Orr v. Lewis Central School District

retrial, now reverse. the State improperly admit On lying were either records other evidence to produce evidence or oth able not offered in also ted were be. available, charges against summari- made defendant. prove Covault’s erwise made justice was not admissible favor zation of their content See id. interests urged by the general principle opportunity for the under the be remanded this case State. of a new trial. is, accordingly re- judgment court’s argues because Trial

The State also testi is remanded for new concerning which Covault this case the checks versed and defendant, signed by they consti fied were trial. him, by and therefore

tuted admissions REMANDED. AND REVERSED respect their testimony with auditor’s clear that if the proper. content was SCHULTZ, J., except All Justices concur signed by de question cheeks in had been part. no who takes fendant, they constitute would indeed not fall admission and would therefore See, e.g., v. hearsay

within the rule. State

Welsh, (Iowa 1976). have been admis

While these checks would they

sible had there been evidence that defendant, signed

were in the absence as to testimony Covault’s

such evidence hearsay and their constituted content ORR, Appellant, William John See State should not have been admitted. (Iowa 1969). v. Evans, v. 169 N.W.2d stated, challenged testi For reasons DISTRICT, CENTRAL SCHOOL LEWIS mony improperly admitted. Casualty Employers Mutual Appellees. assigned Company, and conclu- III. errors Other evi- sion. The errors the admission of 64118. No. I II re- dence delineated divisions Supreme Court of Iowa. a new tri- quire granted that defendant be Therefore, pass upon we de- al. need Nov. 1980. court erred fendant’s assertion that trial denying for mistrial defendant’s motion by upon prosecu-

based a remark made during closing

tor as we assume argument, will not on retrial. remark recur lastly contends that his

Defendant

motion should have for directed verdict however, We, decline to

been sustained. motion ruling

review the on that because only upon error in predicated

our reversal is ques But the admission of evidence.

tion we should now then arises whether excluding the evi

review that motion after improperly

dence we have held admit explained in recently

ted. For reasons Howell,

State there,

1980), stated we believe not. As here, may have re

applicable the State developing evi fully more its

frained from evidentiary rulings we

dence because of Huebner,

R. Pogge Hopkins Ronald & Moines, appellees. Des for McCORMICK, Justice. question here is whether the “dis-

covery rule” applies two-year period original compen- of limitations for workers’ sation actions under section The Code 1975. Claimant John William Orr filed a petition for arbitration in June seek- ing benefits alleged for headaches which he he suffered as the result of a work-connect- May ed incident in he 1975 when was struck on the back by falling plank. of the neck that, He averred despite reasonable dili- gence, he was unable to determine the May headaches were caused September incident until 1977. Defendant Lewis Central District and its insur- School er, Employers Casualty defendant Mutual Company, petition moved to dismiss the ground the action be- was barred it untimely cause was under section 85.26. deputy A industrial commissioner sustained petition. the motion and dismissed the depu- industrial commissioner affirmed ty’s ruling. Upon petition judicial for re- view, We re- the district court affirmed. verse and remand to the industrial commis- sioner. Griswold, explained

Ás in Chrischffles v. 453, 463, (1967), delays rule the accrual injured person of a cause of action until byor exer- has in fact discovered his diligence cise should have dis- reasonable specifically, covered it. More a condition implied provisions of most compensation workers’ statutes “[t]he time for notice or claim does not claimant, as a reason- begin to run until the man, nature, recognize the seri- able should probable compensable charac- ousness and A. Larson ter of his or disease.” 3 at 15-65 Compensation Workmen’s 78.41 applicable This rule is to 15-66 provision in the notice of claim Rob- our workers’ statute. Over, Over, Transportation, Oscar Department 0. Over of Over & inson v. Bluffs, appellant. Council for his em- painting truck bodies spray the suffi- regarding here

