*1 application “greater rizes to (Tex.Cr.App.1979), at 254-257 possession” proving ownership method of in saying may errs that one have a to all offenses settings. and factual “greater right possession” than another applied. shall be so State’s first when neither is possessory shown to have a of error is sustained. cognizable interest at property law the See also Freeman v. In its second the State (Tex.Cr.App.1986)(Clinton, J., S.W.2d 597 challenges the sufficien- dissenting cy analysis. We do not reach this analysis because the court’s was based erroneously interpreta- an restrictive ONION, P.J., joins. ownership.
tion of Now that we have “greater right”
made it clear that the theo-
ry case, will be utilized in the instant we
will remand for a reassessment of the suf-
ficiency evidence
The judgment of the Court Appeals
reversed and the cause remanded to that ORN, Stanley
court for opin- action consistent with this Carl ion.
CLINTON, Judge, dissenting.
What the recog- still refuses to nize is statutory definition of Texas, ultimately “owner” Legis- settled on En Banc. Code, 1.07(a)(24), lature in V.T.C.A.Penal single, universally applicable is not “a defi- 25, 1988. nition,” as Opinion, characterized in Rehearing 22, Denied June Rather, that definition embraces distinctly three aspects different of “inter-
est in property” “designed the law is
protect,” Davis, parte Ex
at 196 (Tex.Cr.App.1976),viz:
one, property, title to
two, possession property,
three, greater right possession
property.* stated,
Disjunctively “goes the definition scope protected of interests by the
law,” legislative recognition and reflects understanding concept of “the many types possessory
there are inter- property ownership
ests in besides in title.” Davis, parte supra,
Ex at 196. It is an property” may
“interest in entitle one possess right; it as a matter of without “possessory
some kind of per- interest” a “right possession.”
son has no given
For reasons in my dissenting opin- in Compton
ion
* emphasis throughout All is mine unless other- wise noted. *2 days county jail and at a $500
180 fine. sole of appeal appellant, in a
On trial complained that the court erred overruling pre-trial his motion dismiss in Texas Speedy the the information under V.A.C.C.P.). (Article 32A.02, The Trial Act pursuant error advanced point of was Lockhart, Berg, for appellant. Mike 44.02, V.A.C.C.P. Article Lockhart, Horn, Dist. Atty., Van Jeff of sustained The Austin Court Austin, Huttash, Atty., for Robert State’s error and reversed the appellant’s of the court, State. overruling, in judgment of the trial alia, the the State’s contention that
ter
Trial Act
unconstitutional be
Speedy
was
separation
powers
of
cause it
the
II,
forth in Article
Texas
doctrine set
§
PETITION FOR
OPINION ON STATE’S
State, 727
764
Orn v.
S.W.2d
Constitution.
REVIEW
DISCRETIONARY
1987).
(Tex.App. — Austin
DUNCAN, Judge.
ruling
In
of the
on the constitution-
view
by
for
Appellant
convicted
the court
was
peti-
the
State filed its
ality of
statute the
intoxicated,
driving
second offense.
while
granted
We
tion for
review.
days
con
Punishment
assessed
180
was
petition
determine
cor-
the State’s
the
appeal
fine.
finement and
On
$500.00
ruling.
of
rectness of the Court
Appeals, appellant’s
the Austin
of
Procedure,
of
Rule
Appellate
Texas Rules
State, 727
convictionwas reversed. Orn v.
200(c)(2).
(Tex.App.
764
The
S.W.2d
— Austin
State,
(Tex.
In
v.
739
246
S.W.2d
petitioned
State
this Court for review of
Cr.App.1987), majority
a
Court de-
appeals’ holding
the court of
Art.
Speedy
clared the
Trial Act unconstitution-
32A.02,
(hereinafter
Speedy
V.A.C.C.P.
In
entirety.
in its
Meshell this
al and void
Act),
Trial
was constitutional.
enacting
by
announced that
Legislature
Speedy Trial Act the
had violat-
State,
(Tex.
In Meshell v.
State, 505 751 S.W.2d (Tex.Cr. Beddoe v. GADDIS, Preston Robert App.1988); Garcia State, 751 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Wright v. In each of these cases reversed the Court of was *3 except Appeals was affirmed of Texas.
of the trial court remained to be points other of error where situation the In this latter considered. Ap- Court of remanded to the cause was Rehearing Denied June involving appellants’
peals. And in cases review concern- judgments ing the same Appeals and the trial court have
been affirmed. See Chacon (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Taylor turns
Strangely, today, actions, simply recent
aside from our Appeals
remands the cause to the Court pro- and “for further
ceedings opinion.” consistent with
This, despite the fact that this cause is not many
different from cases cited. Pray tell is the what have no choice
do? will except opinion another to write
rejecting appellant’s point of error and af-
firming of the trial court judgment
citing possi- Jefferson, Reyes, etc. After a rehearing appellant
ble motion for
could file a re-
view and the matter would be back before backlog.
this Court and added to our Our in-
staff and this Court be would with the
volved same Where majori- judicial economy
ty’s today? Why finality action is the delayed, kept in
this action and the cause
heavenly appellate orbit?
I would reverse the and affirm I vigorously
of the trial court. dissent to dispose
the failure of the
cause now.
TEAGUE, J., dissent. joins this