Comm’n, ding v. Industrial Colo. (1) person: seizure enforce law (where (1973) language *5 effecting ment officer the seizure must clear, plain meaning is and court should a specific have had and in articulable basis subtle, “[fjorced, un- make strained or fact that suspecting the has usual interpretation”). conclude that in engaged activity, criminal was commit section 42-4-1202.1 does that crime, so; (2) ting a or was about to the do checkpoint stops grounded on reason- purpose temporary seizure must suspicion. able reasonable; (3) scope have been and the Judgment affirmed. and character of the intrusion have must reasonably purpose. been related to its J., QUINN, LOHR, J., and dissents Wilson, 325, People v. E.g. 784 P.2d 327 joins in dissent. the (Colo.1989); People v. 778 P.2d Ratcliff, 1371, (Colo.1989); QUINN dissenting: People Melgosa, Justice 1376 v. 221, (Colo.1988); People P.2d 753 225 v. view, I respectfully my dissent. the Carlson, 310, (Colo.1984); 677 P.2d 315 suspicionless during seizure of a motorist a 1272, Thomas, People v. 1274 highway sobriety checkpoint program vio- (Colo.1983); Tate, 955, People P.2d v. 657 lates the and clause the Search Seizure (Colo.1983); People v. Schreyer, 958 640 Const, Constitution, II, Colorado Colo. art. 1147, (Colo.1982); P.2d v. People 1149 Ca 7, totally the itself because seizure 72-77, sias, Colo. unsupported by even a minimal level (1977); People, v. 174 Colo. Stone suspicion
individualized motorist (1971). As I P.2d operating a motor vehicle while under dissenting opinion in in emphasized my Ris- of, impaired in- by, the influence or while ter, three-part devel this standard “was toxicating liquor. oped regard priva awith conscious for the Although checkpoint program at is- cy interests Colorado citizens under proportionately in sue here resulted a op. Dissenting Colorado Constitution.” greater number of arrests for 495. P.2d at program People in intoxicated than today’s I and court’s view decision this (Colo.1990), this differ- opinion going long in a recent Rister ence, notes, majority should a as the not be way approving suspicionless stops toward constitutionally significant factor in deter- temporary persons and seizures mining the under the the seizure in sole that such intrusions are brief Maj. op. basis Colorado Constitution. to however, pursuant governmen- duration and are a majority, place does constitu- program tal calculated deter or tionally significant initiated to importance the fact prevent in certain forms of criminal conduct. program that the the instant considerably stopping pedes- in every case resulted a reduced av- No one doubts that high empowerment has its source in the state locations crime trian at selected making simultaneously principle indi- city, a of reasonable areas of physical cursory a of their suspicion. examination vidualized frisking their outer characteristics and investigative de- To authorize safety measure clothing aas anything tention of a motorist on less detention, result in sei- probably would suspicion individualized renders reasonable drugs other contraband and zure of privacy illusory person’s right personal drug might reducing even result in abuse emanating sec- security from article society. activity in our and other criminal tion 7 the Colorado Constitution However, jurisprudence the constitutional prior this decision- mirrored both court’s state, this prior at least court’s our positive by the al law and the law enacted per- ascribed value decision accordingly I Assembly. General would security was irrecon- privacy and sonal construe the Search and Seizure clause a court could with the notion that cilable Constitution a manner Colorado temporary sei- legitimatize suspicionless public highway vests a motorist on “solely on the basis of of a zure proceed to her destina- public balancing gravity of the interest being required to submit tion without severity of the intrusion associ- person, of his or her and associ- seizure Rister, dissenting with the seizure.” ated physi- questioning and ated observation op. at 496. of intoxi- cal for evidence characteristics statutory law of this state also cation, there is a total absence of when principle salutary pre-Rister echoes the motorist of suspect whatever to cause an individu- that a officer must have driving. accordingly drunken dissent *6 activity criminal in order suspicion alized judgment would reverse the district person temporarily stop and detain court. person’s activi- investigation a brief 42-4-1202.1, 17 ty. Specifically, section LOHR, J., joins in this dissent. suspicion requires reasonable C.R.S. been under that a is or has motorist of,
the influence liquor
impaired by, intoxicating before may stop mo-
law enforcement officer name, give “require his him
torist address, ac- explanation and an his
his 16-3-103(1), 8A C.R.S.
tions.” See also § (1986) (reasonable suspicion of criminal ac- The PEOPLE of the State of may officer tivity required police Colorado, Complainant, name, address, if avail- identification actions); able, explanation RHODES, II, Raymer Martin (offi- 42-2-113(1), Supp.) Attorney-Respondent. suspicion that cer must have reasonable 90SA255. No. traffic laws before motorist violated requiring motorist stopping motorist and Colorado, Supreme Court of license). majority over driver’s hand En Banc. any significance declines to find requirement sec- suspicion” “reasonable Jan. by characterizing that
tion 42-4-1202.1 rath- empowerment as “a statute
statute authority
er limitation stops.” to make 42-4-1202.1
Maj. op. at 512. While section “empowerment,”
clearly is a statute