No issue exists he had the not find out He did petition plead ployer. a basis ciency claimant’s physi- his diagnosed by rule, until it was available under disease invoking the if it is after he two months approximately cian A to dismiss should section 85.26. motion given more of claim was ill. Notice if certain that became only be sustained it is events which ninety after the any days of not recover under state than party could up of the disease but lighting the support of caused proven which could be facts claimant learned Stark, ninety days after v. 252 N.W.2d within his claim. Giltner part, In section 85.23 he it. material allegations the had 744 Whether compensation would provided is that workers’ proven at trial a differ- actually could be employer the had unless only here with not be allowed issue. We are concerned ent the or no- of occurrence knowledge to a whether the rule is available actual employer ninety “within given to the tice be claimant under section 85.26. an injury.” of days after the occurrence At incident I. the time applied the dis- adopted This court provided in mate- present section 85.26 85.23, holding under section covery rule com- part: original proceedings rial “No ninety-day in the statute did not case pensation be shall maintained he employee found out had begin until proceedings shall be commenced unless such the disease. inju- years within from date of the two Jacques deci- disability for a result of the Otis and ry causing such death or As 85.26, sions, giving from employee an excused which benefits are claimed.” See § injury until he compensable of a The Code 1975. notice it, bring if but he did found out about Parrott, Iowa In Otis v. on within two after the an action it (1943), held that N.W.2d 708 the court it, he knew which caused whether event injury referred to in 85.26 is the section not, claim was injury or about disability injury which caused the or death barred. disability rather than the or death itself. true the notice The court said: section starts injury” period with “occurrence of an interpret It reasonable to the word its limitation section 85.26 started whereas “injury” “disability to mean when occurs” injury causing period “from the date of the “compensable injury” or where that word benefits or such death stands alone in the But it is not statute. However, treat this dif- are claimed.” so it interpret reasonable to when a differ- language justifying as ference legislature “inju- has followed the word ignore is to construction of the statutes ent ry” by the words “that caused the death n Jacques. The result Jac- the rationale in disability.” By or words the these latter interpretation ques the court’s was based on legislature it designated has used in “injury” the word which is both means. word provisions. court found the en- 1042-43, Id. at in- at 711. N.W.2d non-occupational disease and compassed volved a lapse of time between date of preexisting disease. It “lighting-up” of an accident and the date when tuberculosis meaning within the also found was allegedly lighted by it. The court up 85.23 “need not arise out of acci- section held that started at any special or incident.” Id. dent the date of the rather than the accident at 239. date the itself. disease manifested The court then reasoned: Subsequently the was confronted court problem phrase when we “oc- analogous with an under So construe the injury” starting Jacques 85.23. & currence as Farmers Lumber Supply point ninety-day period for the (1951), “injury” we have one word incipient the claimant suffered from notice statute ... up consistently his which has con- lighted tuberculosis which was been lighting persuaded strued to include disease or the court said: “We are not the com- when no time missioner and district court should up preexisting of a disease be re- versed under this record.” Id. when and at 767. The place pointed can be court delayed held the claimant had inju- unrea- employee where the received the sonably seeking a diagnosis of his trou- . ry. .. ble, saying: “Certainly there is no room for made disease com- Since finding ordinary he exercised or reasona- “injury” then pensable under its term ble regard. care this A claimant should the “occur- clearly it must have meant permitted not be thus running to toll the when type “injury” rence” of this of limitations for such an extend- employee found out about the dis- Hence, ed time.” Id. deciding instead of employee hardly ease. . . . The could be whether the discovery ap- rule should be duty employer his notify held under a plied under section merely the court of a disease of which he had no knowl- help held the rule would not claimant edge. that case. 552-53, Id. at 47 N.W.2d at 239. The court We applicability affirmed the of the dis- approved discovery then statements of the covery recently rule under section 85.23 as jurisdictions rule in cases from other Robinson, as our decision in but we have effect that an “injury” does not occur with- required not been to reexamine the meaning in the of compensation workers’ in Otis since the decision in Mousel. employee statutes until discovers its meantime, In the two events of some probable compensable character. significance have event occurred. One Nothing precluded in section discovery uniformly that the rule has been giving court Otis from the word injury adopted by jurisdictions courts of other hav- interpretation. “injury” same If did ing compensation starting workers’ statutes not occur until employee discovered its period injury. the claim with the In date of character, probable compensable section 85.- jurisdictions discovery the few where the simply meant the limitations rejected, express- rule has been the statutes discovery started with the date of of ly start the with the date of accident probable compensable nature of the injury. rather than the date of A. “causing . . . death or for which Larson, supra, 15-87 78.41 at 15-86 to benefits Injury claimed.” would [were] (“The jurisdictions number of that are still thus have the same meaning and occur at capable destroying compensation rights the same time provision. under each for failure to file a claim at a time when its neither necessary say reasonable nor reasonably existence could not have been legislature intended the word to have one known has dwindled to three or four at meaning purposes for notice entirely but an dating most-all under statutes different meaning purposes. for suit from time of accident rather than the time injury.”).. significant Mousel v. The second event is Sup- Bituminous Material & has removed the lan- ply (Iowa 1969), 169 N.W.2d 763 guage from section 85.26 which this court court give Jacques was asked to inter- precluding interpre- relied on Otis as pretation to section 85.26. This was after given tation that section which was later adopted the court discovery rule for Jacques. to section 85.23 in negligence cases in Chrischilles. The claim- ant Mousel had received thermal burns in Act, legislature passed In 1977 1958, causing malignancies which were not title, according to its “to resolve differences diagnosed until reviewing 1966. After procedures involving provisions of the holdings Otis, Chrischilles, Jacques, workers’ law and the Iowa distinguished Jacques court from procedure administrative Act.” See on the language basis of the difference in in Session, G.A., 67th enactment ch. 51. The sections 85.26 and 85.23. Without either provi- struck section 85.26 and substituted a adopting rule, or rejecting following: sion which included the ties, original proceedings change existing

No for benefits un- as it did to law chapter, chapter eighty-five changed der this A where the former law is Code, (85A) (86) only minor Thus it has been eighty-six of the shall details. recognized, asserted that “one well in- be maintained in contested case un- legislative clarify, dication of intent to proceedings less such shall be commenced change, existing rather than law is within two from the date of the surrounding ambiguity doubt or a stat- occurrence for which bene- ute.” The New York has estab- court provided except fits are claimed as following lished the test: “The force (86.20) eighty-six twenty point given subsequent which should be as the Code. affecting prior legislation, depends Thus, 1, 1977, July peri- since the limitation largely upon the under circumstances od in section 85.26 starts with “the date of place. which it takes If it follows im- injury.” the occurrence of the same upon mediately and after controversies language starting is used to define the phraseology therein use of doubtful point language in section 85.23. It was this have arisen as to the true construction Jacques which was to include held prior great of the law it is entitled to discovery rule. weight place ... If it takes after a Because the change in section 85.26 was lapse considerable of time and the in- part of an enactment of technical nature leg- other of the tervention of sessions clarify designed chapter islature, change phraseolo- radical legislature’s the bringing action in the lan- gy sup- would indicate an intention to guage conformity of section into with in ply provisions some not embraced that may of section 85.23 have been taken the former statute.” 2A Sutherland light meaning to shed on the of which it Statutory at 265- Construction 49.11 § intended the former statute to have. This (Fourth 1973). 266 Ed. by does not itself settle the issue whether Community Barnett v. Durant Dis- School change in merely section 85.26 was in- trict, 629 tended to concerning remove doubt its Mousel, Jacques In the wake of and meaning. We have said: viability interpretation of the of section 85.- An may amendment indicate an intent question. 26 in was in serious Until change meaning either to of a statute present the court did not have an clarify or to it... . appears Whenever it opportunity question. to that The resolve legislation passed simply have been legislature in the Its has acted meantime. purpose for the removing doubt from any amendment to 85.26 occurred without acts, previous give the courts should ef- change indication that a substantive in the fect that'purpose. to . . . law was intended. The amendment was a The rule ascertaining purpose minor detail a technical enactment legislature of the is as follows: clarifying purpose. that had a It is obvious Whether or not a subsequent statute by legislature words deleted from light upon meaning sheds of a for- significance 85.26 did not have the section depends upon mer statute a number of legislature they for the did this original circumstances. Where the law uncertainty In view of the court Otis. subject doubt, very to by serious Mouse1, Jacques gen- the law after and permitting subsequent amendments to adoption discovery eral trend toward of the control meaning great the former statutes, rule under the context similar deal uncertainty law re- is occurred, in which the amendment we be- moved. legislature probably And the is legislature lieve amended section 85.26 position the best to ascertain the clarify meaning. to change rather than its most desirable construction. In addi- Because the amendment removed the lan- just tion it probable legis- as that the guage which had been determinative in Otis lature up to clear uncertain- brought provision conformity intended into 85.23, possible, with we the one giving longer section conclude period to remove the uncer- intended litigant seeking relief is to preferred be tainty following concerning Mousel whether Rasmussen, applied. Sprung the discovery applicable rule was under sec- (Iowa 1970). tion 85.26 as well as under 85.23. rule', discovery Under Accordingly, we overrule Otis. limita- begin limitations does not until run tion under section The Code claimant knows of his and its 1975, began to run employee when the dis- probable compensable Mousel, nature. See covered or in exercise of reasonable 169 N.W.2d at 766-67. This is the rule nature, diligence should have discovered the which the 1977 applicable amendment made probable compensable seriousness and char- section 85.26. “injury causing acter of the . . . death Nothing purports the statute to exclude for which benefits [were] injuries from reach its discovered after the claimed.” amendment’s effective date which were We hold that this rule by preceding change. caused events present available to claimant in the case. Moreover, commissioner, The deputy viewing the commissioner section 85.26 as a and the district court “statute of does require erred oth- creation” erwise. inapplicable. amendment to be held 4.2, The Code. statute as amended II. We believe the result is the same right expressly confers the which claimant even if the amendment were as viewed attempted to exercise. changing the law. In that event we would have to determine whether the amended Supreme The New held a Jersey Court injuries statute was intended to to all apply applicable similar even amendment was discovered after the amendment’s effective injuries discovered before its effective date only injuries date or those caused events in Panzino v. Continental Can N.J. occurring put after that date. We to one so, A.2d doing side retrospectivity. issue of Cf. Sec court reasoned: v. Galloway 168, rest 30 . long . . has been that axiomatic [I]t (1948) N.W.2d that (holding 793 amend an the is to be Compensation Workmen’s Act shortening ment the limitations in liberally . . Bearing construed.. this in 1457, 1939, The Code was not retro mind, being sought the aware of mischief active). always to be remedied and conscious present situation, the important claimant alleges purposes the beneficent of this he did injury not discover his until Septem- legislation, perceive reason social we no 1977, ber several months the Legislature after amend- wished why the would have ment became effective. Because his action place any greater to limitation the upon 1978, was in timely commenced June it was sensibly the than can be reach of statute if the amended applied. language. Accordingly from its drawn However, because the accident occurred be- enactment be we conclude that the should amendment, fore effective date of the cover who files a read to claimant his action timely would not be if the amend- date petition within two of the on ment only applies to causing injury events disabili- which he learns the nature of his or disease adoption. after its ty employment. its to his and relation at court Id. at 364 A.2d 1045. The apply

We must workers’ com strengthened by added its pensation that broadly liberally statute and the fact that the time limitation was a objective. furtherance its humanitarian Texaco, than ordi- statute of creation rather in an Halstead Johnson’s 264 nary Courts not statute of limitations. Id. at do (“Thus favor logically statutes limitations. When A.2d at 1047 can be said two it interpretations of a limitations statute are revive that amendment does not “inju- claim; has merely enlarg- legislature followed word expired instead it the death by the words “that caused ry” jurisdiction.”). the agency’s es disability.” these latter words By or rule availa- We that the is hold it injury designated has ground this also. present ble in the case on compensa- mean It does not means. course, meet still his bur- Of claimant must or condi- injury or the state of facts ble prove to proceeding den the arbitration which claimant tions first entitle rule. of the application factual basis injury compensation. It is causal th,e We and remand to industrial reverse it is com- without reference to whether proceedings. for further

commissioner pensable description this With not. we arrive at “injury,” AND REMANDED. the word cannot REVERSED injury” the “resultant conclusion that UHLENHOPP, justices except All concur In all com- by legislature. meant J., who II and the result inju- concurs division pensation may be two cases there HARRIS, J., I, which injury, but from division The without dissents ries. first result, is be who concurs in division I and there can no MeGIVERIN, may be This LeGRAND, ALLBEE, synonymous with accident. may result or it be trivial. It SCHULTZ, JJ., serious dissent. death, or it disability or in immediate UHLENHOPP, (concurring Justice for a disability result or death may not part, dissenting part). injury If first or accident long time. this opin- I II of the court’s concur division trivial, may be a second is then there questions re- ion and in the result. when injury which occurs main, course, did as to whether claimant injury. This is resultant arises. Septem- injury not in until fact discover legisla- injury. by the first If caused not, and, he ber if he whether did ture, single “injury,” by using the word should it sooner in the ex- have discovered speculate allows the courts diligence. ercise of reasonable intended, can, upon the courts injury was authority, arrive at a conclu- reason and I. agree I do with I think division or resultant sion second surrounding circumstances amend- When, however, legisla- was meant. ment of section 85.26 are not sufficient will the causal specifies ture Parrott, overruling warrant our Otis v. control, then the court bound Besides, Iowa 8 N.W.2d 708 language of the statute. words following reasoning in Otis seems irre- to set an intention this statute evidences futable: within limitation a definite only injury The received in the may be commenced proceedings which employment course of his was the exigencies reference to the without 4, 1939, January when the truck later caus- arise from trivial that Cumberland, near Maryland. turned over compensable injury. The statute es a The statute of Iowa states “within two for com- only proceedings to relates years injury causing from the date of the pensation proceed- for but also to death such disability.” death or The statutes disability. ings for “inju- stop other states at the word injury that instance it is the causal each ry.” This afforded the courts of those for the limitation starting is the date saying “injury” a basis for states proceedings within which the “compensable injury.” meant Our stat- be maintained. gives ute opportunity. us no such 1042-43, 8 N.W.2d at 711. 233 Iowa at word interpret “injury” reasonable LeGRAND, (dissenting). Justice “disability to mean when or occurs” ' Divi- “compensable injury” where that word Division I and I from both dissent would majority opinion, stands alone in the statute. But it is not and I sion II of the interpret to so it when the affirm the trial court. reasonable ' Uhlenhopp’s dissent agree I with Justice points I in which he out

to Division R. Donna M. HANSEN and John Parrott, 1039, reasoning v. of Otis Hansen, Appellants, (1943), “irrefutable.” 8 N.W.2d 708 v. However, too, disagree, with Division I II, which turhs on the effect of a Iowa, Appellee. The STATE of 85.26, The Code. amendment to section No. 63278. purpose The of that amendment was make section 85.26 consistent with section Iowa. Supreme Court of 85.23 as far as limitation of actions is con- by deleting language making the cerned Nov. 1980. limitation statute run from the date of the injury. event which caused the The deci- question

sive is whether that amendment prospective retrospective

shall have ef-

fect, issue. although majority skirts that majority

The leans section The

Code, construing statutory support

this amendment. I think it should have

looked, rather, guidance. section 4.5 for prospec give

That section directs that we application [they

tive to statutes “unless expressly retrospective.” made Under

are] rule, must be 1977 amendment only. Not

given prospective application 4:5,

only is this dictated it is also Galloway, of Secrest 168, 176, (1958).

Iowa 795-96 rule, general

Furthermore it is the accord C.J.S.,

ing Compensation, to 100 Workmen’s (1958). majority opinion leads to a curious injured May,

result. Orr was June, petition

filed a for arbitration in 1978. majority says amendment which filing

extended the time for his claim be- 1,1977. July

came effective Under the law date,

as it both statuto- prior existed to that

ry May, claim was barred in Orr’s two after the accident two

months before the amendment became law. Am.Jur.2d, also 51 Limitation of Ac-

tions, section 15 merely

Thus the majority does not extend filing; already

the time for it revives an

extinct claim. I do not believe rule of can, should,

“liberal construction” reach

that far.

ALLBEE, SCHULTZ, McGIVERIN and

JJ., join this dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: Orr v. Lewis Central School District

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Nov 12, 1980

Citation: 298 N.W.2d 256

Docket Number: 64118

Court Abbreviation: Iowa